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If Hitler had stopped before Poland, he would likely be looked upon as one of the greatest German leaders in history. Its downright remarkable how much territory, population, and industry he gained in a few short years without ever going to war.
Unfortunately, by all accounts Hitler seemed dead-set on a war, and plenty of evidence shows he was genuinely surprised when his de facto annexation of Czechoslovakia didn't result in one.
Had he been satisfied with his pre-Poland gains, he'd be known as the leader who took a marginalized, regional power and in a few short years swelled it into a state with everything needed to become the predominant European power for generations to come- all without getting up from his chair.
Was it George Orwell who said that the definition of a great man is one who dies, or leaves public life, before his policies have had a chance to go pearshape?
Germany before WW1 was completely surrounded by the major powers. GB and France to the West, Russia to the East, Austria Hungary to the south. The treaty and the consequences of WW1 pushed Russia's borders further east and created Poland and the Baltic states as buffer states. Austria Hungary was completely broken up into smaller countries. The newer smaller Austria had a good chance of joining Germany, and even requested it in 1919, therefore, potentially making Germany even more powerful than in 1914 down the road. Germany unfortunately got a Hitler instead of a Bismarck who could have taken advantage of Germany's new situation and brought it back to glory in a much stronger position than it was before. GB was declining as India wanted independence and the French population was not growing. The Soviets were an outcast and many saw a strong Germany as a buffer against them.
Germany with its large population and strong industry could have enjoyed a great advantage against other European powers for a long time. Makes you think sometimes.
It took Germany nearly a 100 years to repay war debts to France, GB, USA, Italy and other allies who participatped against Germany. Germany was in economic shambles after the war, the Great Depression of 1929 made the situation even worse for Germany which led the Nationalist Socaliast Workers party to come to power!
A true lost victory: Germany should have seen armistice day and the Treaty of Versailles as an opportunity
Quote:
Originally Posted by jobseeker2013
Germany before WW1 was completely surrounded by the major powers. GB and France to the West, Russia to the East, Austria Hungary to the south. The treaty and the consequences of WW1 pushed Russia's borders further east and created Poland and the Baltic states as buffer states. Austria Hungary was completely broken up into smaller countries. The newer smaller Austria had a good chance of joining Germany, and even requested it in 1919, therefore, potentially making Germany even more powerful than in 1914 down the road. Germany unfortunately got a Hitler instead of a Bismarck who could have taken advantage of Germany's new situation and brought it back to glory in a much stronger position than it was before. GB was declining as India wanted independence and the French population was not growing. The Soviets were an outcast and many saw a strong Germany as a buffer against them.
Germany with its large population and strong industry could have enjoyed a great advantage against other European powers for a long time. Makes you think sometimes.
I agree with what your saying. The fall of Austria-Hungary (and also the Ottoman Empire), left the entire area from the southern borders of Germany all the way to Persia (Iran) in the hands of smaller and weaker countries. It was a potential boon to Germany and also the Soviet Union / Russia.
A wise German leader such as Bismarck, could have possibly reentered the Rhineland and completed unification with the rump state of Austria. He then could have taken advantage economically and politically of southeastern Europe's weakened state while slowly building up Germany's strength while at peace.
The problem was that Germany was lead by a Hitler who did not know when to stop. After annexing the Sudetenland, Hitler violated the Munich agreement and annexed what was left of the Czech lands - thereby finally getting the British and French to finally stand up to him over Poland. They decided Hitler could not be trusted. Because of that a coalition began to form against Germany.
IMHO, I agree that a forceful, determined, less stupid, and less extreme leader for Germany in the 1930s and/or beyond could have accomplished a lot for Germany, including (not in order):
Having France and the U.K. eventually reduce or eliminate Germany's reparations payments in one way or another.
In 1924, the Weimar Republic began to suffer from severe financial instability. As hyperinflation took hold, there were fears in the West that this would lead to a complete collapse of the German economy. In an effort to prevent this from happening, financial experts from the U.S., Britain, France, Belgium, and Italy met to discuss ways to improve Germany's overall situation. They concluded that one way to do this would be to reduce the amount of the yearly payments of war reparations Germany was responsible for under the Treaty of Versailles. The formal agreement that came out of these discussions became known as the "Dawes Plan" and its implementation led to a period of extended economic stability and growth in Germany that lasted until 1929. By that year, it had become clear that despite the benefits derived from the Dawes Plan, Germany still could not pay even the reduced amount of reparations per year set out under the plan. So the Allies set up another committee, this one headed by Owen Young from the U.S., to study the problem. Once again, they concluded that the best course of action would be to reduce the war reparations payments even further, to the point where Germany would essentially pay only one third of the total amount they were obligated to on a yearly basis. The "Young Plan" was presented to the Weimar government in June of 1929 and accepted by it in January 1930. However, the Great Depression intervened and in 1931, the Allies placed a moratorium on German war reparations payments. Over the objections of the United States, this suspension of payments was formalized at a conference held at Lausanne, Switzerland in June 1932. And when Hitler took power in January 1933, the suspension of war reparations payments became permanent.
