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SmilingWolf, very detailed and well thought out post, already sent some rep your way. Most of your points I would take no issue with and it seems like a spot on analysis. The only real question I would pose is what would the capture of Moscow had done for the Germans?
In order to answer that I think you need to frame the response into the scenario that you envision them making Moscow their ultimate target.
1. From the onset of Barbarossa. You argued that the broad front offensive simply involved too much territory for the Germans to take. I would agree with the statement. However, do you think a concentrated punch straight through to Moscow would have really worked? The Germans would have been operating with massively extended supply lines and broad exposed flanks if they chose to undertake that sort of attack. Also, by diverting further resources into a center punch would the remaining forces have been strong enough to rapidly neutralize other existing Soviet forces as they did, forces that would threaten the main thrust if left alive?
2. The alternate plan to Barbarossa that took a more structured and longer approach. Would taking more time have really been in German favor? As history proved the Red Army grew stronger by the day as they raised new troops, produced more tanks and weapons and brought in veterans from the east. Would a longer and arguably better planned German offensive had made a real difference if other critical mistakes pointed out in your post were not also corrected.
3. Stepping up the timetable by a month. There is a lot of debate on this one and the ultimate effect that it would have. Ironically launching Barbarossa a month earlier may have found the Soviets in a better defensive position as their second echelon would not have been in the process of displacing and moving forward. Additionally, the armies that defended Moscow existed a month before the Germans actually got there, so force disposition at the actual battle would not have been any different.
4. Not stalling to regroup and take the time to complete the encirclement of Leningrad and destroy the Soviet SW Front at Kiev. I posted earlier about what I see as the unreasonableness of foregoing these moves. The German supply situation following Smolensk was tenuous at best and they had committed most of their reserves to that battle. They needed to time to regroup, supply and secure their flanks before moving on.
So, under what scenario (doesn't even have to be one of the ones above) do you see as having the greatest chance of success to take Moscow?
Further, what would taking Moscow actually have accomplished? There is a remote chance that the Soviets sue for peace, there are many rumors of a peace initiative in early October of 1941, but nothing that is conclusive that anything actually took place or developed into a real initiative. Barring a peace treaty (why would the Germans accept if vicotry was inevitable?) we need to assume that the Soviets would continue the fight. The Battle for Moscow may have simply denegrated into another Stalingrad. Even if the Germans take it, the Soviets would still be left with a strong base in the Urals, in possession of Stalingrad and the Baku fields, most likely still holding Leningrad and with armies in the field (Kiev?). How are the Germans in a better position holding Moscow then they were without it?
NJGOAT very cogent observations regarding my initial criticism of the overall strategy for Operation Barbarossa. I will respond to each of your observations in turn and do what I can to enhance the credence of my assertion that Hitler should have narrowed his overall strategic objective by taking Moscow in one supremely concentrated thrust. Your first observation covered the overall big picture question:
“The only real question I would pose is what would the capture of Moscow had done for the Germans?” I would also submit that a variation of this very important question is: What would the capture of Moscow do to the Russian people?
I will give a broad answer to your question and then follow up by responding to each of your points.
Why take Moscow?
Historically, Moscow was (and still is) the core and heart of the Russian nation. Over the span of centuries, it grew into becoming the home and symbol of czarist power and it is this very special, very unique kind of consummate power over a nation of 180 million souls which I would like to stress as a key to understanding why Moscow should have been Hitler/Germany’s singular strategic objective in the beginning phases of the invasion of the Soviet Union.
Moscow wasn’t just a point on the map. It wasn’t just another capital to be taken by the Germans. It was the heart of Russian political power; it was the seat and head of Stalin’s rule over the Soviet Union. Moscow and Stalin were, in some ways, one and the same animal. The Russian people, though in a constant state of terror and fear of Stalin, were held within the grip of an intense cult of personality/leader worship of the man, bordering on a kind of mass hysteria. In the eyes of the Russian peasant, he was given a kind of God-like status over them. He could do no wrong. He could make no mistake. He was omnipotent. That God-like status was the very core of his ultimate vulnerability.
Throughout its long history, the Russian people have deeply depended on strong, despotic tyrants to rule over them. And, it is this very profound dependence on a tyrant and the perception of the Russian people of where that power originated which goes to the very heart of why Moscow should have been Hitler’s ultimate objective in the first phase of the invasion. And, it is that very deep psychological dependence on authority and the Russian perception of Moscow as being the symbol of that authority which clearly should have made the taking of Moscow as Germany’s “prime directive”.
By taking Moscow, had he fled the capital, Stalin would have been unceremoniously and violently removed from his own seat of power over the Soviet Union and the Russian people. The psychological and symbolic action of the taking of Moscow - this alone would have been more than enough impact as to not only destroy his power and political base of support but also, in the eyes of the Russian people, it would have been a mortally damaging blow in the way they perceived their leader.
The very heart of Stalin’s power base was Moscow. The actual political infrastructure to his power lay there. Stalin and his Communist rule within the Kremlin along with his vast network of power support groups like the NKVD made Moscow their physical operational base along with all of the files, all of the infinitely mountainous piles of information necessary to control and terrorize 180 million people.
By taking Moscow, Hitler would have chopped off the head of the Soviet snake. Stalin, fleeing in humiliation from the Russian seat of power, would have been deposed and or assassinated by those within his power circle and a negotiated surrender initiated.
There are several other prime reasons why Moscow had to be Hitler’s supreme strategic objective if he and Germany were to stand a real chance of conquering and defeating such a vast continental empire like the Soviet Union.
As mentioned in the original post, Moscow was the hub and heart of the Russian nation. From its tentacles spread not only Stalin’s power, his underlying Kremlin circle of power, the power of the interior ministry forces, the power base of the NKVD, but also Moscow held a substantial portion of the nation’s industrial war capacity and output, it was the central communications hub to the entire nation, and the list of national infrastructure imperatives goes on and on.
By taking Moscow, Hitler would have ripped out the heart and soul of the Russian people.
Leningrad, though quite important as a strategic military objective in its own right, could only be regarded as a secondary objective relative to the overall invasion. Peter the Great established St. Petersburg (Leningrad) as Russia’s capital –this is true. However, his prime motivation was to create a tangible link to Europe so as to help pull Russia out of its more provincial (barbaric) roots and help modernize Russia. Be that as it may, St.Petersburg/Leningrad remained an outpost to the central and dominating influence of Moscow where the real power of the Czars and subsequent rulers existed.
Why take Moscow? Moscow was Stalin just as Berlin was Hitler and the ultimate taking of Berlin by the Russians at the end of the war was never something to be questioned by Stalin as Russia’s key and ultimate strategic objective in the eventual destruction of Germany. By taking Berlin, Stalin automatically assumed Hitler would be destroyed and, by extension, Hitler should have drawn the same line of ultimate logic in the taking of Moscow as the destruction of Stalin and the Soviet Union.
Moscow not only should have been taken. It had to be taken.
(NJGoat) 1)From the onset of Barbarossa. You argued that the broad front offensive simply involved too much territory for the Germans to take. I would agree with the statement. However, do you think a concentrated punch straight through to Moscow would have really worked? The Germans would have been operating with massively extended supply lines and broad exposed flanks if they chose to undertake that sort of attack. Also, by diverting further resources into a center punch would the remaining forces have been strong enough to rapidly neutralize other existing Soviet forces as they did, forces that would threaten the main thrust if left alive?
Response: As outlined in the original post, Hitler made a number of detrimental strategic mistakes that affected the outcome of Barbarossa. The scenario of making Moscow the primary objective in the defeat of the Soviet Union is based on the set of assumptions related to strategic decisions made by Hitler being different ones and would have supported and substantially increased the probability of Germany’s success invading Russia.
If any other nation state under absolute authoritarian rule could possibly understand the dependence of the Russian people on an absolute authority figure, it should have been Hitler and the German people whose culture of respect and adherence to ultimate authority was central to their existence.
