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Curious what people think about how history would have differed if SA Chief Ernst Rohm had instead initiated and succeeded in asssssinating Hitler and his close subordinates in 1934 and so if that had happened i'm assuming that would have pitted the SA vs the army (Reichswehr) in a civil war as the high command (Von Blomberg) despised the SA correct?
So could the German army possibly defeated the much larger SA force and also what was Vice Chancellor Von Papen's relationship with Rohm as i'm guessing that he would have supported the army as to have himself promoted as Chancellor (was that in the german constitution then?)?
Secondly if Rohm had succeeded in becoming German dictator did he have grandeur plans similar to those of Hitler for Germany to expand as to eventually go to war with it's European neighbors and/or the Soviet Union or do you think that he'd just settled on just being dictatorial head of state and just concentrated on internal issues?
Curious what people think about how history would have differed if SA Chief Ernst Rohm had instead initiated and succeeded in asssssinating Hitler and his close subordinates in 1934 and so if that had happened i'm assuming that would have pitted the SA vs the army (Reichswehr) in a civil war as the high command (Von Blomberg) despised the SA correct?
The army definitely despised the SA. The distrust and conflict between the army and the SA was one of the few things holding Hitler back that led to the Night of the Long Knives, which was basically house cleaning to placate the army that went with Hitler in exchange for getting rid of the SA. Rohm basically envisioned a situation where the SA became the army.
If Hitler had been deposed by the SA and Rohm was assuming a leadership position, there is no doubt that there would have been a civil war between the army and the SA.
Quote:
So could the German army possibly defeated the much larger SA force and also what was Vice Chancellor Von Papen's relationship with Rohm as i'm guessing that he would have supported the army as to have himself promoted as Chancellor (was that in the german constitution then?)?
The army had less then 100k troops and the SA numbered nearly 3 million at that point and also had weapons caches. Many SA members were also formerly in the army and there were many minor officers (like Rohm) as well. I doubt the army could have beaten them, they weren't quite the unorganized mob the general staff thought them to be. Then we have the question about whether or not the average soldier would have fought against them.
I have no idea about Von Papen. He supported Hitler because he thought they could control Hitler and from what I know he was in the "get rid of Rohm and the SA camp". I imagine that in the event of Hitler's death Von Papen would have been made Chancellor, but I don't know if there was a specific succession in the Weimar Consitution.
Quote:
Secondly if Rohm had succeeded in becoming German dictator did he have grandeur plans similar to those of Hitler for Germany to expand as to eventually go to war with it's European neighbors and/or the Soviet Union or do you think that he'd just settled on just being dictatorial head of state and just concentrated on internal issues?
This one is tough to guess at. Rohm had far more military experience then Hitler did, so I don't know if he would have been as reckless or forceful in daring the Allies as Hitler was.
What we do know is that Rohm and the SA in general, took the "socialist" part of National Socialism far more seriously then others did. Goebbels was of the same mindset before Hitler swayed him over, so I could see Goebbels sticking around as a prominent figure as he started his work in the NSDAP in the more "socialist" camp. Rohm believed in tearing down the old aristocracy and redistributing their land and wealth. He believed that the state should own all major industries and resources, etc. The SA men used to be referred to as "beefsteaks" they were brown on the outside, but red on the inside. I imagine given Rohms and the SA's general political and economic views, they would have had their hands full in Germany far longer then Hitler did.
Roehm would have evolved into something similar to Italian Fascism, and Roehm was not crazy so he would have survived far longer than Hitler. He had military experience, I believe he was training the army of Bolivia when they called him and he came from the Freikorps. As to the "likes" and "dislikes" of the Army, they did not like Hitler much either. I do not think that Roehm would have started a WW.
Roehm would have evolved into something similar to Italian Fascism, and Roehm was not crazy so he would have survived far longer than Hitler. He had military experience, I believe he was training the army of Bolivia when they called him and he came from the Freikorps. As to the "likes" and "dislikes" of the Army, they did not like Hitler much either. I do not think that Roehm would have started a WW.
