This topic has been discussed several times, usually spun around a question of the "necessity" of the bombings. I typed out an exhaustive detailing of the actual timeline in this thread, post #155:
//www.city-data.com/forum/histo...-15-am-16.html
Quoting myself...
*****
The Japanese government was always dominated by the military which held 4 of the 6 cabinet posts. The military was also able to exercise great control by either refusing to form or resigning from a government as they controlled the appointment of their ministers and cabinet members. Basically, the military ran the country.
Beginning in 1945 the Japanese recognized that the war was going badly. They became divided into two camps. One side wished to pursue a diplomatic settlement through the
Soviet Union. The other believed in seeking a "decisive battle" that gain Japan leverage in negotiations.
In January 1945 Prince Konoe persuaded the emperor to agree to send a peace dossier to the Allies. Terms were transmitted to the British and Americans. The military hardliners were completely opposed to the move, but went along with sending out the feelers. The terms were lengthy and included territories to be retained by the Japanese, namely Korea and Formosa and their possessions in China as well as the preservation of the Imperial family, no occupation of the home islands and a voluntary disarmament to be adminstered by the Japanese themselves. FDR and Churchill rejected these immediately based on their desire for unconditional
surrender.
In Febraury 1945 Prince Konoe appealed to the emperor again to more seriously consider peace. The emperor rejected the idea thinking that the time was not correct until the Japanese had sought and won the "decisive battle". At the same time the Japanese leadership pondered what the Allied demands would be. These included: unconditional
surrender, occupation, disarmament, elimination of militarism, democratic reforms, punishment of war criminals, and the status of the emperor. All of these were a non-sequitor for the Japanese military leaders, but most offensive was the occupation of Japan and the removal of the emperor in any capacity.
On April 5th the Soviets told the Japanese that they were not going to renew the five-year non-aggression pact. The Soviets were simply following their commitments made to the Allies at the Tehran Conference. At Yalta the Allies had also made concessions to the Soviets to bring them into the war against Japan when Germany surrendered. This gravely concerned the Japanese government, but the
Soviet ambassadors continually told them that the
Soviet Union would honor the final year of the pact, which would take it to April 1946.
At high level meetings in May following the formation of the final Suzuki government serious discussion was made about ending the war. However, none of those included any proposals that would have remotely met the Allied demands. The meetings were held in secret behind closed doors do to the fear that zealous military officers would assassinate anyone who had been speaking of
surrender.
Following those meetings on June 6th the new government issued a proclamation laying out the aims of the new government. The government pledged to "fight to extinction rather then
surrender". Only one member of the cabinet, the Foreign Minister opposed this statement. At the same time the Japanese laid out their plans for approaching the
Soviet Union. They wished to convey to the Soviets that their victory over Germany was made possible by Japan's neutrality and that in a future world where the United States is the enemy of the Soviets it was in the Soviets best interest to maintain a friendly Japan in her current international position of power.
On June 9th Marquis Kido approached the emperor and begged him to consider more generous terms for
surrender as the ability of Japan to "wage modern war" would be exhausted by the end of the year. Kido proposed that Japan: withdraw from the occupied European colonies provided they were granted independence, that the nation disarm provided this not occur under Allied supervision, and that Japan for a time be content with minimum defense. Kido's proposal did not contemplate Allied occupation of Japan, prosecution of war criminals or substantial change in Japan's system of government. The emperor authorized Kido to "float" this plan to the minsiters. There was a mixed reception with two in favor, two nominally in favor and two ambivalent and wanting to continue to wait for the decisive battle.
Later in June the emperor learned of the losses on Okinawa and the rapidly deteriorating position of the Japanese military, even at home. Most compelling to him was that iron scrap from bombs being dropped on Japan were now being used to make shovels to clear the rubble, obviously in his mind the situation had become extremely dire. The emperor convened the government on June 22nd and ordered them to solicit
Soviet aid in ending the war. The Soviets were chosen over Switzerland, Vatican City or Sweden precisely because they hoped the Soviets would use their influence to gain the Japanese better terms. The other entities could do no more then transmit messages.
On June 30 Togo told the Ambassador Sato in Moscow to start a dialogue with the Soviets. The Soviets ever mindful of their promises to the Allies and the deteriorating situation dealyed any meetings until July 11th with no result from the meeting. On July 12th they met again and Sato informed the Soviets that: "His Majesty the Emperor, mindful of the fact that the present war daily brings greater evil and sacrifice upon the peoples of all the belligerent powers, desires from his heart that it may be quickly terminated.
