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ON a bright Hawaiian Sunday morning 70 years ago today, hundreds of Japanese warplanes appeared suddenly over Pearl Harbor and laid waste to the United States Pacific Fleet. The American people boiled over in righteous fury, and America plunged into World War II. The “date which will live in infamy” was the real turning point of the war, which had been raging for more than two years, and it opened an era of American internationalism and global security commitments that continues to this day.
An excellent article, as we might expect from the New York Times willingness to give adequate space to such things. I just want to point out that there is no new material or new discovery involved; basically everything in the article was previously known. I do not mean that as a criticism of the article.
Some years ago I read a biography of Yamamoto which contained all that, but to my frustration I can remember neither the title nor the author. That failing is typical for me - I frequently remember content but not titles and authors. Speaking of which, there is a book length treatment of the P-38 mission which resulted in Yamamoto's death. We knew the time, date, and destination of his flight on an inspection trip through decryption of the Japanese naval code, but we didn't want the Japanese to figure out that's how we intercepted his plane. Therefore, considerable thought was given in the mission planning to make it appear plausible that we had "accidently" intercepted his flight with its escorting fighters. The date of Yamamoto's death, April 18, was the one year anniversary of the date the Doolittle B-25 flight took off from the carrier to bomb Japan (April 18, 1942). A lot had changed in a year's time, and even more would change in the following year.
My Dad was 19 years old on Dec 7th, 1941. He enlisted in the Marine Corp within weeks and was in the 3rd Marine Division. He served in Guadacanal, Guam, Bougainville. He was wounded and was in the hospital for 5 months so missed the Iwo Jima landing but was on an invasion ship in the first wave in the planned invasion of the main islands of Japan when they dropped the bomb. I wouldn't be here typing this if they wouldn't have dropped that bomb because my Dad would have surely been killed along with 90% of the first waves of the invasion.
Escort rider is correct, no new info in that article. Yamamoto knew what would happen if war broke out, but as a loyal subject of the emporer he did his duty to the best of his ability. Many in Japan honestly believed that a major blow against the US would drive us to sue for peace. Some of the Japanese leaders thought we were a weak people unwilling or unable to sacrafice and fight for our nation. Yamamoto knew Americans well enought to know this was not true. He knew about our industrial capablities, and the nature of our people. Here in the US we did not take the Japanese seriously either, as we felt we were superior to them. Both sides underestimated thier enemy, a big no no when it comes to war. We learned our lesson in 1941 and early 42, as we were forced to take the Japanese seriously. The Japanese learned the hardest lesson of all through their defeat, and the destruction of thier cities.
What's sad is that this should be considered "news." Anyone who's actually picked up a history book knows that Admiral Yamamoto wanted nothing like a war with the United States. Lumping him together with Hideki Tojo's war cabinet is not only a mistake, it crosses the line into ignorance.
From a purely military standpoint Admiral Yamamoto should be admired.
He was an excellent sailor, he disagreed with the political war mongers but still carried out his duties to the best of his ability.
But, as they say the winner writes the history books.
And the winner, in this case, has been pretty objective in writing the history books for the most part. History books are written after an event is over. The conception of Yamamoto as a "reviled" admiral was the popular conception of him while the war was still going on. The reasoning was simplistic but understandable: He had planned and led the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor. The average American was not privy to the debates which had occurred among the Japanese leadership. Yes, Yamamoto had a strong sense of duty as well as more common sense than many of his compatriots in the top leadership, especially those in the Imperial Japanese Army.
From a purely military standpoint Admiral Yamamoto should be admired.
He was an excellent sailor, he disagreed with the political war mongers but still carried out his duties to the best of his ability.
But, as they say the winner writes the history books.
It's an interesting topic to discuss. I admire Yamamoto the man and he was certainly an extremely capable commander and one of the best the Japanese had, but his record isn't exactly sterling.
