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It’s funny, the things which run through someone’s mind at 4 AM. Today, I found myself thinking about Gen. Ambrose Burnside. I can’t say why he crossed my mind, but it did. Naturally, I never knew the man as I am not THAT old, but something I read this morning must
have piqued my curiosity and I decided to consult my CD friends about their opinions.
Was Burnside unfairly criticized? Was his performance during the Civil War really all that bad? I understand that most people wouldn’t even recognize his name, but for we students of military and Civil War history, he’s well known as the author of the debacle at Fredericksburg, VA and the goat of Antietam. He’s been called the best Corps Commander of the war and the worst Army Commander, but is that true?
He lived an interesting live, running from his post-war service in Mexico to his involvement with the railroad boom in both the pre-war and post-war periods, plus serving as both Governor of Rhode Island and Senator from the same state (even though he was born in Indiana) and owner of the Burnside Arms Company which produced the Burnside Carbine, one of the Army’s standard issue Cavalry weapons during the war, though discontinued in the post-war area.
His reputation rests upon his record as a Commanding Officer during the Civil war and it’s something of a mixed bag.
His early campaign into coastal North Carolina, resulted in the loss of about 80% of that state’s shoreline to the use of Confederate blockade runners, is generally considered a plus. So too was his Command of the Army of the Ohio during which time they occupied eastern Tennessee and drew forces away from Gen. Braxton Bragg’s front around Chattanooga. His outflanking of Confederate positions at the Cumberland Gap (and subsequent surrender of those forces) and his offer to tie down Longstreet’s Corps while Grant and Sherman assaulted Bragg’s positions proved to be decisive.
But, the negatives of his reputation rest upon his actions at three important battles: Antietam, Fredericksburg and The Crater, near Petersburg, VA.
I could write a book on this subject, (which nobody would buy!) and don’t want to make this initial post so long that it drives away participants, so I’d like to start with Fredericksburg and see if there is any interest in pursing this.
In the first place, Burnside didn’t want command of the Army of the Potomac and turned it down more than once, apparently because he didn’t consider himself as proficient enough and because of his personal friendship with “Little Mac” McClelland, whom he would have replaced. But, eventually, he acquiesced and took it, more from a sense of duty than excitement.
When Burnside assumed command, the Army was in winter quarters facing Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia across the Rappahannock River around Fredericksburg. Lee felt secure enough in his position, which basically followed the river from the heights above Fredericksburg to the vicinity of Germanna ford, well upstream, that he had dispatched Longstreet’s Corp to the Norfolk area to gather supplies.
Burnside planned to take advantage of that separation and directed his Army to force a crossing of the river directly into Fredericksburg to tie down Jackson’s Corp and to cross at fords below the city and move to intercept Longstreet’s Corp returning from Norfolk, dividing the rebel Army and defeating them piecemeal. He was under a lot of pressure from Pres. Lincoln, Gen. Halleck (the Army Commander) and members of Congress to do SOMETHING and get on with capturing Richmond, so this is the plan he devised.
Tactically, it was sound. It did catch Lee off-guard, as his missives to Longstreet to hurry back to Fredericksburg with all alacrity demonstrate that Burnside truly had stolen a march, but the Army got off to a slow start which gave the rebels time to react.
Worse, when they arrived upon the heights across from Fredericksburg, it was discovered that the necessary pontoons had not yet arrived. Burnside is faulted for this too, even though that was the responsibility of his Engineer Commander. However, ultimate responsibility was Burnside’s and he was faced with the choice of waiting and continuing the attack, or withdrawing and planning something else. He waited.
It’s easy to condemn Burnside for that now, in retrospect, but one must recall that not only was he under intense pressure to move (as McClelland had been before him), his headquarters was beset with intrigue to get him fired and replaced by Gen. Joe Hooker. Burnside found himself in a nest of vipers, assailed from all sides, and lacked both the will and the political connections to stand up for himself.
Ultimately, he delayed until the necessary pontoons had arrived, then began the assault using the original plan, in spite of the fact the elements of surprise and disadvantage were lost. The result was, of course, the horrendous bloodletting at the foot of Marye’s Height, for which Burnside is correctly excoriated, even though his men did temporarily insert themselves between Lee‘s two Corps, but couldn‘t hold the position. (In defense of Burnside, though, it should be noted that during the following years, similar (or worse) losses were sustained during equally futile attacks at Vicksburg, Kennesaw Mountain, Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor, but neither Grant nor Sherman are considered as failures).
