Teachable Moment: A math puzzle and the nature of metaphysics (suicide, believing)

[Gaylenwoof]

Originally Posted by Gaylenwoof

But why do I predict that this objective database of subjective qualia will generate paradoxes requiring that new conceptual tools be added to fundamental physics? It goes back to my prediction that qualia are causal - specifically, my proposal that the subjective "raw feels" aspect of qualia is causally significant. The physical correlates are the signs of the root phenomena (the smoke rising from the fire, so to speak - the map not the territory, to borrow another catchphrase). The causal driver, on my theory, is not the correlate, as such, but that which the correlate is a correlate of - i.e., the intrinsically subjective aspects of the "raw feels" of qualia. Again, this does not necessarily imply that qualia are not physical; it just implies that qualia are not purely objective phenomena. Qualia objectively exist as physical processes, but experiencing qualia is not an entirely objective process because for subject X to fully experience quale Q, X must be the physical process experiencing Q, and only X can be the physical process that X is. The experimenter can access the objective component of the physical correlate of X's experience of Q, but not the subjective "raw feels" component unless the experimenter is X herself.

Originally Posted by KCfromNC

Here's where things go off the rails. Subjective and objective refer to the methods used to collect different types of observation. Here you're using a much different meaning that I'm unfamiliar with, almost as if some things are, for lack of a better term, objectively objective or objectively subjective. Or maybe you're saying a process is inherently objective or subjective, but htat makes no sense since those words refer to how we observe the process rather than some inherent property of the process itself. So I have no idea what you're trying to communicate here but it doesn't line up with how I've seen these words used before.

I think this is at the heart of the disagreement or misunderstanding that you and I have had in several threads, and I think it is the core problem creating "the great divide" in philosophy that I mentioned earlier. If either of us could get the other to "see the light," we could probably win a Nobel Prize in something or other. This issue intrigues me because 99.999% of the time, if someone offers a perspective, I can eventually understand their point of view, even if I don't agree with it. And, based on this understanding, I can generally rephrase my point of view in such a way that the other person can understand me, even if they don't agree with me. This issue is one of the rare exceptions, and thus I find the disagreement deeply fascinating.

Let's start here: "Subjective and objective refer to the methods used to collect different types of observation." I see every concrete observation as a subjective process, whether it is an observation of, say, (1) "this vague feeling of unease in my belly" or (2) "the scale says 1574 pounds." I'm guessing you would agree that observation #1 is clearly subjective. Do you also see the subjective component of observation #2? You and I can both look at the scale and agree on the readout, but the concrete experience of looking at the scale and reading the number is a subjective process. Neither of us is a solipsist or an idealist, so we agree that there is an objectively real world, and we can agree that the scale really does indicated 1574 pounds when a block of concrete is placed upon it. The fact that you and I and other people can all look at the scale and agree on the readout is something that we all take to be an indication that there is an objectively real event that we commonly describe as a "force pushing down on the scale." Our conception of the objectivity of the event includes the idea that I could close my eyes and the scale would still read 1574 even though I am no longer looking at it. The reality of the event does not depend on my perception of it.

Although observation #1 is subjective, I think we can agree that virtually everything I've just said about #2 can be said about #1 as well, with a couple of modifications. You could presumably hook up sensors to my stomach and/or brain and observe the neurological processes that I describe as "a vague feeling of unease in my belly," so there is an important sense in which this feeling is objectively real. I could look at the same readouts you are looking at and thus I can agree that the sensations I'm feeling are objectively real. Along similar lines, you could, in principle, hook up sensors to my brain and confirm the objective reality of my experience of looking at the scale and seeing that the readout says 1574. You and I can look at the same monitor and agree that my experience of seeing the scale and reading the number is an objectively real phenomenon. You might even noticed that certain parts of my brain activity indicate that I am thinking that 1574 could also be a historical date and wondering if anything interesting happened on that date.