Now while it is clear that the first round of payment reductions did help the Weimar Republic, historically speaking there is no way to determine if a second round would have done the same, regardless of who was leading Germany. The Great Depression saw to that.
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Originally Posted by Futurist110
Permanently acquiring Austria, the Sudetenland, Danzig, Eupen-Malmedy, the Memel, and perhaps some other German-speaking territories/areas for Germany.
Well again, here is an instance where historical fact conflicts with your position. The Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of Saint Germain both prohibited a union between Germany and Austria. The only way around this would be to either do it by force, or achieve it through negotiating a revision of the two aforementioned treaties with the Allies. In most respects, the same can be said with regard to the Sudetenland and Danzig. What seems to have been lost in this whole discussion is that revision of the Treaty of Versailles was a longstanding foreign policy goal of the Weimar Republic, especially during the time between 1923 and 1929 when Gustav Stresemann served as Germany's foreign minister. In 1925, Stresemann negotiated the Treaty of Locarno with Britain and France. In exchange for agreeing that German's western border was permanent as it stood, the British and French allowed for the possibility of border adjustments in the east. What was not said out loud but was understood by all involved was that eventually, the governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia would have no choice other than to reach an agreement to return control of Danzig and the Sudetenland to Germany. It was expected this might be facilitated through the League of Nations which Germany was now allowed to join after accepting the terms of the Treaty of Locarno. It should be noted that Germany's foreign policy under Hitler was in fact a continuation of the policy of the Weimar Republic at least up until the time of the re-militarization of the Rhineland.
With regard to Austria, Hitler tried to engineer a union with this country in 1934 after Austrian Nazis assassinated the country's chancellor, Engelbert Dollfuss in an attempted coup. However, Mussolini, who considered Dollfuss a friend and protege, threatened military action if Germany moved into Austria. Hitler had no choice but to back down. This led to an attempt by Mussolini in April 1935 to organize an anti-German alliance with Britain and France with the goal of keeping Austria independent as well as trying to check German military growth by force of arms if necessary. The "Stresa Front" as it became known, ultimately failed when it became clear that neither Britain nor France had the will or desire to oppose Germany militarily. This moment also marked the point where Mussolini began to abandon working with the Allies in favor of forming a closer relationship with Germany. Germany and Austria would eventually be united in 1938 without interference from the Allies.
As is well known, the Czechs were forced to return the Sudentenland to Germany by the agreement reached at Munich. Without having been pressured (or abandoned if you want to look at it that way) by the British and French, I don't really see a scenario where the Czechs would have given back the Sudentenland willingly. The same can basically be said about Danzig and the Polish Corridor. Attempts were made by Hitler to negotiate the return of Danzig in the summer of 1939. The offer extended was for Poland to join the Axis, place Danzig back in German hands in exchange for a guarantee allowing continued use of the port by Poland, and to permit Germany to build a highway and railroad (which Germany would have exclusive control over) to connect Germany proper with East Prussia. Poland rejected this offer, largely because of the guarantees of protection put forth by Britain and France. What is interesting about this is that both Britain and France knew they had no means to make good on these guarantees when they gave them. Additionally, the British in particular, believed that Poland should make a deal of some sort with Germany to avoid a war. Unfortunately, they never voiced this to the Polish government and we know what the end result of that was.
So when you look at the question of revision, the issue of who is leading Germany is not really relevant in the grand scheme of things. What mattered was the willingness of the Allies to permit revision where they could, and to encourage other parties with whom they had influence to do the same. After all, they opened the door to revision with the Treaty of Locarno in the first place. Had they actually followed through instead of dancing back and forth between offering first the carrot, the stick, and then starting it all over again, things may have turned out a bit different.
As to the question of whether Versailles offered Germany an opportunity, I don't believe that a strong case can really be made to that effect. Had the Allies opted to pursue a negotiated peace with Germany rather than a dictated one, then the alternative scenario put forth by the OP could well have come to pass. With that being said, however, Versailles wasn't the only roadblock preventing this from happening. The larger, and often overlooked issue, is the Weimar government itself, or more specifically, the constitution. In their eagerness to build democracy in Germany, the framers of the Weimar constitution arrived at a formula of "proportional representation" that they believed would allow the greatest degree of participation in the government by all sides of the political spectrum. Unfortunately, the problem that developed from this was in fact too much participation. The proliferation of political parties that resulted made it nearly impossible for any one party to win a clear majority and thus be able to rule effectively. The only way an almost majority could form a government was if they did so in coalition with other parties who they may or may not have been completely in sync with politically. This inherent flaw created a succession of weak governments, some of which lasted only a matter of months. This merry-go-round effect fueled the fire of political discontent as Germans increasingly concluded that democracy was both alien to and bad for Germany. In simple terms, the Weimar constitution opened the door to it's own destruction long before Hitler even became a factor.
