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Major General Benjamin Butler had been both a blessing and a curse to President Lincoln. It was Butler's exertions which had gotten the first troops through to Washington in the war's early days. It was Butler who took charge in Maryland and was greatly responsible for keeping that state out of Confederate control, and it was Butler who had conceived the idea of classing runaway slaves as contraband of war, subject to seizure and liberation.
But when called upon to be a general in the field, Butler had already been exposed as incompetent by the fiasco at Big Bethel.
Moving him from the field to occupation duties had been the solution to that last shortcoming. Butler commanded the 18,000 infantry which now controlled New Orleans and propped Butler up as military governor.
In that capacity he was to be a curse and a blessing to the citizens of New Orleans. His administration had set up a poor relief agency and had established sanitation programs which reduced annual deaths from yellow fever by 80%. He had also closed all newspapers, demanded an oath of loyalty to the Union from any merchants wishing to do business with the US Army, executed a man for tearing down the Union flag which flew over the local US mint, confiscated all weapons...but nothing came close to stirring up the fury caused by his Order # Twenty Eight.
The ladies of New Orleans were spirited women in the feisty Southern tradition, and they felt free to openly express their contempt for their occupiers. Federal soldiers going about town received spit attacks, curses, unsolicited high volume lectures on their absense of breeding, and sometimes urine showers dumped on them from upstairs windows.
In response to this treatment, Butler ordered:
Quote:
General Orders, No. 28.
HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,
New Orleans, May 15, 1862.
As the officers and soldiers of the United States have been subject to repeated insults from the women (calling themselves ladies) of New Orleans in return for the most scrupulous non-interference and courtesy on our part, it is ordered that hereafter when any female shall by word, gesture, or movement insult or show contempt for any officer or soldier of the United States she shall be regarded and held liable to be treated as a woman of the town plying her avocation.
There was outrage North, South and in Europe to this heavy handed measure. Butler, who had been known as "Spoons" in the South for his habit of looting the diningware from occupied Southern homes, now gained the nickname that would stick...."The Beast Butler."
Butler was to go on to do even more controversial things, especially with regard to his treatment of foreign nationals in the city who had commercial or diplomatic relations witrh the rebels. Butler seemed to feel that confiscating their property was the just retribution for their lack of loyalty to the stars and stripes. He would last seven months before Lincoln was forced to replace him with a less controversial governor.
General Richard Ewell was feeling extremely frustrated. With his 8000 man division he had been sent to join General Jackson's force in the Valley, but since his arrival three weeks ago, he and his troops had been camping at Swift Run Gap, doing nothing. Jackson had not called upon Ewell's help during the fight at McDowell, had not confided his strategic plans to Ewell, and the few instructions he had received from Jackson, were now in conflict with orders he was receiving from Generals Lee and Johnston in Richmond. Jackson wanted Ewell to stay put and keep an eye on General Banks and his army, Richmond was ordering him to follow Banks and come back to Richmond if it looked like Banks was moving to link up with General McDowell's Corps.
150 years ago this morning, Ewell's decided to wait no longer. He rode the 30 miles to Jackson's headquarters at Mount Solom and found Jackson at an old gristmill he was using as his operations planning center. Jackson invited Ewell in and the two of them spent the next several hours studying maps of the Valley. Jackson revealed that now that portions of Banks' army were departing for the Peninsula, it was the time to unite and strike. Ewell pointed out that his orders from Johnston required him to follow Banks out of the Valley.
Jackson's solution was typically Jacksonian. He wrote Ewell a letter absolung him of responsibility for disobeying Johnston, wrote a letter to Lee requesting permission to retain Ewell's troops for an offensive against Banks, and then set his troops in motion without waiting for a reply. Permission, if it was to come, would be retroactive. And if it was denied, then it would be too late.
With that, Jackson invited Ewell to attend prayer service with him, and then sent him on his way to get his troops on the road.
Banks still had 9000 men in the Valley and 1,063 of them under Col. John R. Kenly occupied their forward position at Front Royal. They were to be the targets of Jackson's first strike.
In the first clash of arms in the Valley at Kernstown, Stonewall Jackson had suffered a tactical defeat because he had received false intelligence regarding the size of the opposition. As Jackson pushed his force toward Front Royal to ambush the segment of General Bank's army which occupied the town, he was completely confident he knew the size of his foe this time. The information had come from a 17 year old girl, but this was no ordinary teenager.
