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. I've never met or heard a Frenchmen declare that they wish America and the Allies would have left them alone so that they could continue to live under the Nazi's. While this was not a universal feeling among all the French, those who tended to not share the view that liberation was a good thing often found themselves receiving a knock on the door from the resistance.
Things had changed by the time of the Normandy landings. The Allied Invasion of North Africa featuring the French forces there largely capitulating and going over to the allied side, triggered the expansion of the Nazi occupation to 100 % of France. Before that had happened, the French had soured on the Nazis when the labor deportations had begun. (A key foundational element for the resistance was the presence of so many young Frenchmen hiding in the countryside in order to avoid being swept up in the labor drafts.)
It eventually became apparent to most, including the right wingers, that the Nazis intention was to treat France as a resource, not as an ally of any sort.
1.France was no match for Germany, nobody knew it better than French themselves. France couldn't even score any real victory and achieve her objectives against a disarmed Germany when she and Belgium invaded and occupied Ruhr. She was no match against Germany when it came to industrial production, population, amount of troops capable of fielding, and after WWI, geopolitical situation (WWI destroyed Russian Empire and Austria-Hungarian Empire, two great powers capable of threatening Germany and potential candidates for France to establish alliance with. Soviet Union was big and powerful, but because of her political system and Britain&France's stubborn refusal to open their eyes and see reality, Soviet Union, mortal enemy of Germany geopolitically and ideologically, in Hitler's mind, racially, ended up becoming Germany's ally, till Hitler's folly blew it all off, which ultimately led to his defeat. All the other small nations grew out of former Russian and Austrian-Hungarian territories, did ally themselves with France, but they did it because they wanted to leverage France against Germany when in reality France herself was scared to death by Germany, militarily speaking, France almost bankrupted herself trying to build Maginot Line, she didn't build it so she could venture out to attack Germany to save, say, Poland. Both sides were totally clueless when it came what the other side were capable of and what the other side was expecting. Britain didn't help either, for some still unexplained reason, Britain somehow managed to convince herself that Soviet Union wasn't a significant power while Poland was. Britain sincerely believed Poland could serve as the new Russia while the actual successor to Russia was considered at best a supplier of raw material. The whole scene between WWI and WWII was just bizarre.) and unlike Britain who actually considered France to be the main threat to European balance of power after WWI, France knew it all too well that she was just not of the same league with Germany. When you were trying to fight a war against an enemy you knew you couldn't win, usually people just give up. And unlike Russians who, for a while, was fighting a hopeless war against Nazi invasion, there were no ideology, no stubborn nationalism and certainly no fear that even if you hang white flag, the enemy would still just shoot you because they consider you barely above animal.
2. Ideologically speaking, extreme rightwing Nazi-like ideology was actually quite popular in France, more than a few French politicians and officers would rather France join hands with Germany fighting Soviet Union. When your sympathy lies with your enemy, it weakens your spine and makes you surrender the first sign things are not doing well.
3. Nobody, absolutely nobody, foresaw the power of mobile warfare, Stalin reached a deal with Germany not because he was naive enough to believe there wouldn't be a German-Soviet showdown somewhere down the road, he did it because Germany was the sole nation capable of providing him the freedom of action he needed to rebuild Russian empire's border in eastern Europe (Britain and France blustered a lot but in reality they could not do anything against Soviet Union without the cooperation of Germany no matter what Soviet Union did.) and because he, like everybody else except for Hitler and maybe a few of his newly promoted senior officers, believed a war between France&Britain and Germany would be long-running and bloody as it was in WWII, he was trying to strengthen himself and waiting for France&Britain and Germany to bleed them out before intervening. France and Britain didn't see what's coming either, people panic when they see stuff that defies their own life-long belief/education, usually they either retreat further into their own stubborn belief and blame others, or they collapse. In life and politics, there are places for the losers to retreat, lick their wounds and rage, in war, there is none, so they collapse.
I am curious to know your thoughts. Also, why is it that after they were conquered, there were no massive resistance movements? Did the average French citizen possess firearms like is common in the U.S. today?