While it can often times be a fun exercise to speculate on what might have been, for things to have deviated so far from their historical path as suggested by the OP would have required more than just different circumstances or leaders in Germany. It would have meant that attitudes, actions, and perceptions would have needed to change drastically in Britain, France, the United States, and just about everywhere else too. Sad to say, that just wasn't going to happen.
@TonyT: I don't think that I genuinely argued against historical facts here. I strongly appreciate your extremely detailed explanation here, but fundamentally, I appear to have agreed with you in my previous points. Considering that the Allies were willing to re-negotiate German reparations payments and German borders in the East, my points here in regards to a more capable German leadership also being capable of (eventually) doing this appear to still be valid. Also, as far as I know, the Belgian government actually was willing to negotiate the return of Eupen-Malmedy to Germany in 1926, but France stopped these negotiations. Perhaps it would have been possible for France to agree to such negotiations being renewed in the 1930s or in the 1940s in the right circumstances?
In 1924, the Weimar Republic began to suffer from severe financial instability. As hyperinflation took hold, there were fears in the West that this would lead to a complete collapse of the German economy. In an effort to prevent this from happening, financial experts from the U.S., Britain, France, Belgium, and Italy met to discuss ways to improve Germany's overall situation. They concluded that one way to do this would be to reduce the amount of the yearly payments of war reparations Germany was responsible for under the Treaty of Versailles. The formal agreement that came out of these discussions became known as the "Dawes Plan" and its implementation led to a period of extended economic stability and growth in Germany that lasted until 1929. By that year, it had become clear that despite the benefits derived from the Dawes Plan, Germany still could not pay even the reduced amount of reparations per year set out under the plan. So the Allies set up another committee, this one headed by Owen Young from the U.S., to study the problem. Once again, they concluded that the best course of action would be to reduce the war reparations payments even further, to the point where Germany would essentially pay only one third of the total amount they were obligated to on a yearly basis. The "Young Plan" was presented to the Weimar government in June of 1929 and accepted by it in January 1930. However, the Great Depression intervened and in 1931, the Allies placed a moratorium on German war reparations payments. Over the objections of the United States, this suspension of payments was formalized at a conference held at Lausanne, Switzerland in June 1932............
The whole thing reminds me of the mortgage meltdown.
When people (like Germany) were unable to repay their mortgage the government (like Dawes Plan) devised a way for the debtors to reduce their monthly payment.
But the people still could not pay - like Germany.
So a further reduction in payment or an outright forgiveness of debt was ordered, even though the entity ordering forgiveness was not the one harmed by non-payment. That looks to me like Owen Young, representing a country which had not been invaded, ordering forgiveness of payment to France, which looked like a moon-scape and Belgium, which had also been stomped flat by German soldiers.
Then The Depression came along and even though the injured parties had even greater need for the money, it was decided that no further payments should be made - just like decisions that were made in Florida where no mortgage payments were made and no one was evicted. But in Florida, when the banks got desperate, the occupant would send in an emissary to buy the loan the occupant had abandoned, and the emissary would by it for nickles on the dollar!
Gotta be careful who you punish and how you do it.
@TonyT: I don't think that I genuinely argued against historical facts here. I strongly appreciate your extremely detailed explanation here, but fundamentally, I appear to have agreed with you in my previous points. Considering that the Allies were willing to re-negotiate German reparations payments and German borders in the East, my points here in regards to a more capable German leadership also being capable of (eventually) doing this appear to still be valid. Also, as far as I know, the Belgian government actually was willing to negotiate the return of Eupen-Malmedy to Germany in 1926, but France stopped these negotiations. Perhaps it would have been possible for France to agree to such negotiations being renewed in the 1930s or in the 1940s in the right circumstances?
I think your post was pretty much correct, because even Hitler was able to accomplish most of what you said without going to war. Now imagine if Germany had a more rational long-term looking leadership then Hitler and his Nazis.
To be honest after rereading some of the other posts, I do not even think we are all talking about the same thing (very easy to do on the internet). For instance, TonyT seems to be talking about changing the actual Treaty of Versailles back in 1919 - " Had the Allies opted to pursue a negotiated peace with Germany rather than a dictated one, then the alternative scenario put forth by the OP could well have come to pass. With that being said, however, Versailles wasn't the only roadblock preventing this from happening".
Now I was under the impression that the OP was already passed that. I was looking at the actual real life situation and opportunities that Hitler and Germany faced in the late 1930s not whether the Versailles treaty could have been written differently. So if we are not on the same page I do not see how can we have a good discussion.
