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I am curious to know your thoughts. Also, why is it that after they were conquered, there were no massive resistance movements? Did the average French citizen possess firearms like is common in the U.S. today?
As I understand it, on the eve of war, France had one of the largest standing armies in the world. They mobilized more than 8 million men prior to Hitler's invasion. This was larger than the German Army. Also, the German Army was only 25% mechanized. The French Army's tactics and commanders were inferior to their German counterparts, which contributed greatly to the rapid German victory. I am still puzzled as to why they did not put up a better fight.
I don't think there was ever a will to fight. WWI had been years of frustrating stalemate trench warfare. It was too recent and France did not want to put itself through that again.
No one expected he Panzers to be able to go thru then Ardennes as they did so it was not adaquatley defended. The Germans used a small force to make the French and British think they would hit the Maginot Line, BUT instead flanked em and came in behind. With most of the french army surrounded they had little choise BUT to declare Paris an open city [did so to spare civilian lives].
The British forces were pushed back to Dunkirk where MOST made it home to England minus weapons and equipment.
Just a note when McAurther pulled out of Manilla in 1942 he ALSO declared it an open city so the Japanese would not shell it and save civilian lives.
They DID have a Resistance BUT Germans retaliated with killing 10 innocents for every German soldier killed. They also had to be carefull as many French were scared ofthe germans and would report them. [ as was in EVERY occupation.]
Very true. The strategy they used was good if the Germans had planned on following the same book, but they didn't. What is questionable is why the French did not extend it across the Belgian border. They had already proven, in WW1 when they came in via Belgium, that it was a successful strategy. I think the French were also just very tired. Remember WW1 was fought IN France. French civilians took the brunt of civilian war losses. Shelling was far from accurate. Given that they were surrounded, is it wrong to not fight to the death anyway?
But the interesting thing is, the French Resistance did leave a mark. People did resist in quiet ways despite the cost. Most didn't, its true, but one of the interesting facets of it is that without them the successes might have been few. French resistance fighters, when not resisting, just looked like anyone else. With a population which was just trying to get by they could blend in. Their success was not in being daring and public, but in the aide they gave the allies and in the quiet things. And the demoralizing effect of random destruction on individuals. They could not have won the war themselves, but they did a measurable job of helping make it possible, as did the silent just get through the day people where they could hide in plain sight.
There were a number of reasons not to extend the Maginot line to the coast. Mainly, doing that would have meant abandoning the low countries which the allies were not about to do. The Maginot line's purpose was to channel the German forces into Belgium/Netherlands. There the mobile allied armies would meet them together with Belgian/Dutch troops. It should also be remembered that the Belgians had their own formidable fortifications. Thus, building the Maginot line along the Belgian border was unnecessary and didn't at all fit with the allied war plans.
It is NOT the case that the French didn't think the Germans could go around the Maginot line. They WANTED the Germans to do that, and they were fully prepared for that eventuality.
What they were not prepared for was that the Germans could come through the Ardennes forest. In fact, even many German officers didn't think that was possible. The German attack there was basically a gamble and one that happened to pay off. They attacked at the weakest part of the Allied line and were able to break through.
Many have already mentioned the various reasons why the French lost, such as outdated doctrine, defense-oriented thinking and so on. All of those are valid. But let me offer one that hasn't been mentioned (I think). The highly mobile warfare of WWII was very unforgiving to mistakes. In the First World War, if a breakthrough occurred, attacking side lacked the ability to move quickly to seize the opportunity. All troops moved at basically the same speed and the defenders would simply pool back while collecting reinforcements. In WWII, on the other hand, mobile armored and motorized units could cover nearly 100 miles in a day. Flanking and enveloping maneuvers became far easier to execute. Air power helped neutralize the defenders ability to react to breakthroughs by attacking their lines of communication.
Thus, I think, once the Germans broke through at the Meuse river, no amount of "will to resist" would have made much difference. As has been mentioned, France isn't that big. With the French First Army, along with the BEF, trapped in a huge pocket on the coast, the battle was over.
Operational history of WWII showed that defense was actually harder than offense. And mistakes on defense often lead to entire formations getting surrounded and destroyed. This was just as true for the French as for everyone else - the Russians and even the Germans themselves.
Several posters have already highlighted the main reason. I would like to expand a little on what MrMarbles was saying from the German perspective.
