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Location: About 10 miles north of Pittsburgh International
2,458 posts, read 4,202,032 times
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Quote:
It is too early to speculate that this is pilot error.
Nah. You're missing the whole point of internet aviation fora. They exist to provide a venue for speculation in the absence of any verifiable facts. That way, in a year or so, when the NTSB issues their findings of probable cause, somebody gets the "I knew that all along" bragging rights. It's better than winning the office football pool.
Let's leave the not speculating to the professional investigators, shall we?
The biggest danger in the air is not severe weather, terrorism or sytems failure. The primary danger when flying today is automation complacency from the pilots.
Think about the Colgan accident in Buffalo a few years ago. These pilots had the autopilot on when the procedures state that the aircraft must be handflown in icing conditions. Due to total situational disengagement this crew killed dozens of people when their dash-8 stalled on approach- up to seconds before disaster this crew was oblivious to the looming disaster as automation complacency lulled them into situational disengagement.
This OZ214 SFO 777 accident is the same story. Severe clear weather, light winds. This is what they call "Captain's weather". Due to the ILS inop the autopilot was not available for the final approach. Take away the autopilot and the modern pilot is questionable to complete a safe approach in even the best conditions. More situational disengagement, this crew was totally oblivious to the looming disaster as automation complacency set in with a lack of airmanship.
Currently the pilots job involves pushing some buttons, munching on a crew meal, monitoring the computers and answering the radio. Very little flying takes place and many pilots can't fly anymore as the FMC does all the work. Take away that autopilot and it gets scary.
The NTSB had a great opportunity to address automation complacency in the post-Colgan BUF investigation but they dropped the ball. Instead the new crew rest rules (FAR 117) allows the pilots even more time to munch their crew meals and disengage with their I-pads. After this SFO accident I hope the NTSB addresses automation complacency. Crew rest is not an issue- lack of airmanship is!
Next time you find yourself in the TSA line remember that the real danger is not terrorism. Tell the TSA agents to check the pilots I-pads. The real danger is the pilots playing fantasy football on their I-pads while in-flight or engaging in small talk instead of flying the airplane.
My point is I doubt the pilots "asked" to go around like the article quoted stated.
RTFQ
The media is horrible at aviation reporting. They may be able to get some facts right, but even then they stretch it and over dramatize it. Unfortunate really, as it leaves the general public even more clueless and needlessly scared (IMO).
Oooops - my mistake - I didn't realize your point was to argue minutia.
Quote:
Originally Posted by dkf747
I said that it didn't "look" too low in the video. What it looked like to me is that the nose up position was started way too early. I think that made the descent rate increase. However, I'm not an expert on that. I still think it's too early to determine pilot error, although, yes, it does seem to be pointing that way right now. We don't have all of the details yet. Don't get me wrong. I see what you're saying, but it's' just right to not rush to judgment in a situation like this.
Nobody is "rushing to judgement". This was clearly and undeniably pilot error - individually or collectively - either way, it is still pilot error. There was nothing wrong with that airplane that some thrust applied to idling engines wouldn't have fixed.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Captain Bill
Airline pilots are capable of making landings with or without glide slope indicators (ILS), or VASI. It's a very simple technique of aiming for the 1500 foot touch down marker. If the runway begins to visually flatten out, then the plane is getting low. If the runway begins to appear shorter, then the plane is getting too high on the approach path.
The Kai Tac airport at Hong Kong, approach to runway 13, was the most difficult airport runway in the world to land because of it's location and proximity to buildings and mountains. The approach was a curved approach so there was no glide slope. It only had a VASI, but in case the VASI is inop, every pilot has to know how to land without any glide slope guidance. I describe the Kai Tac approach in my book.
The pilot was new in this aircraft, 44 hours, according to the NTSB. However, he had 747 experience. Also, the simulators of today, and even 25 years ago, are so realistic that after the training and passing the simulator check ride, getting into the aircraft is a very easy transition. So, his lack of time in this particular aircraft should not be a factor.
The NTSB stated that the approach speed over the runway for this aircraft, (I have to assume they're using the speed for the estimated weight at landing) was 137 knots. She said that according to the flight data recorder, the airplane slowed to 103 knots, and then increased to 106 knots with 50% power at the time of hitting the edge of the runway at the waterline.
At some point after slowing below 137, someone in the cockpit called out to increase airspeed.
A passenger said that before impact, the airplane began shaking. That would indicate to me that a stall had begun. First a stick shaker should have gone off in the cockpit. That vibrates the yoke and wheel to alert the pilots that they are approaching the stall speed.
It is too early to speculate that this is pilot error. The NTSB has said that everything is on the table. No longer do they see something like this and close the books by calling it pilot error. They will examine everything before they make a determination, and they expect it to take about one year.
The questions I have are:
Why was the airspeed decreasing below the approach speed?
Did the aircraft stall?
Did the stick shaker work?
Why was the co-pilot not more aggressive in calling out the speed is low?
Why was the decision to go around delayed to the point where it was impossible?
