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The U.S. stood to lose a lot in the event of a German victory. Our entire trading system with Europe would have collapsed. Any future trade would be on the terms of the Germans, not the British or French. U.S. influence over Europe would have been severely weakened or non-existent.
Another issue is we couldn't trade with Germany at that point. For a while, we did trade with Scandinavia, and they filtered it through to Germany. But then Britain turned the screws and even tightened calorie levels for Scandinavia through the blockade, not all that different from the tightening Union blockade of the Civil War South, insofar as effectiveness (no territory was seized in the blockade). The terrible turnip winter of 1916-17 was also part of it, to make Germany decide to go a big step further.
In 1916 a German submarine went to the US with chemicals and other high value per weight items, Baltimore I recall, but this return item was tiny compared to the British return trade, and investment was much greater in the US or non British areas (sell for hard currency, free of possible war loss).
In short, the US was getting sucked into the fray, practically by gravity of the map and sea power (keeping sea lanes open, a practically no contest issue on 98% of the world's oceans by 1916 for tonnage shipping).
Your assertion that the "smart money" was on an Allied victory in early 1917 is questionable. If that were true, why would the U.S. need to draft 4 million troops and send them overseas? Why not just let the British and French clean things up.
Because all Wilson's assumptions turned out wrong. As far as he knew he was climbing aboard the winning bandwagon, and the war was likely to be over long before any significant number of troops reached Europe, so that US casualties would be negligible, while even the financial contribution was likely to be modest. Wilson was all set to lead America to a near bloodless triumph, making himself the hero of the hour and perhaps even setting the stage for a third term in 1920.
He also had to promise troops (even if they were never needed) to assure himself of the major role at the peace table that he craved. To refuse would have deprived him of much influence with the Allies.
Within weeks of the declaration of war, everything was going pearshape. By June Russia's was visibly failing, and France struggling, while Britain was desperate for money. Both financial and military commitments were going to be far higher than Wilson ever anticipated. Instead of the expected cakewalk, he had to impose sacrifices which effectively signed his political death warrant.
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Regardless, the decision to go to war wasn't made on a whim in 1917 because the Allies were winning.
Not sure what you mean by "on a whim". Wilson accepted war because German actions had amply justified him, at what was to all appearances the ideal moment. There was no longer any particular reason not to go to war. He stood to get his big moment at the peace table, for a negligible price. In the event, of course, the opposite proved true. Far from climbing aboard with the winners, he found himself having to make a far bigger effort in order to bail out the losers. And since no politician could admit to a misjudgement on such a scale, he had no choice but to pretend [1] that he had understood this all along, and had gone to war to "save" civilisation from the supposed horrors of a German victory. Events having handed him a lemon, he did his best to make lemonade. The elections of 1918 and 1920, though, would suggest that the voters weren't fooled.
[1] Though he may not have been just pretending. He had a phenomenal capacity for believing what he wanted to believe, and overlooking inconvenient facts. It may be that he convinced himself that he really had anticipated events.
Another issue is we couldn't trade with Germany at that point. For a while, we did trade with Scandinavia, and they filtered it through to Germany. But then Britain turned the screws and even tightened calorie levels for Scandinavia through the blockade.
But much of the tightening came after, not before, US entry into the war. As most of the Northern Neutrals imports came from the US, her belligerency meant that these could be controlled at source. Thus (see Stephenson 1914-18, p454) US exports to those countries in 1917-18 were only around 10% of their 1915-16 level. The blockade became watertight as a result of US intervention, rather than being a cause of it. Indeed, until USW made the question moot, blacklists and other blockade measures meant that US relations with the Allies (and esp GB) in mid to late 1916 were a good deal worse than with Germany.
This always puzzled me. German Americans were the biggest ethnic group in the country and they contributed so much to American civilization in education, engineering, culture, etc. It has been said that German Americans were the backbone of the country. And German Americans had the nicest neighborhoods in the big cities with real nice architecture. But WW1 was devastating to the German American communities all across the country. The war broke up their neighborhoods and they never recovered. Naturally the German Americans were against going to war against Germany. But it seemed the government ignored the interests of the biggest ethnic group. So I wonder why the government didn't consider the what the German Americans wanted. It is like they didn't matter or something.
I am not very sure about "betraying." I suppose history cannot be judged by perfect 20/20 hindsight.
"Once the U.S. entered the war against Germany and the Central Powers, a search for spies and saboteurs escalated into efforts to suppress German culture in America. Many German-language newspapers were closed down. Public schools stopped teaching German. Many of the numerous churches which had been founded by German-speaking immigrants stopped holding services in German and began changing over to English. The result of all of these was a blurring of German ethnic and linguistic identity in the face of rising anti-German sentiment."
But much of the tightening came after, not before, US entry into the war. As most of the Northern Neutrals imports came from the US, her belligerency meant that these could be controlled at source. Thus (see Stephenson 1914-18, p454) US exports to those countries in 1917-18 were only around 10% of their 1915-16 level. The blockade became watertight as a result of US intervention, rather than being a cause of it. Indeed, until USW made the question moot, blacklists and other blockade measures meant that US relations with the Allies (and esp GB) in mid to late 1916 were a good deal worse than with Germany.
