The British Attack on Mers-el-Kebir (England, colonies, Japan, Spain)

[ovcatto]

Originally Posted by cpg35223

The truth was that the French were given a number of options: 1) Sail with the British navy against the Germans, 2) sail to a British port, 3) sail to a more removed French colonial port or the United States, or 4) scuttle his vessels. The French admiral chose to do none of those things.

The "truth" is that the negotiations were muddled by protocol, and miscommunication.

In fact, the British intercepted a cable from Darlan that ordered the French admiral to defend himself with force, [/quote]

The "fact" is the that cable sent to Admiral Gensoul wasn't sent by Darlan but by Admiral Le Luc based upon Gensoul's misrepresentation of the negotiations.

All in all, the squadron at Mers-el-Kebir was not preparing to sail, the harbor had been mined, and no German force was approaching to take control of the vessels. So I still don't see the need for the British Admiralty to have issued a time ultimatum delivered by a officer of lower rant to a prideful French Admiral.

[cpg35223]

Originally Posted by ovcatto

The "truth" is that the negotiations were muddled by protocol, and miscommunication.

In fact, the British intercepted a cable from Darlan that ordered the French admiral to defend himself with force,

The "fact" is the that cable sent to Admiral Gensoul wasn't sent by Darlan but by Admiral Le Luc based upon Gensoul's misrepresentation of the negotiations.

All in all, the squadron at Mers-el-Kebir was not preparing to sail, the harbor had been mined, and no German force was approaching to take control of the vessels. So I still don't see the need for the British Admiralty to have issued a time ultimatum delivered by a officer of lower rant to a prideful French Admiral.[/quote]

Well, that's awfully easy for you to say 73 years after France fell with Britain's back to the wall. England's position was extremely precarious. To me, the more telling incident took place down the coast, where a different French admiral agreed to dump the oil from his ships and removed all the breechlocks from his naval artillery, putting them in the custody of the British consul. Those ships were not harmed.

[TonyT]

Originally Posted by Grandstander

With the benefit of hindsight we know that the damage to their relations with France caused by the decision to attack, was not so much of a calamity that it altered the war's eventual outcome. We do not enjoy knowing with any certainty what the outcome would have been had Britain decided to rely on Darlan's assurances of ongoing fidelity to the alliance.*

Consequently a fair judgment of Britain's actions should begin by looking at matters as Britain did in 1941, without that hindsight advantage. Considering the stakes and considering the position of disadvantage Britain found itself in at that point in time, was it unreasonable for them to not rely on trust when the means to make matters certain was available to them, even at the cost in good will which you described in your post?

Well, I wasn’t really trying to make the case that the tide of war was nearly changed by the actions the British took against the French at Mers-el-Kebir. But I think the effect it had on the war effort from July 1940 until the “Operation Torch” landings in North Africa in November 1942, was not insignificant. There were certainly enough people on the British side that were against the operation and the basis for their objection was the harm it would cause Anglo-French relations. First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, the British Admiralty as a whole, and the commander of British naval forces in the Mediterranean, Admiral Andrew Cunningham all argued against the necessity of the attack and counseled that Churchill should trust in the French assurances. They pointed to the fact that the French had scuttled every warship and submarine that could not be sailed from either Channel or Bay of Biscay ports to prevent them from falling into German hands. Additionally, a committee had been asked by Pound to study the consequences of taking armed action against the French. They concluded that use of force to neutralize the French fleet would invariably spark open and active hostility amongst the French toward Britain, thus erasing what little benefit there was in taking these ships out of action. Lastly, intercepted French cables that were shown to Churchill before he gave the go ahead for the attack, made it clear that French ships were under orders to scuttle or sail to Martinique or the United States should the Germans or Italians attempt to seize them.

