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I find your ability to deny the existence of the most central sense of existence we all have as merely some illusion of an ever-changing composite of separate primordial qualia very puzzling.
Once again, for clarity, I am not denying the existence of the "I" but rather, I am saying it is not fundamental.
Perhaps I should have also mentioned the work of Benjamin Libet, since this helps our metaphysical speculations to make contact with the realm of empirical science. Libet's work gives us verifiable evidence for the idea that the sort of self-reflective awareness we understand as conscious experience takes time to construct. This makes perfect sense if, as I am suggesting, consciousness is a higher-level, emergent phenomena. In any given moment of conscious awareness, we are not consciously aware of the neural processes that were essential to the construction of this conscious moment. These unconscious processes determine the qualitative content (the "what-it-feels-like-ness") of the conscious moment.
Libet's works is often used to support the ideas of epiphenomenalism and the illusory nature of free will, but if my concept of "unconscious qualia" is correct, these conclusions are misguided. On my theory, the "qualitative feel" is already there in the unconscious processing, and it is precisely the feeling nature of these unconscious feelings that energizes and loosely guides the causal stream of events constituting the unconscious process as a process. In a very important sense the "self" (in the form of fundamental Subjectivity) is already there in the midst of this consciousness-construction process, but it is the unconscious self. What is not there - i.e., what is being constructed during the "delay" in Libet's experiments - is the self-reflective awareness of the qualitative phenomenal nature of the moment as a phenomenal moment. Being inherently qualitative is fundamental, but the process of objectification (whereby we have conscious awareness of the qualia as the contents of "my" experience) is a higher-level phenomena; the self to which we direct our attention when we introspect the presence of our self is a pattern of qualia. The elements, per se, are more fundamental than the patterns that arise from these elements.
I reject dualistic epiphenomenalism because the patterns are not ontologically distinct from the elements of which they are composed. The patterns are merely a higher-level manifestation of the fundamental elements. This "higher dimensionality" (time/space/motion) that serves as the basis for dynamic pattern-development is an objectified projection of what I've been calling the intrinsic "Subjectivity" of existence.
Despite Libet's findings, I accept a limited from of free will. As I've said before, I didn't choose to exist, and I didn't choose my fundamental nature, but given that I do exist, and given that my nature is what it is (and given the fundamental indeterminism of reality), there is no logical paradox in the idea that my nature might be the nature of a being who has free will - meaning, that my actions are not strictly predetermined by past events, nor are my actions merely random. My actions are indeterminately guided by my qualitative nature, and the interconnectedness of all things (statistical causality rather than strict deterministic causality). Thus, what I do depends, to a large extent, upon what it feel like to be me, and this is the most freedom-of-the-will that we can logically ask for.
Libet's findings are troublesome for a lot of people, but if you think about it, there is really no reason to freak-out about the fact that our self-reflective conscious awareness is constructed over time. Logically, we ought to already know that we can't consciously choose what our choice will be ahead of the choice-making process itself, and we cannot consciously choose the qualitative nature of the conscious moment prior to the moment itself, so if we are thinking clearly we already know that each conscious moment must arise from unconscious processes (unless you believe in strict determinism, in which case you are forced to say that each moment arises by strict laws from the prior moment). Libet's experiment just confirms what we already ought to expect, if we have been keen introspectors. Thus science and introspection both agree: consciousness arises from unconscious processes. All I'm adding is that these unconscious processes must be understood as being, in themselves, qualitative.
Once again, for clarity, I am not denying the existence of the "I" but rather, I am saying it is not fundamental.
Perhaps I should have also mentioned the work of Benjamin Libet, since this helps our metaphysical speculations to make contact with the realm of empirical science. Libet's work gives us verifiable evidence for the idea that the sort of self-reflective awareness we understand as conscious experience takes time to construct. This makes perfect sense if, as I am suggesting, consciousness is a higher-level, emergent phenomena. In any given moment of conscious awareness, we are not consciously aware of the neural processes that were essential to the construction of this conscious moment. These unconscious processes determine the qualitative content (the "what-it-feels-like-ness") of the conscious moment.
