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He didn't post anything signifiant. Mainly an acronym play of the the UPS name. After 4 post you still cant grasp that.
When you look at the crash, and post crash fire... It would be relatively safe to presume that most of the cargo was destroyed. It tends to require deductive thinking. Any sort of thinking would be nice.
I don't know where you get the idea that I didn't get his irrelevant point about UPS. You must have made that up somewhere. He said he has info, or saw info, about the plane prior to this crash. I asked him for it. That's it. I ignored the silliness about UPS because I couldn't care less about that. Why do you care so much about it? Let him give his own answers.
I don't know where you get the idea that I didn't get his irrelevant point about UPS. You must have made that up somewhere. He said he has info, or saw info, about the plane prior to this crash. I asked him for it. That's it. I ignored the silliness about UPS because I couldn't care less about that. Why do you care so much about it? Let him give his own answers.
Because of people like you who feel the need to continually pontificate. The simulator jockeys around here amuse me.
I think this accident reinforces the point made by the 1997 Children of the Magenta video. That is, that modern airline crew's habitual and systemic crutching use of the high level automation available in order to negotiate any and all facets of aircraft flying, leads to less safe outcomes than if said level of automation wasn't utilized. In essence, the attempt to negotiate tasks more appropriate to HAND-FLYING are routinely being managed and dealt with the almost comical procedure of inputing commands into the aircraft's navigation and autopilot systems, a la Star Trek, instead of manipulating the controls. Such insistence on flying the plane by managing the input of command subroutines into a box is literally killing people.
It is my opinion, considering the A/P system was engaged all the way to impact on this accident, that such outcome was the result of the crew's crutching use of the aircraft's autopilot functions in order to negotiate a non-precision approach and subsequent visual transition to landing in less than benign visual conditions, a set of actions they would have been better off negotiating to a successful outcome by hand flying the aircraft. It is my further opinion that the crew probably held atrophied hand flying skills, which were being masked by the performance of their duties day in and day out by said crutch use of the autopilot/autothrottle, day in and day out.
From the maintenance perspective, not the flying side, I honestly feel that truer words couldn't be spoken. In no way do I speak about ALL pilots and ALL flight crews. As someone who started working "analog" aircraft complete with a World War II era RADAR and a periscopic sextant next to the Navigator's desk, and now works on numerous "digital" aircraft with full automation, and who specializes in avionics systems, the "monkey presses a button and gets a reward" syndrome has gotten so bad we find it downright frightening.
I know it's not the pilot's job to fix airplanes. I've always understood that and accepted that. I even understand that it's not their job to know that if you do this, that, and the other thing you can "trick" the system. I get all that and, truth be told, I don't want them doing that either. Maybe it was because the older analog systems were less reliable and the pilot's constantly had to forego using them. Maybe it was because the analog systems were possibly a little easier to understand. Maybe the analog systems had an apex of technology that really couldn't be exceeded. I tend to think that most pilots never grew up surrounded by digital technology and will never have the familiarity that someone "native" and born into it would have. And those pilots who are young and grew up with it, have no ability to fall back on the "old school" methods.
But, the write-ups I get on a daily basis make me go "Does this guy even understand what he's doing?!" I probably get anywhere between 5-10 write-ups a month where the problem described was not just normal system operation but vital to their safety and they missed it. I've had crews downright refuse to fly because their FMS was deferred. One First Officer even asked me what he was going to do without his FMS. I like to tell them "See that big bag of books over there? Enjoy your flight." And watch his eyes get as big as golf balls.
I get a lot of "stall warning" write-ups that were crew induced. They rat themselves out a lot of the time too. "At cruise altitude, with flaps down, airspeed @ 65 knots, stick shaker started going off." <--- OK. So I'm being a little facetious but sometimes I think about calling the Captain and asking him if he'd like to revise his writeup before I engrave it in stone on the computer system.
There's always the popular "Display too dark" which is solved by "Turned brightness up."