In everyday language, most people would say that #1 is a subjective observation and #2 is an objective observation, but when I think about all of this, it seems to me that there is a subjective and objective aspect to both observations #1 and #2. The subjective aspect is simply "what I experience" and the objective component is what you and me and countless others can experience and agree upon when we all look at the monitors that convey the objective information about my subjective experiences in the processes of observation (both #1 and #2).

Now, there is a loose sense in which we could say that the scale has a unique perspective when the block of concrete is placed upon it. The scale is the only physical object that "directly experiences" - so to speak - the weight of the concrete pushing down on it. We can all agree that the scale is a physical process that is responding to the concrete in a particular way. The mass of the concrete is causing "things to happen" to the scale, and we can all observe these things happening and agree that they are happening, just as we can all read the monitors registering the "things happening" in me when I feel queasy or when I experience the process of thinking that the number 1574 is the weight of some concrete, although it could also be a date in history and wondering if anything interesting happened on that date.

But I see a deeply important difference between the scale and me. When everyone looks at the scale they can, presumably, see everything there is to see. In contrast, when everyone looks at my brain activity, they can see every objectively real thing that there is to see, but they can't directly know the feeling of my subjective perspective. The scale and I both have "unique perspectives" on the event wherein the scale has concrete on it, and I'm reading 1574, and I think we can agree that the process constituting my perspective is far more complex than the process constituting the scale's perspective, but I think there is more to the story than just a difference in complexity. I can't directly experience the scale's unique perspective, but I assume that its perspective does not involve any qualitative feeling aspect. I know on the basis of my own direct experience, however, that I do, indeed, feel stuff as an aspect of my own unique perspective. Buy how? There is nothing in our current concepts of atoms or forces, etc., that imply anything along the lines of "If a process of type X happens, then the unique/subjective perspective of X will include feelings."

A typical response is to point to something like water and say that the liquidity of water is not implied in our descriptions of atoms, and yet somehow liquid properties emerge as lots of atoms interact. Why can't qualitative feelings emerge in this way from lots of neurons interacting? The difference, as I see it, is that liquidity involves motion through space - a flowing nature, surface tension causing a tendency to form spheres, etc. It's all essentially a matter of dynamic geometry. The "seeds" for understanding liquidity are already there in our concepts of atoms because we are conceptually able to translate from dynamic geometry of one sort into dynamic geometry of another sort. We can't generally predict, in advance, what properties might emerge from various increasingly complex forms of interactions, but once we see the emergent properties, we can comprehend them by retracing/modeling the steps from one sort of dynamic geometry to another. But I don't see how anyone can think that an explanation for the qualitative nature of feelings will be essentially more of the same - just more complicated or more weirdly organized. Everyone seems to agree there is a promissory note, but I don't understand why anyone would accept this note.

It's like I look at you and I see that, to you, everything is an apple. Everything you own is made of apples. You can't even comprehend anything but apples. But I need payment in oranges. Everything you say to me indicates that you don't comprehend my need for payment in oranges, but you nevertheless promise to pay me in oranges. I look at you and wonder why on earth I should accept your promise. For me to get payment from you, there needs to be a formula for converting apples into oranges. Maybe, if we could agree to seek out this formula, I could consider accepting your promissory note, but from what I can tell, you don't even acknowledge the need for such a formula. So, again, I wonder why I should accept your note. So I seek the formula on my own. I need to study apples to find some hints of "potential-for-orang-ness" in them. I'm pretty sure the potential has to be there, but I'm also pretty sure that I'm not going find this potential by just studying the skins of apples. I need to understand apples in a deeper way - I need to get hold of a concept that you don't get my just looking at an apple. I need a concept like genetics. Apples and oranges are both made of DNA. With a concept like this, I can begin to see some glint of hope that somehow the "potential orange-ness" of apples can be understood.

