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The inability to subdue Malta was certainly one element that led to the eventual defeat of the Axis forces in North Africa. Another element that aided the Allies greatly were the ULTRA intercepts of German communications which made it easier for the Allies to track and destroy supply convoys sent out from Italy to support the Axis troops.
But the Allies weren't the only ones intercepting communications. In September 1941, Italian military intelligence agents broke into the American embassy in Rome and copied the code book used by American military attaches to encrypt communiques. The Italians were all too happy to share this information with the Germans. However, the Germans had already broken the code themselves and had begun intercepting and reading these communiques. With things heating up in North Africa, intercept stations in Bavaria began to focus on communications coming out of Cairo.
Lucky for the Germans, the U.S. military attache in Egypt, Colonel Bonner Frank Fellers, was sending extremely detailed reports to Washington about British troop strength and movement. All of this information was forwarded immediately to General Rommel. In addition, Rommel was also listening in on British radio transmissions. Not only were the British not changing their codes as often as they should, they also tended to be rather chatty over the radio when on the battlefield. Between the intercepted messages from Fellers and radio chatter, Rommel had a very good idea of what was going on around him.The information gathered told Rommel that at least in the short term, he had the advantage over the British forces. Thus, he went on the offensive on January 21, 1942, taking the Allies by surprise. In the ensuing months, the intelligence he was being provided enabled Rommel to advance and finally push the British out of Libya and back into Egypt.
Early on the British had become certain there was a leak and attempted to track it down. Suspicion shifted to Fellers based on an intercept of an Axis message that mentioned "a source in Egypt". For whatever reason, the focus was taken off Fellers and he happily, and unwittingly kept providing Rommel with much needed intelligence until July 1942 when he was re-posted to Washington, D.C. The departure of Fellers was followed closely by the capture of Rommel's radio intercept post. The documents found at the post by the British made clear the value and extent of the information that Rommel had been receiving, including the fact that some was from Colonel Feller's messages. Steps were taken quickly to rectify the situation and almost immediately, Rommel was in the dark as to what the British were going to do next. Weak, lacking vital supplies, and now blind as to what the British were doing, Rommel never had a clear picture of the force he ended up facing and that would defeat him at El Alamein.
There is no question that Erwin Rommel was a brilliant general. But at least a part of his success in North Africa is due to unexpected, though very welcome, intelligence falling into his hands. And much like his Allied counterparts did with the ULTRA intercepts, Rommel used what he had to great strategic benefit. One has to wonder whether things might have turned out differently at El Alamein had the flow of information to him not been cut off at such a critical time.
General Erich von Manstein wasn't included in this group, but according to military historians B.H. Liddell Hart and Antony Beevor, they thought him to be Germany's most brilliant WWII general. Manstein was one of the few generals who openly opposed Hitler's erratic plans, and Hitler finally sidelined him in 1944. Manstein was the principal architect of the invasion of France by circumventing the Maginot Line, with the main tank force going through Luxembourg and, surprisingly, to the British and French, through the difficult terrain of the Ardennes. In Russia, Manstein's forces drove the Red Army off the Kerch Penninsula and captured the Crimea, including the naval base at Sevastopol,, where there was fanatical Soviet resistance. In fact, the monstrous Dora artillery 800mm (31-inch bore) weapon was used there to dislodge Soviet troops deep underground. Again, his technical brilliance allowed the Germans to recapture Kharkhov in a counterattack. However, the attrition of these battles had been disastrous for the Germans.
Rommel gets good press in the Anglo-American world but he really wasn't THAT important. He was a commander in a sideshow and then was pretty much shelved until he took over Army Group B in France under von Runstedt and he wasn't fighting there that long before he was wounded and out for good.
As German generals go I rate Kesselring highly, Model too.
As American generals go I like Eichelberger.
When considering Montgomery's caution one must take into account his experiences on the Western Front in the Great War.
Rommel gets good press in the Anglo-American world but he really wasn't THAT important. He was a commander in a sideshow and then was pretty much shelved until he took over Army Group B in France under von Runstedt and he wasn't fighting there that long before he was wounded and out for good.
As German generals go I rate Kesselring highly, Model too.
As American generals go I like Eichelberger.
When considering Montgomery's caution one must take into account his experiences on the Western Front in the Great War.
