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Actually, those employed by Ludendorff's spring offensives in 1918 (small unit attacks in concentration, hedgehog advances with interlocking fields of fire, and specific limited objectives with multiple options upon the completion of each bite-sized advance), very nearly turned the tide by splitting the French and English armies and brought about the defeat of both the French and the BEF (as it was, England's Fifth Army vanished in the face of the German onslaught.)
One could make the argument that only the fact that Germany had no more reserves to throw against the overwhelming mass of the burgeoning American forces (which Foch used in his devastating counterblows), coupled with a lack of overall strategic planning on the part of the Germans in favor of tactical concerns, saved the Allies from defeat.
The ability of the German army to commit itself to an offensive on this scale, at this late date, is truly amazing. It is matched only by the incredible courage of the Allied soldiers who faced up to the tragic stupidity of their leaders day after day, month after month, and year after year, and rescued "victory" (for want of a better term) from what could easily have been defeat on the battlefield.
To my thinking, France and England have never really recovered from the atrocious waste of human life and the stupendous failure of leadership which characterized the Allies in the Great War, and which taught them the limits of hubris. Germany needed another more thorough lesson, though...
Those local tactics had been tried before, plus others. And, some temporary gains had been made. But, without enough troops to hurl through a break in the lines, they never came to much. The Ludendorff Offensive can't rightly be used as a basis for comparison with other attacks because it was the first time since August of 1914 when the Germans had a significant numerical advantage to exploit gains.
I'm not defending the horrific slaughter or the inept decisions which led to such massive blood-lettings, just pointing out that unless they were willing to just throw in the towel and give up, there really weren't any other alternatives than frontal assaults for about 3 1/2 years.
Those local tactics had been tried before, plus others. And, some temporary gains had been made. But, without enough troops to hurl through a break in the lines, they never came to much. The Ludendorff Offensive can't rightly be used as a basis for comparison with other attacks because it was the first time since August of 1914 when the Germans had a significant numerical advantage to exploit gains.
I'm not defending the horrific slaughter or the inept decisions which led to such massive blood-lettings, just pointing out that unless they were willing to just throw in the towel and give up, there really weren't any other alternatives than frontal assaults for about 3 1/2 years.
True. Still, the ability of the Germans to accomplish the gains they made -- as you point out, limited largely through lack of manpower -- at that late stage of the war was a significant achievement (if any such waste of young lives can be described as an achievement)...
There were some very brave regiments from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. A better term would be Great Britain and Ireland, the British Isles (a georgraphic term) or indeed just Britain or the UK.
In fact the British Empire or Commonwealth of Nations would probably be a more apt discription, as there were also regiments fighting for Britain from most countries of Empire.
England is not a country, it is part of the UK, to use the term England is like using one of the states that makes up the US or indeed Canada rather then the nation.
True. Still, the ability of the Germans to accomplish the gains they made -- as you point out, limited largely through lack of manpower -- at that late stage of the war was a significant achievement (if any such waste of young lives can be described as an achievement)...
What you are missing is how they gained that numerical advantage. The Russians signed an armistice in early 1918 and this freed up a large number of troops to be sent west to bolster the German advantage for the Spring Offensive. While the offensive was planned without these troops in mind, they certainly helped. What the Germans were betting on outside of their slight numerical advantage was new tactics, primarily stormtrooper units. The problem was, as before with the Schlieffen Plan the Germans were horrible at planning their logistics and did not have any available mobile troops such as cavalry to exploit a breakthrough.
Ultimately, this offensive is what led to their failure (though the Germans pretty much agreed the offensive was a last ditch effort). Bolstered by fresh supplies of US troops, the allies were able to go on the offensive. However, what allowed the allies to perform their flanking maneuvers was that the German gains in the Spring Offensive had only created salients, which greatly extended the line and meant that the positions could be attacked from multiple sides and that is exactly what the allies did.
Given all that, how would you determine our casualty rate or casualty ratio to use as a basis for discussion and comparison?
You'll find that the same kinds of issues arise when trying to compare casualties between WWI and WWII. Heck, they'll even tilt the figures from one year to another during WWI. Or, ANY war.
