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...and that is a statement I have attempted to refute and prove the folly of. "Winning" for Hitler meant achieving resource security for Germany. That could only be done in the east. The German economy also was overheated and the country was about to face a mountain of hidden debt becoming real. Hitler needed the war to offset the looming economic collapse. Had Hitler stopped in 1940, he would have won nothing.
I don't think the Germans under-estimated the SIZE of the Soviet military at all. I do think they undersestimated the resolve of the Soviets to continue to fight in the face of overwhelming defeat. The Germans never thought they would have an easy campaign. What they did think was that once they had liquidated a few Soviet field armies, the Soviets would sue for peace. The Germans threw EVERYTHING they had into Barbarossa and that does not lead one to the conclusion that they thought they were in for an easy campaign.
"The Russian Armed Forces are like a headless colossus with feet of clay but we cannot with certainty foresee what they might become in the future. The Russians must not be underestimated. All available resources must therefore be used in the German attack." ~ Adolf Hitler
That comment is a pretty succinct and accurate view by Hitler on the status of Soviet arms in 1941. No one was underestimating the Soviets, in fact they rather feared what would happen if they didn't strike. Germany was at the peak of its power, the Soviets were only getting stronger. No one expected an easy campaign, but they also never expected that having entire armies wiped off the map would not compel the Soviets to surrender.
A good, short article on the pre-invasion preparations and estimates made by the Germans:
I have not read his book, but Panzer East I think supports the discredited thesis that Stalin was ready to attack Germany in 1941. Many studies of the state of the Red army in the Spring of 1941 show its sorry state.
The Germans did underestimate the size of Soviet divisions. After Minsk, Guderian and Hoth argued for a full advance on Moscow. Hitler overruled them and said capture Smolensk first for logistical reasons. The Germans encounter 500000 red army troops that according to their intelligence were not supposed to be there. Oops.
Hitler spent a great deal of time in preparation for Barbarrossa making sure he did not repeat Napoleons fate. Yes, he believed the Soviets will fall like a house of cards, but he wanted to engage and defeat the Soviet army, something the Czar did not want to do against Napoleons army. However, he totally underestimated the strategic reserve of the Soviets. German intelligence never knew the full size of the army. They believed once they defeated the armies positioned before the Dnieper, the Soviets would not have a sufficient reserve to combat further German advances.
The diaries of the German commanders in the course of the Summer and Fall of 1941 make very clear that their previous and continuing estimates of the Soviet reserve were nowhere close. They were constantly frustrated fresh divisions were replacing old ones. They ignorantly believed Stalin would place his strategic reserve in defense of Moscow, and pleaded with Hitler to choose Moscow over Ukraine. Their argument was frivolous since the Soviets had more than enough manpower overcome the loss of their capital.
This will lead to a seperate discussion, but the Germans also got wrong the quality of Soviet equipment, much which was better than their own, and the effectiveness of Blitzkrieg over a large space. Both were strong indicators early on that the Soviets were not being defeated overwhemingly.
Last edited by jobseeker2013; 11-11-2013 at 09:01 PM..
I have not read his book, but Panzer East I think supports the discredited thesis that Stalin was ready to attack Germany in 1941. Many studies of the state of the Red army in the Spring of 1941 show its sorry state.
I agree that it is ludicrous that the Soviets were preparing to attack Germany, they weren't. Stalin did plan for such a contingency and was rebuilding the Red Army to handle it, but he was looking at a ~1943 start to the war. The Red Army was large, that the Germans rather accurately predicted, but it was also poorly organized, rigid and had poor leadership.
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The Germans did underestimate the size of Soviet divisions. After Minsk, Guderian and Hoth argued for a full advance on Moscow. Hitler overruled them and said capture Smolensk first for logistical reasons. The Germans encounter 500000 red army troops that according to their intelligence were not supposed to be there. Oops.
First, the argument for the attack on Moscow happened after Smolensk. You can't advance on Moscow without taking Smolensk and Smolensk was the original goal of AG Center. Hitler diverted Hoth and Guderian to assist AG North and AG South in completing their operations before an attack on Moscow could begin. It has been debated on here a few times, but I am of the opinion that this was not a "mistake" by Hitler as the Germans had insufficient logisitcial capacity to support an assault on Moscow at that time.
Second, again they didn't underestimate the size of the Soviet army at the time, they underestimated the ability of the Soviets to call up and equip manpower reserves. The Germans counted the regular troops, the known reserves, etc. What they didn't count was the legion of villagers with pitchforks the Soviets could call up.