It should be remembered too that Mers-el-Kebir was part of a much larger action that sought to capture or destroy every French ship that the British could get their hands on. This included those vessels already in ports in Britain itself (roughly 200 warships and merchant ships) and those that had taken refuge at the British base in Alexandria. With those ships essentially already in British custody, that left the French ships at Mers-el-Kebir, Bizerte, and at Toulon in France. Yet the British only moved against the French “Force de Rade” at Mers-el-Kebir and nowhere else. The ostensible reason given was that the eleven warships there constituted a force so formidable that should it fall into Axis hands, the danger to Britain’s war effort would be incalculable. But upon closer examination, Churchill’s main concern (or fixation) was not with the Force de Rade as a whole but just two ships; the battle cruisers Dunkerque and Strasbourg. As modern and powerful as these vessels were, it seems a serious stretch to paint them as being all that stood between Britain’s survival or defeat, which is essentially the argument that Churchill made. And though the attack itself was lauded as a great military victory, the results weren’t that clear cut. Of the four heavy warships of Force de Rade, only one was destroyed outright, two were damaged (one of which was the Dunkerque), and the fourth (Strasbourg) actually escaped and sailed to Toulon followed closely by six cruisers that fled Algiers. After Dunkerque and the battleship Provence were repaired, they too joined Strasbourg in Toulon, placing them all closer to possible seizure by the Germans instead of completely out of reach, which they unquestionably were when at their bases in North Africa. So from that standpoint alone, Mers-el-Kebir accomplished the opposite of what was intended.

If we then look at the impact the attack had on relations between the French and British, it’s clear the concerns raised by Pound and Cunningham, among others, were not far off the mark. The Vichy government in which a fragile balance of pro and anti-British factions existed, went permanently anti-British and “collaboration” became official policy. Continued British support for Charles de Gaulle as the representative of the “legitimate” government of France, alienated both the majority of the French populace and Vichy military who viewed Marshal Petain as the real leader of France and De Gaulle as a British puppet. Consequently, recruitment attempts by the “Free French” forces went nowhere. When the British attempted to assist the landing of Free French troops in Dakar, Senegal, in September 1940 they were met with fierce resistance from Vichy forces, the end result being the abandonment of the operation. In June 1941, the British and Free French attacked Vichy controlled Syria and again met strong opposition from Vichy troops. Though the British prevailed this time, hostility was still such that when the British offered the Vichy men the chance to join the Free French or be repatriated back to France, two thirds of them chose to go back to France. It wasn’t until the Germans occupied the whole of France in the wake of the Torch landings that an active resistance movement finally took hold in France and large numbers of Frenchmen went over to the Free French side. All things considered, can it really be said that any of this helped the British war effort in the long run?

In the final analysis, what are we to make of Mers-el-Kebir? Was it an operation that was truly motivated by military necessity to counter an imminent threat to the very existence of the British Empire? Based on what was known to all at the time, I would have to say no. But that’s just me.

[Grandstander]

TonyT

Fair enough, I certainly would not argue that it was a clear cut, unambiguous decision either way.

I would quibble a bit with:

Lastly, intercepted French cables that were shown to Churchill before he gave the go ahead for the attack, made it clear that French ships were under orders to scuttle or sail to Martinique or the United States should the Germans or Italians attempt to seize them.

Okay, but the French generals were under orders to stop the Germans from conquering France, and despite their best intentions.....

Based on the hasty collapse and early surrender of their ally, did Great Britain have reasonable grounds for mistrusting the French intent, or French ability to carry out the pledges? I suspect that this particular moment in time represented a low point in terms of the credibility of French military representatives.

[Felix C]

Originally Posted by TonyT

Well, I wasn’t really trying to make the case that the tide of war was nearly changed by the actions the British took against the French at Mers-el-Kebir. But I think the effect it had on the war effort from July 1940 until the “Operation Torch” landings in North Africa in November 1942, was not insignificant. There were certainly enough people on the British side that were against the operation and the basis for their objection was the harm it would cause Anglo-French relations. First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, the British Admiralty as a whole, and the commander of British naval forces in the Mediterranean, Admiral Andrew Cunningham all argued against the necessity of the attack and counseled that Churchill should trust in the French assurances. They pointed to the fact that the French had scuttled every warship and submarine that could not be sailed from either Channel or Bay of Biscay ports to prevent them from falling into German hands. Additionally, a committee had been asked by Pound to study the consequences of taking armed action against the French. They concluded that use of force to neutralize the French fleet would invariably spark open and active hostility amongst the French toward Britain, thus erasing what little benefit there was in taking these ships out of action. Lastly, intercepted French cables that were shown to Churchill before he gave the go ahead for the attack, made it clear that French ships were under orders to scuttle or sail to Martinique or the United States should the Germans or Italians attempt to seize them.