Belle Boyd had been living in Martinsburg, Virginia when in July of 1861, Federal soldiers broke into her family home with the intention of raising the US flag over it. When one of the Union soldiers insulted and threatened her mother, Belle drew a pistol and shot him to death.
She was exonerated by a board of inquiry, but the family was now suspect and the house was kept under watch by the Yankees occupying the region. Ms. Boyd took full advantage of the situation, ingraciating herself with the troops and becoming friendly enough with several officers that they revealed military movements and plans to her, all of which she conveyed to Confederate forces via her maid, Eliza Hopewell. who carried notes hidden in a hollowed out watch.
At Front Royal, Union general James Shields had convened a strategy session in the parlor of the local hotel owned by Belle's father. Ms. Boyd was directly above them, listening through a small hole drilled in the floor for the purpose of eavesdropping. She learned that the bulk of Shield's force was departing Front Royal and leaving behind just a thousand men to guard the town. Using false papers, 150 years ago today Boyd bluffed her way past Union sentries and located Colonel Turner Ashby, conveying the information about Shield's movements which was then passed on to Jackson.
It was this information which had triggered Jackson's decision to attack Front Royal first before going after Bank's larger command which was a dozen miles to the west at Strasburg.
Boyd's career as a spy lasted only another few months, in July another officer whom she was using to extract information, became suspicious and turned her into Federal authorities. She was imprisoned for a month, exchanged, arrested and released twice more after that...and of course by that time she had become so widely known that she could no longer pose as an innocent while collecting information.
Boyd was one of numerous rebel women who took severe risks on behalf of the cause, but for reasons unclear, she became the collective symbol of all female spies during the war, the exploits of others often being attributed to her, and an unusually large amount of post war literature produced supposedly depicting her adventures. She was held in great esteem in the South until her death in 1900.
General Nathaniel Banks had the bulk of his army, 9000 men, stationed in and around Strasburg. (lower left side of map) 20 miles to the east Col. J. R. Kenly commanded 1,063 men and two guns at Front Royal. General Jackson had merged with General Ewell's division and now commanded 16,500 and they were closing in on Kenly's tiny force. The object was to rout these Union troops which would open the the road which stretched from Front Royal to Winchester. As Jackson's army advanced on Winchester, Banks would have to retreat or face a Confederate army in his rear.
On the 21st, Jackson had sent his cavalry commander, Colonel Ashby Turner, to the Strasburg area to to skirmish with Banks' pickets and keep them occupied while the main force closed in on Front Royal. Turner broke off the action and rejoined Jackson 150 years ago this morning, in time for the attack on Front Royal which opened when Turner's horsemen surprised and flushed the Federal pickets.
The main Union defensive position was on a rise named Camp Hill. Jackson's men muscled their artillery up a nearby elevation and the early action consisted of a medium range field gun duel. While this was taking place, Confederate infantry was working its way around Kenly's flanks. Recognizing the danger, Kenly abandoned Camp Hill, retreated across the Shenandoah River and attempted to set the bridges ablaze to frustrate pursuit, but the attacking rebels reached them too quickly and extinguished the fires. Jackson's men pushed across in close pursuit and after a mile, the cavalry caught and cornered Kenly's men who deployed on some low heights on either side of the road. They were encircled, Kenly was wounded, and without an official command, the Union soldiers decided the battle at this moment by throwing down their arms and throwing up their hands.
For 50 casualties among their own ranks, the Confederates had killed 126 Yankees, wounded another 122, and captured 750 in the mass surrender.
Wasting no time, Jackson immediately began to organize the movement on Winchester.
It was panic time for General Banks 150 years ago today. At 4 pm the previous afternoon, a courrier had galloped up to his headquarters with the news that Front Royal had fallen and that the Confederates were crossing the Shenandoah River on bridges that had failed to burn.
Banks had been a highly skilled politician before the war, a Massachussetts born boy with no great advantages, who had built himself up into a person of great consequence. He had been a newspaper editor, lawyer, then member of the state legislature where he rose to Speaker of the House, and in 1853 he was elected to the US Congress. Banks had run as a "Know Nothing", the slang identification for the anti immigrant American party. They were absorbed by the Republicans in 1856 and Banks established close ties with a number of the men who would emerge as the most powerful of the radical Republicans.