The psychological state of the Russian people was dependent on a command and control mentality. Their psychological make-up rested on rule from above. Individual initiative, personal initiative and independence of action were not attributes of the traditional Russian mindset. This was where the major difference existed between the Russians and the Germans.
Though the average German was raised to respect authority, he was also raised to take individual initiative and exercise aggressive, independent action and this was one of the primary psychological core elements of the German soldier in the field – from their officers, line officers right down to enlisted personnel. When given an order to take an objective, the typical German officer was given the autonomy and independence of action to fulfill the order and take the objective in whatever way he deemed necessary, just as long as he obeyed the order and took the objective.
On the other hand, the Russian was not given such license or automatic autonomy of action. He did exactly as he was told to do or he’d be removed and or shot on the spot. This reality led to the Russian officer corps showing a supreme reluctance to take immediate and independent action in the field and led to entire army groups being annihilated by the Wehrmacht during the first phases of the invasion.
By making Moscow the supreme strategic objective in this first critical phase of the invasion, Hitler could have altered the aim and force concentration of the invasion groups and significantly sharpened the Wehrmacht’s “point of the spear” while dramatically increasing the force multiplier of his three major army groups.
Even after the beginning stages of Operation Barbarossa, Hitler was still unclear with his overall strategic objectives and this led not only to increased tensions and stresses to the German general staff but seriously dulled the “point of the spear” of the overall strategic initiative of the entire invasion force. This uncertainty and resulting dilution of the strategic objective only added to the original mistake Hitler made of spreading his entire invasion force over such an impossibly vast expanse of enemy territory. It seems he wasn’t really quite sure of what he specifically wanted to do with over 3 million German and allied soldiers in the conquest of the Soviet Union. Yes, the overall mission objectives of each of the three major army groups was outlined, however, these three major strategic objectives were so general and so dispersed over such a vast expanse of Russian/Soviet territory as to inevitably dilute the energy of the overall strategic thrust.
In this overall alternative reality (!) scenario, Hitler from the very beginning of the planning stages of Operation Barbarossa decided to make Moscow his ultimate strategic objective in this crucial, primary first phase of the invasion.
· Hitler places the entire German economy on a war production footing at least 18 months before the actual invasion. He orders top priority to the production of armor, heavy tank design and production, infrantry support tanks (STUGS), support armor vehicles, with heavy production emphasis on 88 mm artillery and mobile artillery tracked vehicles. All combat and support vehicles will be designed to withstand absolute worst case scenario winter cold weather conditions and all armored units, especially new tank designs will be given heavy sloping armor along with 88mm main canon along with a completely reliable and easily mass produced diesel engine that can easily operate under the harshest winter conditions and be powered by coal produced diesel fuels. He orders the improvement of severe cold weather resistant lubricants and engine insulators along with 35% wider tank tracks and wider tracks for all tracked vehicles to maneuver better through heavy snow.
· Hitler orders the increased production of tactical attack/ and ground support aircraft especially heavy production of ME-109/Fockewulf and Stuka ground attack aircraft.
· Hitler orders the doubling of panzer armored divisions without the dilution of numbers of tanks and support vehicles in each division.
· Hitler orders his friend Albert Speer to work with Fritz Todt, Armaments Minister carrying out the increased War time production orders.
· Hitler orders the production of adequate winter clothing to the entire invasion force and the complete stockpiling in forward areas of this clothing along with ration stockpiles to help feed his invasion forces for two years in addition to actual field foraging by invasion forces.
· Hitler orders the Wehrmacht to send specially trained and culturally sensitive training and support personnel to immediately improve the combat effectiveness and unit cohesion of all allied forces in the army groups. He also excludes any and all participation of Italian military personnel in the combat groups.
· Hitler orders Himmler and the SS and the Wehrmacht overall to become “goodwill” ambassadors of Germany in the occupied countries of Europe and to implement immediate recruiting drives in all occupied lands in the formation of supporting allied armies using the same elements of German training and discipline used in the regular Wehrmacht. He further orders Himmler and the attached Reich Govenors of the occupied lands to refrain from any ethnic persecution of any kind, including jewish populations.
· Six months prior to the invasion, Hitler orders Goring to arrange for both Himmler and his assistant, Heydrich to be tried for treason and shot and replaced by an SS chief whose primary focus is the formation of new Waffen combat SS divisions to spearhead the advance of Army Group Center’s advance toward Moscow. All political SS units will be “re-educated” with the new mission objective of Germanic cultural and political indoctrination and the winning over of all newly conquered peoples in the “former” Soviet Union as well all occupied lands in Europe and especially Poland. All peoples will be treated with the proper respect and invited to join Germany’s noble effort in defeating Stalin and the Communist Bolsheviks. The newly conquered lands will be given their own semi autonomous rule and given the proper respect. No genocidal operations will take place and any violent resistance will be liquidated. The carrot will be emphasized over the stick but the stick will be used when necessary.
· Hitler makes a secret agreement with Japan one year before invasion. Hitler promises to declare war on the United States once Japan is at war with America. In return, Japan promises to tie up Stalin’s eastern armies in Manchuria and preventing any reinforcement of Moscow.
· Hitler orders 16 months prior to the actual invasion window for German military intelligence to infiltrate the Russian army general staff, along with Russian front line Polish frontier units with complete intelligence assessment of the condition and disposition of Russian opposing forces in the region. Additional infiltration of the Russian armaments industry and production areas with a complete assessment of the latest armor tank designs to be passed onto Albert Speer and the German armor production design staff for any possible improvements in the overall heavy tank design.
· Hitler orders counter espionage agents to infiltrate the ranks of Stalin’s agents within the German general staff headquarters and to coordinate the dissemination of a disinformation campaign to be given to Stalin.
· Hitler orders 36 months prior to invasion window, the replacement of all German rail lines/tracks to be compatible with the Russian rail tracks specs.
· Hitler orders the increased production of heavy trucks and other vehicles in support of additional and existing armor divisions and the immediate acquisition of an additional 1,000,000 horses.
· Hitler orders 36 months prior to invasion window, complete studies and preparation of all logistical and force supply requirements with Albert Speer and his deputies given additional responsibilities in this area.
· Hitler orders 18 months prior to invasion window full mobilization and the conscription of an additional 2 million invasion troops to be added to the existing 3 million invasion forces for a total front line force of 5 million troops and an additional 1.5 million invasion troops as a reserve force to replace anticipated deaths/casualties of front line troops and to replace depleted front line units.
· These reserve and replacement units will also be further reinforced with the addition of newly recruited and fully trained and indoctrinated allied units from the entire European theatre with the exception of Italy.
Finally, Hitler orders 24 months prior to Operation Barbarossa the complete operational planning for the taking of Moscow as the primary strategic objective in the first phase of the successful invasion and conquest of the Soviet Union. The planning and strategic initiative will be focused, concentrated and pointed in the taking of Moscow.
Army Group Center will be the natural point of concentration for the attack holding 60% of all German Wehrmacht invasion forces. The majority of all Waffen SS combat divisions will be assigned to each of three large panzer armies as the front of Army Group Center’s spearhead toward Moscow, each in complete and coordinated support of the other and all three moving simultaneously toward Moscow. Each of the three panzer armies will be led by newly minted Field Marshal Heinz Guderian, Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, and Field Marshal Hermann Hoth. The outer and extending flanks of this center spearhead will be protected by flanking German and allied divisions and by further flanking movements of advancing elements from both Army Group North and Army Group South.
Army Group North’s mission is to advance in support of Army Group Center protecting Center’s advancing flanks and eventually encircle and cut off Leningrad but not to invade the city itself. This operation will be completed as quickly as possible so as to provide a northern force support to reinforce the advance of Army Group Center’s drive to Moscow.
