Quote:
Originally Posted by BECLAZONE
This shows just how close we were to losing, and how the few saved us.
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That the UK barely survived the aerial onslaught is one of those historical tidbits that everyone knows ... and which is not true.
The British were building aircraft faster than Germany - they built 38% more in 1940. That number would climb to over 60% more in each of 1941 and 1942. The number of serviceable Hurricanes, the British workhorse of the battle, increased from barely 100 in early June to over 400 in early September. The number of Spitfires, the next-most important British fighter, increased over the same period, albeit much more modestly. Nonetheless, the number
increased.
Look at the comparative aircraft losses for each day - from July 10 thru October 30 (the beginning/end dates of the Battle of Britain), on 10 days the RAF lost more aircraft than the Luftwaffe, on 9 days losses were even,
and on 94 days the Luftwaffe suffered the most losses. And a closer look reveals that most days where the RAF lost more craft, total losses were minimal and close - 5 aircraft to 2, 9 aircraft to 7, and so forth. But check out the really big numbers. You'll find that they're devastating to the Luftwaffe. In the eight-day span from August 11 to August 18, the Luftwaffe lost over 320; the RAF lost less than half that total over the same time. The Luftwaffe lost 30+ aircraft in a single day 18 times, losing at least 50 in a say 4x, and in two of those days they lost 70+. The RAF lost 30+ on only four days, and never s many as 40. And again, the British were building aircraft faster than the Germans.
The British more properly shepherded their human resources. Though the RAF did suffer from a pilot shortage, part of this was caused by their wise use of their limited resources. Fighter Command maintained pilot leave, which kept individual pilots fresh and better suited for the long haul of the battle and the war. It also refused to scrimp on pilot training, with a significant minority of experienced combat pilots diverted to the cause of preparing more pilots, as well as continually rotating experienced pilots for further training themselves. Finally, the RAF had a strict policy of filling staff positions with experienced pilots rather than non-pilots, to obvious long-term benefit. The Luftwaffe did not follow these procedures. They went balls to the wall, throwing everything they had at the here-and-now of the Battle of Britain. The result was that the Luftwaffe had no reserves to which to turn. Conversely, had things gone south for the RAF they could have cancelled all leave and training and diverted pilots in staff positions in large numbers (Churchill pushed for this as it was, but Hugh Dowding successfully resisted him).
Additionally, the RAF enjoyed much in the way of a 'home field' advantage. Far greater loiter time, the ability to bail out and return to battle, or to coax a crippled machine to an emergency landing, to be repaired or parted out. On the other side of the coin, the German pilots had to expend a lot of fuel travelling to and from their airfields, and a disabled aircraft meant a machine and a pilot or pilots lost for the duration.
Another element of the myth of The Few is that the RAF perpetually overestimated the quantity of Luftwaffe resources, both personnel and machines. Thus, the British during the battle were convinced they were just hanging on. This is understandable. But wrong. Since it was an appealing idea, it endured and endures.
Finally, there were the German pilots and commanders who wrote their memoirs. It is said that the winners write history but as anyone who has ever studied the American Civil War knows, that is nonsense - the losers of that conflict made a cottage industry out of telling us why it happened (it wasn't their fault) and why they lost (not their fault, either). Similarly, German commanders who survived the war often claimed that their failures were really the failures of the people who told them what to do. Hitler, of course, was always a favorite. From the ranks of the Luftwaffe, Goering was always to blame. It is no coincidence that they were both dead and thus unable to rebut any of this. It is true that both made many profound mistakes. But the German war effort was a widespread failure, not one limited to convenient scapegoats. That said, Hugh Dowding was an inestimably more capable a commander than Hermann Goering.
Simply put, the United Kingdom was not as weak and as vulnerable in 1940 as popular history holds. It won the Battle of Britain not because of bumbling by Hitler or Goering, though the mistakes of those men throughout the war were many, but by the exceptional talents Air Chief Marshall Dowding and the leadership of the RAF. All the bravery in the world by men in cockpits wouldn't have won the battle had not their skills been resourcefully managed.
Quote:
Originally Posted by jonesg
THeres a bit more the program didn't tell.
Churchill bombed Berlin, Hitler went into a rage and ordered London flattened.
So the German air force switched from attacking airfields and factories to ordinary buildings in London.
Luftwaffe fighters were ordered to escort bombers and not engage the RAF fighters, they were hamstrung by their imbecile fuhrer.
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Attacking the airfields was ineffective. They were quickly repaired - World War II era fighters just needed a field and/or dirt runway, of which there's not exactly a shortage in England, and damage was easily rectified in any case. That was not going to win the battle. And while British losses were severe, German losses were worse. And the British were playing defense, such that they didn't need to win to win, they just needed to prevent Germany from winning. Which they did. Attrition was hurting the RAF but it was hurting the Luftwaffe more.
Eagle Day was August 13, an all-out massive attack on RAF airfields. It failed. German losses were far more severe than British losses. The Hardest Day was August 18, another such attempt. 71 German aircraft were shot down, to 27 British fighters. This was the heart of the airfield war. It failed. German losses were absolutely unsustainable. The shift to The Blitz wasn't the answer, but that doesn't change the fact that the plan to destroy the airfields wasn't working, and luring the RAF into battle ultimately harmed the Luftwaffe more.
Quote:
Originally Posted by jonesg
If the intent was to destroy the RAF, bombing London was a strange way to go about it.
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The strategic bombing of the cities was an attempt to negatively influence British morale, and ultimately bring the Brits to the table. That is what Hitler wanted - not to invade, though that was considered (ludicrously) an option to force the issue but to simply knock the British out of the war, thus giving Germany a free hand on the continent. Back to
Mein Kampf, Hitler considered Germany and the UK to have common cause. He did not think they would go to war over Poland, and he was perpetually surprised that they did not agree to terms of some sort. He never understood the British (or the Russians, or the Americans, or really anyone except Germans).
Quote:
Originally Posted by jonesg
Churchill was fearless and aggressive, not afraid to antagonize Hitler.
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The RAF attack on Berlin on August 25 was a retaliatory strike to German strikes on civilian areas of London on the 22nd and 24th - these were probably simple navigation errors. In other words, it was responsive and not proactive. And contrary to the Hitler-flew-off-the-handle-and-vowed-to-flatten-London silliness, the reality is that British raids on Berlin continued until on August 30, when Hitler, after pondering whether or not to do so for the better part of a week, decided to go ahead and hit London en masse. At any rate, the offensive against London had been long-planned - it wasn't cooked up at the last minute in response to developments.
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All of this is not to denigrate The Few, whose sacrifice and bravery are not dependent on the closeness of the battle.
One final note:
Operation Sea Lion was never going to happen. It necessitated not only the annihilation of the RAF, but the neutralization of the Royal Navy and the logistical ability to transport an invading army across the Channel. Even in an alternate reality where the Luftwaffe somehow achieved air superiority over Britain itself, the Royal Navy still stood in the way and the Germans still didn't have the means to invade.
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