When the war began, Banks had proven himself among the most highly effective of recruiters and organizers of new regiments. When President Lincoln made him a major general of volunteers, it seemed a logical choice.
Banks spent most of the war proving beyond possibility of argument, that he was no general.
The news of the defeat of the force which guarded the road into his rear, did not seem to register with Banks. He told his concerned officers that this was but a diversion and that any real attack on Stasburg would have to come from the South. Late into that night, his subordinates tried desperately to convince him that he was dangerously mistaken about this. After a time, all Banks would utter to these men by way of response was "I must develop the enemy."
Somewhere around 3 am, Banks finally grasped the concept that he was in a terrible position, and he ordered his sick and wounded on the road to Winchester. The army would follow in the morning.
Such vacillation was not something an enemy commander could afford to indulge when his opponent was Thomas J. Jackson. During the same dark hours that Banks spent in a non comprehending muddle, the rebel general was crafting the ways and means of cutting off Banks' retreat. He was aware of a road which stretched from Cedarville a few miles north of Front Royal, to Middletown, a few miles north of Strasburg. (see map in previous post.) Stonewall decided to send Ewell's men on a straight march to sieze Winchester, while he would cut across on the connecting road and if luck was with him, strike some portion of Banks' army while it was in motion.
It worked, but not nearly as completely as Jackson had hoped. His advance on Middletown took far longer than anticipated, thanks mostly to a spirited fight put up by the Federal cavalry who used hit and run tactics to continuously slow and stall the rebel columns. It wasn't until 3 pm, when the rear of Banks' retreating army was passing through Middletown, that the Confederates arrived.
What was there was still a reasonably fat and helpless target, and Jackson quickly unlimbered his artillery and began to make life in the column rather hellish for an hour. The men under the bombardment lost cohesion and began to run, the rebel cavalry swept in and captured a large number of abandoned wagons and guns. They were having a good time of it until coming upon a rear guard formed to meet them. The cavalry fell back and Jackson began to organize an infantry assualt to chase them away, but when the attack got underway, it discovered that the Yankee rear guard had already stolen away.
Jackson ordered his cavalry in pursuit, and was infuriated when Colonel Ashby was unable to get his men away from looting the captured Yankee wagons and into the road in pursuit. Jackson sent his by now exhausted infantry up the road after Banks' retiring men, but their staggering pace, with many dropping away in dead feints, made no progress and was ended by the arrival of darkness.
Jackson, when begged by his subordinates to please allow the men some rest, relented and permitted two hours, 2 am to 4 am, for all to grab some sleep. Jackson personally stood guard during the two hours, the only rebel sentry awake and on duty. Then he had them up again and headed for Winchester and a showdown with the inept Banks.
Another Sunday, another Sabbath which General Jackson would have to break in order to attack General Banks' 6500 troops at Winchester. By now Jackson had evolved a new doctrinal justification for this religious violation. He reasoned that if the Lord did not want him to fight on a Sunday, he would not have placed the Yankees within his grasp.
General Banks, after arriving in Winchester the night before, saw to his defensive positions, and then took a warm bath and retired for the night. If he was concerned about being attacked the next day, he did not share this with his officers. With Ewell's 8000 ready to assault Banks' left, and Jackson's 8000 arriving to hit his right, Banks might have shown a bit more attention to the situation.
150 years ago this morning, all it took was one grand, coordinated charge by the two wings of Jackson's army. Jackson's troops were taken forward by General Richard Taylor who marched them in parade ground order half way up the hill being held by Banks, and then sent them into a charge which broke the Yankee line and sent them fleeing for the rear. About the same time, Ewell's men came sweeping in on the Yankee left flank.
And after that it was nothing but rout and pursuit, Jackson himself getting caught up in the exceitement and spurring his horse forward to get in on the hunt.
The non plussed Banks raced about trying to rally his running troops. To a fleeing Wisconsin regiment he called "Don't you love your country?" The answer came back "Yes, and by God I'm trying to get back to it as fast as I can." It was an impressive rout on the Yankee's part in that they made incredibly good time, covering the 35 miles from Winchester to the banks of the Potomac in just 14 hours. Jackson's pursuit became scattered and ran out of steam long before that.
