The British Attack on Mers-el-Kebir (war, bomb, Great Britain, general)

[ovcatto]

On July 3, 1940 the Royal Navy opened fire on the unsuspecting French squadron anchored at the French-Algerian port of Mers-el-Kebir during negotiations between the French and the British as to what to do with the French squadron that was under threat of Nazi capture.

Was the firing on the French squadron by the RN an act of betrayal or one of pragmatism?

[Grandstander]

Wouldn't that be a pov style question? Obviously the Brits believed it a necessary action, their domination of the seas was all that they had going for them at that point in time and the risk of the Germans using the French fleet against them struck them as so catastrophic that they were left with no choice.

Just as obviously, if you were the French admiral Darlan and had made a public statement that the French fleet would never fall into German hands, this was an embarrassing "We either don't trust you, or we don't think you have enough political muscle to keep that promise" style in your face repudiation. It is also quite expected that the French would be unhappy about the nearly 1000 dead sailors killed in the bombardment.

Moral justification would then come down to the probability of Britain's suspicions being valid....would the Nazis have eventually forced the French to either use their fleet in cooperation against Britain, or seized their ships and employed them with German crews against the Brits? I can see why Great Britain would not have been comfortable with the promise...the stakes were too high if it turned out that the promise wasn't kept. The lead up to the war had been a series of broken pledges from Hitler regarding the extent of German ambitions, so there was little reason to believe that the Nazis would have hesitated to exploit the French fleet if the situation demanded it. There is also little reason to believe that the French would have put up sufficient resistance to such an action.

It was a sad situation, but Britain did what it had to do for the sake of the larger picture...not losing the war.

[TonyT]

The following something I originally posted in a thread about Vichy France and "Operation Torch". It was in response to a question about my referring to the attack at Mers-el-Kebir by the British as being "ill-advised":

Ill-advised in that the “need” for “Operation Catapult” was borne out of panic which in turn created a sense of immediate threat where one actually did not exist. It was also a decision prompted solely by the concerns of politicians, primarily Churchill and his War Cabinet, who felt that some major public demonstration of Britain’s will to stand against German aggression needed to take place. Military officials, including Vice Admiral James Somerville, who commanded “Force H” which attacked the French, and Vice Admiral Andrew Cunningham, the Mediterranean fleet commander, strongly recommended against the operation for fear of what it might do to British/French relations, which at that point in the war were of critical importance. But Churchill’s need to appear decisive, coupled with a healthy dose of paranoia, won out over his commander’s objections.

There were really no hard facts to justify Britain taking such extreme action. From the start, the British convinced themselves the Germans viewed the French fleet as a great prize they had to have. Yet the terms of the German/French armistice, which the British had been apprised of, made it quite clear the ships would remain under French control as long as they stayed in French ports, were disarmed, and the French played no further role in the war between Germany and Britain. Petain negotiated a concession in the armistice which allowed for the French ships to be disarmed in the North African ports. This is one reason why the vessels of the French Atlantic Fleet came to be at Mers el Kebir once the armistice was signed. The other was to put the ships out of Germany’s reach should she decide to renege on the armistice. If the Germans had wanted the ships as badly as Churchill thought, they simply would have taken them or demanded they be turned over in return for granting an armistice. Since we know they did neither, it seems safe to say the Germans had no interest in these ships other than to get them out of the way, especially given the fact that Germany didn’t have large numbers of spare sailors around to man the ships in the first place.

In addition, Admiral Francois Darlan had communicated to Churchill personally that French naval vessels would never be allowed to fall into German hands. Darlan had issued orders to all commanders that if the Germans attempted to seize any French ship, it was to be scuttled immediately. When “Force H” arrived off Mers el Kebir, the commander of the French fleet, Admiral Marcel Gensoul sent a message to Admiral Somerville, reiterating what Darlan had said to Churchill, and affirming that he was prepared to carry out those orders. This message was passed back to Churchill, but apparently he simply refused to take Gensoul at his word. Interestingly, when the Germans moved into the Unoccupied Zone in November 1942 and seized the port of Toulon, what remained of the French fleet was immediately scuttled, just as Admiral Darlan had promised Churchill two years earlier.