Now, I'm also a pretty forgiving guy too. I know everyone has their off days, their bad days, their fights with the wife (sometimes wives in many pilot's cases), and all sorts of things. There are certain things that happen in flight that I can understand can be confusing. A shorted wire causing a light to flicker or a message to appear and disappear would probably not only drive a crew crazy but also tick them off quite a bit. I know it would me. So, when they write up things like "This is the THIRD time no one has fixed that flickering light" I can certainly understand their frustration. But... They could always remove the bulbs if it bothers them that much.
I've always felt that the mechanics should get sim time once a month and that pilots should spend a week or two with maintenance. The first time I went into a full motion sim, all of the theory and system knowledge I'd gained was put together for me in so many ways that I couldn't believe they never gave me that opportunity before. On rare occasions, a pilot may step out of his nice, warm cockpit while I work hastily on his engine problem to kick him out of town. Sometimes they ask what's going on and when I explain it to them, they usually light up with understanding. "Ohhhh.... OK.... That's why this was doing that. The engine's not really going to eat itself, the low oil pressure indication is because someone nicked the oil pressure transmitter wires with a machete. Got it."
I've also found that certain systems, although deferrable, will send the crew into outer orbit when you defer them. So, I defer them a lot. Especially when I get two write-ups: A short novel on why the ACARS system didn't work and all I'm going to do is reset the circuit breaker, and a four word "Number Two Autopilot Strange" without any sort of parameters to give me something to work with. The logic behind all this astounds me.
So, would I be surprised if the flight crew over-relied on their technology? Absolutely not. It scares me sometimes. It truly does. And again, that's not a slant against all pilot's. There are some really good, really knowledgeable, and really intelligent pilot's out there. But, I guess like doctors, there are those who finished at the top of their class and the bottom of their class but we still call them doctors and pilots.
From the maintenance perspective, not the flying side, I honestly feel that truer words couldn't be spoken. In no way do I speak about ALL pilots and ALL flight crews. As someone who started working "analog" aircraft complete with a World War II era RADAR and a periscopic sextant next to the Navigator's desk, and now works on numerous "digital" aircraft with full automation, and who specializes in avionics systems, the "monkey presses a button and gets a reward" syndrome has gotten so bad we find it downright frightening.
I know it's not the pilot's job to fix airplanes. I've always understood that and accepted that. I even understand that it's not their job to know that if you do this, that, and the other thing you can "trick" the system. I get all that and, truth be told, I don't want them doing that either. Maybe it was because the older analog systems were less reliable and the pilot's constantly had to forego using them. Maybe it was because the analog systems were possibly a little easier to understand. Maybe the analog systems had an apex of technology that really couldn't be exceeded. I tend to think that most pilots never grew up surrounded by digital technology and will never have the familiarity that someone "native" and born into it would have. And those pilots who are young and grew up with it, have no ability to fall back on the "old school" methods.
But, the write-ups I get on a daily basis make me go "Does this guy even understand what he's doing?!" I probably get anywhere between 5-10 write-ups a month where the problem described was not just normal system operation but vital to their safety and they missed it. I've had crews downright refuse to fly because their FMS was deferred. One First Officer even asked me what he was going to do without his FMS. I like to tell them "See that big bag of books over there? Enjoy your flight." And watch his eyes get as big as golf balls.
I get a lot of "stall warning" write-ups that were crew induced. They rat themselves out a lot of the time too. "At cruise altitude, with flaps down, airspeed @ 65 knots, stick shaker started going off." <--- OK. So I'm being a little facetious but sometimes I think about calling the Captain and asking him if he'd like to revise his writeup before I engrave it in stone on the computer system.
There's always the popular "Display too dark" which is solved by "Turned brightness up."
Now, I'm also a pretty forgiving guy too. I know everyone has their off days, their bad days, their fights with the wife (sometimes wives in many pilot's cases), and all sorts of things. There are certain things that happen in flight that I can understand can be confusing. A shorted wire causing a light to flicker or a message to appear and disappear would probably not only drive a crew crazy but also tick them off quite a bit. I know it would me. So, when they write up things like "This is the THIRD time no one has fixed that flickering light" I can certainly understand their frustration. But... They could always remove the bulbs if it bothers them that much.