Metaphorically speaking, my proposal is for something like a "genetic link" between the currently known elements and forces of physics and the qualitative feelings of subjective experience. I'm proposing that this "genetic material" is "in" the stuff of physics, but we haven't recognized it yet because we have not yet even begun to study the "seeds of the apple" so to speak - i.e., the behaviors of fundamental quantum elements in situ in sentient nervous systems. I'm suggesting that hidden within the dynamic geometry of neural activity is a deeper principle that explains the unique dynamics of their dynamic geometry. The uniqueness of any particular sentient system suggests that there will probably be logical limits to our understanding of these principles from an objective point of view because the observer can never be the system observed, except in the case of self-observation. Which brings us to the key concept I'm trying to explicate: The tools for finding the deeper principles that motivate the dynamics of sentient systems will need to include the self-reported "feelings" of sentient systems. We can do this because feelings have objective reality and can be objectively studied, even though the deeper principles we are looking for are always manifested in the intrinsically unique/subjective aspects of the particular experiential moments of particular sentient systems. It's kinda like we can track an iceberg via the portion that sticks above the surface, even if we are unable to directly observe anything below the surface.

The iceberg is, in reality, far more than the above-surface portion that we can objectively record, but we can comprehend what is below the surface because each of us is, in ourselves, "an iceberg," so to speak. And in the case of self-observation, we can go below the objective surface. This doesn't necessarily imply anything nonphysical. It's just that the uniqueness of perspective involved in subjectivity puts logical limits on the "angles" so to speak, from which physical existence can be observed, and it so happens that feeling the subjective aspects of qualia requires an "angle" that can only be achieved via self-observation.

[KCfromNC]

Originally Posted by Gaylenwoof

I think this is at the heart of the disagreement or misunderstanding that you and I have had in several threads, and I think it is the core problem creating "the great divide" in philosophy that I mentioned earlier. If either of us could get the other to "see the light," we could probably win a Nobel Prize in something or other.

There's no Nobel prize for Philosophy. And it remains to be seen if this issue has much to do with science or if it is just a problem some philosophers have conjured out of thin air.

The subjective aspect is simply "what I experience"

Having a feeling of something when making an objective measurement doesn't make the measurement subjective. It means you have feelings.

But I see a deeply important difference between the scale and me.

Don't worry, it is a common feeling. It's a product of our naturally limited conscious insight into how our brains actually work. There's a good reason scientists don't just sit around and think really deeply about these things but instead do actual experiments. Our folk-psychology based feelings about how these things must be tend to be misleading at best.

I'm reading 1574, and I think we can agree that the process constituting my perspective is far more complex than the process constituting the scale's perspective, but I think there is more to the story than just a difference in complexity. I can't directly experience the scale's unique perspective, but I assume that its perspective does not involve any qualitative feeling aspect.

And you know this isn't simply due to a difference in complexity how, exactly?

I know on the basis of my own direct experience, however, that I do, indeed, feel stuff as an aspect of my own unique perspective. Buy how? There is nothing in our current concepts of atoms or forces, etc., that imply anything along the lines of "If a process of type X happens, then the unique/subjective perspective of X will include feelings."

I've addressed this problem before, but this is a gross misunderstanding of how science works. It starts with empirical observations and works towards generating models which explain them. We know how bad logical deduction from first principles is at learning stuff about reality - one just needs to look at the utter failure of philosophy to see that. Expecting to derive the entire universe from basic first principles is a pretty big mistake in understanding what science actually does.

But I don't see how anyone can think that an explanation for the qualitative nature of feelings will be essentially more of the same - just more complicated or more weirdly organized. Everyone seems to agree there is a promissory note, but I don't understand why anyone would accept this note.

Because we have a process which has had a pretty good track record at modeling reality. The real issue isn't that science is iffy. It is that other approaches - including the one you're advocating - have failed miserably in the past.

It's like I look at you and I see that, to you, everything is an apple. Everything you own is made of apples. You can't even comprehend anything but apples. But I need payment in oranges.