I think we are ultimately in agreement on this point. The only reason I mentioned it was to back up Felix's assertion which was quite correct that the "slaughter" of WW1 was not necessarily any worse then any other war, it was just shocking to the people of the time do to the scale, which leads us to the belief that it was a horrendous blood bath worse then anything else.
Like you said pinning down any of these actual numbers is next to impossible and even when the armies themselves provide them, they all use different measurements and ways to calculate it, even from time period to time period.
"Just One Long Degradation'
-- Major Sidney Baker, A Letter from the Front
Not counted among the causalties of WWI are those who suffered long, painful illnesses because of the effects of mustard gas, among other things. We will never know how many millions died from similar causes. If there were a misnomer for a war, the 'Great War for Civilization' would be it.
In his book, British Butchers and Bunglers of World War I, John Laffin, whose mother and father both served in WWI, is particularly scathing of the British military leadership, especially naming Field Marshall Earl Haig and Field Marshall Lord French, although several others are called out as well. The callousness,insensitivity and incompetence of the British commanders is cited by Laffin in a paragraph written by Brigadier-General Rees after his brigade's advance on July 1, 1916:
"They advanced in line after line, dressed as if on parade, and not a man shirked going through the extremely heavy barrage, or facing the machine-gun and rifle fire that finally wiped them out. I saw that lines which advanced in such admirable order melting away under the fire. Yet not a man wavered, broke the ranks, or attempted to come back. I have never seen, I would have never imagined, such a magnificent display of gallantry, discipline and determination. The reports I have had from the very few survivors of this marvelous advance bear out what I saw with my own eyes, viz, that hardly a man of ours got to the German front line."
The preceding paragraph describes a carnage with less dispassion than that of a sporting event. Even the German gunners must have been appalled by such indifference to death.
According to Laffin, even after the Battle of the Somme, "Haig appeared undismayed by the number of casualties and with the help of the London press -- he had friends among the newspaper proprietors -- he set about convincing Britain that all was going according to plan." As Laffin said, many battles in history were called off after fewer than 60,000 casualties, but "Haig never entertained the the idea of calling off the offensive."
Predictably, the senior generals were well rewarded for their service. The already wealthy General Haig was given the thanks by parliment and a grant of 100,000 pounds. Other officers received 30,000 pounds. "Next-of-kin of servicemen who gave their lives received a bronze memorial plaque but no other details."
This is the old "lions led by donkeys" view of the war. This view has been getting challeneged more and more these days on a closer look at the events.
FWIW, the battlefiled of WW1 was very different from anything that came before it. People draw parallels to the US Civil War in terms of tactics and while there are similarities there, what is radically different is the SCALE of the battles.
WW1 was the first war in history where commanders could not see the entire battlefield no matter where they stood. What that meant was that commanders had no sense of the progress of the battle or to observe enemy movements and counter them. Along those same lines, communications (actually lack of) did not allow a commander to alter his battle plans on the fly or receive updates from the field. Technology had simply not caught up with the scale of the battlefield.
The best analogy to this is playing chess where you have to plan all of your moves ahead of time and then wait for someone to run into the room and tell you what happened once the game was over.
This is largely what contributed to the issues at the Somme that people are so hard on Haig over. Despite the fact that people think of the Somme as a single battle and not the 3 1/2 month campaign it was, once attacks were started and general objectives agreed to there was little that could be done to call off the attacks and change course. At the Somme Haig was also filling his role of occupying the Germans while the French delivered the blows with concentrated force. There was also a good amount of hesitancy to call off an attack once committed given the massive amount of resources that went into pulling one off. The British alone fired over a million tons of high explosive in the lead up to the battle.
Outside of those glaring issues with battlefield control, we then get into the problems of logistics and exploiting any gains. Logistics at the time were a very ponderous thing at best and relied on railheads and wagons to get anywhere. A unit advancing could easily outstrip the ability to be resupplied. This is what destroyed the Schlieffen Plan and the Kasierschlacht. The Allies were no different on the logistics end.
Then we get to exploitation. There was simply nothing that had the ability to really exploit a break in the lines once one was achieved. Infantry were too slow and cavalry were hard to keep supplied and were incredibly vulnerable on the offensive and incapable of holding anything for long without infantry support. This became the entire point behind the development of armor and mechanized/motorized infantry in the inter-war years.