But so long as England and the United States insist upon unconditional surrender, the Japanese Empire has no alternative but to fight on with all its strength for the honor and existence of the Motherland."
Sato informed Togo that in reality the best Japan could hope for was unconditional or near unconditional
surrender. The Soviets continued to press for more detailed proposals and this led Sato to question whether or not Togo actually had the backing of the government in his current initiatives. On July 17th Togo sent a message to Sato to inform him of his position: "Although the directing powers, and the government as well, are convinced that our war strength still can deliver considerable blows to the enemy, we are unable to feel absolutely secure peace of mind ...
Please bear particularly in mind, however, that we are not seeking the Russians' mediation for anything like an unconditional surrender."
Sato replied: "It goes without saying that in my earlier message calling for unconditional
surrender or closely equivalent terms, I made an exception of the question of preserving [the imperial family]." Togo responded to that message on July 21st and made it clear he was speaking for the entire government: "
With regard to unconditional surrender we are unable to consent to it under any circumstances whatever. ... It is in order to avoid such a state of affairs that we are seeking a peace, ... through the good offices of Russia. ...
it would also be disadvantageous and impossible, from the standpoint of foreign and domestic considerations, to make an immediate declaration of specific terms."
It is important to note that US intelligence had long broken the Japanese codes, even their diplomatic ones. All of the messages being transmitted were known in full to the Allies. It is very obvious from these messages that the Japanese government was NOT in any way, shape or form seeking anything but a conditioned
surrender favorable to Japan.
On July 26th the Allies (US, Britain and China) issued the Potsdam Declaration. It was made clear that the Potsdam terms were the only terms acceptable to the Allies. They included numerous provisions but most importantly insisted on these points: the Japanese government would be disbanded and reformed along democratic principles, Japanese territory would be reduced to their pre-1894 borders, Japan itself would be occupied by Allied forces, the Japanese military would be completely disarmed, war criminal would be tried for their crimes by an Allied tribunal. At the same time it also declared that: the Japanese people were not to be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, basic human and democratic rights would be put in place and preserved, Japanese industry critical to the economy would remain intact and Japan would have global trade rights, the occupation would end as soon as the above had been accomplished. Completely absent was anything regarding the status of the emperor. The only mention of "unconditional
surrender" was in the last line that required that action of all Japanese armed forces or Japan would face "prompt and utter destruction".
On July 27th the Japanese government debated the Declaration. The military cabinet members wanted to reject it ouright. Togo persuaded them to wait until they could discuss it with the Soviets. Japan's ambassador to Switzerland, Kase, made an impassioned plea to the government to consider the Declaration as the language had been carefully chosen to allow the Japanese to save face. The "unconditional
surrender" he implored them applied only to the military and not the government and people and contained a "great deal of thought" as to the terms and language used.
The next day Japanese media reported that the Declaration had been rejected. Leaflets had been dropped on Japan announcing the terms and the media responded to that with a further call to arms. The Japanese government through Suzuki needing to manage the situation publicly stated, "I consider the Joint Proclamation a rehash of the Declaration at the Cairo Conference. As for the Government, it does not attach any important value to it at all.
The only thing to do is just kill it with silence (mokusatsu). We will do nothing but press on to the bitter end to bring about a successful completion of the war." The word
mokusatsu essentially mean to "ignore with contempt". The Allies felt they had gotten their answer.
On July 30th Sato in Moscow reported that Stalin was working with the Allies and would soon join the war. He said: "There is no alternative but immediate unconditional
surrender if we are to prevent Russia's participation in the war." On August 2nd Togo replied that: "It should not be difficult for you to realize that ... our time to proceed with arrangements of ending the war before the enemy lands on the Japanese mainland is limited,
on the other hand it is difficult to decide on concrete peace conditions here at home all at once."
On August 6th with the last peace overtures made and the ready realization that Japan was rejecting any talk of
surrender unless under conditions favorable to Japan, the US dropped the first
atomic bomb on
Hiroshima. The Japanese were rather unmoved knowing the difficulties of building a bomb through their own programs. They theorized that even if the US had built one (they still weren't convinced it was actually an
atomic bomb) they couldn't have many of them available.