It seems odd that such a heavy handed approach was taken with regards to the French fleet at Mers el Kebir. Rather than attempt to enter into negotiations as equals or allies, the French were approached as enemies and asked to make a decision literally at gunpoint. This doesn’t make sense, especially given the events that had recently transpired. France was a country still suffering the fresh sting of defeat. One fifth of the country was occupied by Germany and the French were desperate to hold on to what remained. And along came the British, virtually ordering France to surrender or destroy one of the few truly valuable military assets she had left. Had the roles been reversed, I think it very unlikely the British would have complied with such a demand, so why it was believed the French would respond in anything but negative terms is hard to fathom. Also, no state of war existed between Vichy France and Britain in July of 1940, and in fact still did not at the time of the Torch landings in November 1942. Marshal Petain had made a point of advising the British that Vichy France was now neutral. Churchill chose to ignore this. To his mind, Vichy France and Germany were now allies, and any day, one of the following three “nightmare” scenarios would take place: Germany would seize or be given the French fleet for their own use, Vichy France would combine their fleet with that of Italy and sweep the British from the Mediterranean, or Vichy would send the fleet back into the Atlantic to assist Germany in defeating Britain. The first scenario was possible but unlikely, and the latter two were just the products of Churchill’s overactive imagination.

To sum up, Churchill and his government had the information they needed to make a better choice. Instead, they launched an attack against an ally based on erroneous assumptions made about Germany’s intentions without thought to the long term consequences of such an act. Churchill got his political victory and won the confidence of the British people, but lost the trust and goodwill of the French in the process. Rather than try to salvage what had been squandered, the British compounded the damage by going after Dakar, Syria, Lebanon, and Madagascar, leaving the French to conclude that Britain was using the war with Germany as a pretext to destroy the French Empire. All of this pushed Vichy France closer to Germany and made it nearly impossible for De Gaulle to recruit men to the ranks of the Free French for the next two years.

When put in the context of Britain having no other allies to speak of in the summer of 1940, saying the decision to execute “Operation Catapult” was ill advised actually seems a bit of an understatement.

[Felix C]

Churchill urged continuing the land battle after the German breakthrough and drive southwards. French government declined. Churchill urged a union between the UK and France to continue tha war although the French mainland was to be occupied. French government declined. Churchill offered the ships the option of joining the UK to continue fighting the Axis. This had occurred with Polish and Norwegian naval forces in exile. Some did. Based on his reading of history regarding how occupied countries became unwilling allies and cooperate militarily it would be necessary to eliminate the modern French heavy ships- Richelieu, Strasbourg, Dunkerque. The remaining BBs were old ships.

To the surprise of those present, France folded quickly in 1940 and no one could state for certain they would not continue to succumb to German pressure. UK relied on secure Atlantic sea routes. The Germans had very few heavy ships to properly use the North Atlantic ports. Eliminating the threat of of the French modern heavy ships should there be an alliance with Germany ensured the safety of those routes.

Promises mean little in wartime when the spirit to resist is shown to be diminished. Then there is the issue of cultural stereotype perception. What did Churchill write about the French commander at Oran? "One of those good Frenchmen who hate the English" which could be matched by the English perception after May 1940 that the French are unreliable in their convictions.


Hard decision but one that had to be made. Alexandria was resolved more peaceably because the French squadron was inside a British controlled harbor.

The action took place before the BoB and it may indeed have shown to the flagging elements within the UK that there would be no terms with Nazi Germany. It has been said (although I do not place stock in it) that the harsh measures convinced Roosevelt Great Britain would not yield.

[Snowball7]

Mers-el-Kebir happened less than 40 days after the French First Army
saved the British from total annihilation at Dunkirk. General Molinie
in four days contained seven German divisions which allowed the Brits
to evacuate.
We will never know for sure what would have happened if the British did
not mercilessly surprise attack the sitting French fleet at Mers, but thier doing so,
and their reporting of the event, which was egotistical, did serious harm to
the relationship.