Rohm joined the army early in his life, was twice wounded severely (once in the face at Chanot Wood, the source of the numerous scars on his face and once in the chest at Verdun) in WW1 and ended the war with the rank of captain and a recipient of the Knight's Cross First Class. He ended the war as a staff officer (where he contracted and almost died from Spanish flu) and remained in the army after the war as an adjutant in the Freikorps. He became active in what would become the NSDAP early on and was involved in the Beer Hall Putsch, but had his sentence suspended. He resigned his military commission and entered politics where he served in the Reichstag until the party lost seats in the 1925 election and he lost his seat. He then set about building the Frontbann as a replacement for the SA (Hitler has asked him to do so), but then had a falling out with Hitler and Ludendorff over integrating the Frontbann into the SA. Rohm then left political life and accepted the posting to Bolivia to train their forces in 1928. He was forced to flee to the German Embassy during the Bolivian revolt in 1930 and that's where he received a phone call from Hitler asking him to come back to Germany because Hitler needed him.
The issue with the Reichswehr, or more so the leading figures within it, was that they themselves were divided over whether to fully support Hitler or not once he became chancellor in January 1933. The younger officers were more sympathetic to the Nazi cause. They had no love for the Weimar Republic, wished to see the restrictions of Versailles cast aside, hoped to see a genuine societal change in Germany itself, and believed Hitler was the man who could make it all happen. More senior officers wished to see an authoritarian regime emerge in which the political power and influence the military once had, would be restored. When Hitler spoke of the army and the party as being the “twin pillars” upon which the National Socialist state would be built, many senior officers responded positively. But just as many were still suspicious of Hitler, largely because of the unruly and often illegal behavior of the SA.
Two men within the Reichswehr were ultimately responsible for pushing the organization toward support of Hitler. They were the Minister of Defense, General Werner von Blomberg, and chief of the Bureau of Ministers, Colonel Walter von Reichenau. In many respects, von Blomberg was a man searching for a cause, flitting back and forth between different political ideologies until finally becoming enraptured by the aura of Hitler and all he seemed to represent. Von Reichenau, on the other hand, was a cold, calculating opportunist who saw in Hitler the chance to advance his dream of seeing the army returned to its former place of glory. The Nazi Party and its ideology held no interest for him. He was able to easily look beyond its excesses and view it as little more than a mass political movement, no different than any other, which could serve as a potential vehicle to get the Reichswehr where he wanted it to go. Reichenau believed if he could tie the Reichswehr to Hitler, he would be able to marginalize the power of both the Party and the SA.
While Hitler, Blomberg, and Reichenau were moving in the same direction, albeit with completely different agendas, one key figure in the Nazi movement, Ernst Rohm, stood opposite them. Rohm did not grasp the full extent of the game that Hitler was playing or the concept of achieving power through “legal revolution”. What he saw instead was a betrayal of the National Socialist cause. The spoils of victory that should have been showered upon the loyal men of the SA and Rohm himself, were instead being awarded to those who were supposed to have been the enemies of National Socialism; the aristocrats, bankers, industrialists, conservative politicians, and the generals. Rohm did not blame Hitler personally for what was taking place. His anger was directed toward the “stupid and dangerous” individuals Hitler had surrounded himself with such as Goering, Goebbels, Hess, and Himmler. They were the ones that stood in the way of the “real” revolution.
Rohms’ views were shared by many within the leadership ranks of the SA. As Rohm increasingly gave public voice to the bitterness and displeasure inside the SA, a call for a “second revolution” started to circulate. Rohm began to target his speeches and anger toward the Reichswehr. He was convinced that the only way forward to achieving meaningful change was to subordinate the armed forces to SA control, or more accurately, to his personal command. He spoke of how “the gray cliffs must inevitably be swallowed by the brown tide” and readied plans to combine the Reichswehr and SA into a popular militia. In December of 1933 at a conference of army commanders, Blomberg raised concerns about “attempts within the SA to establish an army of its own”. Concern grew into alarm when Blomberg received a memorandum in mid January 1934 from Rohm that stated “the entire realm of national defense falls within the purview of the SA”. A second memorandum followed which said “I now consider the Reichswehr to be only a military training school for the German people. The conduct of war and therefore also the mobilization of troops are henceforth the concerns of the SA”. Both Blomberg and Reichenau had heard enough and went to Hitler demanding that a “clear decision” be made with respect to Rohm, the SA, and the Reichswehr.