True, the US relations were initially generally more outspoken with UK than Imperial Germany. Like in era before the War of 1812, America does not like her cargoes confiscated, much less entire ships (or crews). But the British used correct maritime law in stopping these vessels, unlike Germany U-boat, which in the end more than evened out the trouble. Pre 1812, America verged on war with both France and the UK at different points.
It is very difficult for me to see how it contradicts my assessment.
Yes, I can believe a figure of 10% of the 1915-16 level at 1917-18. Almost all my information is based upon readings in the college library some 30 years ago. The graphs of Scandinavian imports were a surge upwards after 1914, deflating, then crashing to tiny levels you mention, obviously due to tight monitoring by the British/Allied blockade. My understanding of the issue is as follows:
Right now, look at a map. All entrances to Germany/Austria are from the Norwegian to UK (ignoring the very restricted English Channel and Straits of Otrano) a total length of little over a hundred miles of critical zone for a blockade. Compare that to the nearly two thousand of mile on the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico to blockade for the American Confederacy in the Civil War. If Norway was not on the side of the British in all but name, this would have been much more complicated, as it was for naval vessels in WWII.
What would be the likely policy if you were losing many tens of thousands of men in casualties every year? Do whatever it takes is a simple answer. If you see your enemy gaining by trade with neutrals, and neutrals must use shipping lanes in areas of your relatively easy control, you turn the screws.
In the science and history show Connections, I was introduced to the idea that in the 1880's the Americas and Australia had grain coming out of their ears, the flooded excess then shipped to Europe. And it is true that Europe became used to cheap grain and as a result neglected its intense farming. Come 1914, this was more so. It upsets an enemy to have to rebuild an industry during a war, so foodstuffs were a natural target. Same goes for neutrals trading with Germany. With less food, people put inefficient amounts of people back to the farms, away from factory production. With the Baltic effectively a German Navy Lake, there are few other options but to trade with Germany, if there is enough food to produce things Germany would want, as Adam Smith, Ricardo, etc. presented in economies of scale/comparative advantage.
Netherlands (like Switzerland) did effectively export to both sides, the famous Fokker biplanes for example, yet was probably most willing to do a more expert balancing act to avoid Belgium's fate. The Scandinavians, though, required the British to be much more sensitive. Norway was more on the British side, but had only gained an amicable separation (independence) from Sweden a mere 9 years before. Treat Sweden in a heavy handed way and Britain ran a serious risk of festered a mega problem involving a very long fiord coastline perfect to launch clandestine deep water shipping from ten thousand points, enormously complicating the blockade. On the other hand, these countries had a lot to lose when food became scarce, and it put pressure from the average citizen though the stomach.
When countries are as dependent upon importation of foodstuffs as this and have constricted flow, the first thing to go is meat. Meat becomes much a luxury, which imports can be confiscated. Home grown meat takes 10 times the amount of land to grow, although grazing animals have some leeway since many rocky pasture lands common in glaciated lands are completely unsuited for any cultivation besides grazing. One grows beans for protein, not a welcome event for gastonomical reasons, and turnips have the added problem of being extremely bitter for those with a paired gene.
This would have been difficult pre 1917, just as you say. After 1917, no one in the US could voice much discontent with out having a good chance of being sent to prison. As in WWII, Scandinavian-American holdouts could be within days of the declaration of war be told "Don't you know there is a war going on?" with the effective end of a potential public relations problem on the blockade (and other) fronts.
However, US simply not being able to freely trade with Germany, my entire point, was still very true come 1916. It is all a matter of degrees. All businessmen have a very strong profit motive. The threat to confiscate cargoes, and potentially entire ships as well, has served wartime U.K. very well in blocades over the last few hundred years. Also remember that Lloyds of London, the only effective insurance clearing house exchange on the globe at that time, was hardly likely to be receptive to a sympathetic German-American or Scandinavian-American company suspected of contraband running, or anyone else for that matter. So they would be uninsured, which is not a commonly favored shipping strategy.
There is more guessed of British adroitness in turning the screws and how/why they did it with what historical learning to guide their policy, but the above is more than enough for most all people's interest level at this site, at this thread.
This would have been difficult pre 1917, just as you say. After 1917, no one in the US could voice much discontent with out having a good chance of being sent to prison. As in WWII, Scandinavian-American holdouts could be within days of the declaration of war be told "Don't you know there is a war going on?" with the effective end of a potential public relations problem on the blockade (and other) fronts.
However, US simply not being able to freely trade with Germany, my entire point, was still very true come 1916. It is all a matter of degrees.
I agree entirely. But it is one thing to get tough with a big neutral on whom you yourself depend for any number of essentials, and quite another to twist the arms of a few small ones after the big neutral has jumped off the fence and is not only going along with your actions but is egging you on to get tougher, and also getting tougher itself. See Nash Herbert Hoover; Master of Emergencies for how the US tightened up its exports to Denmark and other neutral states after April 1917. The blockade got watertight as a result of US entry into the war, it didn't cause it.