[Grandstander]

Originally Posted by TonyT

To sum up, Churchill and his government had the information they needed to make a better choice. Instead, they launched an attack against an ally based on erroneous assumptions made about Germany’s intentions without thought to the long term consequences of such an act. Churchill got his political victory and won the confidence of the British people, but lost the trust and goodwill of the French in the process. Rather than try to salvage what had been squandered, the British compounded the damage by going after Dakar, Syria, Lebanon, and Madagascar, leaving the French to conclude that Britain was using the war with Germany as a pretext to destroy the French Empire. All of this pushed Vichy France closer to Germany and made it nearly impossible for De Gaulle to recruit men to the ranks of the Free French for the next two years.

When put in the context of Britain having no other allies to speak of in the summer of 1940, saying the decision to execute “Operation Catapult” was ill advised actually seems a bit of an understatement.[/i][/b][/b][/b]

With the benefit of hindsight we know that the damage to their relations with France caused by the decision to attack, was not so much of a calamity that it altered the war's eventual outcome. We do not enjoy knowing with any certainty what the outcome would have been had Britain decided to rely on Darlan's assurances of ongoing fidelity to the alliance.

Consequently a fair judgment of Britain's actions should begin by looking at matters as Britain did in 1941, without that hindsight advantage. Considering the stakes and considering the position of disadvantage Britain found itself in at that point in time, was it unreasonable for them to not rely on trust when the means to make matters certain was available to them, even at the cost in good will which you described in your post?

[NJGOAT]

I think GS's original post was on the money. It's all perspective based. Since Britain was the main actor, you need to look at it from their perspective in 1940. In that light, I am not sure I wouldn't have done what they did. The French had signed an armistice with Germany against the wishes of Britain. The French could have chosen not to surrender and simply put the government into exile in Britain and continued the fight. They could have retained control over their colonies and ordered their fleet and any available military assets to join the British and continue the fight. By signing the armistice they, in essence, betrayed Britain by making things like the disposition of their fleet and status of their colonies a question. Regardless of treaty provisions and promises, the fact remained that France was now officially subjugated to Germany.

Militarily the fleet may not have posed much of a threat in reality. However, would anyone in Churchill's position have taken the chance? Whether for military or political gain, I don't think people in that position would roll the dice and hope that the Strasbourg and Dunkerque and the various other ships would just remain sunning their crews in Mers-El-Kebir until the war was over.

We know that attacking the fleet didn't really much change the course of war. However, not attacking it is something we just don't know. Would it have cemented better British-French relations? To what end? Could the fleet have fallen to the Germans and been used against the British? Maybe, but highly unlikely.

So, put me in the pragmatic camp. I'll take souring relations with German-client state France in exchange for making sure that fleet doesn't get used against me.

[cpg35223]

There were two and only two things keeping Britain in the war in 1940. The Royal Navy and the RAF. The Royal Navy was stretched thin enough as it was without the Kriegsmarine suddenly getting its hands on the large and substantial French fleet.

Yes, we all know what Darlan promised. But were the French in any position to keep their promises? Given the fact that the British held out by the skin of their teeth in 1940 and 1941 as it was, I am tempted to give them the benefit of the doubt on this action.

[cpg35223]

The other thing is the assumption that the British fleet simply sailed into range and began blasting away at the French. The truth was that the French were given a number of options: 1) Sail with the British navy against the Germans, 2) sail to a British port, 3) sail to a more removed French colonial port or the United States, or 4) scuttle his vessels. The French admiral chose to do none of those things. In fact, the British intercepted a cable from Darlan that ordered the French admiral to defend himself with force, also implying that Darlan had informed the Germans of what was happening. Further, there were indications that the French were actually reinforcing the fleet with more ships. In the fog of war, the Admiralty did what it needed to do. In that sense, the term "unsuspecting" as applied to the French fleet is just a bit disingenuous.

[Snowball7]

Pretty good article on it here:

Churchill’s Sinking of the French Fleet (July 3, 1940)