For 400 casualties sustained, Jackson had inflicted more than 2000 on the enemy, most of those prisoners, rounding up the ones who could not keep up with the quarterhorse paced retreat of their comrades. Jackson had also driven the largest federal army completely out of the Valley and left it cowering on its own side of the Potomac.
There were immediate and far reaching consequences. That evening General McClellan received a telegram from President Lincoln:
"In consequence of General Banks critical position I have been compelled to suspend General McDowell's movements to join you."
This of course infuriated Little Mac, this was the third time that McDowell's large corps had been on its way to join the seige of Richmond, and the third time it had been diverted back to the Valley as a consequence of Stonewall Jackson's high intensity campaign.
The fear that Jackson might blow right through what was left of Banks' army and advance against Washington was gripping Washington. Secretary Stanton began sending telegrams to all Northern governors requesting that they forward all available troops instantly to the defense of the capitol. To facilitate this movement, Stanton assumed control of all Northern railroads.
Lincoln sent another wire to McClellan insisting that he either immediately attack Richmond, or abandon the effort and return to defend Washington. McClellan, for a change, was the one Federal taking a realistic view of the situation. He wired back to the President that the entire purpose of Jackson's movements had been to try and prevent the reinforcement of the Army of the Potmac, and that Jackson's force was too small and too lacking in siege guns to seriously threaten the Washington forts. In any event, Mac neither attacked Richmond immediately, not did he give up the siege and return to Washington.
The consequence was Lincoln deciding to take operational control of the Valley armies himself, and direct them in a coordinated attempt to trap Jackson before he could exit the Valley.
Though stunned by severe handling he had received at the hands of Stonewall Jackson in the Valley, once safely across the Potomac he recovered his political instincts and sent a telegram to President Lincoln displaying his spin doctor skills.
"It is seldom that a river crossing of such magnitude is achieved with greater success. " The wire went on to deny that he had " ...suffered an attack and rout, but had accomplished a premeditated march of nearly 60 miles in the face of the enemy, defeating his plans and giving him battle wherever he was found."
The President had already been briefed on the actual character of this "premeditated march" and recognizing that Banks' shattered command was in no condition to hold back the invaders, had made the decision to call back General McDowell's Corps from their march to join General McClellan, and return to the Valley to deal with Jackson. As with all of Lincoln's generals save Grant, McDowell responded to the order with protests and complaints. McDowell pointed out that he was too far away to arrive in time to do anything to assist Banks and that he could make a far greater contribution to the cause by joining McClellan. The president held firm and told McDowell that it "..was all a matter of legs. Put all your speed into it."
Lincoln was already thinking beyond simply saving Washington, he wanted to trap and capture Jackson's army, putting an end to these feints and distractions. He spent the night 150 years ago today at the War Department, going over the maps of the Valley again and again and finding points where Fremont's Mountain Army could move from the west, McDowell from the east, and Banks from the north, converging on Jackson's force as it returned up the Valley. Telegrams went out with instructions, the first of which was to The Pathfinder at Franklin, telling him to immediately put his men on the road to Harrisonburg, 80 miles south of Jackson's army. Lincoln reasoned that the best way to relieve the pressure on Banks and the threat to Washington, was to place a force in Stonewall's rear.
All that was needed was for Fremont to execute his orders.
But this of course was John Charles Fremont.
Situation in the Valley, May 26th: Banks is occupying Williamsport on the northern bank of the Potomac, Jackson reamained South of the River near the Martinsburg/Harpers Ferry area. Franklin is near the lower left side of the map and Harrisonburg is about 25 mile to the SE.
After a staggeringly ponderous march by the 120,000 soldiers of General Henry Halleck's three armies, they had at last arrived in a position to lay siege to Corinth, Mississippi on the 25th. Halleck did not organize an immediate assault on Beauregard's 65,000, but like General McClellan in the east, began gearing up for a siege, digging approach trenches and bringing forward his heavy artillery. Unlike McClellan, Halleck didn't wait for every gun to be emplaced before opening the bombardment. As soon as the guns were in place on the platforms and supplied with shells and powder, explosives began to rain down on the rebel trenches.