I've always felt that the mechanics should get sim time once a month and that pilots should spend a week or two with maintenance. The first time I went into a full motion sim, all of the theory and system knowledge I'd gained was put together for me in so many ways that I couldn't believe they never gave me that opportunity before. On rare occasions, a pilot may step out of his nice, warm cockpit while I work hastily on his engine problem to kick him out of town. Sometimes they ask what's going on and when I explain it to them, they usually light up with understanding. "Ohhhh.... OK.... That's why this was doing that. The engine's not really going to eat itself, the low oil pressure indication is because someone nicked the oil pressure transmitter wires with a machete. Got it."
I've also found that certain systems, although deferrable, will send the crew into outer orbit when you defer them. So, I defer them a lot. Especially when I get two write-ups: A short novel on why the ACARS system didn't work and all I'm going to do is reset the circuit breaker, and a four word "Number Two Autopilot Strange" without any sort of parameters to give me something to work with. The logic behind all this astounds me.
So, would I be surprised if the flight crew over-relied on their technology? Absolutely not. It scares me sometimes. It truly does. And again, that's not a slant against all pilot's. There are some really good, really knowledgeable, and really intelligent pilot's out there. But, I guess like doctors, there are those who finished at the top of their class and the bottom of their class but we still call them doctors and pilots.
Good post....and it goes from a different direction to the heart of what I have been trying to say here.
The gist of what you are saying is that people are morons - in every walk of life, including aviation. Yeah, sure....there is a sprinkling of brilliance in the ocean of ineptitude. But it is not the norm and the system cannot be designed as though it were.
That is why we need to make this - the "tricky" landing approach - idiot proof. We can - and we should. Until we do, we can expect more painting of hillsides with the blood of stubborn refusal to let go of a bygone era where pilots were cowboys in the air.
Good post....and it goes from a different direction to the heart of what I have been trying to say here.
The gist of what you are saying is that people are morons - in every walk of life, including aviation. Yeah, sure....there is a sprinkling of brilliance in the ocean of ineptitude. But it is not the norm and the system cannot be designed as though it were.
That is why we need to make this - the "tricky" landing approach - idiot proof. We can - and we should. Until we do, we can expect more painting of hillsides with the blood of stubborn refusal to let go of a bygone era where pilots were cowboys in the air.
In aviation, the weakest link of all is the human. Human error accounts not just for the majority of crashes but a huge portion of maintenance problems, injuries, damage to aircraft, and the list goes on. It's not necessarily that most people are idiots and we rely on a few rays of sunshine here and there. It's probably quite the opposite. Most people are competent enough not to screw anything up despite the fact that we all make mistakes but some folks have the unique trait of outperforming all others in the screw-up department.
Most facets of aviation are highly complex. As humans, every layer of complexity that is added increases the risk of something going wrong. But, you're kind of stuck in a Catch-22. You can't hand over full control of the aircraft to the onboard computers without decreasing crew proficiency in a situation where the onboard computers aren't working. You also can't rely on flight crews (human beings) to make 100% safe approaches 100% of the time (as evidenced by the UPS crash and Asiana). There is always the risk for human error.
That being said, incidences like UPS and Asiana fall well on the outer bound of a 4-5 sigma deviation from normalcy. In other words, these incidences are statistical anomalies that should require investigation and corrections so they don't happen again, but don't necessarily point out glaring fallacies in aviation safety.
You can go to NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System and look at the confessionals all the flight crews and maintenance personnel have made over the years. Human factors... Human factors... Human factors...
In aviation, the weakest link of all is the human. Human error accounts not just for the majority of crashes but a huge portion of maintenance problems, injuries, damage to aircraft, and the list goes on. It's not necessarily that most people are idiots and we rely on a few rays of sunshine here and there. It's probably quite the opposite. Most people are competent enough not to screw anything up despite the fact that we all make mistakes but some folks have the unique trait of outperforming all others in the screw-up department.
Most facets of aviation are highly complex. As humans, every layer of complexity that is added increases the risk of something going wrong. But, you're kind of stuck in a Catch-22. You can't hand over full control of the aircraft to the onboard computers without decreasing crew proficiency in a situation where the onboard computers aren't working. You also can't rely on flight crews (human beings) to make 100% safe approaches 100% of the time (as evidenced by the UPS crash and Asiana). There is always the risk for human error.
