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I respect everyone's opinions stated here and it seems like you all know your stuff. But if Lee was so great, then why did his army bleed men like a gushing oil well with over 65% casualty rates? What about that Pickett's Charge gaffe? What about his ideas of invincibility of his own army? What about him gambling with the lives of his men, taking way too many risks?
Lastly, why is it, from what I've heard, Lee is not studied at West Point today, but Grant, Sheridan, and Sherman are?
Military history is not my forte, but the evidence I've seen makes Lee seem reckless to me--even when he knew he had a limited supply of men and materiel to draw from. A good general knows this and acts accordingly. Further the whole offensive-defense strategy of the CSA was doomed because it violated the maxim of interior lines, but I guess that didn't matter since most of the Confederacy didn't have any reinforcements to begin with.
Interesting how "fired" means something different in the military than in the civilian world. The "firing" of a General involves him being removed from an assignment but not kicked out of the Army. This would be like a company removing an executive from head of a department, for cause, but allowing him to keep his title and salary, instead of what usually happens under such circumstances - separation.
In WWII, Winston Churchill, who I admire tremendously, did not have the greatest track record for choosing commanding generals. He fired some that likely did not deserve it, such as Wavell and Auchinleck, both of which had their faults, especially in communication, and kept some in command, such as Alexander, who were clearly in over their head.
Fate intervened to prevent his choice for 8th Army commander in the critical days of 1942 from ever assuming his post. General "Strafer" Gott was picked to replace Auchinleck as commander of the 8th Army, but his aircraft was shot down, and Gott was killed. he was replaced by a certain General Sir Bernard Law Montgomery.
Now, Monty had many faults, but his efforts resulted in victory at El Alamein, and the eventual defeat of the Axis in North Africa.
Gott had a fine fighting record, but was said to be worn out and due for replacement anyway.
I know Mac and Abe is a good example of a chief exec removing a commander (Lincoln removed several), but what about Davis removing Joe Johnston? His later promotion of Lee, aka the "king of spades," was super controversial within the Confederate ranks and among the Confederate high society. Lots of politics played itself out in that war regarding generals and presidents.
Joe Johnston wasn't fired and replaced by Lee, he was wounded and unable to stay in command of the army.
I hope that our WW2 German expert on the history forums here Tony T will post in here about all the Wehrmact Generals and Chiefs of Staff etc. that Hitler fired during WW2.
Joe Johnston wasn't fired and replaced by Lee, he was wounded and unable to stay in command of the army.
That's what I was going to say, he wasn't releived, he was injured.
In the Civil War you had generals replaced right and left, mostly for political purposes on the Confederate side. On the Union side you had a revolving door of Union Generals in charge of the Army of the Potomic, most of them incompetent.
Joe Johnston was effective enough, but he was a defensive general, and you can't win a war (except by attrition) by just using defense. Othere than that, there were two generals that Davis could not stand due to political/personal reasons - Johnston and Beauragard. Both were effectively side-lined multiple times during the war, only to appear again when their talents were needed. Johnston was very effective in the Georgia theater with his defensive strategy, it was the correct (and only) strategy the south really had. But Davis wanted more than the troops there could give. He played exactly into the north's/Sherman's hands, appointed a "fighting general" (Hood), who subsequently destroyed what remained of the CSA's army of the west.
I respect everyone's opinions stated here and it seems like you all know your stuff. But if Lee was so great, then why did his army bleed men like a gushing oil well with over 65% casualty rates? What about that Pickett's Charge gaffe? What about his ideas of invincibility of his own army? What about him gambling with the lives of his men, taking way too many risks?
Lastly, why is it, from what I've heard, Lee is not studied at West Point today, but Grant, Sheridan, and Sherman are?
Military history is not my forte, but the evidence I've seen makes Lee seem reckless to me--even when he knew he had a limited supply of men and materiel to draw from. A good general knows this and acts accordingly. Further the whole offensive-defense strategy of the CSA was doomed because it violated the maxim of interior lines, but I guess that didn't matter since most of the Confederacy didn't have any reinforcements to begin with.