As detailed reports flooded into Tokyo on the destruction in
Hiroshima the government delayed officially meeting until August 8th to discuss what had happened. The next day at 4am the Japanese received word that the Soviets had broken the pact and declared war. This deeply shocked Suzuki and Togo and they immediately called for the government to end the war at once. The military block refused and began making preparations to declare martial law on the nation, sieze control of the government and block any attempts at peace. The military underestimated the scale of the
Soviet attack and was steadfast in their belief that the US did not possess anymore
atomic weapons.
Hirohito implored Kido to control the situation as it was now spiralling out of control with
Soviet entry into the war. At 10:30am the council met and Suzuki who had just come from an audience with the emperor told them that was must be ended. Togo suggested accepting Potsdam with one condition, being the preservation of the royal family. The Navy Minister Yonai conceeded that they must make some diplomatic move as the war was lost. At 11am the meeting was interupted with news that Nagasaki had been hit with another
atomic weapon. At the end of the meeting, Togo, Suzuki and Yonai were in favor of accpeting Potsdam with the condition of the preservation of the emperor. The remaining military members were against the proposal, the government was split 3-3 after two
atomic bombings and the
Soviet invasion. The military block steadfastly refused to accept; occupation, disarmament at the hands of the Allies and the loss of Korea, Formosa and sections of China.
At 2:30pm the full cabinet met, but remained split with neither "side" garnering a majority. Anami told the other members about information given to the Japanese from a captured American pilot that the Americans had 100
atomic bombs and that Tokyo and Kyoto were next. The pilot was lying, but even that information given to the highest echelons of the government wasn't enough to make a consensus. That meeting ended at 5:30pm and was immediately followed by a second that lasted from 6pm-10pm and again ended in no consensus.
Suzuki and Togo then went to meet the emperor and proposed holding an Imperial Conference that began near midnight on August 9th/10th. Both sides presented their position to the emperor. By 2am on the 10th no consensus had been reached and Suzuki implored the emperor to decide. The emperor stated:
Quote:
I have given serious thought to the situation prevailing at home and abroad and have concluded that continuing the war can only mean destruction for the nation and prolongation of bloodshed and cruelty in the world. I cannot bear to see my innocent people suffer any longer. ...
I was told by those advocating a continuation of hostilities that by June new divisions would be in place in fortified positions [east of Tokyo] ready for the invader when he sought to land. It is now August and the fortifications still have not been completed.
There are those who say the key to national survival lies in a decisive battle in the homeland. The experiences of the past, however, show that there has always been a discrepancy between plans and performance. I do not believe that the discrepancy in the case of Kujukuri can be rectified. Since this is also the shape of things, how can we repel the invaders? [He then made some specific reference to the increased destructiveness of the atomic bomb]
It goes without saying that it is unbearable for me to see the brave and loyal fighting men of Japan disarmed. It is equally unbearable that others who have rendered me devoted service should now be punished as instigators of the war. Nevertheless, the time has come to bear the unbearable.
I swallow my tears and give my sanction to the proposal to accept the Allied proclamation on the basis outlined by the Foreign Minister
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The military leaders and head of the Privy Council then questioned the emperor: "Your majesty, you also bear responsibility (
sekinin) for this defeat. What apology are you going to make to the heroic spirits of the imperial founder of your house and your other imperial ancestors?" The emperor simply rose and left the room. Suzuki then implored everyone to accept the emperors will. The Japanese then sent a message via Switzerland that they accepted Potsdam on one condition, that the "prerogatives of the emperor should not be prejudiced", essentially saying that the emperor would remain a powerful force in the country.
On August 12th the Allies responded with the following: "From the moment of
surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the
surrender terms. ...The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people." Truman also then ordered a complete halt to bombing activities which had been suspended on the 11th do to weather as he did not want the Japanese to think we had rejected their peace proposals and resumed the war.
The cabinet then debated the Allied response. Suzuki wanted to reject it and ask for explicit guarantees for the emperor and imperial family. Anami wanted to reject it on the grounds of the Allied occupation of Japan. Togo and Suzuki privately met and determined that there was no hope of better terms. Kido then informed them that the emperor wanted them to
surrender.
At the same time the emperor was hearing from Yonai about gorwing civil unrest and dischord in the country that threatened to bring down the government. He ascribed the
atomic bombings and
Soviet attacks as divine gifts that would mask the deteriorating situation at home. The emperor announced his decision to his family and his uncle asked him, "Will we continue the war if the national sovereignty could not be preserved?" The emperor replied succinctly, "of course".