Army Group South’s mission is to protect the southern flank of Army Group Center’s advance, to fend off expected Russia southern/Ukraine force counterattacks and to make diversionary deception thrusts toward Kiev with the aim of immediately assaulting newly formed Russian counterattack armies in the southern region.
In addition, All Army Groups, but especially Army Group South would deploy specially trained SS political officers who will help trigger localized insurrections by the Ukraine population against communist rule.
Operation Barbarossa would take place on May 15th, 1941. If springs rains at this time made the start date unfeasible, then the start date would be set after the ground firmed to support the armored divisions. All forward supply depots, rail depots, forward airfields would be established and ready at least 3 months prior to invasion window.
Hitler gives as part of the operational directives of the invasion the standing order to abide by the Geneva Convention in treatment of enemy prisoners of war and to offer them full shelter and food and to indoctrinate those willing to join the German army to fight the Bolsheviks and defeat Stalin.
Hitler will order Mussolini to not invade the Balkans. German intelligence and espionage personnel will fully infiltrate Yugoslavia and its possible opposition forces and neutralize any British agents in the area and cover other flashpoints in the Balkans. With the augmented and enlarged Barbarossa forces on standby, an additional Balkan force and attached two reserve Waffen SS divisions will be stationed in Yugoslavia and on the border of Greece to extinguish any hostilities in the region.
(NuGoat)”Also, by diverting further resources into a center punch would the remaining forces have been strong enough to rapidly neutralize other existing Soviet forces as they did, forces that would threaten the main thrust if left alive?”
Response: At this point, the spring and early summer 1941, the Russian military was still in the throes of frantically trying to reorganize, re train and revamp the Russian army and correct the obvious deficiencies of tactical warfare doctrine, equipment obsolescence, and nearly non-existent communications/command and control systems.
All of these weaknesses were a drawback to Russia adequately coordinating and putting together effective strategic counterattack initiatives in response to an immediate, violent, shock inducing assault into the heart of Russia.
These coordinated spearheads would be designed and planned to support the core mission of Army Group Center in its drive to Moscow. Of course, Stalin would have no clear idea as to the primary strategic objective of the invasion, he would be as disoriented and in shock over the invasion as he actually was in the first weeks of Operation Barbarossa.
The augmented German invasion forces through military conscription, along with the augmented Allied recruitment and training of support forces should prove more than adequate to reinforce the advancing flanks created by the forward thrusts of Army Group Center and these flanking forces would be assigned to both Army Groups North and South.
(NuGoat)” 2. The alternate plan to Barbarossa that took a more structured and longer approach. Would taking more time have really been in German favor? As history proved the Red Army grew stronger by the day as they raised new troops, produced more tanks and weapons and brought in veterans from the east. Would a longer and arguably better planned German offensive had made a real difference if other critical mistakes pointed out in your post were not also corrected.”
Response: This entire alternative invasion plan would be based on the above corrections to Hitler’s mistakes and the longer approach of this alternate plan would be initiated in the event that Moscow was not taken by the beginning of the Winter of 1941. As part of the standing operational orders, Hitler would order all forward units to prepare to dig into already prepared defensive lines and winter quarters in forward advance areas if this Plan B scenario were to occur.
In this way, the advances sustained to that point would be protected and secured in preparation for the coming spring offensive of 1942. However, given the exponential punching power of three massive combined and coordinated panzer armies pushing forward in the advancing vanguard of Army Group Center’s drive to Moscow, given the earlier determined starting date for Operation Barbarossa in mid-May 1941, given the increase in force strength to well over 200 plus fortified divisions to a total invading force of 5 million men and a reserve force of 1.5 million men, given all the mentioned strategic, operational, material, and force corrections, given the augmentation of the Luftwaffe attack squadrons to work in coordination with all three army groups, but especially aerial artillery concentration in unison with Army Group Center’s advance…this overall strategic plan stood a healthy chance of success.
Though your point is well considered in regard the reality of Russia’s amazing ability to withstand an assault of this nature and to pour in nearly limitless new conscripts against the German advance, and that each day’s delay in the completion of the strategic objective would mean a further opportunity for Russian forces to rebuild and fight back; it is, however, also a reality that such counterattacks could prove disastrous for Russia as evidenced by Stalin’s fatal decision to push forward counterattacks during the winter of 1941/early 1942 when Soviet armies sustained severe losses as German forces dug in after an initial pullback from Moscow.
By planning in advance and preparing winter fortifications along the line of advance the offensive thrust of Operation Barbarossa and the subsequent Operation Typhoon initiative could be preserved and readied for the Spring 42 offensive.
However despite these precautions in preparation for the possible delay in the taking of Moscow, it would be considered as a fallback Plan B.
(NuGoat)”3. Stepping up the timetable by a month. There is a lot of debate on this one and the ultimate effect that it would have. Ironically launching Barbarossa a month earlier may have found the Soviets in a better defensive position as their second echelon would not have been in the process of displacing and moving forward. Additionally, the armies that defended Moscow existed a month before the Germans actually got there, so force disposition at the actual battle would not have been any different.”
Response: Though the Russian Army disposition in the defense of Moscow was clearly established by the time of Army Group Center’s delayed advance to Moscow, this alternate invasion scenario would have stood a much better and much earlier chance of success against such arrayed defenses. Army Group Center in this alternative would be more highly concentrated, heavier manned, heavier armored spearheads, three massive, concentrated, coordinated attacking panzer armies moving together, along with the mayhem inflicted by two supporting flanking, gigantic army groups creating their own line of destruction along a very wide swath along the line to Moscow.
It would have proven extremely difficult for any Russian defensive force to withstand such an intense onslaught. These force multipliers of such a massive and heavily concentrated advancing armored spearhead would be further enhanced by a more fortified Luftwaffe working in support of the ground forces applying heavy ordinance as “aerial artillery”, thus decimating Russian defensive positions in unison with ground attack forces.
(NuGoat)”4. Not stalling to regroup and take the time to complete the encirclement of Leningrad and destroy the Soviet SW Front at Kiev. I posted earlier about what I see as the unreasonableness of foregoing these moves. The German supply situation following Smolensk was tenuous at best and they had committed most of their reserves to that battle. They needed to time to regroup, supply and secure their flanks before moving on.”
Response: Such considerations would need to be adequately taken into account in the planning and preparation stages of the operation long before it even started. As mentioned, a more fully mobilized Germany would need to be established at least a year to 18 months before the start of hostilities on the Eastern Front. And, Germany did have the luxury at this time to fully and adequately prepare for the invasion.
Though it seems Hitler was a bit reluctant to initiate such a mobilization due to political concerns over doubts as to the actual collective resolve of the German populace to embrace such a reality, nevertheless, Hitler was their leader, their Fuhrer, and he had the final say in such a decision and I am confident, given the character of the German people, they would have easily went along with the mobilization and war economy retooling. And Hitler up to that time, was an absolute winner, taking one nation after the next without a shot being fired all the way to border with Poland which astounded the German people.
As far as Leningrad and Kiev are concerned, I recall that Leningrad was not completely encircled by Army Group North and that there was entry point into the city via Lake Ladoga which at least helped keep the wretched populace alive. It would have been sufficient in my estimation for Army Group North to maintain a standing stranglehold over most of the city and to keep a portion of Russia’s army busy defending the city and tied up in that region.
Once Leningrad was reached and threatened, a portion of Army Group North could then be sent to offer Army Group Center’s armored spearheads further support as a force protector against further Russian counterattacks on the approaches to Moscow.
(NuGoat) “So, under what scenario (doesn't even have to be one of the ones above) do you see as having the greatest chance of success to take Moscow?
