Quote:
Originally Posted by user_id
Really? Because....it did happen many
many times during the housing bubble.
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Just what is "many many times?" Even if it happened 10,000 times,
that isn't statistically significant and is just anecdotal evidence
inside a population of millions of loans.
Quote:
Originally Posted by user_id
ALT-A loans required large down-payments, typically more
than 20%, ... in part what killed Washington Mutual.
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ALT-A loans were all or mostly ARMs then?
Quote:
Originally Posted by user_id
Then you're not trying very hard.
ARMs ... magnify the returns on your investment.
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I'm sure you saw this happen, don't get me wrong.
What I'm saying is that if someone can come up with 20% from a
HELOC off of another property, then why wouldn't the speculator
just buy
two properties - paying 10% on each or even 5% on
four.
See? I can imagine all sorts of risky stuff.
Quote:
Originally Posted by user_id
You don't seem to realize what people did during the housing bubble.
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I'm fully aware of what happened.
The problem was with lending to people without verifying that they could
actually pay the note. The structure of the note wasn't the problem.
That is my only claim. I'm never said that strange stuff never happened.
I took a temp job in CA in 2006 and practically everyone I worked
with 'had a property' in either Los Vegas or Phoenix, sometimes both.
All those people could probably afford the payments, but after they
all got laid off when the plant shut down ...
In order for me to believe you, you would have to come up with some
actual statistics showing that most or the great majority of "
20% buyers"
were speculating. "Lots and lots" doesn't count.
Until then, I'm going to assume that most people coming to the borrowing
table with 20% down were not speculators. They were giving out 0% down,
no interest, or worse negative-amortizing, loans. Why would speculators
try that hard? Again, I don't mean some speculators, I mean most. No way.
Finally, no bank
had to make those loans. They did it to make a killing
before the scheme collapsed ( which they knew would happen ).
The behavior of the risky buyers and the structure of the notes
would have been irrelevant had the lenders done due dilligence.