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The failure to keep all their scouting aircraft in proper working order wasn't bad luck for the Japanese, it was neglect. And I wonder why it didn't seem to occur to Nagumo, who commanded a fleet featuring hundreds of aircraft, that he just might have been able to spare a carrier launched plane to fill in for the faulty Tone scout. They had plenty of Val divebombers aboard, each with an 800 mile range.
Not pure luck.
Hmmm... a very solid point. The moment that plane failed to launch, he should have sent something else off to fill in for it.
To me, I think one of the most interesting discussions of the battle was actually what happened afterwards. Spruance was roundly criticized in some quarters for not pursuing the remnants of the Japanese fleet, when it was actually the smartest move he could have made. The American fleet was still numerically weak in strength compared to the overall Japanese navy, and to pursue the Japanese would have likely meant sailing into a trap. The Japanese had anticipated an American pursuit and were prepared to engage surface ships at night and submarines.
So Spruance retired from battle having achieved his strategic objectives and picking off a few stragglers. Anything more would have been greedy and would have risked the ships we had.
To me, I think one of the most interesting discussions of the battle was actually what happened afterwards. Spruance was roundly criticized in some quarters for not pursuing the remnants of the Japanese fleet, when it was actually the smartest move he could have made. The American fleet was still numerically weak in strength compared to the overall Japanese navy, and to pursue the Japanese would have likely meant sailing into a trap. The Japanese had anticipated an American pursuit and were prepared to engage surface ships at night and submarines.
So Spruance retired from battle having achieved his strategic objectives and picking off a few stragglers. Anything more would have been greedy and would have risked the ships we had.
Excellent point. And at the moment Spruance broke off the battle, we should remember that he was minus one carrier and a number of pilots who had been killed. His main advantage had been surprise and a fore-knowledge of the basic Japanese movements. Now that advantage had been nullified. Monday-morning quarterbacking is an enterprise fraught with dangers.
My asumption of any luck was that the US caught the Japenese carriers with bombs and fuel on the flight decks which made them become a flaming inferno much easier. I do not want to take away any of the skill of the courages US pilots. Ron
There are three book-length treatments of the Battle of Midway that I am aware of, two which have been around for a while and one newer one. The old standbys are "Incredible Victory" by Walter Lord and "Miracle at Midway" by Gordon Prange. The newer work is "Shattered Sword" by Jonathan A. Parshall and Anthony P. Tally (2005).
Prange died before finishing "Miracle at Midway" and it was completed by his assistants.
What is odd about the book is that it provides excruciating detail on every aspect, right up to the moment of decision...the American dive bomber attacks, and then just a few confusing paragraphs on those attacks which destroyed three Japanese carriers. I kept flipping forward through pages, thinking that the book might get back to those critical moments and fill in the detail, but it never did. I don't think I have ever been more deeply disappointed by a historical work. It was as though someone had made a three hour movie about the Battle of Bunker Hill, but the attack itself was depicted in a 30 second scene.
It seemed like Prange must have died just before he would have written that section.
I wrote my college thesis on the Battle of Midway 2 years ago - the inability to adapt is what kept the Japanese from winning. Yamamoto, for all his brilliance, was dead wrong.
I wrote my college thesis on the Battle of Midway 2 years ago - the inability to adapt is what kept the Japanese from winning. Yamamoto, for all his brilliance, was dead wrong.
Yup. The Japanese command was all top down. Inferior officers always waited for commanders before acting. I also think that the Japanese fleet command had a certain amount of hubris at play- until Midway, their navy had never been defeated, and none of their previous sea battles had been overly costly to them.
The American commanders were allowed much more freedom and leeway in tactical decisions, and Spruance had very well developed strategic plans. All of the Americans, from command all the way down, were ready and spoiling for a victory.
While luck entered into it, I am very sure that the US would have won the battle. The only element of luck was that our fleet was able to cripple or sink more main warships than Spruance expected. Sinking 3 would have been a major victory; sinking 1 or 2 would have been satisfactory.
He was prepared for the worst, and the fight was vitally important to us.
I don't think 'many' consider Midway to be the turning point in the Pacific. I believe historians universally agree that it was.
Yup. The Japanese command was all top down. Inferior officers always waited for commanders before acting. I also think that the Japanese fleet command had a certain amount of hubris at play- until Midway, their navy had never been defeated, and none of their previous sea battles had been overly costly to them.
The American commanders were allowed much more freedom and leeway in tactical decisions, and Spruance had very well developed strategic plans. All of the Americans, from command all the way down, were ready and spoiling for a victory.
While luck entered into it, I am very sure that the US would have won the battle. The only element of luck was that our fleet was able to cripple or sink more main warships than Spruance expected. Sinking 3 would have been a major victory; sinking 1 or 2 would have been satisfactory.
He was prepared for the worst, and the fight was vitally important to us.
I don't think 'many' consider Midway to be the turning point in the Pacific. I believe historians universally agree that it was.
I don't know if there was a single turning point, as much as we like those nice, neat demarcation points. What about the Battle of the Coral Sea? It was the first time we were able to blunt a Japanese thrust. Then there was the Guadalcanal. In those three battles, the war in the Pacific was in doubt. After all three were fought, it was never really in doubt again.
I don't know if there was a single turning point, as much as we like those nice, neat demarcation points. What about the Battle of the Coral Sea? It was the first time we were able to blunt a Japanese thrust. Then there was the Guadalcanal. In those three battles, the war in the Pacific was in doubt. After all three were fought, it was never really in doubt again.
You have a point about identified turning points often not really being turning points, but in the case of Midway, it seems legit. Before Midway the Japanese were strictly on the offensive, the Americans strictly defending. After Midway, it was the reverse, the Japanese launched no more offensives, the Americans launched nothing but offensives.
Before Midway the Americans were losing, after it they were winning.
Coral Sea did blunt the japanese advance BUT it was basically a tie we lost 1 heavy carrier a destroyer and tanker. The Japs lost a light carrier
Midway WAS a turning point as they lost 4 top line carriers and hundreds of highly trained pilots and crews. We lost one carrier BUT was able to rescue many of our pilots
Japanes only trained so many [considered the cream of the crop] While our pilots were trained BEFORE they went into combat and many returned to train new pilots.
ALSO at Midway the IJN had been for 6 months incuring victory after victory and had a sense of invunerablity and dismissed suggestions from others to bring the fleets in for rest and refit. The high command scoffed at that idea and Midway was the result
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