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Hitler spent a great deal of time in preparation for Barbarrossa making sure he did not repeat Napoleons fate. Yes, he believed the Soviets will fall like a house of cards, but he wanted to engage and defeat the Soviet army, something the Czar did not want to do against Napoleons army. However, he totally underestimated the strategic reserve of the Soviets. German intelligence never knew the full size of the army. They believed once they defeated the armies positioned before the Dnieper, the Soviets would not have a sufficient reserve to combat further German advances.
There are "reserves" and then there are "reserves". The Germans counted up the actual reserve numbers, but they didn't count the ability of the Soviets to "create" divisions seemingly out of thin air.
What is interesting is the conflict between "annihilation" and "strategic point" theory. Hitler tried to pattern Barbarossa off of what happened in France. There, the German army defeated the French army and the French surrendered. In Russia, Hitler defeated the Russian Army, but the Russians just kept making new armies. He would have arguably had more success planning a "strategic points" war where the Germans focused on taking critical areas and holding them.
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The diaries of the German commanders in the course of the Summer and Fall of 1941 make very clear that their previous and continuing estimates of the Soviet reserve were nowhere close. They were constantly frustrated fresh divisions were replacing old ones. They ignorantly believed Stalin would place his strategic reserve in defense of Moscow, and pleaded with Hitler to choose Moscow over Ukraine. Their argument was frivolous since the Soviets had more than enough manpower overcome the loss of their capital.
It was all for nought by that point. When the Soviets weren't really reeling after Smolensk and then didn't surrender after Kiev, there was little chance for Germany to be succesful. The army that spearheaded Barbarossa was worn out and would never be replaced.
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This will lead to a seperate discussion, but the Germans also got wrong the quality of Soviet equipment, much which was better than their own,
This arguably shocked them more than anything. The T-34 and KV-1 were nearly invincible in 1941. The Germans had nothing that could match them and would spend the rest of the war trying.
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and the effectiveness of Blitzkrieg over a large space. Both were strong indicators early on that the Soviets were not being defeated overwhemingly.
The "blitzkrieg" was effective in that it accomplished its stated goal. The Germans planned a series of "cauldron battles" and executed them all brilliantly. What they missed was that the Soviets weren't going to be beaten by losing a few armies.
The German plan in Barbarrossa was carried out nearly flawlessley. The blitzkrieg worked brilliantly. The problems for the Germans were that once the initial operation drew down, their armies were heavily depleted and became less effective from then onward. Hitler also could not account for the will of the Soviet people to keep fighting. Had the average Soviet behaved like the average French, the war would have been won by December 1941. The Soviets simply refused to be conquered and fought to the death of every last man. It stands to reason that the Soviets fought much harder than the French, because they knew that dieing in battle was a better outcome than the alternative, being exterminated.
Had the French been under the belief that refusing to fight would result in extermination of every last French citizen, I'm sure they would have fought harder too. The French seemed to be under the belief that surrendering was a better alternative than being wiped out by warfare. In hindsight, they were probably right as bad as things got for them. It was nothing compared to the Eastern front.
The German plan in Barbarrossa was carried out nearly flawlessley. The blitzkrieg worked brilliantly. The problems for the Germans were that once the initial operation drew down, their armies were heavily depleted and became less effective from then onward. Hitler also could not account for the will of the Soviet people to keep fighting. Had the average Soviet behaved like the average French, the war would have been won by December 1941. The Soviets simply refused to be conquered and fought to the death of every last man. It stands to reason that the Soviets fought much harder than the French, because they knew that dieing in battle was a better outcome than the alternative, being exterminated.
Had the French been under the belief that refusing to fight would result in extermination of every last French citizen, I'm sure they would have fought harder too. The French seemed to be under the belief that surrendering was a better alternative than being wiped out by warfare. In hindsight, they were probably right as bad as things got for them. It was nothing compared to the Eastern front.
The German plan in Barbarrossa was carried out nearly flawlessley. The blitzkrieg worked brilliantly. The problems for the Germans were that once the initial operation drew down, their armies were heavily depleted and became less effective from then onward. Hitler also could not account for the will of the Soviet people to keep fighting. Had the average Soviet behaved like the average French, the war would have been won by December 1941. The Soviets simply refused to be conquered and fought to the death of every last man. It stands to reason that the Soviets fought much harder than the French, because they knew that dieing in battle was a better outcome than the alternative, being exterminated.
Had the French been under the belief that refusing to fight would result in extermination of every last French citizen, I'm sure they would have fought harder too. The French seemed to be under the belief that surrendering was a better alternative than being wiped out by warfare. In hindsight, they were probably right as bad as things got for them. It was nothing compared to the Eastern front.
I would like to mention that blitzkrieg did not work nearly flawlessly. Primarily, too many Soviet troops escaped the encirclements. This caused great alarm to Hitler since his main goal to cut Soviet retreat eastward.
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