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His tactics were unimaginative and pedestrian at best, and downright arrogant and haphazard at worst. He simply waged a war of attrition, throwing his men into the fray to become fodder. He knew he the North could afford more casualities then the South, and took absurd advantage of this. How many of you know he lost 10,000 at Shiloh?
On his best day he wasn't a pimple on General Lee's butt so far as tactics were concerned.
His tactics were unimaginative and pedestrian at best, and downright arrogant and haphazard at worst. He simply waged a war of attrition, throwing his men into the fray to become fodder. He knew he the North could afford more casualities then the South, and took absurd advantage of this. How many of you know he lost 10,000 at Shiloh?
On his best day he wasn't a pimple on General Lee's butt so far as tactics were concerned.
Perhaps as far as tactics are concerned, yes. In the realm of strategy, no. Lee and Grant were very much mirror images of each other and the debate over who was better has been going on since 1864 or so. What I would say is that both had pros and cons, but those don't automatically make one better than the other.
Lee Pros:
-Brilliant tactician.
-Good evaluator of other men both in his command and his opponents.
-Decisive and bold.
-Won battles.
Lee Cons:
-Poor quartermaster with little grasp of supply situation.
-Poor strategic vision.
Grant Pros:
-Excellent strategic vision.
-Excellent grasp of supply situation.
-Decisive and bold.
-Won battles.
Grant Cons:
-Poor tactician.
I think ultimately both were very good for their situation. To paint a parallel Lee was Rommel to Grant's Eisenhower. Given that, comparing them really isn't fair as they were both good in their own way. Together they would have been an excellent team.
Grant was ultimately the better big picture thinker, but poor on the battlefield. Lee never quite grasped the big picture, but was brilliant on the battlefield. In the end Grant is what the Union needed to win and Lee failed to grasp what was needed for the South to win. Indeed the South never had a "Grant level" commander to coordinate their entire war effort. Lee spent the majority of the war caring about NoVa and NoVa only leaving the other fronts to their own devices.
His tactics were unimaginative and pedestrian at best, and downright arrogant and haphazard at worst. He simply waged a war of attrition, throwing his men into the fray to become fodder. He knew he the North could afford more casualities then the South, and took absurd advantage of this. How many of you know he lost 10,000 at Shiloh?
On his best day he wasn't a pimple on General Lee's butt so far as tactics were concerned.
General Lee surrendered his butt to that pimple.
Grant was more than just numbers and attrition. His Vicksburg campaign involved daring and imagination.
Before Grant, the Army of the Potomac was commanded by others who enjoyed the same numerical advantages over Lee as did Grant. All were whipped save Grant. Obviously something more than just greater numbers was needed to prevail.
In the course of the war there were four surrenders forced on the enemy where more than 10,000 troops went into captivity. One was when Stonewall Jackson captured the Harper's Ferry garrison in September of 1862, the other three were Fort Donelson, Vicksburg and Appomattox ...all surrendering to Grant.
Lee spent the majority of the war caring about NoVa and NoVa only leaving the other fronts to their own devices.
That isn't precisely correct. Lee formed the notion that the fate of the Confederacy rose and fell with the fate of the Army of Northern Virginia. In that the Confederacy collapsed right after it was surrendered, his idea was not without merit.
Lee was aware of what was taking place in other theaters, but always resisted the idea of diluting his army to shore up those other sectors because he strongly believed that Southern morale was tied firmly to the victories which he had brought about at the head of that army. He believed that the Confederacy could survive the loss of portions of its territory, but would not survive the loss of his army.
The key to understanding Lee is in understanding how closely he had tied himself to the image of George Washington, and how he conceived of himself as the Washington of the South.
Lee married into Washington's extended family. Lee was the caretaker of a great deal of Washington property. Lee admired Washington's stoicism and determination. Lee especially admired Washington's self control and at all times kept his emotions in check and his temper masked.
Washington's strategy was one of survival, that battlefield defeats were subordinate to simply keeping his army in the field. Washington relied on the British people losing heart for the war. Lee embraced this idea. He knew that the South could not conquer the North, so what was needed was for the North to lose the will to prosecute the war. Washington relied on time as the agent for British morale eroding, Lee believed it had to be brought about by battlefield victories.
