Your thoughts on General Longstreet..

[Strelnikov]

Originally Posted by Grandstander

I do not think that Longstreet was in the same class of greatness as Jackson. Given independent command, Jackson was at his absolute best, as demonstrated by his brilliant Valley campaign of 1862, and his complete befuddling of General Pope in the Second Manassas campaign.

While Longstreet was a superior and reliable Corps commander, what happened the two times he was given independent command? He made a hash of it both times. When detached to try and shore up the North Carolina coastal front in the spring of 1863, Longstreet conducted timid operations and accomplished nothing. Lee was deprived of his services at Chancelorsville and got no dividend in return.

Worse was when Bragg sent him to take charge of the Knoxville theater after the Chickamagua battle. Once more Longstreet showed no imagination or daring, conducting defensive operations only, and allowing himself to be beaten by General Burnside....Burnside....how can anyone who couldn't cope with Burnside be considered a great general?

The comments regarding how Longstreet's image was tarred in the post war by his joining the Republican Party, and his criticism of Saint Bobby Lee, are quite accurate. But that Longstreet became unpopular after the war is not a good reason to over estimate his leadership any more than it was a valid reason to denigrate it.

I would argue that there was an upper tier of brilliant rebel generalship evidenced by Lee, Jackson, Forrest and John Gordon...might throw in a word on behalf of General Richard Taylor as well. These were men who accomplished amazing things with limited resources.

Then there was a second tier of highly competent, but not really brilliant leaders and Longstreet was probably the best of that class. Steady, reliable, knew how to manage men on a battlefield, but if we are to think him the equal of Lee or Jackson, we will need examples of his brilliance, and I do not see anything in his record to suggest that adjective.

I agree. I'll just add that personally, I do not believe that Longstreet was as forceful with General Lee at Gettysburg as he claimed in his memoirs. I just don't believe it. To me, Longstreet always had a bit of passive-aggressiveness in is personality. But on the other hand, I do not believe Longstreet "sabotaged" Pickett's Charge at G-burg, either. Sure, Longstreet was slow, and Gettysburg was not one one of Longstreet's premier performances, but he was not alone. There were a lot of command problems on a relatively long front for the Confederates.

[Grandstander]

Originally Posted by Strelnikov

I agree. I'll just add that personally, I do not believe that Longstreet was as forceful with General Lee at Gettysburg as he claimed in his memoirs. .

I think that there is reason to suspect that he was.

On the second day at Gettysburg, when Longstreet finally had his corps in position to attack the Federal left, he of course observed that Sickles' corps was now occupying the ground upon which he was supposed to be staging his attack. Things had changed since General Lee had ordered the attack to be conducted in echelon and that particular form of attack was not really suited to the new reality facing Longstreet.

General Hood, observing the same changes, pleaded with Longstreet to allow him to swing around the two hills and hit what was the actual flank, not the no longer existent one upon which Lee had based his plan. Longstreet certainly knew that Hood's suggestion made a great deal more sense than proceeding as originally ordered, but he denied Hood permission to shift, telling him that Lee had ordered this particular attack and it would be going forward exactly as ordered.

Why didn't Longstreet send a messenger back to Lee advising him of the new circumstances and asking permission to re-order the alignment of the attack? My suspicion is that Lee had already lost patience with Longstreet's arguments about swinging around the Union left flank, and his manner must have conveyed to Longstreet that the issue was closed and he would hear no more about it. If so, Lee would have been reacting to Longstreet having continued to argue, to the point of irritation, for the move even after Lee had made up his mind. Longstreet knew that if he delayed his attack while the new circumstances were relayed to Lee, the commanding general would explode....as in..."That damn Longstreet is still trying any trick he can think of to get his way."

Longstreet sending the men in when the plan no longer made sense, was his way of saying "You wanted this damn attack this way, General Lee, and by god you're getting it." The failure would then belong to Lee rather than Longstreet.

So I do think that the two generals were rather heavily at odds with one another during those three days.

[Strelnikov]

Originally Posted by Grandstander

I think that there is reason to suspect that he was.

On the second day at Gettysburg, when Longstreet finally had his corps in position to attack the Federal left, he of course observed that Sickles' corps was now occupying the ground upon which he was supposed to be staging his attack. Things had changed since General Lee had ordered the attack to be conducted in echelon and that particular form of attack was not really suited to the new reality facing Longstreet.

General Hood, observing the same changes, pleaded with Longstreet to allow him to swing around the two hills and hit what was the actual flank, not the no longer existent one upon which Lee had based his plan. Longstreet certainly knew that Hood's suggestion made a great deal more sense than proceeding as originally ordered, but he denied Hood permission to shift, telling him that Lee had ordered this particular attack and it would be going forward exactly as ordered.

Why didn't Longstreet send a messenger back to Lee advising him of the new circumstances and asking permission to re-order the alignment of the attack? My suspicion is that Lee had already lost patience with Longstreet's arguments about swinging around the Union left flank, and his manner must have conveyed to Longstreet that the issue was closed and he would hear no more about it. If so, Lee would have been reacting to Longstreet having continued to argue, to the point of irritation, for the move even after Lee had made up his mind. Longstreet knew that if he delayed his attack while the new circumstances were relayed to Lee, the commanding general would explode....as in..."That damn Longstreet is still trying any trick he can think of to get his way."

Longstreet sending the men in when the plan no longer made sense, was his way of saying "You wanted this damn attack this way, General Lee, and by god you're getting it." The failure would then belong to Lee rather than Longstreet.

So I do think that the two generals were rather heavily at odds with one another during those three days.

Longstreet claimed after the war that Lee agreed that he would have a strictly defensive stance at Gettysburg. Lee strongly denied such an agreement. So I take Longstreet, like I take everyone else, with a grain of salt unless there is conclusive collaborating evidence.

Did Longstreet disagree with Lee? Certainly. Was Longstreet obstinate? Surely he was. Did he dramatically oppose Lee, like some Cicero of old, with his famous "....no 15,0000 men" quote? We will never know. His first reference to this was years later, with the benefit of hindsight, when he had an obvious axe to grind. Would his preference to push around the flank succeeded? Maybe. Maybe not. After the war, when Pickett was asked why the Confederates were defeated at Gettysburg, he didn't mention Lee or Longstreet. "I've always thought the Yankees had something to do with it", he replied.