In an attempt to ease the tension, Hitler called Blomberg, Reichenau, and Rohm together at Reichswehr headquarters on February 28, 1934. Rohm was forced to sign a document which affirmed the independence of the Reichswehr from SA and Nazi Party control and relegated the SA to the role of providing supplemental military training. As far as Hitler, Blomberg, and Reichenau were concerned, the matter was ended. But Rohm thought otherwise. He railed against Hitler’s disloyalty, calling him a “ridiculous corporal” and stating “If it can’t be done with Hitler, we’ll do it without him”. Rohms’ comments were relayed to Hitler, who simply remarked “We’ll just let this ripen”. As Rohm continued to act as if the meeting of February 28th never took place, Hitler did nothing. This was either because Hitler was unconcerned with Rohms’ antics or simply believed the tension between the SA and the Reichswehr would keep both sides in check until he was ready to make his next move. But there were many who surrounded Hitler, both within the Party hierarchy, and even in the upper levels of the SA, who were not content to sit back and wait. An operation (ultimately led by Reinhard Heydrich) was put into motion to eliminate the threat posed by Rohm. Evidence, both real and manufactured, was presented to Hitler, but still, he did nothing.
The event which finally tipped the scales against Rohm and spurred Hitler to action, came from a completely unexpected quarter. The hapless Vice Chancellor, Franz von Papen, the man who boasted he would “tame” Hitler but instead wound up on the outside looking in, smelled blood in the water. If the SA and Rohm revolted against Hitler and the Nazi Party, von Papen felt confident he could get President von Hindenburg to declare a state of emergency, oust Hitler, and regain the chancellorship for himself. In early June 1934, Hindenburg seemed to indicate as much to von Papen when he told him “Things are going badly, Papen. Try to restore order”. Emboldened to act, von Papen gave a forceful speech at the University of Marburg on June 17, 1934 in which he condemned Nazi extremism and the violence which it spawned, the curtailment of free speech, and “the unnatural, totalitarian demands” of the state.
The unexpected attack from von Papen stunned Hitler. Was it some sort of indication that Hindenburg, the Reichswehr, and the still potent conservative forces represented by Papen were in collusion to bring Hitler and the Nazis down, all because of Rohm and the SA? Hitler couldn’t be sure, but then again he couldn’t afford to ignore a possible warning sign either. Hitler finally gave the green light to eliminate the Rohm “threat“. The Reichswehr were told through back channels to be on guard against an SA “operation”. Party officials were sent secret reports which stated the SA were going to stage a revolt. In key military districts, the commanders were told that no matter what, the SS would stand on the side of the authorities and should be armed if need be. The stage was set, and on June 30, 1934, “Operation Kolibri” or “Hummingbird” was launched against Rohm, his closest supporters, and everyone else who could possibly challenge Hitler’s hold on power. When it was over, all threats, real and imagined, to both Hitler and the Reichswehr, were successfully eliminated.
Now, considering the background of what really happened, let’s tackle the “what ifs”:
Quote:
Originally Posted by 6 Foot 3
Curious what people think about how history would have differed if SA Chief Ernst Rohm had instead initiated and succeeded in assassinating Hitler and his close subordinates in 1934 and so if that had happened I'm assuming that would have pitted the SA vs the army (Reichswehr) in a civil war as the high command (Von Blomberg) despised the SA correct?
Much would depend on who, if any of Hitler’s inner circle managed to escape an attempted “purge” by Rohm. If even one of them, especially Goering, Himmler, or Goebbels, survived, a major split would erupt in the Nazi Party itself between those who supported Hitler and those backing Rohm. Keep in mind that while there were certainly many within the SA that were absolutely loyal to Rohm and his line of thinking, so to were there at least an equal number who were blindly obedient to Hitler. Thus there is no guarantee that the whole of the SA would have followed Rohm in any attempt he made to launch a “second revolution” to topple the government. Consider to that while the total strength of the SA in the fall of 1933 was nearly 3 million men, a good chunk of that had been gained by the forced absorption of other right wing paramilitary groups such as the “Stahlhelm”, into its ranks. These men, many of whom were First World War veterans, would likely have broken away from the SA and not followed Rohm if he revolted either.
