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Yet sabermetrics tells us that most dugout decisions barely have any effect on the outcome of the game.1 Furthermore, if we look at effects on player performance, it’s evident that hardly any manager can distinguish himself from his counterparts. Based on my analysis, 95 percent of all managers are worth somewhere between -2 and +2 wins per 162 games. Last year alone, 21 batters and seven pitchers were worth more to their teams than nearly every manager of the last 112 years.2
Billy Beane's been (indirectly) saying this for 15 years; the best managers "play the percentages", which is why you don't notice them unless they have the occasional screw-up. Like the Taoist philosophy which states the best leader is the one you don't know exists.
I've been watching baseball since the early sixties and in all that time, I can identify two managers where I could actually see that what they were doing made a difference. They are Billy Martin and Earl Weaver.
Martin compiled an unassailable track record which established that he could turn around a bad ballclub faster and more certainty than anyone else. Everywhere he went, the clubs that hired him instantly improved by a great deal, and also imploded within a few years leading to Martin's firing. Martin came with a lot of baggage and was ultimately going to self destruct, but if you wanted a rapid turnaround of a poor baseball team, he was the man to hire.
Weaver was someone who appeared to intuitively grasp a number of the principles later established by Sabermetrics regarding the actual odds of in game moves. He recognized that the most efficient possible offense involved walks and home runs, he figured out that the steep horseshoe shape of Memorial Stadium in Baltimore meant that balls hit down the lines would ricochet toward center, allowing him to bunch his outfielders closer together and play slower power hitters in the corners, like John Lowenstein or Kenny Singleton. Weaver maintained that the most important part of the manager's job was simply using Spring Training to identify the twenty five guys who could cover all of the advanced platooning, defensive specialties etc. Whatever was needed in a game, Weaver would have someone on the bench who could execute it. Weaver was also a pioneer in keeping records of specific hitter/pitcher outcomes, If some banjo slap hitter happened to be able to pound a Nolan Ryan or a Fergie Jenkins, Weaver would have that guy in the lineup when the pitcher in question started. Weaver's teams were always greater than the sum of their parts.
As for in game strategy...I first became a Strat-O-Matic player in the sixties, and returned to it in the mid '70's. You play about 100 games as a Strat manager and it becomes apparent that the decisions about bunting, stealing, hit and run, bringing in the infield etc, are about as likely to backfire as work and results are largely a matter of luck in execution.
Weaver was also a pioneer in keeping records of specific hitter/pitcher outcomes, If some banjo slap hitter happened to be able to pound a Nolan Ryan or a Fergie Jenkins, Weaver would have that guy in the lineup when the pitcher in question started.
Belanger was the Orioles' everyday shortstop between 1968 and 1978. He started against everybody. The Roenicke/Lowenstein platoon would perhaps have been a better example, and moreso the way in which and why Weaver decided to start the likes of Jim Dwyer or Terry Crowley.
Belanger was the Orioles' everyday shortstop between 1968 and 1978. He started against everybody. The Roenicke/Lowenstein platoon would perhaps have been a better example, and moreso the way in which and why Weaver decided to start the likes of Jim Dwyer or Terry Crowley.
Indeed, Belanger was the everyday shortstop. Was using him more as the example of otherwise weak hitter doing well against Ryan. Roenicke/Lowenstein is probably the best example of Weaver doing the platoon thing. Use of Dwyer/Crowley is a good one, too.
Right, but the thread is about managers and whether they make actual contributions to team performance. Belanger did have a good record against Ryan and it was often commented on at the time. Not as good as Randy Velarde and his .408 lifetime average against Randy Johnson, but still very good. But Belanger would have started all those games whether Ryan had been pitching or not, so there's not much credit to Weaver in it. I do think Weaver got more out of his bench than most would have given the same people, and that he got more out of his 25-man roster as a whole than most would have. He angered some of his players and encouraged others, but he got his people into situations where they could succeed and did his darnedest to help them succeed when they got there. That's pretty much all a manager can really do.
Belanger was the Orioles' everyday shortstop between 1968 and 1978. He started against everybody. The Roenicke/Lowenstein platoon would perhaps have been a better example, and moreso the way in which and why Weaver decided to start the likes of Jim Dwyer or Terry Crowley.
Belanger typically batted 9th in the order since he was the weakest hitter in the lineup. Against pitchers where he had had abnormal success, Weaver would move him up to the # 1 or # 2 slot in the order.
And..contrary to popular belief, Belanger did not own Nolan Ryan. Did you read the linked article?
Quote:
So . . . Belanger owning Ryan? How can that be? Well . . . turns out it can't be. With the assistance of my longtime companion baseball-reference.com, I looked up Mark Belanger's career numbers against Nolan Ryan. And they looked pretty much what you'd expect Mark Belanger's career numbers to look like against Nolan Ryan:
58 plate appearances, 45 at-bats, 11 hits, one extra-base hit (a double), .244 average, .267 slugging percentage, .357 OBP.
Meh. Save for a very respectable OBP -- he walked seven times against Ryan -- those are pretty Belangerian numbers.
Belanger did hit unusually well against Bert Blyleven and Denny McClain..those are the guys Weaver would move him up in the order against.
And of course it wasn't just Belanger, Weaver kept track of everyone on the teams individual match-ups. A good hitter who couldn't handle a certain starter would sit that day or nor enter the game until after that starter was gone.
And..contrary to popular belief, Belanger did not own Nolan Ryan. Did you read the linked article?
Did you read all of the article?
I can attest Belanger's success against Ryan is no myth. The confusion comes from the fact you are looking merely at Mark's career stats against Nolan, while everyone else is looking at just the final seven years of Belanger's career:
26 PA's
20 AB's
5 Walks
6 Hits
.300 BA
.423 OBP!!!!!!!!
Also in 1973 Ryan was just six outs away from back-to-back no-hitters when guess who - Mark Belanger - broke up Nolan's bid for history.
When you get a chance you might want to read "Earl Weaver's Art of Managing a Baseball Team", this is what he had to say about Belanger: "Usually Mark was our ninth hitter. His lifetime batting average was in the .220's but he was the best hitter I had against Ryan. Mark hit over .350 against Ryan's fastball. Mark had a short stroke and did very well against fastball pitchers. He was also 7-for-13 against Jim Kern and a .300 hitter against Goose Gossage. Mark's history against Ryan was the reason I moved him up in the lineup. Mark also had a good eye and could draw a walk. Ryan's control can be shaky, and if you give him a chance he might beat himself with walks."
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