As I understand it, on the eve of war, France had one of the largest standing armies in the world. They mobilized more than 8 million men prior to Hitler's invasion. This was larger than the German Army. Also, the German Army was only 25% mechanized. The French Army's tactics and commanders were inferior to their German counterparts, which contributed greatly to the rapid German victory. I am still puzzled as to why they did not put up a better fight.
They were probably too busy arguing pronunciation to pay attention to the threat against them.
I have a Masters in History from 1990 and I will say this.
It's really not that complicated, the answer to your question
1) The French did not want war with Germany again. They were happy
with the results from the Treaty of Versailles. They were tired of war,
remember, the Great War was supposed to have ended war at the time.
French arts and sciences were booming. Antiwar sentiment was very strong.
2) They felt dragged into it by a treaty with Britain, who declared war on
Germany first, via their treaty with Poland.
3) The Maginot Line fell quickly, designed to protect the border along pressure
points, but thinly, blitzkreig broke through the weakest points and brought in
huge battalions who got inside the line, after which France's army was slow to
be called up and ready.. the Maginot Line failed, but was also not designed for
imminent war.
4) Overall sentiment to preserve villages and cities from destruction, notably Paris
and once the Vichy Regime was installed, most French were ok with life in Vichy
France, there were holdouts in Southern France, where the Free French Army held
sway, and in North Africa, but remember Vichy France was not ALL France.
Therefore a large part of mid-to-southern France stayed independent.
Life went on close enough to normal for many French in Vichy France.
5) With Italy allied to Germany, there was simply no way France would
pursue a real war against Italy, their closest cultural peer.
1) France was totally exhausted after WW1 and the economic depression.
2) France was politically unstable (not unlike Germany before Hitler). When Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia and when he annexed Austria there was no government in Paris.
3) People blame the Maginot line, but what they don't know is that the line was never completed to the Atlantic as planned. It stopped somewhere before the Belgian border. It is reasonable to think that with a completed line, Hitler would have had a difficult job or consider a different strategy.
4) De-Gaulle was a brilliant colonel. He advocated the use of tanks on mass and modern tactics, but was totally ignored by the French high command (who were horrible since WW1). Surprisingly, the German command payed attention to De Gaulle's theories and developed them further.
5) Between September 1939 and May 1940 the front between France and Germany remained quiet. France actually attacked and gained 10 miles of German territory and then stopped. With a different attitude Hitler could have been defeated or at least stopped, but the French chose not to act.
6) Above all, the French didn't want any war and ultimately payed the price.
I have a Masters in History from 1990 and I will say this.
It's really not that complicated, the answer to your question
Just a couple corrections and points to what you said here...
Quote:
1) The French did not want war with Germany again. They were happy
with the results from the Treaty of Versailles. They were tired of war,
remember, the Great War was supposed to have ended war at the time.
French arts and sciences were booming. Antiwar sentiment was very strong.
This is true, the French in general did not want another war with Germany. However, France was the foremost nation in pursuing maintaining the official status of the Versailles Treaty and worked tirelessly for many years to enforce it before they backed down in the face of Anglo-American pressure to back off the enforcement of the treaty. Overall though, France was not "all in" for another war with Germany and was dealing with some major social issues at home as the war loomed.
Quote:
2) They felt dragged into it by a treaty with Britain, who declared war on
Germany first, via their treaty with Poland.
This is technically incorrect. France had been a Polish ally since 1921 and further strengthened the relationship in 1939 specifically to provide a counter to Hitler's Germany. France further promised that they would launch an offensive within 3 weeks if Germany invaded Poland. Britain did not issue a 'guarantee' of Poland until March 1939 pledging their support alongside France in guaranteeing the sovereignty of Poland. Both Britain and France issued separate decrees to Germany following the invasion calling for removal of German troops under the threat of war. The British declaration called for their removal by 1100 hours and the French called for it by 1700 hours. So, Britain technically declared war first, but France's declaration had nothing to do with Britain and everything to do with Poland. The French immediately followed up with the shortlived and ineffectual Saar Offensive.