On August 13th the cabinet continued to debate the Allied offer without consensus. The US was growing concerned as they had asked the Japanese to transmit their acceptance "in the clear". However, the Japanese were sending a large volume of coded military and diplomatic messages. This gave the US the impression they were most likely preparing to reject the offer and prepare a final "banzai" assault on the Allies. Truman ordered a resumption of the attacks on Japan by both bomber and naval forces in a "massive show of force" to drive home the message the war was lost.
On August 13th the US had also decided to drop leaflets yet again detailing Japans offer to
surrender to the US and the Allied response. These leaflets had a profound impact on the Japanese and Suzuki, Kido and the emperor all agreed that they needed to accept the
surrender terms as is, or face a military coup that was gaining growing support among hardliners and devoted citizens.
On August 14th the emperor met with his most senior military officers about the situation. Several spoke in favor of continuing the war, but one notable exception was General Hata who was in command of the Second Home Army which had been headquartered in
Hiroshima. Hata believed that it was impossible for his forces to resist invasion and that
surrender was the only option to avoid further suffering. The emperor then implored the military to work with him to end the war.
Yet another conference was held by the military officers who made another attempt to pressure the emperor to continue fighting. The emperor responded by saying: "I have listened carefully to each of the arguments presented in opposition to the view that Japan should accept the Allied reply as it stands and without further clarification or modification, but my own thoughts have not undergone any change. ... In order that the people may know my decision, I request you to prepare at once an imperial rescript so that I may broadcast to the nation. Finally, I call upon each and every one of you to exert himself to the utmost so that we may meet the trying days which lie ahead."
The cabinet then convened and unanimously ratified the emperors wishes for
surrender. They began extensive operations to destroy documents that could be used against them in war crimes trials while the Foreign minister transmitted the acceptance notice to the embassies in Switzerland and Sweden. The Us picked up these transmissions at the same time the emperor was preparing to record his message to the people.
That night an army officer Hatanaka led a coup to attempt to prevent the
surrender. Senior officers knew of the attempt, but did not support it as they had all agreed earlier to abide by the emperors wishes. The coup was stopped by the actions of General Tanaka who convinced the officers to abandon the occupation of the palace. The coup also targeted Suzuki, but he was able to avoid their attempts to kill him.
At noon on August 15th the emperor's speech was played for the nation. Reaction was mixed with some listening and then just going about their business. Some military officers responded by dragging allied prisoners out of their cells and killing them. There were numerous suicides among the military. A large crowd gathered at the palace to weep, the sound being occasionally broken by a gunshot from an officer committing suicide at the gates. On the 17th Suzuki stepped down as Prime Minister and the emperors uncle took the position to help prevent any further coup attempts.
From there, it was just the play out of the formal
surrender, cessation of fighting and the beginning of the occupation.
*****
So, what is written above is how it played out. Ultimately, both the Soviet invasion and the atomic bombings were critical in bringing certain elements of the Japanese government together to agree to accepting surrender. When enough of the influential members of the blocks agreed, the emperor pressed the issue. The final nail was the growing unrest in Japan which centered around the idea of surrender being unacceptable and was being driven by the ultra-hardliners. This threat helped seal the decision for many of the last holdouts among the senior military leaders. They saw their duty as abiding by the emperors will which was to surrender.
So, we have three influences...
1. Atomic bombings.
2. Soviet invasion.
3. Threat of military coup / civil unrest.
Influence one and two led many members of the cabinet to begin considering the acceptance of an unconditional or slightly conditional surrender. That talk led some ultra-hardline elements to begin to organize a coup taking advantage of the growing civil unrest. The threat of that coup and the complete overthrow of the government led the final holdouts to accept the emperor's will to surrender. Absent the atomic bombings or the Soviet declaration of war, I'm not sure that they would have reached a critical mass of support for surrender. That critical mass is what led to the threats of the coup that brought the last of the senior military into the "surrender camp".
So, as detailed above, you cannot look at the Japanese government as a monolithic thing. It had essentially three camps: emperor/royal family, civilian government and military government. Of those, the military leadership was the most powerful and influential; nothing could be done without their agreement. Within those camps, there were various sub-groups that all had different reasons and events that brought them to agree to the surrender. Given that complex make-up it is impossible to say that any one single event of those that occurred during that timeline are responsible for the surrender. All of the three main influences were needed to get there in the end. Ultimately, the atomic bombings had the largest impact on the civilian government and the Soviet invasion had the largest impact on the military government. The threat of a coup/civil unrest was a factor for the final influential holdouts in the military.
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Did Nuclear Weapons Cause Japan to Surrender?