In 1862 Lee felt that a Southern victory on Northen soil would not only demoralize the North, but also encourage European intervention. That was what the Antietam campaign was about. In 1863, Lee again went North, convinced that a victory on Northern soil, in the wake of the Fredericksburg and Chancelorsville defeats, would turn the Northern population against the Republicans and cause them to cease supporting the war effort.
Finally, with justice, Lee did not trust the Confederate commanders in the West. He did not wish to send a portion of his army to another theater where all that they would accomplish would be to increase the size of the armies which surrendered.
Lee did have a strategic vision, he wasn't just tactics. His strategy ultimately failed, but it had always existed.
Judging (or misjudging) the opponent's morale and resolve
Quote:
Originally Posted by Grandstander
Washington's strategy was one of survival, that battlefield defeats were subordinate to simply keeping his army in the field. Washington relied on the British people losing heart for the war. Lee embraced this idea. He knew that the South could not conquer the North, so what was needed was for the North to lose the will to prosecute the war. Washington relied on time as the agent for British morale eroding, Lee believed it had to be brought about by battlefield victories.
While I admit this is a giant leap, when I read the paragraph above I couldn't help but think of the Japanese in World War II. From at least Iwo Jima forward, and probably before that, their rationale for the stubborn defense which they put up (knowing that they could not ultimately hold the various places) was that by inflicting enough casualties on the American forces, the U.S. would tire of the bloodshed and negotiate a peace. In a way, the Japanese mis-reading of probable American reaction goes back to the Pearl Harbor attack; they seemed not to realize that Pearl Harbor would galvanize and unify the U.S. against them. Their leadership was prone to fantasies about what other countries would do, such as the fantasy that the Soviet Union would use its good offices to help the Japanese negotiate a peace with the U.S. and Great Britain.
That isn't precisely correct. Lee formed the notion that the fate of the Confederacy rose and fell with the fate of the Army of Northern Virginia. In that the Confederacy collapsed right after it was surrendered, his idea was not without merit.
Lee was aware of what was taking place in other theaters, but always resisted the idea of diluting his army to shore up those other sectors because he strongly believed that Southern morale was tied firmly to the victories which he had brought about at the head of that army. He believed that the Confederacy could survive the loss of portions of its territory, but would not survive the loss of his army.
The key to understanding Lee is in understanding how closely he had tied himself to the image of George Washington, and how he conceived of himself as the Washington of the South.
Lee married into Washington's extended family. Lee was the caretaker of a great deal of Washington property. Lee admired Washington's stoicism and determination. Lee especially admired Washington's self control and at all times kept his emotions in check and his temper masked.
Washington's strategy was one of survival, that battlefield defeats were subordinate to simply keeping his army in the field. Washington relied on the British people losing heart for the war. Lee embraced this idea. He knew that the South could not conquer the North, so what was needed was for the North to lose the will to prosecute the war. Washington relied on time as the agent for British morale eroding, Lee believed it had to be brought about by battlefield victories.
In 1862 Lee felt that a Southern victory on Northen soil would not only demoralize the North, but also encourage European intervention. That was what the Antietam campaign was about. In 1863, Lee again went North, convinced that a victory on Northern soil, in the wake of the Fredericksburg and Chancelorsville defeats, would turn the Northern population against the Republicans and cause them to cease supporting the war effort.
Finally, with justice, Lee did not trust the Confederate commanders in the West. He did not wish to send a portion of his army to another theater where all that they would accomplish would be to increase the size of the armies which surrendered.
Lee did have a strategic vision, he wasn't just tactics. His strategy ultimately failed, but it had always existed.
Interesting post, I enjoyed it. Lee was certainly correct in that the Southern cause rose and fell on the performance and existence of his army. Perhaps I was mistaken to assume that his lack of interest in other theaters was a lack of strategic vision (though there are cases in his own theater where that seems to be the case as well) as much as it was actually his strategy. I still feel that Lee was Tactics > Strategy whereas Grant was Strategy > Tactics. Do you agree with that statement?
