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Well I would suggest 'the special relationship' is one of a political contrived nature and more of appearance than actuality, although of course speaking the same lingo and certain cultural similarities does grease the wheels somewhat, but self interest will always win out in the end.
My own impression has been that "Special Relationship" refers to politicians. Which would imply that when the politicians lack similar views, or don't get along, there is no Special Relationship.
Well I would suggest 'the special relationship' is one of a political contrived nature and more of appearance than actuality, although of course speaking the same lingo and certain cultural similarities does grease the wheels somewhat,but self interest will always win out in the end.
I will re-post this from History forum;
"My first question at the Treasury of an international
character was our American debt. At the end of the war, the
European Allies owed the United States about ten thousand
million dollars, of which four thousand million were owed by
Britain. On the other hand, we were owed by the other
Allies, principally by Russia, seven thousand million dollars.
In 1920, Britain had proposed an all-round cancellation of
war debts. This involved, on paper at least, a sacrifice by us
of about seven hundred and fifty million pounds sterling. As
the value of money has halved since then, the figures could
in fact be doubled. No settlement was reached. On August
1, 1922, in Mr. Lloyd George’s day, the Balfour Note had
declared that Great Britain would collect no more from her
debtors, Ally or former enemy, than the United States
collected from her. This was a worthy statement. In
December of 1922, a British delegation, under Government,
visited Washington; and as the result Britain agreed to pay
the whole of her war debt to the United States at a rate of
interest reduced from five to three and one-half per cent,
irrespective of receipts from her debtors.
This agreement caused deep concern in many instructed
quarters, and to no one more than the Prime Minister
quarters, and to no one more than the Prime Minister
himself. It imposed upon Great Britain, much impoverished
by the war in which, as she was to do once again, she had
fought from the first day to the last, the payment of thirty-
five millions sterling a year for sixty-two years. The basis of
this agreement was considered, not only in this island, but
by many disinterested financial authorities in America, to be
a severe and improvident condition for both borrower and
lender. “They hired the money, didn’t they?” said President
Coolidge. This laconic statement was true, but not
exhaustive. Payments between countries which take the
form of the transfer of goods and services, or still more of
their fruitful exchange, are not only just but beneficial.
Payments which are only the arbitrary, artificial transmission
across the exchange of such very large sums as arise in
war finance cannot fail to derange the whole process of
world economy. This is equally true whether the payments
are exacted from an ally who shared the victory and bore
much of the brunt or from a defeated enemy nation. The
enforcement of the Baldwin-Coolidge debt settlement is a
recognisable factor in the economic collapse which was
presently to overwhelm the world, to prevent its recovery
and inflame its hatreds.
The service of the American debt was particularly difficult to
render to a country which had newly raised its tariffs to
even higher limits, and had already buried in its vaults
nearly all the gold yet dug up. Similar but lighter settlements
were imposed upon the other European Allies. The first
result was that everyone put the screw on Germany. I was
in full accord with the policy of the Balfour Note of 1922,
and had argued for it at the time; and when I became
Chancellor of the Exchequer I reiterated it, and acted
accordingly. I thought that if Great Britain were thus made
not only the debtor, but the debt-collector of the United
States, the unwisdom of the debt collection would become
apparent at Washington. However, no such reaction
followed. Indeed the argument was resented. The United
States continued to insist upon its annual repayments from
Great Britain.
It, therefore, fell to me to make settlements with all our
Allies which, added to the German payments which we had
already scaled down, would enable us to produce the thirty-
five millions annually for the American Treasury. Severest
pressure was put upon Germany, and a vexatious régime
of international control of German internal affairs was
imposed. The United States received from England three
payments in full, and these were extorted from Germany by
indemnities on the modified Dawes scale."
W. Churchill "The Gathering Storm."
So you are most likely correct.
If it happened before, it will happen again.
"My first question at the Treasury of an international
character was our American debt. At the end of the war, the
European Allies owed the United States about ten thousand
million dollars, of which four thousand million were owed by
Britain. On the other hand, we were owed by the other
Allies, principally by Russia, seven thousand million dollars.
In 1920, Britain had proposed an all-round cancellation of
war debts. This involved, on paper at least, a sacrifice by us
of about seven hundred and fifty million pounds sterling. As
the value of money has halved since then, the figures could
in fact be doubled. No settlement was reached. On August
1, 1922, in Mr. Lloyd George’s day, the Balfour Note had
declared that Great Britain would collect no more from her
debtors, Ally or former enemy, than the United States
collected from her. This was a worthy statement. In
December of 1922, a British delegation, under Government,
visited Washington; and as the result Britain agreed to pay
the whole of her war debt to the United States at a rate of
interest reduced from five to three and one-half per cent,
irrespective of receipts from her debtors.