Beauregard recognized that in a siege, it would simply be a matter of time, so he determined to evacuate Corinth, which in any event had not been a healthy place to camp even before the enemy arrived, more than a quarter of the Confederate troops were ill with assorted swamp related maladies. How to get them all away, healthy and sick, was Beauregard's problem and his solution was to take a page from Prince John Magruder and rely on showmanship to fool the Yankees.
150 years ago today he issued orders for an attack and had three days rations distributed to the men. As he hoped, a handful deserted before the attack could take place and wound up as POWs who happily blabbed about the coming assault. Halleck ordered preparations made to receive the attack.
While this was going on, Beauregard was loading his ill soldiers aboard railroad cars. As each empty car rolled in to load up the infirmed rebels, Beauregard had his men raise a loud cheer, as though they were welcoming cars full of reinforcements. Beauregard's heavy artillery was loaded onto the trains and bogus "Quaker" guns were laid in their place.
Squads of soldiers were left behind to maintain an army's worth of campfires. They blew bugle calls, drummers pounded out beats as though assembling the regiments for an assault. The army marched away to Tupelo, a fact discovered by the Yankees the following morning.
Though Halleck's advance had been needlessly sluggish, in the end the important railway junction town was in Union hands.
150 years ago today General Thomas Jackson finally began falling back up the Valley from where he had been threatening to cross the Potomac and menace Washington DC. Despite having known for days that the three armies opposing him in the region were moving to cut off his escape, Stonewall had taken his time. It wasn't until General Shield's division, returned to the Valley to reinforce General Banks' shattered command, began advancing to recapture Front Royal, that Jackson at last decided the time had come to make his getaway.
He need not have rushed. General Banks sent word that his force was still too rattled from their defeats to take the offensive, so the Northern part of the trap, the element which was to push Jackson South into the waiting arms of Generals Fremont and McDowell, would be composed of just Shields' division.
And one of those waiting arms would not be there waiting thanks to the exceptionally foolish decision on The Pathfinder's part to not take the direct route from Franklin to Harrisonburg ( see map of May 26th), but because it was easier marching, made an immense detour, first heading North to Strasburg and there turning South for the march to Harrisonburg.
President Lincoln of course was thrown into a black mood by Fremont's inexplicable navigation. He demanded that The Pathfinder explain this failure to follow a direct order from the Commander in Chief. Fremont replied that he had not disobeyed any orders. He had been told to march to Harrisonburg, and assumed that his chosen route was a matter for his own caprice. This of course utterly neglected the entire purpose of the move to Harrisonburg, to get there before Jackson and form a blocking position. By the time Fremont got to Strasburg, Jackson would have already passed and be ahead of The Pathfinder in the race for Harrisonburg.
McDowell was still two days away from being able to join in the chase, Shields called a halt after reoccupying Front Royal, insisting that he could move no further without reinforcements, Banks sat on his behind on the far side of the Potomac and The Pathfinder was making a leisurely roundabout approach which took his Mountain Army out of action for days.
President Lincoln's hammer and anvil plan was sound, but the tools being used were not up to the job.
On this same day near Richmond, despite Lincoln's pleas for him to launch an attack, McClellan was laying out a siege approach to the rebel capitol. Having been once more deprived of General McDowell's Corps, Mac had all the excuse he needed to claim that he did not have sufficient soldiers to mount a frontal assault. What he did have on hand were 105,000 soldiers divided among five Corps, three of which were North of the Chickahominy River, and two stationed on the opposite bank. McClellan's engineers had constructed a number of bridges to facilitate reinforcing one side or the other should the need arise. They were engaged in hauling up the big guns and constructing siege platforms and trenches, the same exhausting work which had won them Yorktown without having had to fire a shot.
In the trenches and bombproofs around Richmond were 60,000 defenders. Their commander, General Joseph Johnston, decided on a course of action he was not to repeat for the remainder of the war....to attack. Johnston recognized he could not hope to match McClellan in a duel of heavy artillery, and since President Davis would hear no talk at all regarding giving up Richmond, that left attack as the only option.
Johnston decided to concentrate his army South of the Chickahominy and have the bulk of his command fall upon the the two isolated Union Corps. The rebels would have a 55,000 to 33,000 advantage in numbers. Generals A.P. Hill and Prince John Magruder would be left on the North bank for another Magruder special...making a huge demonstration to keep those Corps pinned to their side of the river. The jumpoff was set for May 31st and the units were moved quietly into place the night before and the commanders assigned to carefully appointed routes.
