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A) After Sedan the French were just delaying the inevitable. The campaign that decided the war lasted about a month.
B) I never said the Franco-Prussian war influenced Lee's thinking. It was simply an example of a war of a similar period that was decided in 1 or 2 major battles. Helmuth von Moltke was arguably the top military leader of his age and he obviously believed that decisive battles (or at least, campaigns) could win wars so I'm not sure why you think Lee "slow to grasp" anything.
A) After Sedan the French were just delaying the inevitable. The campaign that decided the war lasted about a month.
B) I never said the Franco-Prussian war influenced Lee's thinking. It was simply an example of a war of a similar period that was decided in 1 or 2 major battles. Helmuth von Moltke was arguably the top military leader of his age and he obviously believed that decisive battles (or at least, campaigns) could win wars so I'm not sure why you think Lee "slow to grasp" anything.
You seem to have lost track of the actual debate taking place. You justified Lee's thinking about one big battle deciding it all, claiming he had the example of European battles of this nature.
Obviously he did not have the example of the Franco-Prussian War before him...and even if he did, it is not an example of a war won by one big battle.
Further, even if the Franco-Prussian War had taken place before the American Civil War, and even if it had been decided by one big battle, it would still have little application to the circumstances faced by the generals in the Civil War. The territory over which the Civil War was fought was six or seven times as large as the Franco-Prussian theater.
So, maybe it is time to drop back ten yards and punt on this one.
Right, he "fired" generals on a permanent basis, especially during the purges of the late 1930's. Not with a dismissal letter, but a bullet in the back of the neck.
I'm not a Lee worshiper (in fact the Civil War is not my forte) but allow me to make a case. Lee's options were very limited both by politics and by geographic realities. He was always forced to fight on unequal terms. Any chance of using some kind of Fabian strategy was precluded both by politics and the importance of the Upper South (esp Virginia) to the Confederate war effort. In that situation playing it safe and fighting defensive battles might have saved his troops longer and frustrated the North more but in the long run it wouldn't change the outcome of the war. At the same time a bold move might be risky but it could secure a decisive victory which potentially could end the war. "Offense is the best defense is not just a cliche". And faith in "One Big Battle" wasn't exactly wrong - in fact that's how Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian wars were decided.
I think the problem is that while Lee's victories were impressive, they were not decisive enough. Had he been able to to completely destroy or force a surrender of an entire Union army (as say the Prussians forced the surrender of the French at Sedan) he could have potentially exploited it by capturing Washington, Baltimore, Philly and possibly more. But that, it seems, it was not to be.
So Lee's strategy might have been the least bad out of terrible options. A purely defensive strategy would have probably lead to him being pinned down defending Richmond in a war of attrition he could not win.
You make it sound as if the outcome of the war was inevitable and one of the first lessons historians-in-training learn is that nothing is inevitable. Human behavior causes things. Had a pro-peace party taken control of northern politics during the war and initiated armistice talks with the South, then the outcome would have been different despite the North's industrial and population advantages. Had human behavior been different in myriad ways, the war could have ended much differently than it did.
Had Lee fought a defensive war then the chances of the North tiring of the war would have been greater based on Lincoln's hard fight for reelection in '64 (victory in Atlanta sealed his win that November). McClellan and the Copperheads were a formidable political force for a population that was growing sick of the war and the rolls of war dead pouring into post offices all across the northern states. The Copperheads' position was to sue for peace. But Lee had no way of knowing how the election would turn out. Further, I find it difficult that Lee even believed he had enough men and materiel to prosecute the offensive-defense. He did so anyway, as Grand has provided numerous reasons that explain why.
One more note on Lincoln's '64 fight with Mac--the POTUS feared losing the election so badly that he made his cabinet members sign a statement before they could read the statement. After they all signed the document, Lincoln disclosed that the statement was an agreement that should Mac win the Nov. election, then the current administration would step down immediately rather than waiting until the March inaugural. Lincoln's rationale was that the nation was facing a dire emergency that warranted this action. This action on Lincoln's part represents the poor state of public opinion for his administration and that Mac was a viable candidate.
Lastly, you wrote that you wanted to make a case, but it's not very well done simply because the way you outline Lee's "terrible options." A good general realizes what the terrible options are and capitalizes on them. As I stated earlier on this thread, Washington used elusiveness and knowledge of the terrain to avoid any all-out fights with the British until foreign intervention swung the tide in the Patriots' favor. When life gives you lemons, make lemonade. Further, your case for Lee was would-a, could-a, should-a, which is second-guessing. Had Lee been truly the great general he's puported to be, then there'd be no room for second-guessing. Second-guessing his actions means the gen'ral performed poorly, and Lee even said so himself.