This agreement caused deep concern in many instructed
quarters, and to no one more than the Prime Minister
quarters, and to no one more than the Prime Minister
himself. It imposed upon Great Britain, much impoverished
by the war in which, as she was to do once again, she had
fought from the first day to the last, the payment of thirty-
five millions sterling a year for sixty-two years. The basis of
this agreement was considered, not only in this island, but
by many disinterested financial authorities in America, to be
a severe and improvident condition for both borrower and
lender. “They hired the money, didn’t they?” said President
Coolidge. This laconic statement was true, but not
exhaustive. Payments between countries which take the
form of the transfer of goods and services, or still more of
their fruitful exchange, are not only just but beneficial.
Payments which are only the arbitrary, artificial transmission
across the exchange of such very large sums as arise in
war finance cannot fail to derange the whole process of
world economy. This is equally true whether the payments
are exacted from an ally who shared the victory and bore
much of the brunt or from a defeated enemy nation. The
enforcement of the Baldwin-Coolidge debt settlement is a
recognisable factor in the economic collapse which was
presently to overwhelm the world, to prevent its recovery
and inflame its hatreds.
The service of the American debt was particularly difficult to
render to a country which had newly raised its tariffs to
even higher limits, and had already buried in its vaults
nearly all the gold yet dug up. Similar but lighter settlements
were imposed upon the other European Allies. The first
result was that everyone put the screw on Germany. I was
in full accord with the policy of the Balfour Note of 1922,
and had argued for it at the time; and when I became
Chancellor of the Exchequer I reiterated it, and acted
accordingly. I thought that if Great Britain were thus made
not only the debtor, but the debt-collector of the United
States, the unwisdom of the debt collection would become
apparent at Washington. However, no such reaction
followed. Indeed the argument was resented. The United
States continued to insist upon its annual repayments from
Great Britain.
It, therefore, fell to me to make settlements with all our
Allies which, added to the German payments which we had
already scaled down, would enable us to produce the thirty-
five millions annually for the American Treasury. Severest
pressure was put upon Germany, and a vexatious régime
of international control of German internal affairs was
imposed. The United States received from England three
payments in full, and these were extorted from Germany by
indemnities on the modified Dawes scale."
W. Churchill "The Gathering Storm."
So you are most likely correct.
If it happened before, it will happen again.
This is not the place to debate history, but since you introduced it, it deserves a reply. This will be my only comment here on this matter.
It's a two way street. it's also believed that Churchill opposed the Normandy landings, (where the US lost almost double the number of soldiers than the UK) preferring to focus on the Mediterranean, for both military and non military reasons. That attitude by Churchill, (win the war, plus accrete the most glory to himself), hardened US attitude toward debt repayment. Churchill was seen as attempting to play a double game. That view of the UK in general, was later reinforced by Eden during Suez, when he ignored Eisenhower's warnings not to invade.
In a way, U.S. retrenchment may lead to a more relaxed time in UK/US relations. A United States in an isolationist mood will tend to abstain from wars over seas.
Don't the French have a similar view? Lumping English speaking countries together as Les Anglo-Saxons?
I would guess the world is seen differently through the eyes of Russians.
Canada has way too many Ukrainians to consider it "Anglo," and I suspect they simply don't remember about the existence of Australia all together, since it's not even on their radar.
So when they say "Anglo-Saxons," they imply UK/US first and utmost.
This is not the place to debate history, but since you introduced it, it deserves a reply. This will be my only comment here on this matter.
It's a two way street. it's also believed that Churchill opposed the Normandy landings, (where the US lost almost double the number of soldiers than the UK) preferring to focus on the Mediterranean, for both military and non military reasons. That attitude by Churchill, (win the war, plus accrete the most glory to himself), hardened US attitude toward debt repayment. Churchill was seen as attempting to play a double game. That view of the UK in general, was later reinforced by Eden during Suez, when he ignored Eisenhower's warnings not to invade.
What the "Normandy landings" have got to do with that passage?
It was about the consequences of the WWI, not WWII.
The "indemnities of the modified Dawes scale" were referring to this -
If you're free to use the specific example of the Dawes plan as illustrative of the larger point on the tenuousness of the special relationship, then everyone else is free to use other specific examples of the special relationship in support or otherwise.
Churchill didn't coin the term "special relationship until 22 years after the Dawes plan, so Dawes was not conceived in either the aura or era of the special relationship.
Citing Churchill's negative view in 1950, about US attitude twenty five years earlier, toward Dawes as justification for the tenuousness of the special relationship Churchill envisaged is just revisionism, to say nothing of chronologically challenged.
The US has several "special relationships" by far the most important is with Canada. No more of this.
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