I still feel that Lee was Tactics > Strategy whereas Grant was Strategy > Tactics. Do you agree with that statement?
The line where strategy ends and tactics begin is frequently blurred. When Grant got his army onto the East bank of the Mississippi below Vicksburg, and then vexed the Confederates by heading East toward Jackson rather than North toward Vicksburg, was that strategy or tactics? Was Grant's decision to deal with the threat from Joe Johnston's army first while tempting Pemberton to come out of his works to try and join up with Johnston, strategy or tactics?
If we say that the plan to take Vicksburg by getting his army on dry land on the same side of the river as his opponent, was Grant's strategy, and all that followed was tactics, then we must credit Grant with a brilliant tactical battle, as impressive to me as anything which Lee conducted in the East.
Grant is hard to assess to a degree. Was his refusal to make plans based on the anticipation of what his opponent might do, a strength or a weakness? It was a strength in that Grant was never irresolute or rendered inactive by fear of being surprised. It was a weakness in that Grant's armies sometimes did suffer surprise, as in the attempted breakout from Donelson, or the rebel assault at Shiloh.
It is also hard to distinguish between what was the product of luck, and what was the product of Grant's calm and inability to be stampeded no matter the circumstances. Grant won a great victory at Chatanooga, but it was the product of serendipity rather than his battle plan. Grant's main thrust was supposed to be Sherman's assault on the Confederate right, but that got bogged down and accomplished nothing. Thomas' army in the center was only supposed to be making a demonstration to prevent reinforcements from being sent against Sherman's attack. Instead, Thomas' troops went beyond their orders and won the battle with their spontaneous attack on Missionary Ridge.
How much credit for that should go to Grant?
Grant won at Shiloh by remaining calm in the face of calamity. Grant won at Vicksburg with brilliant strategy and tactics. Grant won at Chatanooga via means he had not anticipated. Grant defeated Lee in the East via relentless attrrition.
With Grant, the pattern is.....there is no pattern. That suggests that he was flexible, that he could adapt to the needs of the conflict in front of him. And that was Grant's great strength....that he could win with what he had in the circumstances that he faced. The man was goal oriented to an extreme degree.
Lee and Grant composed the classic boxing confrontation of the fighter vs the slugger. The former was light on his feet, dazzling in his movements, danced all around his opponent and then dashed in to strike lightning combinations, The latter was more of the sort who just kept coming forward, absorbing his opponent's blows, leaning on him, hammering away in the clinches, and wearing him down to set up that one big punch which would decide the fight. Lee was like Tunney, Ali or Sugar Ray Leonard, Grant was more of a Dempsey, Frazier or Hagler.
Last edited by Grandstander; 08-23-2011 at 10:16 AM..
Grant was willing and able to use speed when he had forces capable of speed such as the Army of the Tennessee and the late war armies of the James and Potomac. When he came east the tools available to Grant were slow, it took time to work the problems of the eastern armies out. But once those problems were solved the armies of the James and Potomac were capable in 1865 of carrying out Grant's plans with both power and speed.
As for Grant's victory at Chattanooga; Hooker's force was falling on the rebel left at Rossville Gap as planned as the positions to the north were crumbling under Thomas's attack. And whether or not Thomas's attack was intended as a demonstration or to break the rebels is unclear; indeed the intentions of both Grant and Thomas are unclear.
I think at Chattannoga Grant, Thomas and Hooker performed well but Sherman didn't. Howard and the eastern troops performed ably as well. And the rebel Cleburne looked very good of course.
The Rebellion lacked strategic talent. Jefferson Davis wanted to run the rebellion's war effort himself and was in charge of strategy. Lee's job was the protection of his department and so he naturally enough wanted all the troops and supplies he could get, even if to the detriment of other departments.
Given Federal resources and will I can see no workable startegy for the Rebellion. Their best hope was victory on the battlefield while dancing to the Federal tune, which worked for some time in the east.
I think Bragg was probably the best rebel strategist.
Last edited by Irishtom29; 08-23-2011 at 10:46 AM..
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Judging (or misjudging) the opponent's morale and resolve