I think the first thing people need to realize is that the Germans never expected to win as rapidly as they did. Their plan was not to conquer all of France in six weeks, but to strike a blow against the French and British forces when they were weakest to gain a major advantage in territory and force the battle to happen, once again, in France. People like to paint this battle as an example of "blitzkrieg" and it is, but the difference is that this battle was the genesis of blitzkrieg tactics, not the other way around. Meaning, this is the first time the Germans used something that could be called "blitzkrieg" and it was a controversial move and a major gamble.
Early German planning had called for an attack similar to the Schlieffen Plan. It was expected that the Germans would sieze the Low Countries and some areas of northern France at the expense of 500,000 German casualties. They would then need a full year to refit before resuming operations in 1942. Basically, no one, not even Hitler, thought that victory would come so easily. Many on the German staff also felt and cautioned Hitler that long term victory was most likely improbable against France and Britain. This mood led Hitler to continually examine and rethink the plan. It is also what allowed a daring new strategy from Manstein (sub-authored anonymously by Guderian) to reach Hitler. This plan called for a concentrated armor thrust through the Ardennes, hinging on Sedan, towards the Channel coast with the goal of cutting off the BEF and bulk of French forces from the rest of the country.
This plan was roundly criticized by many generals on the German staff as being too risky. The supply routes were poor, the flanks of the armored columns would be exposed and if the French and British did not react exactly as the Germans theorized they would, the entire operation would fail and Germany would lose virtually all of their armored and mechanized formations and would not have the power to force their advance in the north. So, Hitler was left with a choice. Roll the dice on an unproven plan and strategy or take the predictable approach which was almost guaranteed to not achieve victory. Hitler took the option that gave him a chance for victory, though it carried the greatest risk of defeat.
The Germans attacked precisely where the French were weakest. They used their air power to devastating effect to blow open a hole in the defenses around Sedan. The French realized where the attack was coming from and began to shift reinforcement, but felt the battle around Sedan and the Meuse would develop slower and they would have more time to respond. They almost did, had Rommel and Guderian not ignored their orders. As the French defenses collapsed Guderian and Rommel siezed the initiative and ignored direct orders to halt their units and wait for their infantry to catch up. Over a 5 day period (May 12th - 17th), Rommel and Guderian dashed across France, ignoring orders to stop and destroying whatever hastily dispatched French reserves were sent their way. They drove towards the Channel until they literally ran out of fuel.
It is reported that Hitler was having an absolute fit over their movements as was the German general staff. The cream of the panzer force was now operating with long extended flanks, out of fuel and their infantry support was far behind them. Had a concentrated counter-attack happened now, the German armored columns would have been decimated. As it was, the rapid movement of the German forces caused the French and British commands to be thrown into total chaos. They had piecemeal committed their reserves to stopping the advance and the reserves had been destroyed. Had Rommel and Guderian followed their orders to hold, it would have given the French and British time to establish a better defensive line. Ultimately, the course of the battle hinged on Guderian and Rommel following their gut and exploiting the breakthrough, while constantly ignoring direct orders from Hitler to stop.
With the panzer forces temporarily stopped, the French attempted some minor attacks on their flanks, led by an armored force under the command of de Gaulle. They met with limited success and were repulsed. On the 19th the Germans began moving again, having been resupplied and the infantry having gotten close. The panzer divisions then began a dash to the coast to complete the cut-off of the bulk of the British and French troops in the Low Lands. At this point, the French had expended their strategic reserve and the bulk of their army was trapped in the north. Thus begins the most important moment of the war.
The French commander Gamelin had ordered a plan for a strike against the German armored columns, that had created a corridor through France. French forces would attack northward from the Somme, while troops in the Low Countries would attack to the south. The goal to linkup the two forces and cut off the German panzer armies. The problem was that Gamelin was removed from command on May 19th and his successor Weygand delayed any operations for three days before deciding to settle on Gamelin's original plan. The delay led to a further deterioration in the pocket and the Belgians had essentially resigned to defeat, the French commander was killed in a car accident and the British had decided to withdrawal. No major attack happened, but the Battle of Arras did result when some British units just happened to strike south while some French units were attacking north. Though the battle did little damage, it through the German high command into a tizzy over the threat that was posed to the armor.