After the defeat, he basically withdrew his Army to it’s original position and planned an almost immediate movement to land on Lee’s rear and roll up the route to Richmond. Lee was still in place on Marye’s Height, facing the river, and Burnside intended to move quickly upstream and cross in the vicinity of the Germanna and Ely’s ford across the river. As any student knows, however, that march was delayed by torrential rains and was dubbed “The Mud March” even then. In the end, Burnside was relieved of command and sent west, with Hooker finally grabbing the prize he wanted: Command of the Army of the Potomac.
And, what did Hooker do with that command? He plagiarized Burnsides strategy and sent the army off to do the same thing. And, it succeeded. Lee was out-marched and out-flanked, only saved by Hooker’s loss of will and timidity. What followed was the Union Army’s rout at Chancellorsville and Hooker’s removal from command.
So..what do you think? WAS Burnside that inept, or has he been unfairly labeled?
The "story" part of history tyically calls for type casting....heroes and villains, the competent and the fools, those who were effective and those who were clowns. Because Burnside had some spectacular failures, he has tended to be cast as a bufooon, his good work neglected.
That is the historical price tag of being modestly talented, of being mediocre among peers. There were worse generals than Burnside, but also superior ones.
I agree with you that Burnside suffers more in historical treatments than is deserved, but caution should be exercised in rehabilitating him, it would not do to shift him to the other extreme. That he wasn't as bad as he has been made out to be, isn't the same thing as "He was good."
My feeling with Burnside is that had he never been promoted to the head of the Union's main army, nothing he did during the war would have made him especially memorable, his level of fame would be akin to other lesser command generals who also turned in mediocre records. It was being placed in the centerstage spotlight, and failing severely while in it, which has caused historians to go shopping for all other Burnside calamities, and focus on them to the exclusion of his successes.
The "story" part of history tyically calls for type casting....heroes and villains, the competent and the fools, those who were effective and those who were clowns. Because Burnside had some spectacular failures, he has tended to be cast as a bufooon, his good work neglected.
That is the historical price tag of being modestly talented, of being mediocre among peers. There were worse generals than Burnside, but also superior ones.
I agree with you that Burnside suffers more in historical treatments than is deserved, but caution should be exercised in rehabilitating him, it would not do to shift him to the other extreme. That he wasn't as bad as he has been made out to be, isn't the same thing as "He was good."
My feeling with Burnside is that had he never been promoted to the head of the Union's main army, nothing he did during the war would have made him especially memorable, his level of fame would be akin to other lesser command generals who also turned in mediocre records. It was being placed in the centerstage spotlight, and failing severely while in it, which has caused historians to go shopping for all other Burnside calamities, and focus on them to the exclusion of his successes.
You're right in that the natural inclination is to off-set an extreme negative with an extreme positive, thereby setting up an either/or proposition. We see that every day over on the political boards.
But, most people are not either totally evil or totally good and I think Burnside falls into this category as easily and readily as anyone else. Like the rest of humanity, he was a mixture of both, but few want to recognize that. At least, few among those who are interested in the subject.
The general, historical conclusion is that Burnside was a dreadful choice as an Army Commander, based upon the performance of the Army of the Potomac before Fredericksburg, but ignoring the performance of his Army of the Ohio in eastern Tennessee. It's as if failure in one place + success in another = failure.
I suppose the same inexact and unwarranted standard could be applied to modern-day field commanders.
Different officers succeed at different levels. It would not surprise me if there were field marshals who would be outright disaster with a platoon. It's often presumed that Stonewall Jackson would have gone on to be a great army commander, but it's not a safe presumption--we really do not know.
I've always thought of Burnside as a poster boy for the Peter Principle. He seems to have been a loyal, modest, competent general up to division and corps level. At the army level, his record would seem to speak for itself. However, he was in no way the only terribly inept Union army commander. He had a lot of company in that club.
Different officers succeed at different levels. It would not surprise me if there were field marshals who would be outright disaster with a platoon. It's often presumed that Stonewall Jackson would have gone on to be a great army commander, but it's not a safe presumption--we really do not know.
I've always thought of Burnside as a poster boy for the Peter Principle. He seems to have been a loyal, modest, competent general up to division and corps level. At the army level, his record would seem to speak for itself. However, he was in no way the only terribly inept Union army commander. He had a lot of company in that club.
