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The Navy uses the same complement of officers and sailors on every watch, no matter what the rotation. True, it's not the same compliment of crew as at battle stations, but that would be over-kill. Officers of the Deck are generally well qualified, with some exceptions.
Collisions at sea are far more numerous than I would have expected. I was a JOD on two near misses where the Captain had the deck and the con. We were rotating the screen at high speeds in both cases, where every ship maneuvers radically to take the fastest route to the new screen station (position, relative to the guide ship). Near misses happen frequently, and don't count. Collisions with commercial shipping are far more numerous in the USN and most COs adopt a safety-first to avoiding them. You site them on radar or visually from as far as possible and assume, at least at night, there's no one awake on the bridge and no signalmen on deck, and that it takes them 10 miles to make a 90 deg. turn and even longer to slow to a dead stop. You adjust your course continually so that closest point of approach is at least 1 nautical mile, or 2,000 yards. Problems can occur inside about 5,000 yards when one ship follows the rules of the road and the other one does not.
In very busy shipping lanes this can be very hard and **** happens, but courts of inquiry or court martials almost always find human error to be the cause.
I can't even begin to guess how this collision happened.
I talked once to a Spruance Captain who laid down the law that if the job wasn't getting done, he would put more khaki on to it (ie, watch). More khaki means less time between watches.
Equally so, a Farragut Captain pointed out that more watch sections, such as in port, is the way one gets flooded spaces. Too few people about for too much that needs to be done, even when things do go right, which they often don't.
Take a simple evolution, moving the ship from the weapons station back down to the docks. It's a fool's folly to think that all one needs is one boiler to do it even though that is possible. Said Farragut Captain said that you do it at least with two boilers on line (one in each fire room?), the anchor manned, the boat crew ready. If you have a man overboard in restricted maneuvering, you send the boat after him. If you lose the main boiler, you have a backup to still feed your props. If you lose both boilers, you can drop anchor to stop you from running aground.
It's when Captains think they don't need all those preps that they are asking for trouble....and probably get it.
A few things.
First of all, people have noted how over the years, manning on ships have gotten less and less as technology has improved. Manning of a Brooke class FFG, 228 at 2600/3400 tons. Manning of Perry class FFG, 176 at 4100/4200 tons. The story goes on and on, from Navy ships to civilian cargo ships (remember a Proceedings article I read around 1979 where a merchant tanker Captain was noting the same thing).
Are we seeing when too few becomes too much?
Secondly, keep in mind that there can be times when even the well qualified aren't at their best. I remember one watch where the OOD was green to the gills with sea sickness while I was totally unaffected (but not as qualified as him).
Finally, for all the perfection we might want to think of out there, it is probably wise to remember that when it comes down to it, it comes down to people. There can be the stellar, the binges, the somewhere in between, and it is more likely they are all together than the stellar to one ship, etc, etc..
I saw a destroyer having to limp into Mayport with its towing hawser wrapped around one of its screws because someone thought that, instead of tying lines of increasing diameter together (as described in the Naval Ships' Technical Manuals), they took the easy way and used a brass key hook........which parted under tension and snarled the screw.
Ever read https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Iowa_turret_explosion (Immediate Aftermath)? There are things to make one cringe........but it does rather show how the thinking can be on a ship. What's important, to look good or the ultimate truth and considering the things I've seen to make a ship look good, we-ll........ (that is to say, if someone was focusing more on their "day job" than their "watch job", I would not be surprised).
All in all, don't look at this with the question of "How could this happen with all this technology, with all these people?" because to do so means that one is looking at it with the eye of a laboratory situation, how it is described to work on paper.
I talked once to a Spruance Captain who laid down the law that if the job wasn't getting done, he would put more khaki on to it (ie, watch). More khaki means less time between watches.
Equally so, a Farragut Captain pointed out that more watch sections, such as in port, is the way one gets flooded spaces. Too few people about for too much that needs to be done, even when things do go right, which they often don't.
.
I do believe that more "khaki" meant more of the senior leadership, officers and senior NCO's supervising the watch instead of taking a sleep cycle. Since they wore khaki uniforms while the lower ranked sailors wore the blue jeans. You can only go so far with that until those leaders start making mistakes from being over tasked
I do believe that more "khaki" meant more of the senior leadership, officers and senior NCO's supervising the watch instead of taking a sleep cycle. Since they wore khaki uniforms while the lower ranked sailors wore the blue jeans. You can only go so far with that until those leaders start making mistakes from being over tasked
I thought that too...but I was Air Force with only one tour in a Navy unit, so defer to TamaraSavannah on that Navy jargon.
I talked once to a Spruance Captain who laid down the law that if the job wasn't getting done, he would put more khaki on to it (ie, watch). More khaki means less time between watches.