Further, what would taking Moscow actually have accomplished? There is a remote chance that the Soviets sue for peace, there are many rumors of a peace initiative in early October of 1941, but nothing that is conclusive that anything actually took place or developed into a real initiative. Barring a peace treaty (why would the Germans accept if vicotry was inevitable?) we need to assume that the Soviets would continue the fight. The Battle for Moscow may have simply denegrated into another Stalingrad. Even if the Germans take it, the Soviets would still be left with a strong base in the Urals, in possession of Stalingrad and the Baku fields, most likely still holding Leningrad and with armies in the field (Kiev?). How are the Germans in a better position holding Moscow then they were without it?”
Response: The overall scenario as outlined in this plan stood a reasonable probability for success in the capture of Moscow before the winter of 1941. Granted, I’ve thrown in lots of corrective measures and enhancements to the overall strategic picture, especially in the preparation of the invasion forces, the enlarged concentration and singular focused objective of Army Group Center and the reliance on flanking and secondary offensive operations along with the outstretched flanks of the advance by both Army Groups North and South. I also stressed a necessity for Hitler to adamantly remain focused on one overall strategic objective; the capture of Moscow and destruction of as much of the Russian army as possible along the way of the advance.
It has been mentioned that there was indeed evidence of overtures made by Stalin for some kind of truce as Army Group Center closed in on Moscow. The evidence is not altogether completely convincing that such an overture by Stalin took place, however I have seen reports made by an historian who spoke with Zhukov on condition that it was off the record that he witnessed a conversation in the Fall of 1941 between Stalin and Molotov regarding such a consideration and whether or not it should be done. There is also evidence in conjunction to this story that an actual Soviet intelligence officer was dispatched to make such an overture and that he was put into a gulag later after the war on a trumped up charge. Be that as it may, it does offer some political insight into the concerns Stalin had, I believe as to the actual survivability of the Soviet regime and his own position as its leader.
The point of that anecdotal evidence is to illustrate that Stalin’s grip on Soviet power was not unbreakable or that it could quickly corrode under the weight of the German advance on Moscow. He was already under excessive strain due to his unspoken yet obvious negligence of the adequate defense of Russia in the first place, along with the colossal casualties and the loss of millions of Russian troops in the process.
As Army Group Center approached the outskirts of Moscow and got to within long range artillery, Stalin was still considering abandoning the city to the fate of the Russian defenses and to evacuate on his awaiting train. I am convinced that he intuitively realized that had he decided to flee Moscow, it would have been over for him and quite possibly the Soviet Union. His political seat of power, destroyed and captured by the Germans, he would have a very time retaining his power base in the face of such a horrendous defeat.
As mentioned previously, the Russian strategic counter stroke objective on their rode to Berlin in the subsequent years of struggle against the Germans was always Berlin. This was Hitler’s nerve center, his seat of power, his everything and, if the Soviets reached it, he was a goner and he knew it. In the same respect, with the tables turned, and with a fully concentrated and strategically focused Army Group Center driving without delay or hesitation toward Moscow, they stood a very probable chance of successfully capturing Moscow and killing Stalin who would have refused to leave the city just as he actually did in reality.
Since, there was no replacement leader to fill Stalin’s shoes, the Soviet State would have been headless and in its death throes.
As far as the actual, boots (Jackboots)on the ground required to take the capital, granted it would be an immense amount of German blood spilled and material expended to fully secure the city. I would further speculate that it would not risk being a rendition of the nightmare that occurred at Stalingrad. Stalingrad, in the very early stages could have been taken with far fewer casualties had General Paulus been far more aggressive with the operation and the initial follow through. Forward German units were actually in the city driving down one of the main boulevards staring at Russian civilians passing by them on the street mistaking them for Russian soldiers. In that one supreme window of opportunity, the city could have been secured by the German Sixth Army had they more immediately secured the area with follow through divisions pouring into the area immediately and the simultaneous seizure of the vital far bank of the Volga River which was to prove the vital life line to Russian defensive forces in the city.
A major mistake in the Stalingrad campaign was the inability of General Paulus to secure a controlling and logistically pivotal east bank stretch of the Volga River which allowed for the Russians to provide a life line to the defending forces in the city and to constantly re fortify and re supply these forces at will. By failing to control the stretch of the far bank of the Volga and to keep outside Russian troops from fortifying the city, General Paulus sealed the fate of the Sixth Army.
In the case of a Moscow encirclement and capture, as long as the entire city were effectively isolated and completely cut off, the chances of success would be very high. A Russian is just as vulnerable to the Russian winter as anybody else, and to be completely surrounded by hostile forces, to have no power, no electricity, no heat, little food if any….would prove to be very overwhelming.
As far as the remaining Russian forces trying to regroup and establish a power base in the Urals, yes, that is a possibility. However, most of their former naton/territory west of the Urals would be in German hands. Remaining Soviet resistance in the Ukraine would meet with a very antagonistic Ukrainian population and they would be made to feel very unwelcome as the people realized they were freed from the communist yoke of oppression.
The Leningrad area would need to be completely encircled around the city proper and especially the access point across Lake Ladoga would have to be completely cut off. Again, without Moscow providing the base source of support for these armies in the surrounding regions, it would be difficult for a remaining Russian military units to continue prosecuting their war effort. Since the Russian mindset is very dependent on that command and control and top down leader reliance, they would be in a bit of a quandary over the whole thing.
Conclusion: Game over for the Russians. Hitler would have clearly refused any peace overture and simply bided his time for the spring and resumed his offensive operations mopping up the remainder of the Soviet Union. At the same time, as news of Stalin’s demise spread, a chance for an outright surrender is a real possibility. The Ukraine people would surely have rebelled against the local communist rule in the Ukraine and joined Army Group South in fighting the remnants of the Soviet forces after the fall of Moscow and Stalin.
First off, while the scenario is interesting it is (as you said) incredibly alt-history. You basically need to assume that Hitler isn't Hitler, the Nazi's aren't the Nazi's and that Germany essentially changes its entire outlook on their own internal and external politics, the invasion, the war in general and fully mobilizes the country. That to me is a lot of what ifs? FWIW, I could provide a similar list of 15 or so things the Russians should have done 3 years earlier to resist and defeat the German invasion and march into Berlin in 1942. That is the problem with alt-history, it's fun to think about and discuss, but is complete fantasy and ignores the overall reality.
So, while it was possible for the Germans to win in an ideal scenario, that really has no bearing on whether or not they could have actually won the campaign as it occurred, with the forces available, in the existing situation by simply changing some of their tactical decisions or strategic objectives. Change nothing in your above list other than making Moscow the direct focus of the campaign and there is no guarantee of victory. In fact, it would be far more likely for the Germans to suffer an even greater disaster.
So, if I strip you of the ability to alter anything besides tactical decisions and strategic objectives, do you think the Germans can still win? My position is no, as evidenced by your exhaustive list of "changes" and "mistakes" made by the Germans in planning the invasion. Essentially Barbarossa was doomed from day one with a very narrow chance of success do to all the faults you outlined. I cannot think of any overriding mistake the Germans made during the execution of the campaign that with a simple correction or two would have resulted in victory.
As for Moscow I do not share the view that the Soviets without Moscow are an instantly defeated foe. Yes, in the ideal scenario you outlined it would have been the final nail in the coffin, but in the real world, let's just say Moscow falls in December 1941, would it have really been the end of the war? I don't think so. If the Germans had managed to take Moscow (I really think it would have simply turned into another Stalingrad scenario), they would have expended their last ounce of strength to do it. They would be stretched thin and facing the same operational limitations they did in 1942 in terms of being contained to a single front for a major operation.
Further, the assertion that losing Moscow meant the end of Stalin is a bit of a stretch. Stalin took great care to eliminate any potential enemies he had within the party, general government and military. His hold on power was absolute. No one would directly oppose him, even if he lost Moscow. The likely scenario is that he falls back from Moscow with whatever forces he has left and spends the winter regrouping and building his forces to continue the war.
The primary industries from the Dnieper River Valley, Don Basin and Volga areas had already been moved to the Urals beginning in July 1941. These industries while operating at a portion of their pre-move levels were up and running producing all manner of war material by November 1941. That month also marks the arrival of the first Lend-Lease shipments and significant forces from the East. Basically, the Soviets even if they did lose Moscow were hardly defeated in December of 1941.
