Texas Judge has struck down Affordable Care Act, declared unconstituional

[Ringo1]

Originally Posted by EastwardBound

The left thought Kavanaugh would be a thorn in their sides about abortion, but I believe he will in fact be the deciding vote to overturn Obamacare - something which they never dreamed.

Either way, Democrats win. Tons of red hats in the mid-west will lose the only insurance they ever had AND the country is once again reminded that Republicans didn't do SQUAT about healthcare when they had the opportunity

[greywar]

Originally Posted by oceangaia

Jurisdiction. Authority. Powers not delegated to congress belong to states. Who cares what Congress intended if they had no authority either way. Didn't Roberts say in 2012 that the only thing making ACA constitutional was the mandate establishing it under powers to tax?

I think the only reason the mandate was constitutional was that it was a tax. That doesn't mean the only reason the aca was constitutional was that the mandate was.


those thinking that this judges ruling is anything but fantasy nonsense are victims of wishful thinking.

[prospectheightsresident]

Originally Posted by EveryLady

Could not this rationale (the bold) be a reason to overturn O'Connor? No argument that the ACA might well "collapse under its own weight" from insurance company non-participation in the marketplace without the mandate. But is lack of revenue not an issue for Congress to address instead of the judiciary? For example, Congress has provided for risk corridor payments to insurance companies to offset lack of enrollment. Plus, no doubt there are multiple sections of the ACA that are independent of revenue.

And then there is legislative intent, which appears relevant for whether or not severability is applied. Congress may well have wanted to gut the ACA last year and not merely defund the mandate. Here you write that:

"After all, the Supreme Court stated in the first Obamacare case that it was only upholding the law because of the tax provision, something that Congress knew when it took the tax out. Again, that Congress lacked the political will to outright eliminate the entire act via legislation doesn't change this point." But none of that changes the point that they did not do it. That Congress couldn't find the votes should not be addressed (or fixed or altered) by the judiciary - even for determining "intent." Not at all familiar with current case law, but are not assessments of "intent" based on analyses of "plain meaning" - not a hypothetical of what Congress would like to do if it had a few more votes.

Talking about judicial activism and separation of powers ...

I see your point, but I don't think it is a reason to overturn the judge. Indeed, Congress--fully aware that the tax formed the basis for the Court's decision to uphold the law initially--chose to gut the tax from the bill. Congress addressed the revenue issue when it gutted the tax, again knowing full well they were taking away the constitutional basis for the law per the Supreme Court's earlier decision.

As for legislative intent: I say that last year's Congress deciding to remove the tax--but no other part of the law--has zero bearing on the intent of the Congress that passed the initial law. But, yes, judges generally favor the plain meaning/text of the law over trying to dig into what a legislature might have meant/intended. In this case, though, the legislature acted with a full understanding of the scope of the constitutionality of the legislation from the NFIB v. Sebelius case initially upholding Obamacare. At least that's my argument.

Also, I'm not familiar with whether there are parts of the law that could stand without funding from the individual mandate; perhaps there are. Judge O'Connor (per Judge Napolitano) seemed to think not.

Lastly, I bring up the point about Congress not being able to muster the votes only to state the obvious to counter critics (not to bring up a judicial point) who say that Congress would have repealed everything if they intended to kill the bill vs. just removing the individual mandate. But this point is not needed to support my primary argument, namely that Congress knew what the consequences of their killing the tax as there is very recent (and public) case law on the matter.

[EveryLady]

Originally Posted by prospectheightsresident

I see your point, but I don't think it is a reason to overturn the judge. Indeed, Congress--fully aware that the tax formed the basis for the Court's decision to uphold the law initially--chose to gut the tax from the bill. Congress addressed the revenue issue when it gutted the tax, again knowing full well they were taking away the constitutional basis for the law per the Supreme Court's earlier decision.

Per the poster above, Congress removed the constitutional basis for the mandate by zeroing out the tax basis. That does not necessarily say anything about the constitutionality of other provisions. No argument that the mandate formed an key component of the law's financial functionality. But the decision did not render the law "income less" rather it was likely that absent the mandate there would be fewer sign-ups with reduced overall income to insurance companies. That's a matter of degree, not an absolute. The law is not "about" a mandate but addresses healthcare.

Originally Posted by prospectheightsresident

As for legislative intent: I say that last year's Congress deciding to remove the tax--but no other part of the law--has zero bearing on the intent of the Congress that passed the initial law. But, yes, judges generally favor the plain meaning/text of the law over trying to dig into what a legislature might have meant/intended. In this case, though, the legislature acted with a full understanding of the scope of the constitutionality of the legislation from the NFIB v. Sebelius case initially upholding Obamacare. At least that's my argument.

Here ... I would need to again find and reread the intent argument to find the relevant question ... but I thought the intent argument for non-severability was that Congress intended to gut the entire bill. That Congress had "full understanding" that last year's tax decision would render the mandate unconstitutional is easily demonstrated given the NFIB v. Sebelius finding. Congress' projection (or understanding) of the remaining ACA viability once the mandate was gone might be harder to demonstrate.