Given these factors, I see a civil war within the Nazi Party taking place at the same time as one in Germany. Those who supported Hitler, the Reichswehr, the other nationalist and conservative parties who were in coalition with the Nazis, their related paramilitary elements, and those average Germans who were opposed to what Rohm represented, would have (in my opinion) banded together to stop him. In that scenario, I don’t see a Rohm/SA revolt prevailing. What would have happened to the Nazi Party is a bit harder to say. My guess though is that while it may have survived the internal strife, it would have emerged much weaker (especially without Hitler leading it) and unable to regain enough popular support to be a serious power player in German politics.
Quote:
Originally Posted by 6 Foot 3
So could the German army possibly defeated the much larger SA force and also what was Vice Chancellor Von Papen's relationship with Rohm as I'm guessing that he would have supported the army as to have himself promoted as Chancellor (was that in the German constitution then?)
As stated above, if all the groups I mentioned were able to come together, Rohm’s revolt fails and the SA would be suppressed. Von Papen most definitely would have supported the Reichswehr. As to whether he would have assumed the chancellorship, I’d say probably, though it wouldn’t be a sure thing. President von Hindenburg unquestionably had a great personal affection for von Papen. That being said, when von Papen had been chancellor back in 1932, he failed miserably in trying to construct a workable government coalition and lasted in office a mere five months. Would Hindenburg have given him another crack at it? I don’t know.
Under the Weimar Constitution, the chancellor was to be elected by a majority vote in the Reichstag and then officially appointed by the President. Generally speaking, the chancellor would come from the majority political party in the Reichstag. Unfortunately, the “proportional representation” scheme set up under the Weimar Constitution virtually guaranteed that no single party would ever be able to attain an absolute majority. Historically speaking, this led to a situation where Hindenburg (as was his right under the constitution) would appoint as chancellor the individual who could put together a coalition of parties to obtain a working majority in the Reichstag. Or, if he felt like it, could appoint anyone he wanted as chancellor, even if that person was not affiliated with any party represented in the Reichstag. Most importantly though, the President, under Article 48, could declare a national emergency, suspend civil liberties, call out the army to restore order, and essentially rule by decree like a dictator.
A full scale revolt by the SA would no doubt have caused Hindenburg to immediately invoke Article 48. The only catch is that he would have to inform the Reichstag that he was doing so and they then had the right to either uphold or veto his decision. If they vetoed it, then he could invoke Article 25 and dissolve the Reichstag and call for new elections within sixty days. So for at least sixty days, Hindenburg could still rule Germany as he saw fit until such time as a new government was in place. My guess is though, no one, not even the Nazis, would have voted against Hindenburg’s use of Article 48 to suppress Rohm and the SA.
Quote:
Originally Posted by 6 Foot 3
Secondly if Rohm had succeeded in becoming German dictator did he have grandeur plans similar to those of Hitler for Germany to expand as to eventually go to war with it's European neighbors and/or the Soviet Union or do you think that he'd just settled on just being dictatorial head of state and just concentrated on internal issues?
Personally, I do not believe that even if Rohm had succeeded that he would have been the one to lead Germany. Instead, I think you would have seen the re-emergence of Gregor Strasser, the one time leader of the left wing of the Nazi Party and once the second most powerful figure in the Party behind Hitler. He and Rohm were much more in sync with the direction they felt the Nazi revolution was supposed to have gone instead of where Hitler took it. If the two were able to reach a power sharing agreement, with Rohm as head of the armed forces and Strasser as head of state, a Germany adhering more closely to the socialist based “Twenty-Five Points” program of the early Nazi Party would likely have emerged. Unfortunately, Strasser was almost as anti-Semitic as Hitler so while you may not have seen death camps in Strasser’s Germany, Jews still would have been subjected to considerable persecution under his regime.
In foreign policy matters, there would have been both similarities and differences. Strasser, like Hitler, believed in the restoration of the borders of Germany as they existed in 1914. Again, as Hitler did, he wished to see all the Germans of central Europe (including Austria, the Sudetenland, and South Tyrol) reunited within a Great German Reich. Unlike Hitler, who had no interest in such things, Strasser envisioned the reestablishment of Germany’s colonial empire in Africa. Lastly, Strasser believed that, instead of being enemies, a truly National Socialist Germany had a natural ally in the Soviet Union. The real enemy of Germany, as far as Strasser was concerned, was Poland.