That being said, incidences like UPS and Asiana fall well on the outer bound of a 4-5 sigma deviation from normalcy. In other words, these incidences are statistical anomalies that should require investigation and corrections so they don't happen again, but don't necessarily point out glaring fallacies in aviation safety.
You can go to NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System and look at the confessionals all the flight crews and maintenance personnel have made over the years. Human factors... Human factors... Human factors...
You've just eloquently made my case while trying quite unsuccessfully to dismiss it in the same post.
Every death resulting from avoidable human error is a fallacy in aviation safety. True enough that technology is not absolutely infallible, but systems can be made very nearly so - and reliably much closer to that goal than humans will ever be.
The stubborn advocacy for a system throbbing with opportunity for catastrophic human error continues in the face of overwhelming evidence of its deficiency.
You've just eloquently made my case while trying quite unsuccessfully to dismiss it in the same post.
Every death resulting from avoidable human error is a fallacy in aviation safety. True enough that technology is not absolutely infallible, but systems can be made very nearly so - and reliably much closer to that goal than humans will ever be.
The stubborn advocacy for a system throbbing with opportunity for catastrophic human error continues in the face of overwhelming evidence of its deficiency.
It comes down to a cost benefit analysis.
The two accidents this year, although for all intents and purposes unrelated in cause, come after one of the safest periods in time of aviation safety. The sheer number of flights that happen daily and go off without a hitch or accidents prevented by crew that no one sees on the front page of CNN.com is mind boggling.
In a perfect world it would be awesome if every single airport in the country had ILS approaches to every single runway. Do you have any idea of the cost to design, purchase, install, maintain, and check the equipment? Not only on a local level but on a federal level (FAA's Flight Check).
At the airline level, if you are prevented from shooting nothing but straight in ILS approaches that severally limits your options until the systems are completely in place or if the equipment is down (such as this UPS incident, it would have effectively shut the Birmingham airport down for who knows how long). Not just for destination airports (some airports might have one ILS on one runway, but none the other way, which is limiting in winds) but for alternate airports as well (suitable vs. unsuitable runways, part of the Op Specs). Imagine having to bump half your passengers because you had to carry much more fuel due to limited alternate availability.
Does shooting a non-precision approach carry a higher risk? Sure it does. Does driving in the rain carry a higher risk than driving in sunny weather? Sure it does. Do "you" (as in the public) not go to work because it's starting to drizzle? Hardly. We accept a higher risk because the higher risk is largely insignificant when taken in context with what we are trying to accomplish.
You've just eloquently made my case while trying quite unsuccessfully to dismiss it in the same post.
Every death resulting from avoidable human error is a fallacy in aviation safety. True enough that technology is not absolutely infallible, but systems can be made very nearly so - and reliably much closer to that goal than humans will ever be.
The stubborn advocacy for a system throbbing with opportunity for catastrophic human error continues in the face of overwhelming evidence of its deficiency.
The problem is that technology is not yet capable of making the same decisions as human beings in corner-case scenarios. For example, whatever one thinks of Sullenberger's landing in the Hudson, computer technology simply isn't capable of making the decision to land in the river. We've come a tremendously long way with Artificial Intelligence but we're not there yet.
I'm all for unassing the pilot's out of the seats. No doubt about it. No matter how good they are, they're still humans and will still make mistakes. But, we have no technological gap to fill those seats as of right now. Even drones are still being flown by humans - but instead of a cockpit they have an air conditioned office building.
My prior point was that even with human beings acting as the critical weak link in aviation safety, accidents like Asiana and UPS are still statistical anomalies. So, flying is still very safe even with humans aboard who sometimes make unsafe decisions.
We're kind of at a technological crossroads right now and will be for a little while longer. We don't have the technology to keep pilots completely off the controls and we have a weak link with human factors in aviation safety. So, it's a bit of a double-edged sword. At this point in time, it's still safer to have humans in the cockpit. However, I do have definite concerns about pilots relying so much on modern technology that it makes them far less effective when things do start to go wrong (like Air France 447).
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Let him give his own answers.