Another point I would raise is that Moscow has been conquered before and it was hardly the death blow the invader was hoping it would be. Now, I don't like the Napoleon to Hitler comparison in terms of the invasion of Russia, they were very different wars at different times and for different reasons, with vastly different objectives. However, the fact that the Russians would burn their own capital to the ground to deny it to the enemy speaks volumes about the Russian resolve. As important and symbolic as Moscow is, it pales in comparison to the soul of the Russian people and their resolve to defend their nation. I think most Russians would rather see Saint Basil's in ruins and occupied by enemy forces then surrender the entire nation and subjugate themselves. This is also why I hate those who place the context of the invasion as being a guaranteed German vicotry that Hitler screwed up. That position discredits the tremendous sacrifices and tenacity of the Russian people.
This is what Hitler and the Germans failed to grasp. The war from day one had to be about total victory and subjugation. You couldn't simply defeat the Russian army in the field and destroy their cities, you had to destroy them.
The rapid growth of the Red Army had everything to do with the shortage of officers. The army grew 5 fold in just a few years. Soviet military academies could not train the necessary numbers of officers. The purges had an effect too but it is generally overestimated. As NJGOAT correctly pointed out, only about 5% of the officers were shot. Most of those arrested were returned to the army.
The Soviet leadership certainly anticipated war at some point. That's why they were expanding the military, militarizing the Soviet industry, making other reforms, building fortifications and so on. But you are right, war in 1941 was not expected for a few reasons.
- Most wars start with some kind of political tension, general worsening of relations, demands, ultimatums and the like. There wasn't anything of the sort in 1941. Europe for the time being was divided into 2 spheres of influence and the Germans seemed to be content with the status quo, especially since the Soviet Union was supplying Germany with important raw materials. Soviet leadership assumed that if and when differences arose, they could be settled politically at least until the USSR was ready for war.
May be there wasn't "anything of the sort" in 1941, but the question of war was definitely hanging in the air already earlier, and Russian government was certain about it, that's why initially they've tried to negotiate the deal with Britain and France (I couldn't find more extensive material on that, so I'll quote at least this short excerpt from Wiki;
"The Munich Agreement of 1938, the first stage in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, gave rise to Soviet fears that they were likely to be abandoned in a possible war with Germany. In the face of continually dragging and seemingly hopeless negotiations with Great Britain and France, a new cynicism and hardness entered Soviet foreign relations when Litvinov was replaced by Vyacheslav Molotov in May 1939."
So no, Soviets were very much aware of what was coming, however I suspect they've made ( for whatever reason) the wrong conclusions, and that's why Stalin (personally most likely) was in denial regarding the fast-approaching war with Germany.
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- In 1941 Germany was already engaged in a war against Great Britain. The Soviet leadership assumed that Germany could not and would not start a war on another front, and that some kind of a conclusion (either conquest or peace) with Britain was necessary before the Germans could invade. This was a reasonable assumption since it was proven to be correct in the end. The war with Britain was a considerable drain on German resources and it also drew United States into the conflict. Stalin, not without reason, thought that to invade the USSR would be very foolish for Germany under such circumstances.
Yes, I suspect that it has got something to do with a war against Great Britain. I am not sure what Stalin assumed, but whatever he assumed most likely made him think that the S.U. was out of danger of the immediate war threat from Germany. Although it was true that Soviet Army was reorganizing, it was reorganizing way too much on their own (if not to say leisurely) terms. It seemed to be reorganization and restructuring of a country that wanted to be ready in a big and turbulent world, where nobody knew for sure what was coming tomorrow, yet hoping that storm would rage behind the wall for a while, hitting in a different direction.
At least it was my impression of 1941.
Sometimes I think may be this particular person was somehow connected to things we can only guess about..- who knows Rudolf Hess - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
First off, while the scenario is interesting it is (as you said) incredibly alt-history. You basically need to assume that Hitler isn't Hitler, the Nazi's aren't the Nazi's and that Germany essentially changes its entire outlook on their own internal and external politics, the invasion, the war in general and fully mobilizes the country. That to me is a lot of what ifs? FWIW, I could provide a similar list of 15 or so things the Russians should have done 3 years earlier to resist and defeat the German invasion and march into Berlin in 1942. That is the problem with alt-history, it's fun to think about and discuss, but is complete fantasy and ignores the overall reality.
So, while it was possible for the Germans to win in an ideal scenario, that really has no bearing on whether or not they could have actually won the campaign as it occurred, with the forces available, in the existing situation by simply changing some of their tactical decisions or strategic objectives. Change nothing in your above list other than making Moscow the direct focus of the campaign and there is no guarantee of victory. In fact, it would be far more likely for the Germans to suffer an even greater disaster.
So, if I strip you of the ability to alter anything besides tactical decisions and strategic objectives, do you think the Germans can still win? My position is no, as evidenced by your exhaustive list of "changes" and "mistakes" made by the Germans in planning the invasion. Essentially Barbarossa was doomed from day one with a very narrow chance of success do to all the faults you outlined. I cannot think of any overriding mistake the Germans made during the execution of the campaign that with a simple correction or two would have resulted in victory.
As for Moscow I do not share the view that the Soviets without Moscow are an instantly defeated foe. Yes, in the ideal scenario you outlined it would have been the final nail in the coffin, but in the real world, let's just say Moscow falls in December 1941, would it have really been the end of the war? I don't think so. If the Germans had managed to take Moscow (I really think it would have simply turned into another Stalingrad scenario), they would have expended their last ounce of strength to do it. They would be stretched thin and facing the same operational limitations they did in 1942 in terms of being contained to a single front for a major operation.
Further, the assertion that losing Moscow meant the end of Stalin is a bit of a stretch. Stalin took great care to eliminate any potential enemies he had within the party, general government and military. His hold on power was absolute. No one would directly oppose him, even if he lost Moscow. The likely scenario is that he falls back from Moscow with whatever forces he has left and spends the winter regrouping and building his forces to continue the war.
The primary industries from the Dnieper River Valley, Don Basin and Volga areas had already been moved to the Urals beginning in July 1941. These industries while operating at a portion of their pre-move levels were up and running producing all manner of war material by November 1941. That month also marks the arrival of the first Lend-Lease shipments and significant forces from the East. Basically, the Soviets even if they did lose Moscow were hardly defeated in December of 1941.
Another point I would raise is that Moscow has been conquered before and it was hardly the death blow the invader was hoping it would be. Now, I don't like the Napoleon to Hitler comparison in terms of the invasion of Russia, they were very different wars at different times and for different reasons, with vastly different objectives. However, the fact that the Russians would burn their own capital to the ground to deny it to the enemy speaks volumes about the Russian resolve. As important and symbolic as Moscow is, it pales in comparison to the soul of the Russian people and their resolve to defend their nation. I think most Russians would rather see Saint Basil's in ruins and occupied by enemy forces then surrender the entire nation and subjugate themselves. This is also why I hate those who place the context of the invasion as being a guaranteed German vicotry that Hitler screwed up. That position discredits the tremendous sacrifices and tenacity of the Russian people.
This is what Hitler and the Germans failed to grasp. The war from day one had to be about total victory and subjugation. You couldn't simply defeat the Russian army in the field and destroy their cities, you had to destroy them.
I understand that the scenario I put forward for an alternative version of history is for a perfect world scenario where Hitler somehow gets out of his own way and makes the right decisions in defeating the Russians. I believe you asked me to put forth such a scenario and I believe such a scenario was not as unrealistic a possibility as you seem to believe.