Interior lines was the Napoleonic maxim (which governed CW generals on both sides) in which lines would be placed in a semi-circular fashion so that reinforcements could be rushed to any vulnerable point in the line--during Gettysburg, the AOP quickly established this principle while Lee's generals faltered. They faltered based on vague field orders, i.e. A.P., "take that hill if the opportunity presents itself," from Lee. What does that mean? Either take the hill or not. Regardless, the ANV did not have interior lines, yet Lee doggedly continued to prosecute the offensive as if he had interior lines. He should have wheeled. Longstreet later took him to task for this fact, but probably during the battle he deferred to his superior because Lee had not lost to that point.
It might have been a Napolean maxim, but Napolean himself did not always follow these princples, prefering advance of envelope strategies (la maneuvre sur les derrieres), and strategic penetration. Mostly the interior lines concept was used in his earlier campaigns, in Italy, when he was at a disadvantage in troops strength (as Lee was always encubmered with).
Now, the problem with this strategy, is that the the enemy can not be destroyed, only defeated. Napolean (or Lee) could not pursue the routed enemy, but had to turn around and face the other component of the enemy. Thus it robbed the victor of any chance of a decisive victory. Because of this, Napolean considered it an "inferiority strategy" and only used it when he must.
Lee also, as had been mentioned he knew he could never win a war of attrition, was forced to use this strategy only when he must, but preferred the more risky envelope strategies.
IF I were a general, I'd certainly prefer being fired by O'bama than Stalin.
Yes, or even Hitler for that matter. Unlike Comrade Stalin, he normally didn't execute his fired generals, although those who participated in the July 1944 plot to assasinate him met a grisly fate, guilty or even percieved guilty, such as Rommel.
It might have been a Napolean maxim, but Napolean himself did not always follow these princples, prefering advance of envelope strategies (la maneuvre sur les derrieres), and strategic penetration. Mostly the interior lines concept was used in his earlier campaigns, in Italy, when he was at a disadvantage in troops strength (as Lee was always encubmered with).
Now, the problem with this strategy, is that the the enemy can not be destroyed, only defeated. Napolean (or Lee) could not pursue the routed enemy, but had to turn around and face the other component of the enemy. Thus it robbed the victor of any chance of a decisive victory. Because of this, Napolean considered it an "inferiority strategy" and only used it when he must.
Lee also, as had been mentioned he knew he could never win a war of attrition, was forced to use this strategy only when he must, but preferred the more risky envelope strategies.
My statement about the Napoleonic maxim of interior lines represents the tactical orthodoxy of CW-era, West Point-trained generals and was not intended as any claim about Napoleon's preference for such tactics. It was what was learned by the generals that led armies in the CW; it was what most CW generals considered a necessity to fight and win battles.
Lee violated this tactical orthodoxy, sometimes with great success (contributed by tactical blunders by the generals on the other side). His freewheeling attitude in violating tactical orthodoxy eventually cost his army from which it could never recover.
Interior lines, which many military historians assert, enabled Union victory at Gettysburg. Pickett's Charge was designed to break the Union's interior lines, yet it was this tactical application that allowed the AOP to reinforce its center. Given the ANV's human and material limitations, it would have served Lee and the ANV better to prosecute battles using interior lines, which would have allowed the army to quickly reinforce its vulnerable sections. Like many field commanders of the era, Lee doggedly adhered to frontal assaults, which caused further loss of the resources the CSA lacked.
Lee knew he couldn't win a war of attrition only after his material and human resources declined to the point that he was forced to adopt defensive strategies--a realization Lee arrived at as the decimated ANV limped back to friendlier territory following the general's blunders at Gettysburg.
Occam's razor is the philosophical principle that the simplest explanation is best. Since Lee lost at Gettysburg, and later continued to fight a trench-warfare defensive war, clearly demonstrates poor tactical application on his part.
Lastly, the offensive-defense or cordon defense that governed many field commanders of the CSA, was a foolhardy plan and, moreover, it represents southern arrogance--the belief that one Confederate could indeed whip ten Yankees. It demonstrates the aggressive character of the southern cause--which might have worked well had the South possessed the fighting capabilities the North enjoyed.
IF I were a general, I'd certainly prefer being fired by O'bama than Stalin.
No doubt!
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