You continue to confuse the IN-PROCESS nature of our experience of consciousness with the END PRODUCT of it which cannot and does not reside in the brain. As Libet suggests it must reside in a field (universal substrate) . . . and as McFadden and R. John have posited that is the result of resonance across multiple neurons. The fact that we cannot even "think" about anything or "experience time" until this process occurs in quantum time is difficult to grasp because for us it is instantaneous. But our fleeting glimpses of what we are producing are NOT the end product that resides in the universal field (substrate) of God's consciousness. I will repost my earlier referral to this idea in my Big Brain thread:
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Originally Posted by MysticPhD There are hypotheses supported by existing evidence and scientific principles . . . (not to mention personal experiences). That is significantly more than "we don't know" . . . so our euphemisms for our ignorance need not be the default. We have not discussed the details of McFadden's CEMI field as the measurable correlate to what I call in-process mind (that which is communicable and reveals the existence of consciousness) or Roy John's resonance field recruiting an entire network of neurons into what I call the "composite sequential lump of instantaneous awareness" that we use to think and measure. These provide strong support and in the case of McFadden's CEMI . . . testable indices of our in-process consciousness as a field. Of course . . . I prefer Libet's non-EM field as the repository for the permanent composite (Soul) because of its compatibility with the non-baryonic nature of dark energy.
You continue to confuse the IN-PROCESS nature of our experience of consciousness with the END PRODUCT of it which cannot and does not reside in the brain.
Are you saying that the in-process nature of our experience is conscious (in God's mind?), even though it appears to be unconscious from our perspective? For the moment I will assume that I understand you correctly, and say this: I can grant the possibility that you are right, but I see no good reason to believe it. If a process appears to be unconscious, then why can't you simply accept that it might actually be unconscious? But, I suppose you could ask the reverse question of me: Given that an unconscious "qualitative" process behaves in such a complex "as if" conscious way, why don't I just admit that it is conscious? I think reality could go either way, but aside from some pre-commitment to the existence of some sort of "God's mind" or "conscious field" I just don't see a reason to think that all such processes must be literally conscious. Also, I think there is some evidence that the "as if conscious" nature of unconscious brain processes is limited. Unconscious processes are not just exactly "as if" conscious - there are always some subtle, but very important, differences, and I'd say these differences are attributable to the nature of consciousness itself (as distinct from unconscious processing).
Another problem: If a process in my brain appears to be unconscious from my perspective, but it is actually conscious from some other perspective (i.e., "God's" or "the Field's" perspective), then in what sense is the behavior that results from the process really my choice? How are my actions, in this case, any different from some sort of "demon possession?" Wouldn't my conscious as an individual be like an epiphenomenal puppet on God's string? I have to admit that my own position potentially faces similar (albeit existentialist/non-theistic) mysteries, except in my case there is no "God," or "other" of any sort because all conscious moments are the World's conscious moments. So in my case, the question of the ultimate nature of the origins of "will" are not questions about the individual, as such, but about the World, or "Existence Itself." In other words, I face the existentialist equivalent of someone asking the theist "Who decided what God's nature would be?" or "How is God's next thought determined?" But in good existentialist fashion, I am fine with the existentialist version of this mystery. Theists try to define "God" in such a way that, by definition, these problems are not problems (e.g., God is all-knowing, and all-powerful so God understands and has power over His own ultimate purpose, his own fundamental nature, etc.) but these are ad hoc stipulative definitions that don't really explain anything and really just try to mask the real mystery (like slapping on some perfume rather than taking a bath). I'd rather bathe directly in the mystery and come clean instead of just pretending that somehow "God did it" or "God knows all" etc. provides some sort of answer.
I'd rather know that I don't know than fool myself into thinking that I have answers to questions that ultimately have no answers.
Are you saying that the in-process nature of our experience is conscious (in God's mind?), even though it appears to be unconscious from our perspective? For the moment I will assume that I understand you correctly, and say this: I can grant the possibility that you are right, but I see no good reason to believe it. If a process appears to be unconscious, then why can't you simply accept that it might actually be unconscious?
Because unconscious is a subjective term referring to our ability to directly access it with our consciousness, period. Access is the issue . . . not its character.
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But, I suppose you could ask the reverse question of me: Given that an unconscious "qualitative" process behaves in such a complex "as if" conscious way, why don't I just admit that it is conscious? I think reality could go either way, but aside from some pre-commitment to the existence of some sort of "God's mind" or "conscious field" I just don't see a reason to think that all such processes must be literally conscious. Also, I think there is some evidence that the "as if conscious" nature of unconscious brain processes is limited. Unconscious processes are not just exactly "as if" conscious - there are always some subtle, but very important, differences, and I'd say these differences are attributable to the nature of consciousness itself (as distinct from unconscious processing).
Limited qualitative processing is still qualitative processing and is subjective, period. The single most identifiable attribute of consciousness is "qualitative perception" (Subject-centered perception . . . NOT automatic or non-conscious) containing some evaluative response/reaction. There is no way to cut out that essential "observer/perceiver/subject" and still have the same attribute.