The issue with the Reichswehr, or more so the leading figures within it, was that they themselves were divided over whether to fully support Hitler or not once he became chancellor in January 1933. The younger officers were more sympathetic to the Nazi cause. They had no love for the Weimar Republic, wished to see the restrictions of Versailles cast aside, hoped to see a genuine societal change in Germany itself, and believed Hitler was the man who could make it all happen. More senior officers wished to see an authoritarian regime emerge in which the political power and influence the military once had, would be restored. When Hitler spoke of the army and the party as being the “twin pillars” upon which the National Socialist state would be built, many senior officers responded positively. But just as many were still suspicious of Hitler, largely because of the unruly and often illegal behavior of the SA.
Two men within the Reichswehr were ultimately responsible for pushing the organization toward support of Hitler. They were the Minister of Defense, General Werner von Blomberg, and chief of the Bureau of Ministers, Colonel Walter von Reichenau. In many respects, von Blomberg was a man searching for a cause, flitting back and forth between different political ideologies until finally becoming enraptured by the aura of Hitler and all he seemed to represent. Von Reichenau, on the other hand, was a cold, calculating opportunist who saw in Hitler the chance to advance his dream of seeing the army returned to its former place of glory. The Nazi Party and its ideology held no interest for him. He was able to easily look beyond its excesses and view it as little more than a mass political movement, no different than any other, which could serve as a potential vehicle to get the Reichswehr where he wanted it to go. Reichenau believed if he could tie the Reichswehr to Hitler, he would be able to marginalize the power of both the Party and the SA.
While Hitler, Blomberg, and Reichenau were moving in the same direction, albeit with completely different agendas, one key figure in the Nazi movement, Ernst Rohm, stood opposite them. Rohm did not grasp the full extent of the game that Hitler was playing or the concept of achieving power through “legal revolution”. What he saw instead was a betrayal of the National Socialist cause. The spoils of victory that should have been showered upon the loyal men of the SA and Rohm himself, were instead being awarded to those who were supposed to have been the enemies of National Socialism; the aristocrats, bankers, industrialists, conservative politicians, and the generals. Rohm did not blame Hitler personally for what was taking place. His anger was directed toward the “stupid and dangerous” individuals Hitler had surrounded himself with such as Goering, Goebbels, Hess, and Himmler. They were the ones that stood in the way of the “real” revolution.
Rohms’ views were shared by many within the leadership ranks of the SA. As Rohm increasingly gave public voice to the bitterness and displeasure inside the SA, a call for a “second revolution” started to circulate. Rohm began to target his speeches and anger toward the Reichswehr. He was convinced that the only way forward to achieving meaningful change was to subordinate the armed forces to SA control, or more accurately, to his personal command. He spoke of how “the gray cliffs must inevitably be swallowed by the brown tide” and readied plans to combine the Reichswehr and SA into a popular militia. In December of 1933 at a conference of army commanders, Blomberg raised concerns about “attempts within the SA to establish an army of its own”. Concern grew into alarm when Blomberg received a memorandum in mid January 1934 from Rohm that stated “the entire realm of national defense falls within the purview of the SA”. A second memorandum followed which said “I now consider the Reichswehr to be only a military training school for the German people. The conduct of war and therefore also the mobilization of troops are henceforth the concerns of the SA”. Both Blomberg and Reichenau had heard enough and went to Hitler demanding that a “clear decision” be made with respect to Rohm, the SA, and the Reichswehr.