I am not sure what is studied at West Point, but I would not say he was reckless. He did take risks indeed, but he did that because it was his only choice. It was because he knew he had a limited amount of men and resources, compared to the north, that he had to take gambles and take chances. He could easily dig into a point (and often did) but he knew he could not win a war like that, a war of attrition, even one in which his butchers bills was 1 to the unions 3, in the long run. The north would win. Thus he was always trying to not win the field, but to destroy the Union's army.
He came close a few times - Chancellersville is a perfect example.
Indeed, interior lines is what helped many of his battles. When he didn't have it (Gettysburg) things went disasterous. When he did have it, he was able to divide his forces and hit the union peacemeal, and then turn around to the other front. I don't see how he "violated the maxim", unless you are talking about the long sweeping offenses that he might have sent a corp on to outflank the union. I would say these were all calculated risks.
Pickett's charge would, I say, be his moment of hubris. Only he could say what he was thinking, but from what I have read he did indeed beleive the union would give at that point and it would win the field. It was a gravely miscalculated moment.
I can't see Joe Johnston holding Atlanta any longer than Hood did though Old Joe would've suffered smaller losses than Hood did before reteating. But Uncle Billy would'a flanked Johnston out of Atlanta just as he did from every other position Johnston took. Johnston wasn't a man to stand a siege and he wasn't a man to break one either; ask Pemberton.
Johnston may or may not have been able to hold Atlanta long enough to make a difference in the 1864 election, but he certainly would have held it far longer than Hood did.
Sherman was conducting a siege at this point, having abandoned the idea of winning via direct assaults after his costly repulse at Kenesaw Mountain. Sherman's plan was to eventually force the evacuation of Atlanta by cutting off all of the rail supply routes into the city. Via the high attrition of his assaults, Hood greatly accelerated matters for Sherman by reducing his defending force from 60,000 troops to 30,000. The consequence was that when Sherman moved against the railroads on Hood's flanks, there were not enough defenders available to stop him. Johnston would never have bled out his army in futile attacks and would have been able to muster enough units so that taking the railroads was going to be immensely costly to Sherman.
Davis had thought that Hood would be duplicating Lee from 1862 when he broke the siege of Richmond by going over to the offensive and driving McClellan to the James River. Everyone with the exception of Davis seemed to understand that Hood was no Lee, and Sherman was no McClellan who would be spooked and stampeded by the first sign of aggression.
My argument is not that the South would have won by retaining Johnston, rather it is that in late summer '64, delaying tactics represented the CSA's only possible hope. Hood represented the reverse of this need, someone who was going to gamble and decide the issue in the shortest possible timeframe...only it was a stupid gamble with Hood not up to the challenge of duplicating Lee on the Peninsula.
I'm not sold on that idea. The Lee/Davis offensive/defensive strategy wasn't sufficient to win the war, but would the purely defensive strategy of Johnston have done any better in the long run? Under Johnston, it would have been a series of sieges, ultimate defeats, and shrinking territory.
Generals rarely win wars. Generals win and lose battles, but wars are won on the willingness of the population to fight and the industrial might of the countries engaged. The South could never win the Civil War as long as the North kept fighting. The North's industrial based was an overwhelming advantage. On an opposite note the US was never going to win in Vietnam, because there was nothing that would have stopped the North Vietnamese from continuing the fight. We could win all the battles yet lose the war, because our population was never committed to the fight.
Generals rarely win wars. Generals win and lose battles, but wars are won on the willingness of the population to fight and the industrial might of the countries engaged. The South could never win the Civil War as long as the North kept fighting. The North's industrial based was an overwhelming advantage. On an opposite note the US was never going to win in Vietnam, because there was nothing that would have stopped the North Vietnamese from continuing the fight. We could win all the battles yet lose the war, because our population was never committed to the fight.
I don't know that I am grasping the point that you wish to make. Generals who deliver victories have enormous influence on the willingness of soldiers and supporting populations to sustain a war. All of the elements are interrelated. A motivated population backed by a superior industrial base will still require competent generals to win. Competent generals will still require motivated populations and sufficient supply sources to win.
If it was support and logistics alone, then it would not make any difference if the army was commanded by Grant or McClellan. Is that what you are arguing?
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