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Another problem: If a process in my brain appears to be unconscious from my perspective, but it is actually conscious from some other perspective (i.e., "God's" or "the Field's" perspective), then in what sense is the behavior that results from the process really my choice? How are my actions, in this case, any different from some sort of "demon possession?" Wouldn't my conscious as an individual be like an epiphenomenal puppet on God's string?
This is a strawman argument tainted by extant "beliefs about" God . . . not the pure existence issue. This would be like trying to explain what the flames of a fire (IF they were actually conscious) became within the universe after leaving our perceptual field. Once our in-process consciousness is produced (the "flames" of consciousness enter the substrate) . . . they acquire the same perspective (locus or point of view) that the Source (God) of the substrate has . . . but there is nothing to suggest they lose their individuality. In fact, the absolutely undeniable uniqueness of our composite life experiences that ultimately comprise our Soul cannot be other than permanently unique.
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I have to admit that my own position potentially faces similar (albeit existentialist/non-theistic) mysteries, except in my case there is no "God," or "other" of any sort because all conscious moments are the World's conscious moments. So in my case, the question of the ultimate nature of the origins of "will" are not questions about the individual, as such, but about the World, or "Existence Itself." In other words, I face the existentialist equivalent of someone asking the theist "Who decided what God's nature would be?" or "How is God's next thought determined?" But in good existentialist fashion, I am fine with the existentialist version of this mystery.
Theists try to define "God" in such a way that, by definition, these problems are not problems (e.g., God is all-knowing, and all-powerful so God understands and has power over His own ultimate purpose, his own fundamental nature, etc.) but these are ad hoc stipulative definitions that don't really explain anything and really just try to mask the real mystery (like slapping on some perfume rather than taking a bath). I'd rather bathe directly in the mystery and come clean instead of just pretending that somehow "God did it" or "God knows all" etc. provides some sort of answer.
This is more of the taint from the extant "beliefs about" God and not part of the existence issue. There are as many unanswered questions using my view as there are with yours . . . just different ones. They are in the "beliefs about" God area . . . not existential. I do not personally ascribe to the ones you assume all theists MUST use as interim answers. I allow those areas to remain unknown (and remain in the "beliefs about" God arena). But at least my view is not irrational and yours is . . . because you are trying to define a qualitative attribute without a perceiver/subject to provide the evaluative component. When you can articulate real differences between a conscious "World Itself" and a God . . . you will begin to see the trap your view inevitably faces by trying to define God in a way that is "non-God."
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I'd rather know that I don't know than fool myself into thinking that I have answers to questions that ultimately have no answers.
We do not disagree here . . . except in our perceptions of which one of us is doing the fooling using euphemisms and other definitional deceptions.
Edit: BTW GW . . . where is our friend Arequipa . . . the atheist equivalent of C34?
Last edited by MysticPhD; 02-22-2011 at 07:28 PM..
[quote=MysticPhD;17989747]Because unconscious is a subjective term referring to our ability to directly access it with our consciousness, period. Access is the issue . . . not its character. Limited qualitative processing is still qualitative processing and is subjective, period. The single most identifiable attribute of consciousness is "qualitative perception" (Subject-centered perception . . . NOT automatic or non-conscious) containing some evaluative response/reaction. There is no way to cut out that essential "observer/perceiver/subject" and still have the same attribute. This is a strawman argument tainted by extant "beliefs about" God . . . not the pure existence issue. This would be like trying to explain what the flames of a fire (IF they were actually conscious) became within the universe after leaving our perceptual field. Once our in-process consciousness is produced (the "flames" of consciousness enter the substrate) . . . they acquire the same perspective (locus or point of view) that the Source (God) of the substrate has . . . but there is nothing to suggest they lose their individuality. In fact, the absolutely undeniable uniqueness of our composite life experiences that ultimately comprise our Soul cannot be other than permanently unique.
This is more of the taint from the extant "beliefs about" God and not part of the existence issue. There are as many unanswered questions using my view as there are with yours . . . just different ones. They are in the "beliefs about" God area . . . not existential. I do not personally ascribe to the ones you assume all theists MUST use as interim answers. I allow those areas to remain unknown (and remain in the "beliefs about" God arena). But at least my view is not irrational and yours is . . . because you are trying to define a qualitative attribute without a perceiver/subject to provide the evaluative component. When you can articulate real differences between a conscious "World Itself" and a God . . . you will begin to see the trap your view inevitably faces by trying to define God in a way that is "non-God."We do not disagree here . . . except in our perceptions of which one of us is doing the fooling using euphemisms and other definitional deceptions.