@TonyT: I don't think that I genuinely argued against historical facts here. I strongly appreciate your extremely detailed explanation here, but fundamentally, I appear to have agreed with you in my previous points. Considering that the Allies were willing to re-negotiate German reparations payments and German borders in the East, my points here in regards to a more capable German leadership also being capable of (eventually) doing this appear to still be valid. Also, as far as I know, the Belgian government actually was willing to negotiate the return of Eupen-Malmedy to Germany in 1926, but France stopped these negotiations. Perhaps it would have been possible for France to agree to such negotiations being renewed in the 1930s or in the 1940s in the right circumstances?
The Allies were willing to re-negotiate because they wanted their money and they knew they wouldn't get it if the German economy collapsed. Therefore it would not be accurate to interpret this as a sign that British and French attitudes toward Germany had softened to any great degree. With respect to border adjustments, yes the Allies did open up the possibility of this taking place one day. But that did not mean they were committed to putting forth their best effort to make it happen. More to the point, this could only take place if Poland and Czechoslovakia were willing to consider it. If they did not, then what? Even if you had the most skilled and capable statesman in the world leading Germany, that would in no way guarantee that one inch of territory would ever be returned, especially the longer it stayed in Polish and Czech hands. So while I understand your point, I think it's too big of a leap to make given the actual facts that we have to deal with.
Quote:
Originally Posted by LINative
To be honest after rereading some of the other posts, I do not even think we are all talking about the same thing (very easy to do on the internet). For instance, TonyT seems to be talking about changing the actual Treaty of Versailles back in 1919 - " Had the Allies opted to pursue a negotiated peace with Germany rather than a dictated one, then the alternative scenario put forth by the OP could well have come to pass. With that being said, however, Versailles wasn't the only roadblock preventing this from happening". Now I was under the impression that the OP was already passed that. I was looking at the actual real life situation and opportunities that Hitler and Germany faced in the late 1930s not whether the Versailles treaty could have been written differently. So if we are not on the same page I do not see how can we have a good discussion.
No. I simply said that a different approach might have produced a treaty which could be viewed by Germany as an "opportunity" to move forward in a more positive direction. Since Versailles was not that treaty, I see no logical means to reconcile that reality with the premise put forth by the OP in order to make it even remotely plausible.
No. I simply said that a different approach might have produced a treaty which could be viewed by Germany as an "opportunity" to move forward in a more positive direction. Since Versailles was not that treaty, I see no logical means to reconcile that reality with the premise put forth by the OP in order to make it even remotely plausible.
Quote:
Originally Posted by jobseeker2013
Germany before WW1 was completely surrounded by the major powers. GB and France to the West, Russia to the East, Austria Hungary to the south. The treaty and the consequences of WW1 pushed Russia's borders further east and created Poland and the Baltic states as buffer states. Austria Hungary was completely broken up into smaller countries. The newer smaller Austria had a good chance of joining Germany, and even requested it in 1919, therefore, potentially making Germany even more powerful than in 1914 down the road. Germany unfortunately got a Hitler instead of a Bismarck who could have taken advantage of Germany's new situation and brought it back to glory in a much stronger position than it was before. GB was declining as India wanted independence and the French population was not growing. The Soviets were an outcast and many saw a strong Germany as a buffer against them.
Germany with its large population and strong industry could have enjoyed a great advantage against other European powers for a long time. Makes you think sometimes.
Tony, I think you are right that it would have been very difficult to change the actual treaty in Germany's favor. But what I am trying to say is that revising or changing the actual Treaty of Versailles has little to do with the OPs question.
Here is the OP from Jobseeker. Basically everything that the OP says is more or less true of the situation that Germany faced in the 1930s and that has nothing to do with changing the Versailles Treaty in 1919. In other words, you can keep the Treaty exactly the same, no need to change it, and Germany still had interesting possibilities in the 1930s.
Basically I look at it like this. What if Hitler did exactly everything the same way as in real life up to, say his decision to attack Poland. Faced with possible war with Britain and France, imagine if Hitler (or some other German leader) backs down over Poland.
But he still would have gained the Rhineland, Austria, Bohemia, Memel etc., all without going to war. The old Entente Allies were very divided because the Russians were now trapped in glorious Soviet communism. The Hapsburgs were gone and replaced by many weaker states that Germany could dominate politically and economically. Old opponents like Italy and Japan were now German allies. Basically as the OP says "Germany with its large population and strong industry could have enjoyed a great advantage against other European powers for a long time". This all could have be done by Germany without going to war.
Seems quite possible to me.
Last edited by LINative; 12-25-2013 at 11:09 AM..
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A true lost victory: Germany should have seen armistice day and the Treaty of Versailles as an opportunity