Pearl Harbor - Obviously succesful attack and bold plan, but ultimately failed by not launching a third wave against US fuel and dock facilities which would have crippled the Pacific fleet.
Coral Sea - Arugably undercommitted his forces to the Coral Sea and Port Moresby operation. While the Japanese won the field, the assault on Port Moresby had to be pulled back. Port Moresby was critical to further tightening the noose on Australia. Though they only lost the light carrier Shoho, the Shokaku and Zuikaku were both neutralized for several months. Yamamoto did not personally command this battle, but he committed the forces and devised the strategy used. Coral Sea was also a questionable operation overall as Yamamoto had already decided that the decisive battle would be at Midway. He committed his two best carriers to Coral Sea, dilluting his forces for Midway and then made no attempt to recover Zuikaku before the operation.
Midway - This one is still debated. Was the failure in Yamamoto's strategy or in the ability of the Americans to decode his plan? This scenario is often played out at naval war colleges and debated by historians and most come to the conclusion that the failure was not so much in the Americans knowing the plan, but in the execution of that plan. Had Yamamoto stuck to his own plan and not delayed the deployment of and then simply steamed past his subs and denied reconnaissance assets to Nagumo's carriers, the Japanese may have been able to carry the day. There is also much criticism over the way Yamamoto divided his forces for the Midway assault and that has nothing to do with the Aleutians campaign. Yamamoto fragmented his fleets and had them so spread out that they could not support each other. When the scenario is run in war colleges the Japanese are almost guaranteed victory with the forces they have.
Guadalcanal - This probably shows the abilities of Yamamoto the best. His resources were heavily depleted but he managed to engage in multiple running battles and inflict losses on the Allied fleets. Ultimately the battle was futile, but Yamamoto showed great strategic thought and dash eventhough his influence over Japanese strategic thought had been virtually eliminate after Midway.
Rating his battle on a scale of 1-10 with 1 the worst and 10 the best I would give him the following marks:
Pearl Harbor - 8 - Missed what was arguably the most critical targets at Pearl.
Coral Sea - 4 - Undercommitted his forces, won the field but had to retire, the losses here were not recovered before Midway.
Midway - 1 - Utter disaster for the Japanese navy and the failure can arguably be placed on Yamamoto's failure to execute his own plan.
Guadalcanal - 7 - Had no chance of victory, but fought well and used what resources he did have to their best advantage.
Midway - This one is still debated. Was the failure in Yamamoto's strategy or in the ability of the Americans to decode his plan? This scenario is often played out at naval war colleges and debated by historians and most come to the conclusion that the failure was not so much in the Americans knowing the plan, but in the execution of that plan. Had Yamamoto stuck to his own plan and not delayed the deployment of and then simply steamed past his subs and denied reconnaissance assets to Nagumo's carriers, the Japanese may have been able to carry the day. There is also much criticism over the way Yamamoto divided his forces for the Midway assault and that has nothing to do with the Aleutians campaign. Yamamoto fragmented his fleets and had them so spread out that they could not support each other. When the scenario is run in war colleges the Japanese are almost guaranteed victory with the forces they have.
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I think it is also fair to question the targeting of Midway when the goal wasn't really Midway, it was luring the American carriers out to defend it.
Had the Japanese taken Midway, they would have then been stuck trying to supply a base which was thousands of miles outside their defense perimeter, but only a few hundred miles away from the main enemy base at Pearl. A Japanese occupied Midway would have been subject to air attack from Hawaii, and their ships which attempted to supply it would have been passing through waters patrolled by American submarines.
Coral Sea should have shown the Japanese that the American carriers would turn out to defend any critical objective. That being the case, a much more useful objective could have been selected. Midway could not have been held for very long even if it had been taken. The Japanese would have been better off taking a second crack at Port Moresby.
Both Yammamoto and Emperor Hirohito were heavily opposed to war with the United States, especially one where Japan would strike first.
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