I think that deep down, at an intuitive level, Hitler deliberately sabotaged his efforts and those of the German Wehrmacht because at a deep, primal, human level it goes against the grain and the psyche of even an ego maniacal sociopath like a Hitler to set out on such a deliberate path of human annihilation. Though I agree this on my part is an act of convenient arm chair amateur historical pscychoanalysis, I believe it is an accurate internal assessment of the man.
You mention total victory and that the Germans had to destroy the Russians and not just defeat their armies, destroy their cities. I believe a huge portion of the Ukrainian population that died as a result of that invasion would beg to differ with you. All that did was create absolute hatred and bitterness and steeled their resolve to fight Hitler instead of joining him and fighting Stalin, a tyrant they hated as well. That opportunity to exploit such conditions was within Hitler and the Wehrmacht's grasp as they invaded the Soviet Union. It wasn't armchair fantasy.
The realistic requirements in destroying entire peoples is a simple waste of energy, manpower, and resources, not to mention it goes against human nature to keep killing whole populations indefinitely. Such an action would only deepen that famous Russian resolve you mentoned and stiffen resistence which is exactly what happened.
Yes, it is a wild stretch to imagine that Hitler would actively drop his existing and long standing ethnic/racial hatreds for the sake of winning a world war, however, there existed, I believe, the possibility of such an action for the sake of winning that war.
Even without all of these "would have, could haves", even with all of delays of Army Group Center's advance to Moscow, they still came within a hair breath away from taking the Russain capital and I still think that would have been a deep psychological blow to the Russian people and affected their further prosecution of the war against the Germans.
If Hitler followed your advice of "total war" against the Russian people and by that, it seems you mean the total destruction/annihilation of the entire Russian population, do you actually believe that deliberate process of human extermination would have actually lessened the Russian resolve to fight back? Is your version any more effective or realistic than mine?
If you believe that it was just plain impossible for Hitler and Germany to even try to defeat such an invincible opponent as Russia, then aren't you asking for Hitler to not be Hitler in his long standing belief in the need for Germany to take land in the East?
As mentioned, many portions of the Soviet populace were not exactly enamored with the tyranny and blood thirstiness of Stalin and would have proven to be a tremendous asset to any invader who was willing to exploit that reality and aim it back at Stalin.
The ultimate prize in conquering any nation is its people. That is the whole point of the exercise throughout the history of conquerors. If Hitler followed your version of the approach of total war and annihilated the peoples of the Soviet Union, what ultimate good or benefit would that have proven to be?
Hitler's gamblers instinct told him that if he were going to strike the Soviet Union and defeat her, he had to do it as quickly as possible to keep from having to fight a major two front war and multiple opponents. His assessment, I believe was correct and that he had to dispatch his largest, most dangerous land opponent, Russia as quickly as possible.
I believe it possible for any nation, any people to be defeated and conquered, including the overcoming of that legendary Russian resolve you mentioned. Any human will, either individually or collectively can be broken, given the right amount of specifically targeted and expertly applied force.
But to use of blind force in the deliberate destruction of an entire people is simply self defeating and counter productive, not to mention extremely difficult for the average human to stomach for any extended period of time. Even the SS extermination squads in the Ukraine and Poland had a tough time dealing with their grim task, even Himmler recognized this!
I understand that the scenario I put forward for an alternative version of history is for a perfect world scenario where Hitler somehow gets out of his own way and makes the right decisions in defeating the Russians. I believe you asked me to put forth such a scenario and I believe such a scenario was not as unrealistic a possibility as you seem to believe.
I think that deep down, at an intuitive level, Hitler deliberately sabotaged his efforts and those of the German Wehrmacht because at a deep, primal, human level it goes against the grain and the psyche of even an ego maniacal sociopath like a Hitler to set out on such a deliberate path of human annihilation. Though I agree this on my part is an act of convenient arm chair amateur historical pscychoanalysis, I believe it is an accurate internal assessment of the man.
You mention total victory and that the Germans had to destroy the Russians and not just defeat their armies, destroy their cities. I believe a huge portion of the Ukrainian population that died as a result of that invasion would beg to differ with you. All that did was create absolute hatred and bitterness and steeled their resolve to fight Hitler instead of joining him and fighting Stalin, a tyrant they hated as well. That opportunity to exploit such conditions was within Hitler and the Wehrmacht's grasp as they invaded the Soviet Union. It wasn't armchair fantasy.
The realistic requirements in destroying entire peoples is a simple waste of energy, manpower, and resources, not to mention it goes against human nature to keep killing whole populations indefinitely. Such an action would only deepen that famous Russian resolve you mentoned and stiffen resistence which is exactly what happened.
Yes, it is a wild stretch to imagine that Hitler would actively drop his existing and long standing ethnic/racial hatreds for the sake of winning a world war, however, there existed, I believe, the possibility of such an action for the sake of winning that war.
Even without all of these "would have, could haves", even with all of delays of Army Group Center's advance to Moscow, they still came within a hair breath away from taking the Russain capital and I still think that would have been a deep psychological blow to the Russian people and affected their further prosecution of the war against the Germans.
If Hitler followed your advice of "total war" against the Russian people and by that, it seems you mean the total destruction/annihilation of the entire Russian population, do you actually believe that deliberate process of human extermination would have actually lessened the Russian resolve to fight back? Is your version any more effective or realistic than mine?
If you believe that it was just plain impossible for Hitler and Germany to even try to defeat such an invincible opponent as Russia, then aren't you asking for Hitler to not be Hitler in his long standing belief in the need for Germany to take land in the East?
As mentioned, many portions of the Soviet populace were not exactly enamored with the tyranny and blood thirstiness of Stalin and would have proven to be a tremendous asset to any invader who was willing to exploit that reality and aim it back at Stalin.
The ultimate prize in conquering any nation is its people. That is the whole point of the exercise throughout the history of conquerors. If Hitler followed your version of the approach of total war and annihilated the peoples of the Soviet Union, what ultimate good or benefit would that have proven to be?
Hitler's gamblers instinct told him that if he were going to strike the Soviet Union and defeat her, he had to do it as quickly as possible to keep from having to fight a major two front war and multiple opponents. His assessment, I believe was correct and that he had to dispatch his largest, most dangerous land opponent, Russia as quickly as possible.
I believe it possible for any nation, any people to be defeated and conquered, including the overcoming of that legendary Russian resolve you mentioned. Any human will, either individually or collectively can be broken, given the right amount of specifically targeted and expertly applied force.
But to use of blind force in the deliberate destruction of an entire people is simply self defeating and counter productive, not to mention extremely difficult for the average human to stomach for any extended period of time. Even the SS extermination squads in the Ukraine and Poland had a tough time dealing with their grim task, even Himmler recognized this!
..."I hate those who place the context of the invasion as being a guaranteed German vicotry that Hitler screwed up. That position discredits the tremendous sacrifices and tenacity of the Russian people."
I don't believe I put forward a scenario based on some kind of "guaranteed German victory". I never mentioned anthing of the sort and takes out of context the scenario I was putting forward. That scenario was based on what decisions could Hitler have made differently in order to increase his chances of successfully defeating the Russians.
And guess what...Hitler did screw up in a number of fundamentally critical ways and on an incredible monumental scale! The quality of his strategic decisions started to go seriously downhill during the planning stages leading up the actual invasion and got worse from there.
How in the realm of reasonable thinking could this plain factual assertion of history be some kind of a slap in the face of the Russian people and the sacrifices they made and the tenacity they showed? What possible link can you actually find there? None.
Hitler was his own worst enemy and completely shattered any viable chance for German success in that invasion by his own impulsive and self destructive decisions.
The Ukrainians not the Russians, by the way, were the real people who suffered by far the greatest actual losses in deaths and casualties. Not the Russians. Generally speaking, the various peoples of the Ukraine were not exactly in love with Stalin, communism, or Russians in general and one of Hitler's greatest failures in his conduct of the war was his failure in taking advantage of this political hotbed.