Equally so, a Farragut Captain pointed out that more watch sections, such as in port, is the way one gets flooded spaces. Too few people about for too much that needs to be done, even when things do go right, which they often don't.
Take a simple evolution, moving the ship from the weapons station back down to the docks. It's a fool's folly to think that all one needs is one boiler to do it even though that is possible. Said Farragut Captain said that you do it at least with two boilers on line (one in each fire room?), the anchor manned, the boat crew ready. If you have a man overboard in restricted maneuvering, you send the boat after him. If you lose the main boiler, you have a backup to still feed your props. If you lose both boilers, you can drop anchor to stop you from running aground.
It's when Captains think they don't need all those preps that they are asking for trouble....and probably get it.
A few things.
First of all, people have noted how over the years, manning on ships have gotten less and less as technology has improved. Manning of a Brooke class FFG, 228 at 2600/3400 tons. Manning of Perry class FFG, 176 at 4100/4200 tons. The story goes on and on, from Navy ships to civilian cargo ships (remember a Proceedings article I read around 1979 where a merchant tanker Captain was noting the same thing).
Are we seeing when too few becomes too much?
Secondly, keep in mind that there can be times when even the well qualified aren't at their best. I remember one watch where the OOD was green to the gills with sea sickness while I was totally unaffected (but not as qualified as him).
Finally, for all the perfection we might want to think of out there, it is probably wise to remember that when it comes down to it, it comes down to people. There can be the stellar, the binges, the somewhere in between, and it is more likely they are all together than the stellar to one ship, etc, etc..
I saw a destroyer having to limp into Mayport with its towing hawser wrapped around one of its screws because someone thought that, instead of tying lines of increasing diameter together (as described in the Naval Ships' Technical Manuals), they took the easy way and used a brass key hook........which parted under tension and snarled the screw.
Ever read https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Iowa_turret_explosion (Immediate Aftermath)? There are things to make one cringe........but it does rather show how the thinking can be on a ship. What's important, to look good or the ultimate truth and considering the things I've seen to make a ship look good, we-ll........ (that is to say, if someone was focusing more on their "day job" than their "watch job", I would not be surprised).
All in all, don't look at this with the question of "How could this happen with all this technology, with all these people?" because to do so means that one is looking at it with the eye of a laboratory situation, how it is described to work on paper.
Reality tends to be not quite like that.
Thanks for your real world insights.
"In theory, there is no difference between theory and practice. In practice, there is."
The thing is that one is not at war and therefore, can't take those other actions to prevent others from getting so close.
A and B.
A: In a simulation back in the Cold War on the opening of a hot war, a Soviet Kashin DDG was one mile off the starboard bow of the USS New Jersey. When a many heard that scenario, again it was the question of "My God, how did he get so close?".
In the simulation it was, "Five minutes ago, we weren't at war. Five minutes ago, our diplomats were racing to find an answer and he could be that close. But now, we are at war and he is that close.".
B: That collision between the Kitty Hawk and the Victor essentially had the Victor surfacing under the bow of the carrier and by all rights of fate, it should have sent him the bottom. Instead, it was just pushed aside with a glancing blow.
To this day I wonder.........if that Soviet Captain became a believer.
Interesting quote from that article.
Quote:
The Sea of Japan has long been the scene of near-collisions and collisions. In the late 1960's, Soviet destroyers frequently sailed close to American ships and occasionally collided. That led to the 1972 agreement covering incidents.
USS Fitzgerald stayed on collision course despite warning – ACX Crystal captain
TOKYO - A US warship struck by a container vessel in Japanese waters failed to respond to warning signals or take evasive action before a collision that killed seven of its crew, according to a report of the incident by the Philippine cargo ship's captain.
Multiple US and Japanese investigations are underway into how the guided missile destroyer USS Fitzgerald and the much larger ACX Crystal container ship collided in clear weather south of Tokyo Bay in the early hours of June 17.
In the first detailed account from one of those directly involved, the cargo ship's captain said the ACX Crystal had signaled with flashing lights after the Fitzgerald "suddenly" steamed on to a course to cross its path.
The container ship steered hard to starboard (right) to avoid the warship, but hit the Fitzgerald 10 minutes later at 1:30 a.m., according to a copy of Captain Ronald Advincula's report to Japanese ship owner Dainichi Investment Corporation that was seen by Reuters.
In earlier times, these things were even more common. In the 1960s, the Australian aircraft carrier Melbourne twice t-boned destroyers - one Australian, one American - cutting them cleanly in half each time. Of course, in today's sophisticated environment of GPS and blanket satellite coverage and electronic monitors, this should not happen. But when humans are involved, there will always be errors. They can be reduced but never eliminated entirely.