I certainly don't see how any of this "sucked" the US into war. After all, the wartime orders were going to end with the war, whichever side won it - and in Spring 1917 most observers expected the Entente to win with or without the US. In fact the Entente's position was nowhere near as good as it looked, but its problems were either still in the future or else closely guarded secrets.
I have no problem with the idea that it was worth America's while to tolerate the British blockade - though (see Devlin and Doenecke) by late 1916 some British measures were straining American patience to breaking point - nor with the idea that, rightly or wrongly, they might have considered a German victory to be against US interests. What I don't buy is the notion that any of this was an important factor in Wilson's decision to go to war. Afaics he wasn't worrying about a CP victory because, like most people, he wasn't expecting one.
Even wilder is the idea I've occasionally run into, that Wilson was in some sort of conspiracy with the Entente (and/or with pro-Entente financiers) to bring America in on the Entente side. Apart from the fact that the biggest pro-Entente financier, the House of Morgan, had supported his opponent in 1916, and could expect no favours from him, Woodrow Wilson, the ultimate political "loner" would never have got into a conspiracy simply because he wasn't enough of a team player to conspire with anybody.
This always puzzled me. German Americans were the biggest ethnic group in the country and they contributed so much to American civilization in education, engineering, culture, etc. It has been said that German Americans were the backbone of the country. And German Americans had the nicest neighborhoods in the big cities with real nice architecture. But WW1 was devastating to the German American communities all across the country. The war broke up their neighborhoods and they never recovered. Naturally the German Americans were against going to war against Germany. But it seemed the government ignored the interests of the biggest ethnic group. So I wonder why the government didn't consider the what the German Americans wanted. It is like they didn't matter or something.
Have not read all the responses but will offer a summary answer to your query: bigotry.
Unlike today when "white" Americans embraces everyone with that color skin and or of European ancestry, early 20th century USA was quite a different place.
Remember it was WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestants) that founded the United States and that group pretty much ran things and considered themselves top dogs.
English, Scottish, Scots-Irish, were at the top of "whites". Then came Irish, Germans, etc.... anyone though white but not English speaking and or did not follow that culture and or Protestant religion were seen as suspect.
Germans not only kept to themselves they brought with them certain habits that were either good or bad depending upon who was doing the judging.
Like many immigrants Germans tended to keep to themselves and develop their own culture in America. Then there was their love of beer including drinking it on Sundays that drove righteous Protestant Americans nuts.
When WWI came along there was much propaganda spread all over the UK, America and elsewhere about the hated "hun" , the Kaiser, and what horrible things the German military was doing (robbing, raping, pillaging, destruction, etc...) their way through Europe.
Wherever Germans were during WWI outside of their own country they suffered various forms of bigotry from the UK to Russia, so the United States was hardly alone. Strong feelings against anything or person German forced George V to disown his German ancestry and change the royal family name to "Windsor".
The main reason German Americans probably were not rounded up like the Japanese were later on was the fact they were at least "white". That and no small number of German Americans were well off and often successful businessmen and or professionals in their community.
What I don't buy is the notion that any of this was an important factor in Wilson's decision to go to war. Afaics he wasn't worrying about a CP victory because, like most people, he wasn't expecting one.
I don't know how much of an influence on Wilson it was. Certainly it was not a dominant but rather a passive one, just as you mention, and you undoubtedly have read much more on Wilson's thinking. But passive thinking can make major differences in end policy decisions, including acts of war. The mere fact that American manufacturers and banks had a booming trade with only the Allied side, with or without advance credits given, does make a large background consideration. Anyway, it is clear the average reader has had this sub topic pretty well covered for the thread.
I don't know how much of an influence on Wilson it was. Certainly it was not a dominant but rather a passive one, just as you mention, and you undoubtedly have read much more on Wilson's thinking. But passive thinking can make major differences in end policy decisions, including acts of war. The mere fact that American manufacturers and banks had a booming trade with only the Allied side, with or without advance credits given, does make a large background consideration. Anyway, it is clear the average reader has had this sub topic pretty well covered for the thread.
Fair enough. But as far as I can see, about all we have to go by is his attitude to unsecured loans. In Nov 1916 he seems to have had no hesitation about supporting the Fed in its opposition to them, (as also Secretary Lansing, despite being about the most pro-Entente member of the Cabinet). This would seem to indicate that Wilson either thought
a) That this refusal would not lead to an Allied defeat, or
b) That it would not matter if it did.
He can, of course, hardly have been unaware that withholding of loans was apt to result in a curtailment of Allied purchases in the US, but again this doesn't seem to have bothered him
I would posit that German Americans were more interested in being Americans than displaying loyalties to Germany. Something which may seem unusual in our current day an age of hyphenated Americans but quite real in this period. I even recall this in my youth, 1970s, that the self identification with hyphenated ancestry and dual allegiance part was a rarity.
Also, as mentioned Germany recently and not entirely happily unified. An immigrant may identifiy more with his parent district or kingdom(in the case of Bavaria) than with Germany depending on what year he came to the USA.
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But I have never heard my grandparents talking about "war" either WWI or WWII. They didn't care. lol