Not sure what "commander in side show" means. After Africa his role wasn't that important however, serving in a defensive capability behind the lines. Even in North Africa he wasn't in command of all the forces. Kesselring was his superior and in 1943 he only commanded on of the two corps I think.
Rommel was a hair away from defeating the english in Egypt, which would have opened up the middle east to Germany. But I see the main problem as being one for supply for the Germans, hampered by the increased priority of sending forces to the russian front and poor Italian transport support (and poor Italian leadership period). This happened at a time when the English was increasing it's forces with American supplies - Grant tanks, etc. By the time Montgommery took over in North Africa he was well supplied for an offensive. Really he didn't do anything different than his predessecors, but we was better prepared to fight Rommel.
Someone said Patton defeated Rommel in African. In spite of the George Scott movie I don't think Patton really had to much influence on the course of battle in Africa. He was training and planning for Sicily for most of the campaign.
Not sure what "commander in side show" means. After Africa his role wasn't that important however, serving in a defensive capability behind the lines. Even in North Africa he wasn't in command of all the forces. Kesselring was his superior and in 1943 he only commanded on of the two corps I think.
Africa was a sideshow for the Germans if not for the Brits---the Brits had far more to lose than Germany had to gain. Germany would've done better to use the energies and resources somewhere else, Russia say. Africa was a good place for the Brits to fight and a bad place for the Germans, much because of the logistic difficulties you mentioned that any power would face fighting Britian on the far side of the Med.
But even had the Germans driven the Brits from Egypt what they then have had? Just a bigger logistical mess I think. Gibraltar and Malta were the keys to the Med. And a fighting British fleet under a fighting Admiral, Cunningham. Indeed, when discussing the war in Africa might it not be Cunningham that was the real key player and a more important one than either Rommel or Montgomery (or Patton, Eisenhower etc. etc.)?
The Axis command structure in Africa is confusing to me; I think that at times Rommel was under Italian command and in Tunisia I think Arnim (sp?) and Rommel had seperate commands, at least for a while. Anyway as you know Rommel left Africa before the Axis army went in the bag.
Africa was a sideshow for the Germans if not for the Brits---the Brits had far more to lose than Germany had to gain.
OK I see, and I totally agree. Not sure where the ultimate goal and benfit of Rommel's africa campaign was, part of it was really to bail out Italy and there nonsensical dreams of re-creating the Roman Empire. Taking the middle eastern oil fields would have helped, but they could have gotten to the oil through Russia and the Caucueses as well and they would still have supply problems. I think Hitler and even Rommel had this ultimate fanciful dream of driving through north africa, to the middle east, and attacking Russia through some pincer move via Armenia and/or Iran.
It must have been very frustrating to Rommel. Yes indeed I've read that most of the Italian leaders outranked him and expected him to follow thier orders. Italian military leadership was really really poor during that war. Rommel was able to ignore most and/or used Kesselring (who had some diplimatic and political skills) as an intermediary.
If Rommel had captured Egypt the Suez Canal would have been controlled by Germany. It would have cut England off from India, Australia and the rest of the empire. Rommel, and others understood this. Hitler did not.
Africa was a sideshow for the Germans if not for the Brits---the Brits had far more to lose than Germany had to gain. Germany would've done better to use the energies and resources somewhere else, Russia say. Africa was a good place for the Brits to fight and a bad place for the Germans, much because of the logistic difficulties you mentioned that any power would face fighting Britian on the far side of the Med.
The oil fields of the Middle East would have been a huge boon for the Reich, as well as possibly diverting American resources from the European theater.
As it stands, the Americans arrived just as the Germans were forced right back into them in Tunisia.
Theire were many other generals that should be considered great. Like Bradley;Alexander;Marshal and of course McArthur. All were brillant men and understood the tatctics of what was then modern war.
The oil fields of the Middle East would have been a huge boon for the Reich, as well as possibly diverting American resources from the European theater.
Yes, but driving the British from Egypt still doesn't get them the oil from Saudi Arabia, Mesopatamia and the Persian Gulf. It's still a considerable distance from Egypt to those places which would mean more fighting and a longer yet logistical tail.
And still Cunningham and his fleet and Malta.
The Suez canal was mentioned, had the canal fell I'm not sure it would've harmed the Brits much, indeed, given the situation in the Med 1940-43 I wonder how much shipping to and from India was going around by way of the Cape anyway.
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