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It was an act of cowardness and making ponds out of civilians thousands of children and wiping out
two metro cultures is unforgivable , It was unnecessary and we have zero data to support what the outcome of extending the war would have generated the number of casualties illusioned by some historians. We would have overpowered the enemy in a few more months. The true test of opinion will be when Korea detonates two nukes over the US knocking out our grid and you end starving in the first year ! Then you can taste evil first hand.
imo...no
what JAPAN did was unforgivable
We could have dropped a few more and I would have been fine with it
considering some of the worst war time atrocities ever committed were done by the Japanese, they and their emperor got off pretty light...as we basically rebuilt them
The Soviet entry into the Pacific War was not a surprise to the Japanese, it was inevitable and they had prepared for it. I don't see it as an element in the decision to surrender. I feel very confident that the militarists wouldn't have thought a military issue as a reason to surrender.
The most hardcore, no, but some (like Suzuki and Togo) were heavily swayed by the dual shock. Japan had been pursuing negotiations through the Soviets right through the end of July. While they knew Soviet entry was inevitable their intelligence apparatus placed the likelihood of a Soviet invasion of Manchuria as being in fall 1945 or spring 1946 at the earliest. They also completely underestimated the size of the Soviet buildup and the amount of forces they could commit. They expected an invasion of a few divisions along the rail line towards Hailar or Solun. What they got was a massive army swarming from all directions including across the "impassable" Greater Khingan range.
The most hardcore, no, but some (like Suzuki and Togo) were heavily swayed by the dual shock. Japan had been pursuing negotiations through the Soviets right through the end of July. While they knew Soviet entry was inevitable their intelligence apparatus placed the likelihood of a Soviet invasion of Manchuria as being in fall 1945 or spring 1946 at the earliest. They also completely underestimated the size of the Soviet buildup and the amount of forces they could commit. They expected an invasion of a few divisions along the rail line towards Hailar or Solun. What they got was a massive army swarming from all directions including across the "impassable" Greater Khingan range.
In the final analysis the Home Islands were what mattered, not Manchuria.
The most hardcore, no, but some (like Suzuki and Togo) were heavily swayed by the dual shock. Japan had been pursuing negotiations through the Soviets right through the end of July. While they knew Soviet entry was inevitable their intelligence apparatus placed the likelihood of a Soviet invasion of Manchuria as being in fall 1945 or spring 1946 at the earliest. They also completely underestimated the size of the Soviet buildup and the amount of forces they could commit. They expected an invasion of a few divisions along the rail line towards Hailar or Solun. What they got was a massive army swarming from all directions including across the "impassable" Greater Khingan range.
The embassies in Sweden and Switzerland had been trying desperately to get instructions on how to treat with the Western Allies and the embassy in Moscow was doing the same for the Great Stalin, but instructions weren't forthcoming.
I'll check Tōgō's book later, but I'm not recalling any shock.
Yep, in The Cause of Japan there's nothing about being surprised at the Soviet declaration, just "one more thing" that meant the Peace Faction had the right idea.
In the final analysis the Home Islands were what mattered, not Manchuria.
While that's true, Manchuria was not a throw away to the militarist faction. They felt it might be possible to retain control or only give it away in exchange for other concessions. They were only willing to part with it if the Soviets demanded it and it was the only way to maintain Soviet neutrality.
Beyond that, the Japanese defense plans for the Home Islands were entirely concentrated on defending against a US invasion from the Pacific. The loss of Manchuria now opened yet another potential front and more importantly exposed a northern front. Soviet entry greatly weakened the overall strategic position of Japan in relation to defense of the Home Islands.
Quote:
Originally Posted by OpanaPointer
Yep, in The Cause of Japan there's nothing about being surprised at the Soviet declaration, just "one more thing" that meant the Peace Faction had the right idea.
Better historians than we have debated this. The counter to your arguments (which echo Ricahrd Frank and Asada Sadao) is made by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa. His arguments are very well presented in this essay from August 2007:
The argument presented by Asada and Frank that the atomic bombs rather than Soviet entry into the war had a more decisive effect on Japan’s decision to surrender cannot be supported. The Hiroshima bomb, although it heightened the sense of urgency to seek the termination of the war, did not prompt the Japanese government to take any immediate action that repudiated the previous policy of seeking Moscow’s mediation. Contrary to the contention advanced by Asada and Frank, there is no evidence to show that the Hiroshima bomb led either Togo or the emperor to accept the Potsdam terms. On the contrary, Togo’s urgent telegram to Sato on August 7 indicates that, despite the Hiroshima bomb, they continued to stay the previous course. The effect of the Nagasaki bomb was negligible. It did not change the political alignment one way or the other. Even Anami’s fantastic suggestion that the United States had more than 100 atomic bombs and planned to bomb Tokyo next did not change the opinions of either the peace party or the war party at all.
Rather, what decisively changed the views of the Japanese ruling elite was the Soviet entry into the war. It catapulted the Japanese government into taking immediate action. For the first time, it forced the government squarely to confront the issue of whether it should accept the Potsdam terms. In the tortuous discussions from August 9 through August 14, the peace party, motivated by a profound sense of betrayal, fear of Soviet influence on occupation policy, and above all by a desperate desire to preserve the imperial house, finally staged a conspiracy to impose the “emperor’s sacred decision†and accept the Potsdam terms, believing that under the circumstances surrendering to the United States would best assure the preservation of the imperial house and save the emperor.
This is, of course, not to deny completely the effect of the atomic bomb on Japan’s policymakers. It certainly injected a sense of urgency in finding an acceptable end to the war. Kido stated that while the peace party and the war party had previously been equally balanced in the scale, the atomic bomb helped to tip the balance in favor of the peace party. It would be more accurate to say that the Soviet entry into the war, adding to that tipped scale, then completely toppled the scale itself.
I tend to share this view based on my own reading.
I'll go with the Gaimudaijin that was in office at the time and the Pacific War Research Society.
I've read Japan's Longest Day...great read. Long on history, short on analysis. I would think in the 40+ years since it was written there is room for further analysis and thought.
I've read Japan's Longest Day...great read. Long on history, short on analysis. I would think in the 40+ years since it was written there is room for further analysis and thought.
..and seem to have rejected the conclusions. It is what it is. There are professionals who disagree over the analysis of these events. I think we have presented plenty of info for both sides.
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