Quote:
3) The Maginot Line fell quickly, designed to protect the border along pressure
points, but thinly, blitzkreig broke through the weakest points and brought in
huge battalions who got inside the line, after which France's army was slow to
be called up and ready.. the Maginot Line failed, but was also not designed for
imminent war.
This is a gross misrepresentation of how the actual battle unfolded. The Maginot Line was never directly assaulted, merely engaged with pinning/feint attacks. The line itself was not even really attacked until the German's launched 'Operation Tiger' on June 14th which is the same day that Paris fell.
What the Germans did do was basically bypass the line by going through Belgium and the Low Countries. Of course, this is exactly what the French and British thought they would do and where each positioned the bulk of their forces and their best units. The Germans further countered this by using another distracting force that occupied the main French and British armies in Belgium while the main German attack moved through the Ardennes which was considered 'impassable' for a larger force.
The attack through the Ardennes avoided the northern end of the Maginot Line and allowed the Germans to cut a swathe through France and isolate the bulk of the French and British armies to the north and away from Paris. In no way was the French army "slow to deply" as there was a 7 month lapse between the declaration of war on Germany and the beginning of the German offensive against France, a period known as the "Phoney War".
4) Overall sentiment to preserve villages and cities from destruction, notably Paris
and once the Vichy Regime was installed, most French were ok with life in Vichy
France, there were holdouts in Southern France, where the Free French Army held
sway, and in North Africa, but remember Vichy France was not ALL France.
Therefore a large part of mid-to-southern France stayed independent.
Life went on close enough to normal for many French in Vichy France.
Given the rapid collapse of their armies the French certainly decided that it was better to surrender then continue the fight and watch the entire country be destroyed. The result was a split France. Paris, northern France and the Atlantic coast all fell under direct German control, the 'Zone Ocupee' and the Vichy government had limited legal authority in those areas. Most of southern and middle France fell under control of the puppet Vichy government in the 'Zone Libre'. The Vichy government administered this zone as well as technically controlling any French colonies, though in practice only Algeria really remained a direct French controlled possession as the others quickly pledged themselves to the Free French or fell under de facto Japanese control. This situation lasted until 1942 when the Germans launched "Case Anton" and basically asserted direct control over the Vichy territories, but allowed the Vichy government to remain intact as local administrators.
Quote:
5) With Italy allied to Germany, there was simply no way France would
pursue a real war against Italy, their closest cultural peer.
I'm not really sure what this has to do with the situation overall. Culturally close or not, I have never seen evidence that would suggest that France chose to not prosecute the war based on the fact that the Italians were allied to Germany.
People blame the Maginot line, but what they don't know is that the line was never completed to the Atlantic as planned. It stopped somewhere before the Belgian border. It is reasonable to think that with a completed line, Hitler would have had a difficult job or consider a different strategy.
There was never a plan to extend the Maginot Line along the Belgian border to the Atlantic coast. For one, the region was almost completely devoid of natural defensive positions which could be incorporated into any system of fortifications. In addition, the water table is extremely high in the area making it impossible to build the type of massive fortresses which made up the rest of the Maginot Line complex. This frontier area between the two nations was also home to significant concentrations of industrial facilities and mining operations. Since you couldn’t exactly build bunkers, anti-tank ditches and other defensive positions right in the center of some factory town, the only alternative would be to construct them away from the border and deeper in French territory. Given that the whole point of the Maginot Line was to keep the Germans out of France, having a line of forts on French soil, well south of the Belgian border would hardly accomplish that task.