He had plenty of company in the south too. Inept officers have been the bane of Privates forever.
I think that Burnside's association with the Battle of the Crater is a nice microcosm of both Burnside's actual talents, and his historical treatment.
It was Burnside's 9th Corps which was involved in the attack, and thus Burnside was the immediate field commander for what turned out to be a disaster. The consequences for Burnside were his being turned over to a board on inquiry, and the termination of active commands for him for the rest of the war.
He was eventually exonerated by the inquiry, but his reputation already was in tatters at that point and it did him no good.
But......The basis for not holding Burnside accountable for the calamity was that his original plans were altered at the last moment by Meade and Grant, who ordered Burnside to substitute another unit for the colored troops which Burnside had specifically trained as the lead troops for the assault. That is quite true, Meade and Grant both agreed that should the attack fail, then the commanders might be seen as callous and uncaring of the black soldiers under their command.
The troops which were selected as substitutes, were absent the special training and that played a large role in the failure of the attack. Thus it appears that Burnside had done all that was required or expected to prepare properly, only to have high command interference cause the failure.
But.....we also need to look at how BUrnside handled the last minute change. In an apparent fit of anger, rather than make a studied selection of who would be the best substitutes, Burnside peakishly had his division commanders draw lots to see which unit would lead the way. The "winner" was the worst officer under Burnside's command, James Ledlie, a man with little combat experience and a severe problem with alcohol. Ledlie wound up spending the entire battle hunkered down in a bunker getting drunk.
So....while we may say Burnside should not be blamed for the calamity because of the interference from his superiors, we should not be letting him off the hook completely. The decision to employ a lottery to select the attack's leader was irresonsible and petty. The willingness to go along with the lottery's outcome when Burnside knew that Ledlie was the worst choice, completely without justification.
I think that Burnside's association with the Battle of the Crater is a nice microcosm of both Burnside's actual talents, and his historical treatment.
It was Burnside's 9th Corps which was involved in the attack, and thus Burnside was the immediate field commander for what turned out to be a disaster. The consequences for Burnside were his being turned over to a board on inquiry, and the termination of active commands for him for the rest of the war.
He was eventually exonerated by the inquiry, but his reputation already was in tatters at that point and it did him no good.
But......The basis for not holding Burnside accountable for the calamity was that his original plans were altered at the last moment by Meade and Grant, who ordered Burnside to substitute another unit for the colored troops which Burnside had specifically trained as the lead troops for the assault. That is quite true, Meade and Grant both agreed that should the attack fail, then the commanders might be seen as callous and uncaring of the black soldiers under their command.
The troops which were selected as substitutes, were absent the special training and that played a large role in the failure of the attack. Thus it appears that Burnside had done all that was required or expected to prepare properly, only to have high command interference cause the failure.
But.....we also need to look at how BUrnside handled the last minute change. In an apparent fit of anger, rather than make a studied selection of who would be the best substitutes, Burnside peakishly had his division commanders draw lots to see which unit would lead the way. The "winner" was the worst officer under Burnside's command, James Ledlie, a man with little combat experience and a severe problem with alcohol. Ledlie wound up spending the entire battle hunkered down in a bunker getting drunk.
So....while we may say Burnside should not be blamed for the calamity because of the interference from his superiors, we should not be letting him off the hook completely. The decision to employ a lottery to select the attack's leader was irresonsible and petty. The willingness to go along with the lottery's outcome when Burnside knew that Ledlie was the worst choice, completely without justification.
That's right. Burnside showed an unwillingness to make decisions in that particular case and the result was not only failure, but tragedy for the troops involved. The same was true at Fredericksburg where his temporizing and indecision had grave consequences when he did finally get across the river.
On the other hand, he's also blamed for delaying his assault on the Confederate right at Antietam and that charge doesn't stick. He was ordered to cross not only the bridge, but at several shallow fords which an engineer officer (I forget his name) claimed to have surveyed when, in fact, he had not. Moreover, even after Burnside's Corp rolled up the Confederate's flank and his advanced troops were literally entering Sharpsburg, A.P.Hills division arrived from Harper's Ferry and came up on his rear, quite by surprise.
Burnside has been criticized for not being prepared for an attack from an unexpected direction, but how could he prepare for something he knew nothing of? The truth is that ordinarily, he would have had cavalry out looking around on his flanks, but McClelland was reserving the entire cavalry force for a final, grand attack which never came and left Burnside hanging out to dry when Hill's division showed up.
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