Needing the answer to be a certain thing is going to limit your understanding when a real answer appears.

Everything you say to me indicates that you don't comprehend my need for payment in oranges, but you nevertheless promise to pay me in oranges.

As I said before, it could be you've stumbled onto something real and science will be incapable of finding an answer which fits with your philosophical musings of what the answer should be. On the other hand, it could be that the whole of a certain branch of philosophy will be shown to be wrong through empirical investigation. History what it is, I know which one I'm going with.

[mordant]

Originally Posted by KCfromNC

As I said before, it could be you've stumbled onto something real and science will be incapable of finding an answer which fits with your philosophical musings of what the answer should be. On the other hand, it could be that the whole of a certain branch of philosophy will be shown to be wrong through empirical investigation. History [being] what it is, I know which one I'm going with.

This raises the issue of scientism, which is a pejorative describing an "excessive" belief in the power of scientific knowledge and techniques.

When is such a belief excessive?

As you point out, science has an excellent track record which engenders a good deal of justified confidence that it is likely to continue to produce results, as well as continue to massively out-produce alternative methods.

On the other hand sometimes I feel like science lives in a reductionist fantasy if it thinks that everything, given enough time and money, can be explained mechanistically. We may be bumping into some limits of what science can provide simply because at very large / small / short / long / scales, we aren't finding a bottom or ceiling or whatever, in fact we find simply more complexity and/or strangeness. It is an open question how far our science, limited as it is inherently by our flawed and finite perceptual and intellectual equipment, may be able to probe.

From this I do not conclude that we must or even can come up with better methods, I mean to say that we may not be able to delve more deeply beyond a certain point, although where that point is, I can't say. Technology and computers can help extend our perception and intellect to a point, but because we still have to direct these tools and know where and how to direct them, at some point further progress may be closed to us.

Scientism then for me is not an "excessive belief" that the SM is sound and useful but rather a failure to recognize that like everything else it has a scope and limitations. Both the potential limitation I've described above, and the fact that it doesn't even attempt to address things like ethics / morality other than very indirectly through suggesting where diminishing returns and poor return on investment might lie for society.

The question then is, what, if anything, do we do about these limitations of science? Scientism suggests that we continue to press forward in the belief that science can expand its scope and has basically no limitations. A more balanced approach is simply an extension of what we presently do when we don't know the answer to a question. We ADMIT that we don't know and learn to sit with the resulting uncertainty until that situation is remedied by the discovery of new knowledge / evidence / logical argument.

Even if it is never remedied in our lifetime. Even if it is never remedied, period.

In other words what science contributes to human ignorance is the hope of remedying it, but also, an attitude of humble acceptance toward it while it exists. The hubris of scientism is not a misplaced respect for the scientific method, but the notion that humanity can reach further than its own finite limitations just because it has discovered a great way to maximize its reach.

I believe that Gaylen is recognizing these limitations and finds them unacceptable to the point that he is likely overthinking a solution that in my view probably doesn't exist in the direction he thinks it does, and may not even exist at all.

[MysticPhD]