That is what the skipper will be held responsible for.
Yep CO career is done regardless of what they find.
I was on the USS Eisenhower when we hit a Spanish tanker pulling into port in 1988. We had a tug pushing us up the river. The captain was giving a tour and was not on the bridge. Wind hit the carrier and pushed us into the tanker which was anchored. CO was relieved even though he wasn't on the bridge.
I talked once to a Spruance Captain who laid down the law that if the job wasn't getting done, he would put more khaki on to it (ie, watch). More khaki means less time between watches.
Equally so, a Farragut Captain pointed out that more watch sections, such as in port, is the way one gets flooded spaces. Too few people about for too much that needs to be done, even when things do go right, which they often don't.
Take a simple evolution, moving the ship from the weapons station back down to the docks. It's a fool's folly to think that all one needs is one boiler to do it even though that is possible. Said Farragut Captain said that you do it at least with two boilers on line (one in each fire room?), the anchor manned, the boat crew ready. If you have a man overboard in restricted maneuvering, you send the boat after him. If you lose the main boiler, you have a backup to still feed your props. If you lose both boilers, you can drop anchor to stop you from running aground.
It's when Captains think they don't need all those preps that they are asking for trouble....and probably get it.
A few things.
First of all, people have noted how over the years, manning on ships have gotten less and less as technology has improved. Manning of a Brooke class FFG, 228 at 2600/3400 tons. Manning of Perry class FFG, 176 at 4100/4200 tons. The story goes on and on, from Navy ships to civilian cargo ships (remember a Proceedings article I read around 1979 where a merchant tanker Captain was noting the same thing).
Are we seeing when too few becomes too much?
Secondly, keep in mind that there can be times when even the well qualified aren't at their best. I remember one watch where the OOD was green to the gills with sea sickness while I was totally unaffected (but not as qualified as him).
Finally, for all the perfection we might want to think of out there, it is probably wise to remember that when it comes down to it, it comes down to people. There can be the stellar, the binges, the somewhere in between, and it is more likely they are all together than the stellar to one ship, etc, etc..
I saw a destroyer having to limp into Mayport with its towing hawser wrapped around one of its screws because someone thought that, instead of tying lines of increasing diameter together (as described in the Naval Ships' Technical Manuals), they took the easy way and used a brass key hook........which parted under tension and snarled the screw.
Ever read https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Iowa_turret_explosion (Immediate Aftermath)? There are things to make one cringe........but it does rather show how the thinking can be on a ship. What's important, to look good or the ultimate truth and considering the things I've seen to make a ship look good, we-ll........ (that is to say, if someone was focusing more on their "day job" than their "watch job", I would not be surprised).
All in all, don't look at this with the question of "How could this happen with all this technology, with all these people?" because to do so means that one is looking at it with the eye of a laboratory situation, how it is described to work on paper.
Reality tends to be not quite like that.
In trying to understand this collision and explain it, the only somewhat reasonable conclusion that I can come to is that the Bay was full of all kinds of vessels of all sizes. In that case, had you drawn a 2,000 yard circle around the USS Fitzgerald, there would have been numerous contacts on the bridge radar screen(s) inside and outside that circle. All of the lookouts on the bridge wings, the bow and the stern, as well as bridge would have become overloaded with information, some of it conflicting. Avoiding small fishing vessels, close in and dead ahead, that might not have appeared on the radar or the human eye, could have pre-occupied all these people. Remember it was night-time. It would have become an OOD nightmare. In that kind of situation, anything can happen.
But why was the CO asleep in his day-time stateroom at night in busy waters and not awake, in control of the deck and the con? That is unthinkable to me. Every CO I worked under in my time gave us clear orders to call him to the bridge, under these circumstances; and, in similar situations we countered in WestPac, would have already been there, knowing in advance that things might get tricky. That would not necessarily have saved the day, either.
As it stands, now, with reports that the merchant ship gave signal warnings to the Fitzgerald before the collision and then radically (if that's possible for a container ship of its size) maneuvered to avoid the collision, the OOD must have screwed up mentally multiple times.
What's your guess: an internal casualty that occupied his mind, hangover,.....?
But why was the CO asleep in his day-time stateroom at night in busy waters and not awake, in control of the deck and the con? That is unthinkable to me. Every CO I worked under in my time gave us clear orders to call him to the bridge, under these circumstances; and, in similar situations we countered in WestPac, would have already been there, knowing in advance that things might get tricky. That would not necessarily have saved the day, either.
I was on 2 carriers, both had CO stateroom off the bridge but they rarely stayed there. They were small and not really comfortable so they usually slept downstairs.
I think we don't have all the info in yet. I can't imagine the navy ignoring warning messages, if there were any. We shall see when they investigate it all.
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