Another one of your counters to my scenarios was that I was somehow asking Hitler to not be who he was - Hitler by having him, for example, refrain from having subjugated peoples persecuted. He actuallly, purposefully did this very thing in the time frame leading up to Olympics in Germany in 1936 by ordering that the persecution of jews stop in order for the world press to not get the "wrong" idea about Germany and it's image.
I think if Hitler could keep the jews from being persecuted for the sake of some Olympic games, he could enact such a policy for the sake of winning a world war!
I will agree that some of your alternate scenarios are perfectly plausible things that the Germans could have done, however, many of them do rely on actions and decisions so out of character or beyond the grasp of Germany at the time that they are fantasy. I admit, I asked for a scenario wherein a German drive to Moscow results in a victory. I somewhat expected you to stick more to reality than fantasy in that regard.
My point on annihilation was not to suggest that was a correct course of action for the Germans, quite the opposite really. It was more about the realization that short of annihilation they had very little chance to defeat the Soviets. There is also the lingering fact that the ultimate goal of the Germans in obtaining their "lebensraum" would have involved significant elements of ethnic cleansing of the conquered areas. Annihilation of the Russian people was an eventual goal of the Nazi state, but they were relying on defeating them on the field of battle first.
If you look at how the events of Barbarossa unfolded Hitler and the Germans came to the realization about 2/3rds of the way into the campaign that they couldn't defeat the Soviets by destroying their armies. They had to attack their economy, their infrastructure, their people. They had to make war so bitter for the Soviet population that they would no longer be able to sustain their forces and capitulate. This was ultimately not possible for them to do and if anything simply strengthened their resolve to fight even further.
I'm not arguing that it wasn't possible for the Germans to defeat the Soviets, merely that it was virtually impossible given the situation they had on June 22nd 1941. The Germans horribly miscalculated what was needed to win and I'm not convinced that they would have (or possibly even could have save for a perfect sandbox world) necessarily been willing to pay the price if they knew what it would actually take.
..."I hate those who place the context of the invasion as being a guaranteed German vicotry that Hitler screwed up. That position discredits the tremendous sacrifices and tenacity of the Russian people."
This sentence was poorly worded on my part. I added it later after typing the original reply. I meant to say, "I hate the assertion that the invasion was virtually a guaranteed German victory if not for Hitler's meddling." Many people take that position and are content to say, oh had he only not paused outside Smolensk he would have been watching a victory parade in Red Square. There are a lot of faults in that position, many of which have been outlined earlier in the thread.
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I don't believe I put forward a scenario based on some kind of "guaranteed German victory". I never mentioned anthing of the sort and takes out of context the scenario I was putting forward. That scenario was based on what decisions could Hitler have made differently in order to increase his chances of successfully defeating the Russians.
My problem with the scenario is that it is incredibly unrealistic. You list 15+ points with multiple changes in each for ways in which Hitler could have "increased his chances of success". You are obviously knowledgable enough on the subject to realize that many of those points are complete fantasy and beyond reasonable in terms of the actual situation and capabilities of Germany.
However, the salient point I am trying to make is that if Hitler needed a perfect world to "increase" his chances of success, then the invasion was essentially doomed from the beginning. That means victory was never really in their grasp, hence the statement of "I hate the assertion that the invasion was a guaranteed victory if not for Hitlers meddling".
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And guess what...Hitler did screw up in a number of fundamentally critical ways and on an incredible monumental scale! The quality of his strategic decisions started to go seriously downhill during the planning stages leading up the actual invasion and got worse from there.
So, what changes could they realistically have made in the year or so leading up to the invasion that would have given them a better chance of success?
Sorry, I don't buy rearming the entire Wehrmacht, designing better tanks, inventing reliable engines, cold resistant lubircants, raising an additional 2 million troops, improving the quality of the other Axis troops, making the Germans actually like their allies, redesigning the entire German rail system to be compatible with the Soviet one, changing the SS into "goodwill embassadors", etc. to be even remotely realistic.
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How in the realm of reasonable thinking could this plain factual assertion of history be some kind of a slap in the face of the Russian people and the sacrifices they made and the tenacity they showed? What possible link can you actually find there? None.
Hitlers mistake was launching the invasion in the first place and failing to have a contingency if the original plan went awry. The comment was directed at those who think that it was the "mistakes" made during the invasion that sealed their fate. I get the sense that we are in agreement on that point. The German effort from day one as historically planned had a very slim chance of success and relied more on the Russians giving up than anything the Germans did.
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Hitler was his own worst enemy and completely shattered any viable chance for German success in that invasion by his own impulsive and self destructive decisions.
If you mean by launching the invasion as planned in the first place, then I agree. War with the Soviets was inevitable, however, thinking you could blitzkreig the equivalent of the eastern half of the United States and defeat them in a span of 5 months with no contingency plan was patentely stupid.
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The Ukrainians not the Russians, by the way, were the real people who suffered by far the greatest actual losses in deaths and casualties. Not the Russians. Generally speaking, the various peoples of the Ukraine were not exactly in love with Stalin, communism, or Russians in general and one of Hitler's greatest failures in his conduct of the war was his failure in taking advantage of this political hotbed.
True, the Germans enjoyed immense support from the people of the Baltic states when they invaded. There was a chance they could have tapped into some of that among the Ukrainians as well. However, Hitler viewed them as subhuman and was looking to colonize their land. This is where the ideology runs afoul of the reality.
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Another one of your counters to my scenarios was that I was somehow asking Hitler to not be who he was - Hitler by having him, for example, refrain from having subjugated peoples persecuted. He actuallly, purposefully did this very thing in the time frame leading up to Olympics in Germany in 1936 by ordering that the persecution of jews stop in order for the world press to not get the "wrong" idea about Germany and it's image.
I think if Hitler could keep the jews from being persecuted for the sake of some Olympic games, he could enact such a policy for the sake of winning a world war!
It was most likely possible for Hitler to change the Nazi ideas on persecuting the various targeted groups. However, Hitler in 1936 was in a very different position than Hitler in 1941. Hitler in 1936 needed to restrain himself and the Nazi's in order to avoid an early conflict. Hitler in 1941 after a string of victories felt no need to restrain himself from his ultimate goal, which was not to win the war. Hitler's ultimate goal was to establish his racial and ethnic policies and ideals in a new Europe. Fighting the war was simply a necessity to achieve that goal. That is why I say you expect Hitler to not be Hitler.
I will agree that some of your alternate scenarios are perfectly plausible things that the Germans could have done, however, many of them do rely on actions and decisions so out of character or beyond the grasp of Germany at the time that they are fantasy. I admit, I asked for a scenario wherein a German drive to Moscow results in a victory. I somewhat expected you to stick more to reality than fantasy in that regard.
My point on annihilation was not to suggest that was a correct course of action for the Germans, quite the opposite really. It was more about the realization that short of annihilation they had very little chance to defeat the Soviets. There is also the lingering fact that the ultimate goal of the Germans in obtaining their "lebensraum" would have involved significant elements of ethnic cleansing of the conquered areas. Annihilation of the Russian people was an eventual goal of the Nazi state, but they were relying on defeating them on the field of battle first.
If you look at how the events of Barbarossa unfolded Hitler and the Germans came to the realization about 2/3rds of the way into the campaign that they couldn't defeat the Soviets by destroying their armies. They had to attack their economy, their infrastructure, their people. They had to make war so bitter for the Soviet population that they would no longer be able to sustain their forces and capitulate. This was ultimately not possible for them to do and if anything simply strengthened their resolve to fight even further.
I'm not arguing that it wasn't possible for the Germans to defeat the Soviets, merely that it was virtually impossible given the situation they had on June 22nd 1941. The Germans horribly miscalculated what was needed to win and I'm not convinced that they would have (or possibly even could have save for a perfect sandbox world) necessarily been willing to pay the price if they knew what it would actually take.