Originally Posted by mordant

This raises the issue of scientism, which is a pejorative describing an "excessive" belief in the power of scientific knowledge and techniques.
When is such a belief excessive?
As you point out, science has an excellent track record which engenders a good deal of justified confidence that it is likely to continue to produce results, as well as continue to massively out-produce alternative methods.
On the other hand sometimes I feel like science lives in a reductionist fantasy if it thinks that everything, given enough time and money, can be explained mechanistically. We may be bumping into some limits of what science can provide simply because at very large / small / short / long / scales, we aren't finding a bottom or ceiling or whatever, in fact we find simply more complexity and/or strangeness. It is an open question how far our science, limited as it is inherently by our flawed and finite perceptual and intellectual equipment, may be able to probe.
From this I do not conclude that we must or even can come up with better methods, I mean to say that we may not be able to delve more deeply beyond a certain point, although where that point is, I can't say. Technology and computers can help extend our perception and intellect to a point, but because we still have to direct these tools and know where and how to direct them, at some point further progress may be closed to us.
Scientism then for me is not an "excessive belief" that the SM is sound and useful but rather a failure to recognize that like everything else it has a scope and limitations. Both the potential limitation I've described above, and the fact that it doesn't even attempt to address things like ethics / morality other than very indirectly through suggesting where diminishing returns and poor return on investment might lie for society.
The question then is, what, if anything, do we do about these limitations of science? Scientism suggests that we continue to press forward in the belief that science can expand its scope and has basically no limitations. A more balanced approach is simply an extension of what we presently do when we don't know the answer to a question. We ADMIT that we don't know and learn to sit with the resulting uncertainty until that situation is remedied by the discovery of new knowledge / evidence / logical argument.
Even if it is never remedied in our lifetime. Even if it is never remedied, period.
In other words what science contributes to human ignorance is the hope of remedying it, but also, an attitude of humble acceptance toward it while it exists. The hubris of scientism is not a misplaced respect for the scientific method, but the notion that humanity can reach further than its own finite limitations just because it has discovered a great way to maximize its reach.
I believe that Gaylen is recognizing these limitations and finds them unacceptable to the point that he is likely overthinking a solution that in my view probably doesn't exist in the direction he thinks it does, and may not even exist at all.

These are the kinds of posts from you, mordant, that have engendered my respect. They reveal the capacity to understand what the real issues are, unlike KC and others who seem incapable of even seeing what the issues are. That you do not engage in the intellectual effort to try and resolve them is your legitimate right. Gaylen and I are not constituted to accept that as sufficient. I have the excuse of personal experience driving my efforts. I suspect Gaylen is just a very inquisitive intellect. He has certainly revealed his enormous capacity for explanation (and patience). Sadly, it does seem to fall on permanently deaf ears, except for yours, mordant.

[Gaylenwoof]

Originally Posted by KCfromNC

Having a feeling of something when making an objective measurement doesn't make the measurement subjective. It means you have feelings.

As I see it, "having a feeling" is not what makes any experience subjective, and it does not "make the measurement subjective." My point was that the objective measurement has a subjective aspect- namely, the uniqueness of perspective that is implicit in every act of perception. The grounds of subjectivity are in the uniqueness of perspective. One way to put it: I am (to some extent) my own unique perspective in the following sense: I (and only I) can experience my unique perspective by being the one who has the perspective. This experience has both subjective and objective aspects. You can observe the objective aspects of my perspective by hooking me up to sensors and observing my neural activity. But observing X via third-person perspective is not the same as being X, unless, of course, you literally are X. My proposal is that "feelings" (qualia) are intrinsic properties of being certain types of physical systems. Third-person perception of X yields, directly, only the objective aspects of X, not the intrinsic aspects of X because these intrinsic aspects are the subjective aspects that are tied to the unique perspective that partially constitutes being X.

Don't worry, it is a common feeling. It's a product of our naturally limited conscious insight into how our brains actually work.

What you call a "limitation" is something that I think stems from an "embarrassment of riches" insofar as the subjective aspects of experience are concerned. Nothing in current physics implies that the objectively observable properties of X are just the "tip of an iceberg." I accept that all of the components of X are physical components, and thus they have objectively-observable properties, but I reject the idea that the physical components of X have only objective properties. And, more importantly, I propose that the subjective properties are rooted in the "unique-perspective" aspects of being X. Only X can be X, so if there are properties associated with "being X" and if these properties are the qualitative components of experience, then X directly knows these properties from a perspective that only X can directly know them. (Others can know these properties indirectly, but only X can know them directly by "being them" to some extent.) So, yes, there probably are limits to our current conscious insights into how our brains actually work, but these limitations are, ironically, rooted in our overabundance of knowledge. I know more about my own existence than I can know objectively about my bodily processes because some aspects of my knowledge stem from what I know by being the physical system that I am.