It should be remembered too that Mers-el-Kebir was part of a much larger action that sought to capture or destroy every French ship that the British could get their hands on. This included those vessels already in ports in Britain itself (roughly 200 warships and merchant ships) and those that had taken refuge at the British base in Alexandria. With those ships essentially already in British custody, that left the French ships at Mers-el-Kebir, Bizerte, and at Toulon in France. Yet the British only moved against the French “Force de Rade” at Mers-el-Kebir and nowhere else. The ostensible reason given was that the eleven warships there constituted a force so formidable that should it fall into Axis hands, the danger to Britain’s war effort would be incalculable. But upon closer examination, Churchill’s main concern (or fixation) was not with the Force de Rade as a whole but just two ships; the battle cruisers Dunkerque and Strasbourg. As modern and powerful as these vessels were, it seems a serious stretch to paint them as being all that stood between Britain’s survival or defeat, which is essentially the argument that Churchill made. And though the attack itself was lauded as a great military victory, the results weren’t that clear cut. Of the four heavy warships of Force de Rade, only one was destroyed outright, two were damaged (one of which was the Dunkerque), and the fourth (Strasbourg) actually escaped and sailed to Toulon followed closely by six cruisers that fled Algiers. After Dunkerque and the battleship Provence were repaired, they too joined Strasbourg in Toulon, placing them all closer to possible seizure by the Germans instead of completely out of reach, which they unquestionably were when at their bases in North Africa. So from that standpoint alone, Mers-el-Kebir accomplished the opposite of what was intended.

If we then look at the impact the attack had on relations between the French and British, it’s clear the concerns raised by Pound and Cunningham, among others, were not far off the mark. The Vichy government in which a fragile balance of pro and anti-British factions existed, went permanently anti-British and “collaboration” became official policy. Continued British support for Charles de Gaulle as the representative of the “legitimate” government of France, alienated both the majority of the French populace and Vichy military who viewed Marshal Petain as the real leader of France and De Gaulle as a British puppet. Consequently, recruitment attempts by the “Free French” forces went nowhere. When the British attempted to assist the landing of Free French troops in Dakar, Senegal, in September 1940 they were met with fierce resistance from Vichy forces, the end result being the abandonment of the operation. In June 1941, the British and Free French attacked Vichy controlled Syria and again met strong opposition from Vichy troops. Though the British prevailed this time, hostility was still such that when the British offered the Vichy men the chance to join the Free French or be repatriated back to France, two thirds of them chose to go back to France. It wasn’t until the Germans occupied the whole of France in the wake of the Torch landings that an active resistance movement finally took hold in France and large numbers of Frenchmen went over to the Free French side. All things considered, can it really be said that any of this helped the British war effort in the long run?

In the final analysis, what are we to make of Mers-el-Kebir? Was it an operation that was truly motivated by military necessity to counter an imminent threat to the very existence of the British Empire? Based on what was known to all at the time, I would have to say no. But that’s just me.

I think you need to verify with your sources some of the statements above. RN acted militarily against Richelieu at Casablanca. The French squadron at Alexandria did not seek refuge there as it was their base of operations prior to the Armistice. The roughly 200 French warships and merchantment joining the allies needs clarification as no French warship larger than a colonial sloop joined unless forcibly boarded by the British as occurred with Surcouf at Portsmouth.

[ovcatto]

Originally Posted by Felix C

I think you need to verify with your sources some of the statements above.

...quickly reaches for a chair, a drink and chips.

