Please register to participate in our discussions with 2 million other members - it's free and quick! Some forums can only be seen by registered members. After you create your account, you'll be able to customize options and access all our 15,000 new posts/day with fewer ads.
Back in 1994, the US, the UK and the Russian Federation as the three nuclear superpowers signed the Budapest Memorandum which guaranteed the security of Ukraine relating to its accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. As a result, Ukraine agreed to give up all its nuclear weapons which at that time was the third largest in the world. Their nuclear arsenal was subsequently transported to Russia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Budape...ity_Assurances
Following the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, the US, UK and Canada all stated that Russian involvement was a breach of its obligations under the Budapest Memorandum and constituted a clear violation of Ukraine sovereignty and territorial integrity. Russia however argued that the treaty doesn't apply to Crimea since its separation was caused by internal conflict and that it hadn't invaded the Crimean peninsula and continues to deny that it has done so to this day in spite of evidence to the contrary.
The Budapest Memorandum sets out six commitments.
Respect Ukrainian independence and sovereignty within its existing borders.
Refrain from the threat or use of force against Ukraine.
Refrain from using economic pressure on Ukraine in order to influence its politics.
Seek immediate United Nations Security Council action to provide assistance to Ukraine, "if Ukraine should become a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used".
Refrain from the use of nuclear arms against Ukraine.
Consult with one another if questions arise regarding these commitments.
Any one of these could provide the trigger which escalates the situation. Russia has already stated it will use nuclear weapons if threatened, or if steps are taken to retake the Crimea.
'could'? I suppose. Anything could happen. But there's a huge chasm between hypotheticals and the real world.
Two factors:
First, Russia has nothing to gain by invading the rest of Ukraine. While the acquisition of Crimea was of some strategic gain and boosted Putin's domestic approval considerably, it came with profound long-term economic costs to Russia, and as well flipped Ukraine from being a nation split between East and West to being a decidedly pro-West country - the result of carving off much of the part that supported the east, thereby unbalancing the Ukrainian electorate, and also by permanently alienating the rest of the country. Beyond that, what would invading Ukraine do? Putin's approval rating can't go up much more, and even worse economic damage would fall upon Russia in consequence. Then there's the dubious 'prize' of seizing territory that doesn't want to be seized. There would be perpetual resistance, costing Russia blood and treasure in perpetuity. And the invasion would destroy infrastructure, so it would become a permanent money pit. Again, where's the advantage?
Two, the West is not going to war over Ukraine in any case. Ukraine is not in NATO. No Western nation is legally bound to defend it. There would no more be direct Western intervention in Ukraine than there was in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, Afghanistan in 1979, would have been had the Soviets invaded Poland in 1981, or was in Georgia in 2008. There would be diplomatic protests, more sanctions, more political marginalization of Russia, and aid and weapons provided to Ukraine (in the same way that Western arms and weapons were sent to Afghanistan beginning in 1979). That's it.
'could'? I suppose. Anything could happen. But there's a huge chasm between hypotheticals and the real world.
Two factors:
First, Russia has nothing to gain by invading the rest of Ukraine. While the acquisition of Crimea was of some strategic gain and boosted Putin's domestic approval considerably, it came with profound long-term economic costs to Russia, and as well flipped Ukraine from being a nation split between East and West to being a decidedly pro-West country - the result of carving off much of the part that supported the east, thereby unbalancing the Ukrainian electorate, and also by permanently alienating the rest of the country. Beyond that, what would invading Ukraine do? Putin's approval rating can't go up much more, and even worse economic damage would fall upon Russia in consequence. Then there's the dubious 'prize' of seizing territory that doesn't want to be seized. There would be perpetual resistance, costing Russia blood and treasure in perpetuity. And the invasion would destroy infrastructure, so it would become a permanent money pit. Again, where's the advantage?
Two, the West is not going to war over Ukraine in any case. Ukraine is not in NATO. No Western nation is legally bound to defend it. There would no more be direct Western intervention in Ukraine than there was in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, Afghanistan in 1979, would have been had the Soviets invaded Poland in 1981, or was in Georgia in 2008. There would be diplomatic protests, more sanctions, more political marginalization of Russia, and aid and weapons provided to Ukraine (in the same way that Western arms and weapons were sent to Afghanistan beginning in 1979). That's it.
Good post. I believe even if Ukraine is invaded the US wouldn't risk nuclear war. For many of the reasons you listed. At the most, if Russia invaded Ukraine, expect them to have to fight an insurgency (against people with western weapons) and major damage politically...
'could'? I suppose. Anything could happen. But there's a huge chasm between hypotheticals and the real world.
Two factors:
First, Russia has nothing to gain by invading the rest of Ukraine. While the acquisition of Crimea was of some strategic gain and boosted Putin's domestic approval considerably, it came with profound long-term economic costs to Russia, and as well flipped Ukraine from being a nation split between East and West to being a decidedly pro-West country - the result of carving off much of the part that supported the east, thereby unbalancing the Ukrainian electorate, and also by permanently alienating the rest of the country. Beyond that, what would invading Ukraine do? Putin's approval rating can't go up much more, and even worse economic damage would fall upon Russia in consequence. Then there's the dubious 'prize' of seizing territory that doesn't want to be seized. There would be perpetual resistance, costing Russia blood and treasure in perpetuity. And the invasion would destroy infrastructure, so it would become a permanent money pit. Again, where's the advantage?
Two, the West is not going to war over Ukraine in any case. Ukraine is not in NATO. No Western nation is legally bound to defend it. There would no more be direct Western intervention in Ukraine than there was in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, Afghanistan in 1979, would have been had the Soviets invaded Poland in 1981, or was in Georgia in 2008. There would be diplomatic protests, more sanctions, more political marginalization of Russia, and aid and weapons provided to Ukraine (in the same way that Western arms and weapons were sent to Afghanistan beginning in 1979). That's it.
I wouldn't be too sure of that. Yes, the memorandum isn't legally binding, but if the US fails to abide by its assurances, then it places its credibility on the line.
That's no the point. If the US, or the UK for that matter fails to live up to its commitment to provide security for another country, then it you can tear up the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to start with and a nuclear arms race will ensue.
A war involving American troops will not happen in Ukraine whatever the Russian provocation. It is a very different case where the Baltic States are concerned. In any case, I would not put too much stock in anything that Pat Buchanan has to say on foreign policy.
A war involving American troops will not happen in Ukraine whatever the Russian provocation. It is a very different case where the Baltic States are concerned. In any case, I would not put too much stock in anything that Pat Buchanan has to say on foreign policy.
Why would it be different for the Baltic States which incidentally also form part of the Budapest Memorandum.
Please register to post and access all features of our very popular forum. It is free and quick. Over $68,000 in prizes has already been given out to active posters on our forum. Additional giveaways are planned.
Detailed information about all U.S. cities, counties, and zip codes on our site: City-data.com.
Please register to participate in our discussions with 2 million other members - it's free and quick! Some forums can only be seen by registered members. After you create your account, you'll be able to customize options and access all our 15,000 new posts/day with fewer ads.