Johnston's tactical plans were very solid, and very complex, the sort which called for well coordinated timing and cooperation among his lower level commanders. Had this been a more veteran army, a more experienced one, and the more disciplined one it was to become, Johnston's plan would probably have been viable, it probably would have worked.
Instead the result was the two day traffic pileup which we know as Seven Pines or Fair Oaks.
The Positions on the Eve of Battle: Hill and Magruder were to hold the attention of the three Federal Corps under Porter, Franklin and Sumner, while D.H. Hill and Longstreet attacked the two Corps South of the river under Keyes and Heintzelman.
150 years ago this morning, General Johnston's attempt to break the siege of Richmond via assault got underway at 8 am. Things instantly began to go wrong.
The night before, rather than issuing written orders to General Longstreet, Johnston had provided a lengthy briefing in person. Longstreet was a bit hard of hearing and this may or may not have contributed to the confusion which followed. Johnston's other division commanders received written instructions, but they were somewhat rambling and contradictory. Most astonishing was that Johnston had appointed Longstreet to be the overall commander on the South side of the river, but had informed Longstreet of this and no one else.
For reasons which are still being argued today, Longstreet failed to follow his orders. Instead of advancing up the Williamsburg Road to strike at Seven Pines in conjunction with General Huger on his right, Longstreet sent his force up the Nine Mile Road, into the zone assigned to General Smith. This was a longer approach and not only meant that Longstreet would be delayed in getting into position, it also meant that Smith's troops were delayed because their assigned route was clogged with Longsteet's men, and Huger would be late because he had been instructed to wait and cooperate with Longstreet's movements on his left. Thus this one mistake caused the entire Confederate attack to be delayed by six hours. And when it finally got underway, hardly anyone was in the position that they were assigned or working next to units they had been told to expect in support.
Johnston sat behind the lines on his horse, joined after a time by General Lee , waiting for the sounds of artillery to inform them that the assault was underway. They waited and waited. Finally around 3 pm the sounds of battle began to be heard.
What they were hearing was the isolated attack by D.H. Hill of Huger's division. Hill, after six frustrating hours of waiting for the signal to get started, finally decided to just go in on his own and hope for the best. Missing were not only the supporting troops from Longstreet which were supposed to be there, but Huger got the rest of his divsion bogged down in a swamp and they were unable to assist Hill.
The sounds of the engagement reached General Smith on the rebel left and this was his signal to sweep down on Seven Pines through Fair Oaks, coming in on the Union right flank. Instead of doing that, their much delayed advance ran into the troops of General Sumner's Corps who had been given ample time to cross the river and take up a blocking position. It had been a near run thing. Rising waters had reached the level of the bridges and were pounding away at the supports holding them in place. Sumner, known as "Bull" thanks to his concert level voice, put his men across the swaying, sinking bridges and got them into place just in time to check Smith. Both bridges washed away shortly after Sumner's Corps got across. A series of attacks and counter attacks by both sides did nothing to change the stalemate on this front of the battle.
On the rebel right, around 4:45 pm, Longstreet's men finally arrived to support D.H. Hill who had been fighting Keyes Corps all by himself. And just as the Confederates had the numbers to make something happen on that flank, General Heintzelman's Corps arrived to bolster Keyes and create stalemate there as well.
Those were the conditions which prevailed when darkness, around seven thirty, brought an end to the fighting for the day.
Into this growing twilight, General Johnston rode to see if anything more could be accomplished on this day. He concluded not and dispatched riders to inform his generals to cease fire and prepare to renew the contest tomorrow. Just as the last of these messengers departed, Johnston was struck in the right shoulder by a bullet. While reeling in the saddle, a shell exploded close by and one fragment struck Johnston in the chest, knocking him from his horse and out cold on the ground.
As aids were carrying the wounded general from the field, President Davis and General Lee rode up. They consoled Johnston, saw him off to the rear, and then went looking for General Smith to inform him that he was now in command. This was not a responsibility the 40 year old Smith wanted, and his anxiety over the appointment was so great as to make him physically ill and incapable of command the following day.
Seven Pines/Fair Oaks..Day One
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