In an attempt to ease the tension, Hitler called Blomberg, Reichenau, and Rohm together at Reichswehr headquarters on February 28, 1934. Rohm was forced to sign a document which affirmed the independence of the Reichswehr from SA and Nazi Party control and relegated the SA to the role of providing supplemental military training. As far as Hitler, Blomberg, and Reichenau were concerned, the matter was ended. But Rohm thought otherwise. He railed against Hitler’s disloyalty, calling him a “ridiculous corporal” and stating “If it can’t be done with Hitler, we’ll do it without him”. Rohms’ comments were relayed to Hitler, who simply remarked “We’ll just let this ripen”. As Rohm continued to act as if the meeting of February 28th never took place, Hitler did nothing. This was either because Hitler was unconcerned with Rohms’ antics or simply believed the tension between the SA and the Reichswehr would keep both sides in check until he was ready to make his next move. But there were many who surrounded Hitler, both within the Party hierarchy, and even in the upper levels of the SA, who were not content to sit back and wait. An operation (ultimately led by Reinhard Heydrich) was put into motion to eliminate the threat posed by Rohm. Evidence, both real and manufactured, was presented to Hitler, but still, he did nothing.
The event which finally tipped the scales against Rohm and spurred Hitler to action, came from a completely unexpected quarter. The hapless Vice Chancellor, Franz von Papen, the man who boasted he would “tame” Hitler but instead wound up on the outside looking in, smelled blood in the water. If the SA and Rohm revolted against Hitler and the Nazi Party, von Papen felt confident he could get President von Hindenburg to declare a state of emergency, oust Hitler, and regain the chancellorship for himself. In early June 1934, Hindenburg seemed to indicate as much to von Papen when he told him “Things are going badly, Papen. Try to restore order”. Emboldened to act, von Papen gave a forceful speech at the University of Marburg on June 17, 1934 in which he condemned Nazi extremism and the violence which it spawned, the curtailment of free speech, and “the unnatural, totalitarian demands” of the state.
The unexpected attack from von Papen stunned Hitler. Was it some sort of indication that Hindenburg, the Reichswehr, and the still potent conservative forces represented by Papen were in collusion to bring Hitler and the Nazis down, all because of Rohm and the SA? Hitler couldn’t be sure, but then again he couldn’t afford to ignore a possible warning sign either. Hitler finally gave the green light to eliminate the Rohm “threat“. The Reichswehr were told through back channels to be on guard against an SA “operation”. Party officials were sent secret reports which stated the SA were going to stage a revolt. In key military districts, the commanders were told that no matter what, the SS would stand on the side of the authorities and should be armed if need be. The stage was set, and on June 30, 1934, “Operation Kolibri” or “Hummingbird” was launched against Rohm, his closest supporters, and everyone else who could possibly challenge Hitler’s hold on power. When it was over, all threats, real and imagined, to both Hitler and the Reichswehr, were successfully eliminated.
Now, considering the background of what really happened, let’s tackle the “what ifs”:
Much would depend on who, if any of Hitler’s inner circle managed to escape an attempted “purge” by Rohm. If even one of them, especially Goering, Himmler, or Goebbels, survived, a major split would erupt in the Nazi Party itself between those who supported Hitler and those backing Rohm. Keep in mind that while there were certainly many within the SA that were absolutely loyal to Rohm and his line of thinking, so to were there at least an equal number who were blindly obedient to Hitler. Thus there is no guarantee that the whole of the SA would have followed Rohm in any attempt he made to launch a “second revolution” to topple the government. Consider to that while the total strength of the SA in the fall of 1933 was nearly 3 million men, a good chunk of that had been gained by the forced absorption of other right wing paramilitary groups such as the “Stahlhelm”, into its ranks. These men, many of whom were First World War veterans, would likely have broken away from the SA and not followed Rohm if he revolted either.
Given these factors, I see a civil war within the Nazi Party taking place at the same time as one in Germany. Those who supported Hitler, the Reichswehr, the other nationalist and conservative parties who were in coalition with the Nazis, their related paramilitary elements, and those average Germans who were opposed to what Rohm represented, would have (in my opinion) banded together to stop him. In that scenario, I don’t see a Rohm/SA revolt prevailing. What would have happened to the Nazi Party is a bit harder to say. My guess though is that while it may have survived the internal strife, it would have emerged much weaker (especially without Hitler leading it) and unable to regain enough popular support to be a serious power player in German politics.
As stated above, if all the groups I mentioned were able to come together, Rohm’s revolt fails and the SA would be suppressed. Von Papen most definitely would have supported the Reichswehr. As to whether he would have assumed the chancellorship, I’d say probably, though it wouldn’t be a sure thing. President von Hindenburg unquestionably had a great personal affection for von Papen. That being said, when von Papen had been chancellor back in 1932, he failed miserably in trying to construct a workable government coalition and lasted in office a mere five months. Would Hindenburg have given him another crack at it? I don’t know.
