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I read recently where the strengthened right wing would still have failed because supply was problematic as is with the lesser number of troops and shorter radius of movement which were utilzied along the front pushing on the British and Beligian side. More troops and the lessened front required to sweep around Paris would not have been possible. Of course, they would have made contacted with the BEF as well only perhaps not in the same position(Mons & Cateau) and the BEF would have been rested and fit as they were initially. (although all of the marching during the retreat wore them out in the heat as it did the Germans as well)
Glantz and van Creveld have done some pretty exhausting study on the Schlieffen Plan and came to the same conclusion you mentioned above. The plan, while masterful, lacked anything but passing attention to logistics. The plan was both ahead of and behind the times.
The rapid logisitcs required to support such a plan were simply not available at the time. Most of Moltke the Younger's work on the Plan was to correct the logistical deficiencies in it. Even then he was never able to fully alleviate them.
The plan was also heavily predicated upon rapid movement of the offensive force against the slow deployment of the defending force. The Plan largely failed to account for 30+ years of development that occurred between the Franco-Prussian War and WW1. The French, British and even the Soviets were able to mobilize far more rapidly than what the Plan assumed was possible. Further the pace of movement did not take into account attrition within the forces or their supply train. For instance, the rear elements of the German Army at the Marne were still marching towards the battle when the lead elements had broken into a retreat and large numbers of horses in the supply train and artillery had become sick from eating green corn, greatly slowing the advance.
Both Glantz and van Creveld came to the conclusion that the original or modified version of the plan, executed perfectly, would still have resulted in failure do to the logistics involved and lack of forethought in that area.
The analysis offered so far has concentrated on the possible altered outcome in the West had the Germans stayed faithful to their plan. We need to also consider what would have happened in the East, if in the absense of Hindenburg and Ludendorff at Tannenberg, the Russians had an open door into East Prussia. That was the last week of August of 1914, and the Marne was not fought until the second week of September.
The Germans could not have all of their troops in two different theaters simultaneously. Sticking to the plan in the West would have meant disaster in the East. Preventing that disaster in the East came at the price of the possible swift victory in the West.
The Schlieffen Plan failed because it was predicated upon being able to defeat France before the sluggish Russians had managed to organize and transport their oversized armies to Germany's Eastern frontier. The Russians instead managed a rapid advancement of two armies which were ready to go. They routed the German defenses at Gumbinnen, (another failed element of the Schlieffen Plan, that a series of fortified spots would be able to slow the Russians to a crawl) and the next thing you know Ivan was headed for the Vistula.
It wasn't the decision to shift troops East which caused the plan to fail, it was the necessity of having to do so. And that was the product of the unexpectedly swift Russian movement. The Schlieffen Plan didn't just fail, it was defeated.
Considering East Prussia was the cradle of the German General Staff,the possibility of having it seized by the Russians was unthinkable.Russian mobilization came quicker than the Germans reckoned,however,the westward and northward thrusts into East Prussia by Samsonov and Renenkampf lacked coordination and secure communications.Mostly this was because they didn't like each other,I believe this goes back to an incident in the Russo-Japanese War,but others may have better info.Regardless,the Germans,working along interior lines,once reinforced,were able to defeat them individually.
Iirc, Sir Roger Casement attempted to recruit Irish PoWs to fight for Germany, but met with little success.
Yes, little success indeed; he was captured and executed in 1916.
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