Why was the power only increased to 50%?
Those are questions the NTSB will have also, and when they interview the pilots they will probably have some of those answers.
Here is the procedure that Pan Am had:
On approach, the pilot not flying will immediately call out if the speed is below or above the approach speed, or if the airplane is above or below, the glide path, and the pilot flying will immediately make a correction. If the pilot not flying believes the airplane is getting into a dangerous situation, he is to call out, "Go Around", at which time the pilot flying is to immediately apply full power and execute a go around.
I don't know the procedures for Asiatic Airlines.
I was an airline pilot for 35 years, 28 of those were with Pan Am, and I flew the 707,747, A300 and A310. I worked in Pan Am's training department for 4 years training pilots on the 707, and giving the 6-month proficiency check to our pilots.
I would suggest that people wait for the NTSB to make the determining cause of the accident. While the initial information may give the impression that it was pilot error, there may have been things going on in the cockpit that no one is aware of at this time. It's just too early to tell.
Bureaucratic nonsense. It is most certainly not too early to say that all indicators point to pilot(s) that turned off the autopilot sooner than need be and then left the throttles unattended. There's a thread over at P&OC with a post that brings it all into focus with few words. //www.city-data.com/forum/30371529-post8.html
There's not a shred of evidence that there was anything wrong with that airplane.
Just curious if there are any international regs in place regarding time at the controls in any given 24 hour period or is that up to the individual carrier?
FAR 121.483: (a) No flag air carrier may schedule a pilot to fly, in an airplane that has a crew of two pilots and at least one additional flight crewmember, for a total of more than 12 hours during any 24 consecutive hours.
The "flight" time is from blocks to blocks. That is, the flying time starts when the airplane pushes back from the gate, and stops when the engines are shut down at the destination. It does not include time on duty.
I don't know the rules for foreign carriers.
Typically, the pilots assigned to the flight will make the take off, and fly for a couple of hours, then the relief crew will take over. The rest periods are planned so that the pilots assigned to the flight will take the last rest period and be back in the seats for the last hour of the flight so they can be rested and prepare for the approach and landing.
This flight originated in Shanghai, flew to Seoul, then to San Francisco. It hasn't been stated if there was a crew change in Seoul, or if the same pilots flew the entire route. However, on that flight, there was a two pilot crew, plus two relief pilots, so there was opportunity for plenty of rest.
Oooops - my mistake - I didn't realize your point was to argue minutia.
Nobody is "rushing to judgement". This was clearly and undeniably pilot error - individually or collectively - either way, it is still pilot error. There was nothing wrong with that airplane that some thrust applied to idling engines wouldn't have fixed.
Bureaucratic nonsense. It is most certainly not too early to say that all indicators point to pilot(s) that turned off the autopilot sooner than need be and then left the throttles unattended. There's a thread over at P&OC with a post that brings it all into focus with few words. //www.city-data.com/forum/30371529-post8.html
There's not a shred of evidence that there was anything wrong with that airplane.
You have not seen the evidence, so you don't know, and neither does anyone else. You have only heard the same information that I've heard about this accident, that is partial information from the press and the NTSB.
TV viewers are not experts in determining the causes of accidents. Neither am I, and I have much more experience in large aircraft that any of these viewers. While it initially appears that pilot error "could" be the cause, it will be the "expert accident investigators" who will make that determination.
Years ago, the FAA would make hasty rushes to judgement like this and many pilots were wrongly held responsible for accidents because it was so easy to say "pilot error". Later, after more thorough investigation, it was determined that the FAA was wrong in their hasty judgements. Today, they must go through a thorough investigation, because there could be mitigating circumstances, compound failures, or a dozen other things that could have contributed to this accident, that arm chair TV viewing experts have no concept of.
By doing a thorough investigation on all accidents, a lot is learned to improve safety for the flying public, so all that money spent in determining the exact cause can save a lot of lives in the future.
On a visual approach like this, with no ILS, the pilot most likely would not have been using the autopilot, and even if the autopilot was on, the pilot flying must have his hands on the throttles at all times.
However, in most cases, at least the way I did it when I was flying, if the weather was VFR, then I would be hand flying the airplane from 10,000 ft down to the landing. If it was IFR, then it would be on the autopilot until I elected to turn the autopilot off after having visual contact with the runway.
By hand flying on take off up to 10,000 feet, and on approach from 10,000 feet down to landing, we were able to keep up our flying proficiency. Above 10,000 we used the autopilot because of the fuel efficiency, and the autopilot flies the plane smoother at altitude than the pilot can.
In the Asiana situation, the pilot flying was new on this airplane, so he typically would have been hand flying it down from 10,000 feet to get more hand flying time. At any rate, since there was no ILS, he probably would not have had it on auto pilot after passing the outer marker because he would have had to control the autopilot descent manually, which adds to the work load. Hand flying the airplane is the fun part of the job. Controlling an autopilot descent manually is not.
Let the accident investigators determine the cause of the accident. That is their job, and they're good at what they do.