In other words, can the courts demonstrate that Congress wanted to bring down the entire ACA last year or intended to merely remove the mandate leaving the ACA to struggle on (or perhaps not, over time). This becomes tricky - for that "intent" can arguably differ among individual Congressional votes. Congressman A may have had different "intent" in his/her vote than Congressman B - hence you can only look what Congress as a whole did - which was to leave the remainder of the ACA intact.

No idea what O'Connor said (or will say) here.

Originally Posted by prospectheightsresident

Also, I'm not familiar with whether there are parts of the law that could stand without funding from the individual mandate; perhaps there are. Judge O'Connor (per Judge Napolitano) seemed to think not.

Lastly, I bring up the point about Congress not being able to muster the votes only to state the obvious to counter critics (not to bring up a judicial point) who say that Congress would have repealed everything if they intended to kill the bill vs. just removing the individual mandate. But this point is not needed to support my primary argument, namely that Congress knew what the consequences of their killing the tax as there is very recent (and public) case law on the matter.

As mentioned above, the mandate does not provide full funding. Agree that financial costs of many bill provisions are connected to numbers of enrollees with, again, that impacted by the mandate. The Medical Records provisions might not demonstrate that direct connection to the mandate. Sure there are certain costs imposed on providers and (probably) the insurance companies to develop the systems. But a substantial portion of those costs would be fixed.

Curious, I spent a few minutes flipping thru an analysis that was written a few years ago of what might be relevant to a SCOTUS severability decision. There were a number of possible considerations that went well beyond those that have been mentioned in the couple of news articles that I've seen. Not sure if O'Connor has or will address them - of if he's required to. The severability decision is not an absolute, of course, but a weighing of what the Supreme Court has found relevant in past cases.

[BentBow]

Originally Posted by ARaider08

....So... Republican judge claims ObamaCare is unconstitutional because of the tax mandate.

Tax mandate is gone so the rest of the bill is too?

...Something doesn't sound right about that...

Only because you never learned yourself, what made it Constitutional in the first place.
Without the tax mandate, it is a 10th Amendment issue. Nothing in the Constitution authorizes the federal government to be involved in the peoples healthcare. The 16th Amendment allows them to tax us directly.
It was not healthcare law. It was a tax law. Had nothing to do with Healthcare.

[InformedConsent]

Originally Posted by BentBow

Only because you never learned yourself, what made it Constitutional in the first place.
Without the tax mandate, it is a 10th Amendment issue. Nothing in the Constitution authorizes the federal government to be involved in the peoples healthcare. The 16th Amendment allows them to tax us directly.
It was not healthcare law. It was a tax law. Had nothing to do with Healthcare.

Bingo.

[Mircea]

Originally Posted by oceangaia

Legislative intent becomes irrelevant if the court determines the act is outside congressional jurisdiction.

Originally Posted by EveryLady

I don't understand. Isn't it Congressional intent that the Court is to evaluate when determining whether or not to apply the severability doctrine? Not sure where "jurisdiction" comes into play?

Legislative intent is not inherently relevant, and courts only examine legislative intent --meaning the history and evolution of the legislation -- when the statute is vague or ambiguous.

Regardless of intent, if the language of the statute or the resultant application of the statute is unconstitutional, then intent is irrelevant.

Courts have not and will not rewrite unconstitutional statutes to make them constitutional. That is far beyond the purview of any court. An unconstitutional statute must be rewritten by Congress or by the State legislature.


In interpreting a statute, "we begin, as we must, with the express language of the statute . . . . Where, as here, the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, resort to legislative history is unnecessary." Rucker v. Davis, 203 F.3d 627, 636 (9th Circuit 2000)

"In a statutory construction case, the beginning point must be the language of the statute, and when a statute speaks with clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into the statute's meaning in all but the most extraordinary circumstance is finished." Riva v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 61 F.3d 1003, 1007 (1st Circuit 1995) (quoting Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475, 120 L. Ed. 2d 379, 112 Supreme Court 2589 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, the court need not consult legislative history and other aids to statutory construction when the words of the statute neither create an ambiguity nor lead to an unreasonable interpretation. Riva, 61 F.3d at 1007 (quotations omitted). In searching a statute's text to determine congressional intent, we attribute to words that are not defined in the statute itself their ordinary usage, while keeping in mind that meaning can only be ascribed to statutory language if that language is taken in context. Id. (quotations omitted).


And...

In recognizing the principle that a statute's language and purpose may at time differ, the Court has stated guidelines for reconciling the two:

There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes. Often these words are sufficient in and of themselves to determine the purpose of the legislation. In such cases we have followed their plain meaning. When that meaning has led to absurd or futile results, however, this Court has looked beyond the words to the purpose of the act. Frequently, however, even when the plain meaning did not produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable one "plainly at variance with the policy of legislation as a whole" this Court has followed that purpose, rather than the literal words. When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no "rule of law" which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on "superficial examination."

United States v. American Trucking Associations, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44, 84 L. Ed. 1345, 60 Supreme Court 1059 (1940) (footnotes omitted), quoted in Church of Scientology v. United States Department of Justice, 612 F.2d 417, 422 (9th Circuit 1979); accord Burroughs v. Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3, 686 F.2d 723, 727 (9th Circuit 1982).