Weygans reorganized his defences and put up a strong fight, stopping the main German thrusts against Paris. French morale was at an all time high and they were adjusting their tactics to great effect. However, it was too little too late and they were being overwhelmed. The Channel ports fell as Rommel drove all the way to Cherbourg and the Germans gradually wore down the French defenses leading to their surrender.
What is interesting about that retelling is to highlight the exact moments the French failed to win. See, that is ultimately the interesting part to me. It was not that the Germans achieved victory, but that the French failed to prevent them from doing it. In terms of force distribution and planning before the invasion, the French had predicted precisely where the Germans would have attacked had they not taken the huge gamble of going through the Ardennes. The first mistake was not recognizing the scale of the Ardennes attack. The second was not executing Gamelins "corridor attack" sooner and cutting off the panzer divisions. Germany gambled greatly and essentially only won because Guderian and Rommel exceeded orders, which led to greater gains and more delays on the part of the French commanders as the situation was developing very rapidly.
The "Battle of France 1940" is routinely played out as a war game in both amateur and actual war college scenarios. In almost every case, more decisive action by the Allies in halting the German advance leads to a French and British victory. The Germans rolled the dice big and only won on the aggressiveness of their local commanders and the hesitancy of the French.
Yup.
The basic reason why France fell was because the French thought they were going to fight the new war the same way as the last war.
That is the most common failure when it comes to war preparations. When a nation gets hit hard by a war, they always expect a repetition of that combat.
When the Germans were forced to scrap all their old weaponry after the Treaty of Versailles, their military had the opportunity to re-build a completely different army with advanced weaponry and brand new strategic tactics. They also had a young officer corps who was determined not to repeat the mistakes of the past.
Only the winners of World War I thought it was the war to end all wars. The losers had different ideas about that one.
Thanks for the replies. I am also interested to know why France's approach was so much different than Germany's approach during the interwar years. I guess I am looking at the total numbers of troops to start the war. France had an edge in ground troops. Germany obviously had a huge edge in air power. I am just curious to know why France's interwar policies were so drastically different especially with their attitudes knowing that it was only a matter of time before Germany rebuilds. I know France was depressed economically after WW1, but so was Germany.
The French people actually put up a massive and heroic resistance, but they did it covertly. They saved many, many Jewish and Allied lives, acting without any support from anyone but each other.
I suggest you watch "Inglorious Basterds" if you haven't already. It pays some respect to the French resistance. They were true heroes.
Thanks for the replies. I am also interested to know why France's approach was so much different than Germany's approach during the interwar years. I guess I am looking at the total numbers of troops to start the war. France had an edge in ground troops. Germany obviously had a huge edge in air power. I am just curious to know why France's interwar policies were so drastically different especially with their attitudes knowing that it was only a matter of time before Germany rebuilds. I know France was depressed economically after WW1, but so was Germany.
France had to face a different reality. During WWI, the French suffered a larger percentage of casualties then other major belligerents. France had a smaller population than Germany, as well as a lower birthrate. Demographics dictated a defensive posture. France didn't have the manpower to invade Germany or fight another war of attrition, however, the French hoped that, with British help, it would be possible to starve Germany (which was essentially what happened in WWI). Fortifications at the border would enable them to now allow Germans on their territory while keeping their casualties low.
However it's probably more correct to ask why Germany's approach was so different. In the German military, people understood that the peace was just temporary and began preparing for the next war soon after WWI ended. Technically, Germany wasn't allowed to have a military (except for a token force). In reality, the core of the German General Staff remained intact, concealed under an inconspicuous name of Troop Office. There, hundreds of the brightest German officers diligently analyzed their experience in WWI. They looked what worked and what didn't work at every level, from tactical engagements to much larger operations. They especially focused on the last year of the war and their successes with storm trooper tactics in the Spring Offensive and the Battle of Caporetto. Germany didn't have much experience with armored vehicles (except in cases of captured British or French tanks) but the analysts recognized their potential and thought about how to use them in the best possible way. Eventually, armored troops would become Germany's elite units.
In short, as a result of their careful and systematic analysis of WWI, the German military had the most comprehensive and effective doctrine. Furthermore, their officers where probably better trained than pretty much anywhere else. This was perhaps the single biggest qualitative advantage that Germany had - more important than differences in equipment. Lastly, the Germans had a unique chance to test their doctrine during their invasion of Poland which was a relatively easy but real campaign.
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