[NJGOAT]

Originally Posted by ovcatto

...quickly reaches for a chair, a drink and chips.

I was thinking more along the lines of this...

[TonyT]

Originally Posted by FelixC

I think you need to verify with your sources some of the statements above. RN acted militarily against Richelieu at Casablanca.

Well you’re partly correct. The British acted against the battleship Richelieu five days after Mers-el-Kebir but at Dakar, not Casablanca. Richelieu’s sister ship, the “Jean Bart” was at Casablanca, just over halfway complete, and was not targeted by the British for that reason. But more to the point; what I was trying to get across with the part of my post that you are referencing is that after the seizure of the ships in British ports and the neutralization of those at Alexandria, there were still other places where French naval vessels were concentrated such as Toulon and Bizerte, in addition to Mers-el-Kebir. Yet the British only used force at Mers-el-Kebir and took no action against the vessels at Toulon or Bizerte, which, no matter how big or small, could still potentially be used against the Allies by the Axis if they were captured. To me that seems both odd and inconsistent given that Churchill acted as if the fate of the British Empire would be sealed should even one French ship fall into German or Italian hands.

Now going back to the Richelieu, we are talking about a single ship, not a fleet or squadron, that was attacked, half heartedly, damaged, but not so badly as to make her beyond repair, in an operation that was conducted separately from those at the ports in Britain, Alexandria, and Mers-el-Kebir. A little more than two months later in opposition to the attempted "Free French" landing at Dakar, the Richelieu was exchanging shots with the Royal Navy. Was this not in some small way a realization of the very nightmare scenario that Mers-el-Kebir was meant to prevent from happening; a French ship being used against the Allies? Is that not enough to make the average person wonder if this would have occurred had it not been for Mers-el-Kebir?

Originally Posted by FelixC

The French squadron at Alexandria did not seek refuge there as it was their base of operations prior to the Armistice.

Correct again. In this case however, it’s more a matter of my choice of a word (refuge) being less precise than it could be rather than being historically inaccurate. With France having surrendered and the ships ordered to do whatever necessary to stay free of Axis control, Alexandria was the best place for them to remain. Thus, to my mind, Alexandria became a refuge for them in addition to it being the base they were assigned to prior to the armistice. Again, that was just my personal interpretation of the situation, not an absolute statement of historical fact.

Originally Posted by FelixC

The roughly 200 French warships and merchantmen joining the allies needs clarification as no French warship larger than a colonial sloop joined unless forcibly boarded by the British as occurred with Surcouf at Portsmouth.

I never stated that 200 French warships and merchant vessels joined the Allies. I said that “Operation Catapult” was part of a larger action by the British to seize the roughly 200 French warships and merchant ships that were in British ports. Two separate sources (neither of which was Wikipedia) cite that number so I have no particular reason to question it. In neither case was the ratio of warships to merchant ships broken down, the size or importance of the vessels mentioned, nor ultimately how many saw service with the Allies, so that’s something that is impossible for me to clarify. But then I see no reason for me to do so since, either way, it has nothing to do with the accuracy or point of my post overall.

[GregW]

IMHO The sinking, instead of negotiating surrender with the individual French Captains, of the French fleet, is as fine an example of Churchill's megalomaniacal paranoia that he fueled with copious amounts of expensive alcohol. The chance of the French fighting on the side of the Germans was far less than the chance of their joining their traditional enemy against their even worse enemy. At that point in the War the French fleet could have surrendered or arrange a peaceful transit of the Atlantic and internment in an American port.

This thoughtless brutality continued throughout the war and culminated in the needless destruction of Dresden by revenge crazed Churchill. I have little respect for Churchill and non for his favorite idiot, Montgomery. Between them they killed more Brits through sheer incompetence than the Germans did on purpose.

[BXboi]

One thing left out by the British negotiators was an option to have French ships go to American waters in the event that a foreign power most likely Germany where to try to gain control of the fleet this was never told to the French although Darlan had told the French negotiator to do this if push came to shove.