Edit: BTW GW . . . where is our friend Arequipa . . . the atheist equivalent of C34?[/quote]
Where IS Arequipa?
I hope he is OK. If he's not...that would be terrible. If he is...he won't be after he reads that! Oh MAN! That's too much! LOL!
Keep explaining it Mystic...they'll "get it" eventually. They're smarter than I am...and I understand it.
It's not like a tree falling in the woods making a sound even though there's no one there to hear it...perception necessarily requires there is a perceiver. No perceiver = No perception. At least as far as I can figure it.
Because unconscious is a subjective term referring to our ability to directly access it with our consciousness, period. Access is the issue . . . not its character. Limited qualitative processing is still qualitative processing and is subjective, period. The single most identifiable attribute of consciousness is "qualitative perception" (Subject-centered perception . . . NOT automatic or non-conscious) containing some evaluative response/reaction. There is no way to cut out that essential "observer/perceiver/subject" and still have the same attribute. This is a strawman argument tainted by extant "beliefs about" God . . . not the pure existence issue. This would be like trying to explain what the flames of a fire (IF they were actually conscious) became within the universe after leaving our perceptual field. Once our in-process consciousness is produced (the "flames" of consciousness enter the substrate) . . . they acquire the same perspective (locus or point of view) that the Source (God) of the substrate has . . . but there is nothing to suggest they lose their individuality. In fact, the absolutely undeniable uniqueness of our composite life experiences that ultimately comprise our Soul cannot be other than permanently unique.
This is more of the taint from the extant "beliefs about" God and not part of the existence issue. There are as many unanswered questions using my view as there are with yours . . . just different ones. They are in the "beliefs about" God area . . . not existential. I do not personally ascribe to the ones you assume all theists MUST use as interim answers. I allow those areas to remain unknown (and remain in the "beliefs about" God arena). But at least my view is not irrational and yours is . . . because you are trying to define a qualitative attribute without a perceiver/subject to provide the evaluative component. When you can articulate real differences between a conscious "World Itself" and a God . . . you will begin to see the trap your view inevitably faces by trying to define God in a way that is "non-God."We do not disagree here . . . except in our perceptions of which one of us is doing the fooling using euphemisms and other definitional deceptions.
Edit: BTW GW . . . where is our friend Arequipa . . . the atheist equivalent of C34?
Where IS Arequipa?
I hope he is OK. If he's not...that would be terrible. If he is...he won't be after he reads that! Oh MAN! That's too much! LOL!
Keep explaining it Mystic...they'll "get it" eventually. They're smarter than I am...and I understand it.
It's not like a tree falling in the woods making a sound even though there's no one there to hear it...perception necessarily requires there is a perceiver. No perceiver = No perception. At least as far as I can figure it.
Thanx, GldnRule . . . I will . . . but the "beliefs about" God just seem to get in the way of the existence issue. They are firmly entrenched.
Limited qualitative processing is still qualitative processing and is subjective, period.
Subjective, I agree. But I'm still not sure that subjective necessarily has to imply actually conscious from the perspective of some being. Notice I am not speaking with confidence here. This is a concept I am still trying to work out. Could the "redness of red" as experienced in a moment of conscious perception be in some sense identical to an unconsciously actualized (or perhaps even a mere "potential for") "redness of red"? Clearly there would be "something different" between the conscious and unconscious moments, but couldn't there also be an underlying "sameness of essence" in a conscious and unconscious red quale? Specifically, isn't it possible that the constituents of the conscious and unconscious moments be qualitatively the same up to a point, with the conscious moment adding a little "something extra" in the form of an additional qualitative self-reflective feeling of "self/other" such that in the case of the conscious moment, the "redness of red" becomes objectified in a way that it is not in the unconscious version? In this case the "what it is like" feeling that we associate with consciously experienced qualia would be dependent upon the self-reflective/objectifying nature of consciousness. Without this, the subjective/qualitative nature of the quale could still be the same, but without the conscious "what it is like" feeling of an actual conscious moment. (Yes, I'm grasping for straws here, but I need to push this envelop as far as I possibly can. I still don't see a blatant logical contradiction - just a tough intuitive challenge.) I think I need to define more carefully what "subjectivity" means.
Libet's works is often used to support the ideas of epiphenomenalism and the illusory nature of free will, but if my concept of "unconscious qualia" is correct, these conclusions are misguided. On my theory, the "qualitative feel" is already there in the unconscious processing, and it is precisely the feeling nature of these unconscious feelings that energizes and loosely guides the causal stream of events constituting the unconscious process as a process. In a very important sense the "self" (in the form of fundamental Subjectivity) is already there in the midst of this consciousness-construction process, but it is the unconscious self.