Autopilot or not, there's no reason to sit and watch while the airspeed erodes to 30kts below Vref.
This is similar to the Colgan accident. The difference being one occurred over the OM on an ILS,and the other on a visual, just shy of the approach end of the runway.
At least with Colgan, early on in the investigation, there were some questions pertaining to possible icing. There are very few questions to ask about the SFO accident. The only possible alternative to pilot error, is if the engines failed to respond to an increase in power. Most evidence so far shows that not to be the case.
Location: By the sea, by the sea, by the beautiful sea
68,327 posts, read 54,350,985 times
Reputation: 40731
Quote:
Originally Posted by Captain Bill
This flight originated in Shanghai, flew to Seoul, then to San Francisco. It hasn't been stated if there was a crew change in Seoul, or if the same pilots flew the entire route. However, on that flight, there was a two pilot crew, plus two relief pilots, so there was opportunity for plenty of rest.
Thanks! I was curious if crew fatigue may have been a contributing factor, doesn't seem as if that's the case here.
You have not seen the evidence, so you don't know, and neither does anyone else. You have only heard the same information that I've heard about this accident, that is partial information from the press and the NTSB.
TV viewers are not experts in determining the causes of accidents. Neither am I, and I have much more experience in large aircraft that any of these viewers. While it initially appears that pilot error "could" be the cause, it will be the "expert accident investigators" who will make that determination.
Years ago, the FAA would make hasty rushes to judgement like this and many pilots were wrongly held responsible for accidents because it was so easy to say "pilot error". Later, after more thorough investigation, it was determined that the FAA was wrong in their hasty judgements. Today, they must go through a thorough investigation, because there could be mitigating circumstances, compound failures, or a dozen other things that could have contributed to this accident, that arm chair TV viewing experts have no concept of.
By doing a thorough investigation on all accidents, a lot is learned to improve safety for the flying public, so all that money spent in determining the exact cause can save a lot of lives in the future.
On a visual approach like this, with no ILS, the pilot most likely would not have been using the autopilot, and even if the autopilot was on, the pilot flying must have his hands on the throttles at all times.
However, in most cases, at least the way I did it when I was flying, if the weather was VFR, then I would be hand flying the airplane from 10,000 ft down to the landing. If it was IFR, then it would be on the autopilot until I elected to turn the autopilot off after having visual contact with the runway.
By hand flying on take off up to 10,000 feet, and on approach from 10,000 feet down to landing, we were able to keep up our flying proficiency. Above 10,000 we used the autopilot because of the fuel efficiency, and the autopilot flies the plane smoother at altitude than the pilot can.
In the Asiana situation, the pilot flying was new on this airplane, so he typically would have been hand flying it down from 10,000 feet to get more hand flying time. At any rate, since there was no ILS, he probably would not have had it on auto pilot after passing the outer marker because he would have had to control the autopilot descent manually, which adds to the work load. Hand flying the airplane is the fun part of the job. Controlling an autopilot descent manually is not.
Let the accident investigators determine the cause of the accident. That is their job, and they're good at what they do.
This tap dance smacks of the "blue code of silence" in the world of law enforcement and I can only assume that as your motivation. It may work well on your grandchildren, but it's not going to sell here tonight.
These guys blew it - big time - just like amateur hobbyists do every day flying Microsoft Flight Simulator. Except that it's ok for hobbyists flying a simulator to attempt the landing anyway despite their full knowledge that they botched another one. I did it dozens of times when I was learning the basics of flight. Sometimes I pulled it off....and sometimes I did exactly what the Asiana pilots did on Saturday - on my computer. And you know as well as I do that when you botch an approach, you know it long before you reach the runway threshold. And you go around.
You clearly have an axe to grind here and it is not helpful to the quest for truth or to the continued improvement of commercial airline safety.
Autopilot or not, there's no reason to sit and watch while the airspeed erodes to 30kts below Vref.
This is similar to the Colgan accident. The difference being one occurred over the OM on an ILS,and the other on a visual, just shy of the approach end of the runway.
At least with Colgan, early on in the investigation, there were some questions pertaining to possible icing. There are very few questions to ask about the SFO accident. The only possible alternative to pilot error, is if the engines failed to respond to an increase in power. Most evidence so far shows that not to be the case.
Have a look at flyingprofessors.net for a good, professional discussion of what happened, based on actual data available to the public. It's pretty interesting. Their conclusion is that it was due to an unstable approach: the pilot came in a bit above the glide path (as most do) and then, about three miles out, over corrected by initiating a too-rapid rate of descent at too slow a speed, that he was not able to correct in time. Before i saw the data i thought maybe it could have been because the aircraft weight punched into the flight computer was too low. But now, i'm not so sure after reading the analysis.
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Bureaucratic nonsense. It is most certainly not too early to say that all indicators point to pilot(s) that turned off the autopilot sooner than need be and then left the throttles unattended. There's a thread over at P&OC with a post that brings it all into focus with few words. 