To me, I think we need to realize that WW1 was a very unique war and what seems obvious to us now in hindsight may not have been possible for the commanders of the time to even consider to attempt.
One the war on the Western Front settled into trench warfare, what other tactics could they have used?
That's the sick beautiful madness of it all, none!
Although by 1918 the Germans had figured it out by giving small units more autonomy, advancing with trained assault units, combined arms at the squad and platoon level and using artillery tactically under the control of advanced units. The only problem, other than Ludendorff's inability decide what he was going to do if and when they broke through Allied lines, was that they hadn't figured out how to supplies would keep up with the speed of advancing units. In short all the tactics that they used in WWII to avoid a WWI redue.
This is the old "lions led by donkeys" view of the war. This view has been getting challeneged more and more these days on a closer look at the events.
FWIW, the battlefiled of WW1 was very different from anything that came before it. People draw parallels to the US Civil War in terms of tactics and while there are similarities there, what is radically different is the SCALE of the battles.
WW1 was the first war in history where commanders could not see the entire battlefield no matter where they stood. What that meant was that commanders had no sense of the progress of the battle or to observe enemy movements and counter them. Along those same lines, communications (actually lack of) did not allow a commander to alter his battle plans on the fly or receive updates from the field. Technology had simply not caught up with the scale of the battlefield.
The best analogy to this is playing chess where you have to plan all of your moves ahead of time and then wait for someone to run into the room and tell you what happened once the game was over.
This is largely what contributed to the issues at the Somme that people are so hard on Haig over. Despite the fact that people think of the Somme as a single battle and not the 3 1/2 month campaign it was, once attacks were started and general objectives agreed to there was little that could be done to call off the attacks and change course. At the Somme Haig was also filling his role of occupying the Germans while the French delivered the blows with concentrated force. There was also a good amount of hesitancy to call off an attack once committed given the massive amount of resources that went into pulling one off. The British alone fired over a million tons of high explosive in the lead up to the battle.
Outside of those glaring issues with battlefield control, we then get into the problems of logistics and exploiting any gains. Logistics at the time were a very ponderous thing at best and relied on railheads and wagons to get anywhere. A unit advancing could easily outstrip the ability to be resupplied. This is what destroyed the Schlieffen Plan and the Kasierschlacht. The Allies were no different on the logistics end.
Then we get to exploitation. There was simply nothing that had the ability to really exploit a break in the lines once one was achieved. Infantry were too slow and cavalry were hard to keep supplied and were incredibly vulnerable on the offensive and incapable of holding anything for long without infantry support. This became the entire point behind the development of armor and mechanized/motorized infantry in the inter-war years.
To me, I think we need to realize that WW1 was a very unique war and what seems obvious to us now in hindsight may not have been possible for the commanders of the time to even consider to attempt.
The story of the LOST BATTALION tells that tale. The one unit that did capture their objective was left surrounded by the enemy and unable to communicate with it's own command. It always amazes me how this story of American Heroism never gets any mention by the "history buffs". Last I heard of the 318th Infantry it was a Reserve Drill Sergeant Unit based in Atlantic City
People draw parallels to the US Civil War in terms of tactics and while there are similarities there, what is radically different is the SCALE of the battles.
WW1 was the first war in history where commanders could not see the entire battlefield no matter where they stood. What that meant was that commanders had no sense of the progress of the battle or to observe enemy movements and counter them.
I'll take that personally!
You have a point to a point. The battles of the WWI were several magnitudes larger than those of the American Civil War, but there were far too many battles where commanders (particularly Union commanders) who were unaware of vital areas of the battle that they were engaged in and if communications were archaic during WWI the comparatively stone aged during the Civil War. How many battles during the Civil War were lost or one by the sudden and excepted appearance or disappearance of major units?
You have a point to a point. The battles of the WWI were several magnitudes larger than those of the American Civil War, but there were far too many battles where commanders (particularly Union commanders) who were unaware of vital areas of the battle that they were engaged in and if communications were archaic during WWI the comparatively stone aged during the Civil War. How many battles during the Civil War were lost or one by the sudden and excepted appearance or disappearance of major units?
For my money Gettysburg was lost at Hanover PA where Custer had the Confederate Cavalry tied up. For the entire three days Lee was poking blindly at Union defenses
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