We agree on so much . . . which is why I say you are so close to getting it. What you are calling our unconscious self is correct . . . it is the "inventory" . . . the cumulative self (Soul) is being produced from our in-process consciousness. You assume that it "dissipates" or is somehow "gone" (fleeting thoughts) . . . but it is permanent and resides in the universal field (substrate) connected to us interactively by our "transceiver" brain.
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What is not there - i.e., what is being constructed during the "delay" in Libet's experiments - is the self-reflective awareness of the qualitative phenomenal nature of the moment as a phenomenal moment. Being inherently qualitative is fundamental, but the process of objectification (whereby we have conscious awareness of the qualia as the contents of "my" experience) is a higher-level phenomena; the self to which we direct our attention when we introspect the presence of our self is a pattern of qualia. The elements, per se, are more fundamental than the patterns that arise from these elements.
I reject dualistic epiphenomenalism because the patterns are not ontologically distinct from the elements of which they are composed. The patterns are merely a higher-level manifestation of the fundamental elements. This "higher dimensionality" (time/space/motion) that serves as the basis for dynamic pattern-development is an objectified projection of what I've been calling the intrinsic "Subjectivity" of existence.
This is your error, GW . . . the elements are NOT more fundamental. Our Self IS a higher level of BEING (light-squared) ANDit is ontologically distinct from its constituents because it is an "evaluative composite" "(Subjective) that is totally unique to each of us. There is nothing else in existence that is "what it is like to be" the cumulative GW consciousness.
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Despite Libet's findings, I accept a limited from of free will. As I've said before, I didn't choose to exist, and I didn't choose my fundamental nature, but given that I do exist, and given that my nature is what it is (and given the fundamental indeterminism of reality), there is no logical paradox in the idea that my nature might be the nature of a being who has free will - meaning, that my actions are not strictly predetermined by past events, nor are my actions merely random. My actions are indeterminately guided by my qualitative nature, and the interconnectedness of all things (statistical causality rather than strict deterministic causality). Thus, what I do depends, to a large extent, upon what it feel like to be me, and this is the most freedom-of-the-will that we can logically ask for.
Libet's findings are troublesome for a lot of people, but if you think about it, there is really no reason to freak-out about the fact that our self-reflective conscious awareness is constructed over time. Logically, we ought to already know that we can't consciously choose what our choice will be ahead of the choice-making process itself, and we cannot consciously choose the qualitative nature of the conscious moment prior to the moment itself, so if we are thinking clearly we already know that each conscious moment must arise from unconscious processes (unless you believe in strict determinism, in which case you are forced to say that each moment arises by strict laws from the prior moment). Libet's experiment just confirms what we already ought to expect, if we have been keen introspectors. Thus science and introspection both agree: consciousness arises from unconscious processes. All I'm adding is that these unconscious processes must be understood as being, in themselves, qualitative.
We do not disagree here . . . as long as we correct your misunderstanding to agree with the earlier above "in-process" and "inventory" (cumulative unconscious Self) distinctions.
Subjective, I agree. But I'm still not sure that subjective necessarily has to imply actually conscious from the perspective of some being. Notice I am not speaking with confidence here. This is a concept I am still trying to work out. Could the "redness of red" as experienced in a moment of conscious perception be in some sense identical to an unconsciously actualized (or perhaps even a mere "potential for") "redness of red"? Clearly there would be "something different" between the conscious and unconscious moments, but couldn't there also be an underlying "sameness of essence" in a conscious and unconscious red quale? Specifically, isn't it possible that the constituents of the conscious and unconscious moments be qualitatively the same up to a point, with the conscious moment adding a little "something extra" in the form of an additional qualitative self-reflective feeling of "self/other" such that in the case of the conscious moment, the "redness of red" becomes objectified in a way that it is not in the unconscious version? In this case the "what it is like" feeling that we associate with consciously experienced qualia would be dependent upon the self-reflective/objectifying nature of consciousness. Without this, the subjective/qualitative nature of the quale could still be the same, but without the conscious "what it is like" feeling of an actual conscious moment. (Yes, I'm grasping for straws here, but I need to push this envelop as far as I possibly can. I still don't see a blatant logical contradiction - just a tough intuitive challenge.) I think I need to define more carefully what "subjectivity" means.
There is no way to account for the entirely unique character of the subjectivity of each unique individual human consciousness in your presumed generic primordial qualia. Come on over to the God side, GW . . . it is unavoidable . . . and you needn't buy into all the extant "beliefs about" God to do so.
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