[KCfromNC]

Originally Posted by mordant

This raises the issue of scientism, which is a pejorative describing an "excessive" belief in the power of scientific knowledge and techniques.

Does it, though? Is it scientism to think that empirical study might be the best way to understand any other part of biology? In the past people thought so, and that didn't turn out too well.

I'm not saying that science has figured it out. Maybe it never will. But maybes aren't a good reason to abandon a method with such a strong track record - especially when there's no good alternatives to replace it.

I believe that Gaylen is recognizing these limitations and finds them unacceptable to the point that he is likely overthinking a solution that in my view probably doesn't exist in the direction he thinks it does, and may not even exist at all.

I think it is that he's so worried that maybe materialism is right - and is worried about the consequences he imagines about things that he really wishes were true - so he's making up solutions to made up problems to try and avoid those issues. Note earlier in the thread his worry about materialism leading to nihilism and so on. Not that any of that is actually true, but he seems to think it does and therefore really really really wants there to be some sort of magic hidden in there to bail him out.

[KCfromNC]

Originally Posted by Gaylenwoof

As I see it, "having a feeling" is not what makes any experience subjective, and it does not "make the measurement subjective."

But that's what qualia are defined as (as much as they're defined as anything) - a feeling that goes along with an experience.

My point was that the objective measurement has a subjective aspect- namely, the uniqueness of perspective that is implicit in every act of perception.

That's not subjectivity - unless you're up for inanimate objects having a subjective component. A camera has a uniqueness of perspective that is implicit in every act of perception since it is not the same as any other camera and it is in a unique location in space and time, but no one would say that cameras have a subjective emotional component to them that's supposedly the key to this subjectivity energy which flows through us or whatever it is science is missing.

What you call a "limitation" is something that I think stems from an "embarrassment of riches" insofar as the subjective aspects of experience are concerned. Nothing in current physics implies that the objectively observable properties of X are just the "tip of an iceberg."

It also doesn't imply that we could create computers which can identify images more accurately than the human brain. And yet we can and do - and using only stuff which is perfectly compatible with modern physics.

I can name millions of examples like this. It just goes to show that the lack of ability to reason from first principles isn't something that is a problem for science. It simply doesn't work the way you need to it for your objection to mean anything.

I accept that all of the components of X are physical components, and thus they have objectively-observable properties, but I reject the idea that the physical components of X have only objective properties.

This gets back to the misuse of objective and subjective as if there's some sort of quantitative amount of subjectivity in any particular lump of matter. Things have properties. It is the observations of them which are subjective or objective, not something inherent in the objects themselves.

So, yes, there probably are limits to our current conscious insights into how our brains actually work, but these limitations are, ironically, rooted in our overabundance of knowledge.

No, they're limited by the things our consciousness is aware of. No matter how hard you sit and think about it, you'll never learn how the autonomous nervous system works, for example. Perception has lots of similar issues, despite philosophers being really sure that they've thought about it hard enough to understand it.

I know more about my own existence than I can know objectively about my bodily processes because some aspects of my knowledge stem from what I know by being the physical system that I am.

Yes, some things feel certain ways. I wouldn't use that approach to diagnose a brain injury, though.

[Gaylenwoof]

Originally Posted by perry335654

Gaylen, this thread doesn't resemble anything close to religion or spiritually, philosophy is more analogous to what section it should be on and maybe science.