But more importantly, the French had concluded that the best way to defend northern France was to do so inside Belgium. Having signed a mutual defense pact with Belgium in 1920, all future war planning was based on the notion that any German aggression would be met by the combined forces of France and Belgium. A mobile force of French troops was to be established which would cross the Belgian border at the first sign of trouble and advance to the Meuse River, essentially blocking what was believed to be the only possible invasion route into northern France. When the Belgians withdrew from their defensive alliance with France and declared neutrality in 1936, the French were left with few options. Extending the Maginot Line was not something which could be considered from either a practical standpoint or a monetary one. Construction costs of the other sections of the line were staggering and funds to do any type of enhancements or add-ons simply did not exist. So the only hope the French had was that the fort system Belgium was building along the Belgian/German border would slow the Germans down enough for France to move troops to the north and halt an invasion. Over reliance on the Maginot Line and the belief that the Ardennes was impenetrable unfortunately locked the French into what turned out to be a losing defensive strategy.
There was never a plan to extend the Maginot Line along the Belgian border to the Atlantic coast. For one, the region was almost completely devoid of natural defensive positions which could be incorporated into any system of fortifications. In addition, the water table is extremely high in the area making it impossible to build the type of massive fortresses which made up the rest of the Maginot Line complex. This frontier area between the two nations was also home to significant concentrations of industrial facilities and mining operations. Since you couldn’t exactly build bunkers, anti-tank ditches and other defensive positions right in the center of some factory town, the only alternative would be to construct them away from the border and deeper in French territory. Given that the whole point of the Maginot Line was to keep the Germans out of France, having a line of forts on French soil, well south of the Belgian border would hardly accomplish that task.
But more importantly, the French had concluded that the best way to defend northern France was to do so inside Belgium. Having signed a mutual defense pact with Belgium in 1920, all future war planning was based on the notion that any German aggression would be met by the combined forces of France and Belgium. A mobile force of French troops was to be established which would cross the Belgian border at the first sign of trouble and advance to the Meuse River, essentially blocking what was believed to be the only possible invasion route into northern France. When the Belgians withdrew from their defensive alliance with France and declared neutrality in 1936, the French were left with few options. Extending the Maginot Line was not something which could be considered from either a practical standpoint or a monetary one. Construction costs of the other sections of the line were staggering and funds to do any type of enhancements or add-ons simply did not exist. So the only hope the French had was that the fort system Belgium was building along the Belgian/German border would slow the Germans down enough for France to move troops to the north and halt an invasion. Over reliance on the Maginot Line and the belief that the Ardennes was impenetrable unfortunately locked the French into what turned out to be a losing defensive strategy.
As usual, an excellent post by TonyT.
However, from what I read, there was a political argument if to exclude Belgium or include it inside the Majinot line. Some French politicians thought Belgians will be offended if left outside.
Anyway, a chain is as strong as its weakest link. If you have a fortification that covers only 2/3 of the territory, guess where the enemy is going to attack...
The French knew the German attack would come through the 1/3 undefended area, not through the 2/3's that was protected by the Maginot Line. That was part of the point of having the Maginot Line. To force the Germans to divert and attack through Belgium instead of the French-German border directly. This would buy time for the French and make the German path of attack predictable. What the French failed to predict correctly was which part of the 1/3 the Germans would attack through. The French fatally believed the Ardennes region was unsuitable for the Germans to launch a major invasion through. The French expected the main German attack would certainly come through Belgium just like WW1 and they put their strongest forces in that area.
Another major flaw of the French was having a purely defensive reactionary battle plan. So by merely reacting to German moves, they allowed the Germans to take the initiative and dictate how the battles played out. The Germans knew this and exploited the French by moving a smaller force into Belgium merely as a screen. The French reacted by moving their largest force into Belgium away from France, exactly as the Germans had predicted. This allowed the Germans to then drive their main force through the Ardennes and attack the French at their weakest point. Once the Germans beat the thin French defenses there, there was no second line of defense to stop the strong German push.
Nobody has said this yet. But I think the French expected the Germans to attack inwards towards Paris. The Germans instead drove their main force (the sickle cut) directly towards the English Channel and did not go towards Paris. This trapped the strongest French forces in Belgium. I think the French figured the Germans would launch their main invasion directly at the heart of France. Instead, the Germans focused their main efforts on trapping in the French army in Belgium.
Here is an alternative history question. What could the French have done differently that would have resulted in a better outcome?
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