Quote:
Originally Posted by mordant
That we are part of reality does not mean that it is "reality itself" that "makes meaning". That is rather like saying that because I am a citizen of the US, I am the US itself.
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I do not want to escape the quality crack cocaine of fundamentalist Christianity only to go on the crystal meth of an alternative inflation, that I am a manifestation of some sort of over-mind.
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People are often confused (and I don't blame them) when I employ the holistic "Reality Itself" concept. It is difficult to avoid picturing a "Cosmic Mind" or "over-mind" as you say that is presumably having some higher-level "God's Eye View" of reality. People often think in terms of the metaphor "We are like neurons in a Cosmic Brain" and, as neurons, we have no comprehension of what the Cosmic Brain is thinking. I understand why people adopt this imagery, and I don't deny this "Cosmic Mind" idea as a possibility, but for what it is worth let me state as clearly as I possibly can: This type of imagery is
not what I'm trying to get at when I say that "Reality Itself" has qualitative experience, or "makes meaning" etc. (BTW: You, mordant, are probably in a somewhat better position than most people to understand the more subtle concept I'm dealing with since you are familiar with
this thread and have read the article about "The Logic of Experience" that I referenced in post #7 of that thread.)
I am
not advocating the idea that Reality Itself is conscious as-a-whole (the Cosmic Mind view) nor am I suggesting that every part of Reality is conscious (panpsychism). I am arguing that when two instances (say X and Y) of conscious experience occur, there is no good empirical or logical basis for individuating the qualitative "raw feels" of these experiences
at the ontological ground level. There is clearly an epistemological divide - you do not literally feel my pain when I tell you I have a toothache, and I don't feel your pain when you tell me you have tennis elbow - but this epistemological divide does not necessarily imply an ontological individuation between one "soul" and another.
I am taking a straight-up atheist position, denying the existence of individual "soul stuffs", and a straight-up materialist-style position, denying there are non-physical "mind stuffs" in your brain and mine. You don't have some "mind stuff" that feels your pain that is ontologically distinct from some "mind stuff" that I have when I feel my pain. It is clearly the case the "pain is felt" and there is clearly a qualitative difference between "tooth pain" and "elbow pain" just as there is a material difference between tooth and elbow, and a material distinction between "your" body and "mine". But who is experiencing these pains? There are two complementary answers (mutually exclusive, and yet both correct, depending on the perspective of the questioner): (1) "No one" and (2) "Reality Itself." Notice what is missing here: There are no individual "selves" i.e., "you" and "me" or "your soul" and "my soul" who individually experience the pains.
The concept of "self" is generally linked to the idea of an "entity" that is thought of as "being at the center of" a series of experiences, wherein "I" have "my" self and "you" have "yours." My proposal is that "selves" of this sort simply do not exist. There are no "entities" and no "centers" of the sort that the concept of "self" implies. Thus (1) is correct, according to my proposal.
But it also seems clear that every experience seems like "mine". There seems to be an "I" at the center of each of my experiences, and this "I" seems to persist from one experience to another. Descartes was partially right and partially wrong with his famous "I think, therefore I am." I cannot logically deny that experience exists, and I cannot logically deny that experience
seems to have a "thinking thing" at the center who "has" the experience, but it does not necessarily follow that an individual "I" exists who "has" the experience - as if the "I" and the "experience" are ontologically divisible. The point of Descartes radical skepticism was to doubt everything that could logically be doubted. We can't logically doubt experience, per se, but we can logically doubt the notion of an ontologically distinct "being who has" the experience, despite the overwhelming feeling that there is such a being. It could be that the
feeling that there is a "being who has" is, itself,
just an aspect of the experience itself - not actually an ontologically distinct entity separable from the experience. This is "Aristotelian" (as opposed to Platonic) metaphysics. The "self"
just is the experience - not an ontologically distinct "essence" so to speak "floating around in Plato's heaven" who might or might not have experience. If there is no "self" in Descartes' sense, but self-conscious experience
feels like an I, then this "feeling like an I" is noting that can be ontologically individuated into a separate "you" and "me". So what is left? There is, plain and simply
just Reality Itself "feeling like an I" in each and every instance in which there is some "feeling like an I." There is no "I" apart from just
"feeling like an I" and "feeling" is just the nature of Reality Itself, thus (2) is also correct.
In other words, you could think of this as a "purely empirical" type of metaphysics. The "essence" or "ontological ground" of any being is nothing other than, or nothing in addition to, just simply the
essence of Reality Itself - which can be thought of in terms of the "pregnant Void" or the "pure potential" of the physical vacuum of physics - but we know, first hand, that qualitative experience happens, so clearly the potential of Reality Itself is qualitative - or, at least, has a qualitative aspect. Notice this is a
qualitative Void or physical vacuum - not a High Level Intelligence, or a Cosmic Mind. The qualitative Void is
unconscious - but unconscious in the sense of
potentially conscious, and this potentially conscious aspect is what I refer to as the
qualitative aspect. That's just what
qualitative is - it is
potential-for-contents-of-conscious-experience, or the
potential-to-effect conscious experience, either directly (as contents) or indirectly (as factors selecting or determining contents). The latter are indirectly assessable via abstract thought. This is where "quantitative" fits together with "qualitative." We can only guess that quantitative factors are real because ultimately it is only the qualitative contents of experience that we directly know.
BTW: If there is any aspect of Realty that is not qualitative (directly or indirectly), then obviously it is an aspect of Reality that we can never know anything about; it is, in effect, a "difference that makes no difference" as far as anything we can ever know, so it would be "pure metaphysics" in the most derogatory sense - a completely pointless speculation than can never make any real difference to anyone. All that can ever really matter to us, so far as we can ever know, are the
qualitative aspects of Reality - the aspect that can, in principle, make some difference, either directly or indirectly, to conscious experience.
Bottom line: We are not ontologically "special" - either as individuals, or as a species - but truly comprehending what it means to be "not special" is an
astounding realization. I am not an ontologically isolated or "in-itself" type of entity, I am not a unique being or essence floating around in a giant box called a "universe." In fact, there is actually no "I" at all. There is just physical Reality and Reality is the sort of thing that "sometimes it feels like an "I"; sometimes it don't".