Under the Weimar Constitution, the chancellor was to be elected by a majority vote in the Reichstag and then officially appointed by the President. Generally speaking, the chancellor would come from the majority political party in the Reichstag. Unfortunately, the “proportional representation” scheme set up under the Weimar Constitution virtually guaranteed that no single party would ever be able to attain an absolute majority. Historically speaking, this led to a situation where Hindenburg (as was his right under the constitution) would appoint as chancellor the individual who could put together a coalition of parties to obtain a working majority in the Reichstag. Or, if he felt like it, could appoint anyone he wanted as chancellor, even if that person was not affiliated with any party represented in the Reichstag. Most importantly though, the President, under Article 48, could declare a national emergency, suspend civil liberties, call out the army to restore order, and essentially rule by decree like a dictator.
A full scale revolt by the SA would no doubt have caused Hindenburg to immediately invoke Article 48. The only catch is that he would have to inform the Reichstag that he was doing so and they then had the right to either uphold or veto his decision. If they vetoed it, then he could invoke Article 25 and dissolve the Reichstag and call for new elections within sixty days. So for at least sixty days, Hindenburg could still rule Germany as he saw fit until such time as a new government was in place. My guess is though, no one, not even the Nazis, would have voted against Hindenburg’s use of Article 48 to suppress Rohm and the SA.
Personally, I do not believe that even if Rohm had succeeded that he would have been the one to lead Germany. Instead, I think you would have seen the re-emergence of Gregor Strasser, the one time leader of the left wing of the Nazi Party and once the second most powerful figure in the Party behind Hitler. He and Rohm were much more in sync with the direction they felt the Nazi revolution was supposed to have gone instead of where Hitler took it. If the two were able to reach a power sharing agreement, with Rohm as head of the armed forces and Strasser as head of state, a Germany adhering more closely to the socialist based “Twenty-Five Points” program of the early Nazi Party would likely have emerged. Unfortunately, Strasser was almost as anti-Semitic as Hitler so while you may not have seen death camps in Strasser’s Germany, Jews still would have been subjected to considerable persecution under his regime.
In foreign policy matters, there would have been both similarities and differences. Strasser, like Hitler, believed in the restoration of the borders of Germany as they existed in 1914. Again, as Hitler did, he wished to see all the Germans of central Europe (including Austria, the Sudetenland, and South Tyrol) reunited within a Great German Reich. Unlike Hitler, who had no interest in such things, Strasser envisioned the reestablishment of Germany’s colonial empire in Africa. Lastly, Strasser believed that, instead of being enemies, a truly National Socialist Germany had a natural ally in the Soviet Union. The real enemy of Germany, as far as Strasser was concerned, was Poland.
I believe that if Roehm prevailed we would see more Fascist face of Nazism in Germany.
In foreign policy matters, there would have been both similarities and differences. Strasser, like Hitler, believed in the restoration of the borders of Germany as they existed in 1914. Again, as Hitler did, he wished to see all the Germans of central Europe (including Austria, the Sudetenland, and South Tyrol) reunited within a Great German Reich. Unlike Hitler, who had no interest in such things, Strasser envisioned the reestablishment of Germany’s colonial empire in Africa. Lastly, Strasser believed that, instead of being enemies, a truly National Socialist Germany had a natural ally in the Soviet Union. The real enemy of Germany, as far as Strasser was concerned, was Poland.
Great contribution TonyT, I enjoyed reading it as always.
Quote:
Originally Posted by rebel12
I believe that if Roehm prevailed we would see more Fascist face of Nazism in Germany.
Can you clarify what you mean by "more Fascist face"?
Roehm believed in the Socialist part of National Socialist even to disbanding the Army and Police and using his People Army the SA. He would probably been closer to Stalin but no one could turn their back on Stalin either
Roehm wanted to arm his Peoples Army, the SA and put the Regular Army under its control. He wantedd to Nationalize much of the private industry, he was a Socialist and a homosexual. About the only one of the inner circle who would have survived a Roehm Coup would have been Goebbels.
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