If you really read what I wrote, you would realize that I am actually agreeing with the gist of your assertion that Germany was faced with a number of critical disadvantages both of their own doing but also natural nearly insurmountable obstacles such as the massive geographical expanse involved in such an undertaking. These are all true negatives when considering such an operation.
However, many points I bring up in my "fantasy" scenario were actually practical, feasible, and realistic decisions that were well within the realm of possibiility.
Bringing Germany and its economy into a full war time production footing was not an impssible task or unfeasible at that time.
Increasing Germany's war time production in the design and manufacture of various instruments of war, especially armored, artillery, and transport units was a real world workable reality. It wasn't part of your perceived "fantasy" of my scenario.
Improving the fighting viability and unit cohesion of Germany's allies before the invasion was practical and workable and was vital in the pending prosecution of the war. This wasn't fantasy or unrealistic. it was a necessity and one that was ignorred to the detriment of the overall mission.
Instructing political units to focus on the carrot of persuasion instead of the concentration camp was a realistic, effective, real world approach to the challenge of getting positive results from subjugated peoples. This wasn't a fantasy idea. it was a practical military and poliitical necessity and Hitler and Germany's refusal to recognize this failure was a consummate act of self sabotaging stupidity.
The Nazi policy of annihilation and extermination of various ethnic groups and races was certainly a built in self destruct aspect to their psyche and proved to be a critical factor in their own destruction.
There were instances in the history of military warfare, where specifically targeted populations were wiped out deliberately by a conquering force.
Caesar and his legions during the Gaul campaigns was an example where population centers were put to the sword...men, women, children....parakeets, hamsters..every single living thing in a given space was killed to make a statement to the rest of Gaul. However, Caesar was intelligent enough and understood human nature enough to know better than to try and destroy every single living thing in the entire region of Gaul. He would have destroyed his own tax base! Think of the slaves lost!
Developing Germany's military intelligence units was not an impossible task or beyond the realm of reality. It wasn't fantasy. This was a practical, real world necssity for any military to undertake and it was a clear failing/weakness of the German Wehrmacht to not fully understand the real strengths and weaknesses of their opponent, the Russian military and the average Russian soldier. This failing could have been corrected and strengthened long before the actual invasion. Their intelligence failings were legendary not only against the Russians but against the British and Americans and accelerated their destructive course.
The enlargement of the actual invasion force was not an impossible undertaking. Given the population availability of both Germany and the conquered territories of Europe, this was feasible. It wasn't fantasy. The creation of a strategic reserve force was a workable measure and a necessity and was ignored by military planners. It was not a fantasy idea.
You wrote: "If you look at how the events of Barbarossa unfolded Hitler and the Germans came to the realization about 2/3rds of the way into the campaign that they couldn't defeat the Soviets by destroying their armies. They had to attack their economy, their infrastructure, their people. They had to make war so bitter for the Soviet population that they would no longer be able to sustain their forces and capitulate. This was ultimately not possible for them to do and if anything simply strengthened their resolve to fight even further."
Response: Actually Hitler decided after the Battle of Smolensk, just four weeks into the campaign, to make a change in the strategic direction of the campaign and attack the Soviet Union economic base, namely the Ukraine region. Though, on the surface, such a decision would seem to make sense, it did not in any way change the outcome of the campaign or the war. What it did do was further stretch logistical supply lines to the point of breaking and created a logistical nightmare as well as an impossible manpower drain. It managed to further dissolve the strategic focus and dillute force concentrations. Not only now was there an outstretched logistical nightmare as Army Group Center attempted to continue its approach to Moscow but the same out stretching provisioning nightmare applied to efforts now undertaken by Army Group South. Hitler's change of strategic focus and concentration made the entire campaign a doomed adventure.
You certainly make valid points in this back and forth between us. And, I would certainly agree that Hitler and Germany faced a set of negatives nearly impossible to overcome. However, to suggest that I was dabbling in some kind of armchair fantsy game scenarios seems a little rich to me.
Most of my suggestions in the proposed scenario were feasible and the neglect of some of them certainly doomed Hitler and the Wehrmacht from the start.
I get the impression that you think I was trying to come up with some kind of fantasy scenario that could somehow "guarantee victory" in your words. Who mentioned anything about guarantees or certainties? There is no such thing in life or in war. If you think war involves guarantees, who is dealing here more with fantasy than reality?
But, there is such a thing as improving the probabilities of success in any endeavor including this one and the corrections I suggested have nothing to do with fantasy and everything to do with real world practical necessity.
This sentence was poorly worded on my part. I added it later after typing the original reply. I meant to say, "I hate the assertion that the invasion was virtually a guaranteed German victory if not for Hitler's meddling." Many people take that position and are content to say, oh had he only not paused outside Smolensk he would have been watching a victory parade in Red Square. There are a lot of faults in that position, many of which have been outlined earlier in the thread.
My problem with the scenario is that it is incredibly unrealistic. You list 15+ points with multiple changes in each for ways in which Hitler could have "increased his chances of success". You are obviously knowledgable enough on the subject to realize that many of those points are complete fantasy and beyond reasonable in terms of the actual situation and capabilities of Germany.
However, the salient point I am trying to make is that if Hitler needed a perfect world to "increase" his chances of success, then the invasion was essentially doomed from the beginning. That means victory was never really in their grasp, hence the statement of "I hate the assertion that the invasion was a guaranteed victory if not for Hitlers meddling".
So, what changes could they realistically have made in the year or so leading up to the invasion that would have given them a better chance of success?
Sorry, I don't buy rearming the entire Wehrmacht, designing better tanks, inventing reliable engines, cold resistant lubircants, raising an additional 2 million troops, improving the quality of the other Axis troops, making the Germans actually like their allies, redesigning the entire German rail system to be compatible with the Soviet one, changing the SS into "goodwill embassadors", etc. to be even remotely realistic.
Hitlers mistake was launching the invasion in the first place and failing to have a contingency if the original plan went awry. The comment was directed at those who think that it was the "mistakes" made during the invasion that sealed their fate. I get the sense that we are in agreement on that point. The German effort from day one as historically planned had a very slim chance of success and relied more on the Russians giving up than anything the Germans did.
If you mean by launching the invasion as planned in the first place, then I agree. War with the Soviets was inevitable, however, thinking you could blitzkreig the equivalent of the eastern half of the United States and defeat them in a span of 5 months with no contingency plan was patentely stupid.
True, the Germans enjoyed immense support from the people of the Baltic states when they invaded. There was a chance they could have tapped into some of that among the Ukrainians as well. However, Hitler viewed them as subhuman and was looking to colonize their land. This is where the ideology runs afoul of the reality.
It was most likely possible for Hitler to change the Nazi ideas on persecuting the various targeted groups. However, Hitler in 1936 was in a very different position than Hitler in 1941. Hitler in 1936 needed to restrain himself and the Nazi's in order to avoid an early conflict. Hitler in 1941 after a string of victories felt no need to restrain himself from his ultimate goal, which was not to win the war. Hitler's ultimate goal was to establish his racial and ethnic policies and ideals in a new Europe. Fighting the war was simply a necessity to achieve that goal. That is why I say you expect Hitler to not be Hitler.
These are all valid counter points you are making. And though some of my scenario suggestions seem pretty unrealistic, especially the whole making outfits like the SS, "goodwill ambassadors" is a fairly rich stretch of the imagination, other points in the scenario do, in my view, have reasonable, real world aspects and would only have at least increased their chances and not diminished them.
In the larger scheme of things, you have an obvious point to the whole adventure...why bother if it was doomed from the beginning? However, if you look plainly at the melodrama of human history on this planet, it is chocked full of bizarre, self destructive acts of futility that make no sense at all.
Humans have a singular tendency to do incrediblly stupid, ridiculous things and to collectively participate on a horrendously destructive course of civilization destroying events. The invasion of the Soviet Union may have indeed proven to be an immaculate "Fubar". However, hindsight never seems to compensate for events taking place on the ground.
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