I agree that these are philosophical topics and, in fact, I have tried to sustain discussions of this sort in the philosophy forum. But I disagree with your claim that this thread "doesn't resemble anything close to religion or spiritually...." This R&S forum is overflowing with atheists trying to convince religious people that their beliefs are utterly irrational, and religious people claiming that atheists are close-minded, and/or reject god simply because they've become so infatuated with science or logic that they are unable to experience that which is "right in front of their noses" (so to speak) - the mysterious/mystical and presumably divinely-inspired "feeling of the presence of God" or the ability to "hear" or "see" God working in the world, etc. As I've said many times, I am flat-out atheist concerning virtually all standard ancient-scroll-based conceptions of God as "Intelligent Designer" but I am agnostic on various general conceptions of a "Cosmic Consciousness" or a "Mystical Oneness" etc. The "math problem" in the OP is a metaphor for why I am agnostic rather than atheist about the loose conceptions of God. These more general "spiritual" feelings and beliefs are not irrational, even though they go beyond anything that science can currently verify by repeatable, objectively-observable experiments. In fact, even if it turns out that science can never, even in principle, test the veridicality of certain subjective beliefs, I would still not necessarily be irrational to hold some of these beliefs. Indeed, what is utterly irrational is to reject certain beliefs just because they can't be verified by science and/or modeled computationally. Gödel's theorem (in line with just plain common sense), gives us rational reason to suspect that knowledge is not limited just to what can be captured by systems of logical inference. It is reasonable to suspect that we can know (or, at least, we can experience) more than we can rationally convey via objective public discourse. I loosely refer to this as "mystical" knowledge and/or experience.

[Gaylenwoof]

Originally Posted by KCfromNC

I think it is that he's so worried that maybe materialism is right - and is worried about the consequences he imagines about things that he really wishes were true - so he's making up solutions to made up problems to try and avoid those issues.

I think you are profoundly mistaken about what my motivations are, but I don't really care because my motivations ought to be irrelevant to the points I'm trying to make. Wanting something to be true doesn't make something any less true if, in fact, it turns out to be true. In any case, for whatever it is worth, what drive me here - what keeps bringing me back to the pipe like a crack ho - is my apparently endless fascination with the idea that some people seem unable to see something that I find so blatantly obvious. There is something for me to learn here, but I have not yet been able to get a grip on it.

Also, BTW: I agree that materialism does not have to imply nihilism. I would also add that nihilism doesn't necessarily make someone a bad person. But a significant number of people do slip from materialism into nihilism, and some nihilists slip into despair, or narcissism, or become socially destructive because they see no point in upholding moral values if everything truly is just random or pre-determined. It might be helpful if these particular people understood that materialism is not the only logical option. As a general principle: people should not be deluded into thinking there is only one plausible option when, in fact, there are many plausible options. Materialism has been an excellent working assumption for science, and it may continue to be so forever, but assuming something for the sake of practicality should not cause one to lose sight of the fact that it is merely an assumption. Just because materialism works as a practical assumption for the purposes of pursuing science, it does not follow that materialism is the best choice of metaphysics when contemplating the nature of consciousness, or the grounds of all moral or aesthetic values. And it also does not mean that knowledge or wisdom is limited to just what science can deliver.

[mordant]

Originally Posted by KCfromNC

I'm not saying that science has figured it out. Maybe it never will. But maybes aren't a good reason to abandon a method with such a strong track record - especially when there's no good alternatives to replace it.

Yes, that was pretty much my point, regardless of how Mystic took it.

I don't think science will ever explain everything once and for all, or that applied science (technology) will end human suffering by itself. But that just means there are things we'll likely never know, and we need not just knowledge but the ability to use knowledge skillfully. Both of these areas very likely have aspects that are beyond the reach of science for the foreseeable future and perhaps for all time.

The question is the import of this. I am not offering theism any purchase here, though they reflexively seek it out. The import of the areas currently unknown is NOT "there must be some non-scientific answer" or "goddunit" or "woo explains it" or "this validates and substantiates my personal subjective experiences and notions". It is just "we don't know right now, and until we do we simply allow it to be as it is."

That does not mean we don't keep looking for answers but it doesn't mean we quit controlling for confirmation bias in seeking those answers out and we don't rush the process just because we don't want to die without our curiosity satisfied.