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Germany could amass sufficient power to occupy France regardless of the resistance, which would just generate a lot more barbarity and bloodshed and lingering acrimony.
A generation or so of an occupying force did not dilute the Hungarianness or the Czechness of those countries in the postwar decades, and the German occupation of France did not change France into something else. When all was said and done, there was still a France, still a Hungary, and resistance would have gained nothing in the end, but with great loss in the interim.
Spain occupied the Netherlands for 133 years, and afterward, they were still Dutch. Maybe France had a sound enough historical perspective that they didn't take such things so seriously. "Vive la France" was a given, in the face of all else.
Occupations come and go. There is absolutely nothing French about Indochina today. You'd be hard pressed to find a single Vietnamese who speaks French. The French came and went in Indochina, and left not a trace. So, for that matter, did the Americans. And the Chinese.
Why did the French military not undertake any serious operations in the early months of World War Two that could have kept the Germans from invading and defeating them later on?
The French did the lion's share of the fighting against Germany in WW1 on the Western Front and suffered the most casualties. They weren't eager to repeat that, so they built the Maginot Line in a vain attempt to hold back any future German invasion.
Why did the French military not undertake any serious operations in the early months of World War Two that could have kept the Germans from invading and defeating them later on?
The French strategy was a defensive strategy. They had no plans for a major offensive invasion of Germany. This strategy was based on their experience in WW1. The French took heavier casualties per capita than any other power involved in WW1, and much of their land was destroyed by the German occupation. The French did not want a repeat of WW1 casualties, so they determined that a defensive strategy would minimize casualties while inflicting more casualties on the enemy, as opposed to an offensive all-out invasion of Germany. The French thought they would be fighting a WW1-style static war on a front, and that they could starve the Germans into capitulation through attrition and naval blockades by the British.
During the Phony War stage, the French were essentially sitting back and waiting for the Germans to invade as opposed to taking preemptive action. The French did invade Germany once the Germans invaded Poland, but it was a half-hearted offensive with limited objectives and was called back quickly. The French were trying to coax the Germans to invade first, so that the French could fall back on their defensive plan.
Another dimension that rarely gets mentioned is the lack of a strong French air force. The French did not invest heavily in their air force during the interwar years like the Germans did or even the British. The Luftwaffe was much larger than the French air force and had much better planes. The French probably knew they were no match in a sky war, thus another reason they were reluctant to invade Germany. Even with Germany distracted in Poland, they still had at least 1 million troops free to go against the French. 1 million was enough to stall the French in a bloody fight with the aide of the Luftwaffe decimating French troop columns.
When Germany did invade France in May, 1940, the French were confident they could stop the Germans, or at least fight them to a stalemate. Nobody, not even the Germans, foresaw such a rapid victory. So its not like the French were just sitting back waiting to get their butts kicked. They had a large army, more tanks, and believed they had a good plan. It just failed miserably.
And what exactly was the world supposed to have done?
For starters Stalin could have torn up the von Ribbentrop -Molotov Pact and launched a pre-emptive attack on East Prussia and Poland (German Occupied part) , one could also throw in German allies like Hungary, and Romania and present the Germans with their nightmare (1914 all over again) . The USSR of 1940 was much stronger than the Russia of Czar Nicholas II in 1914 and would have had the advantage of striking first rather than responding in shock to a surprise attack like it did a year later.
For starters Stalin could have torn up the von Ribbentrop -Molotov Pact and launched a pre-emptive attack on East Prussia and Poland (German Occupied part) , one could also throw in German allies like Hungary, and Romania and present the Germans with their nightmare (1914 all over again) . The USSR of 1940 was much stronger than the Russia of Czar Nicholas II in 1914 and would have had the advantage of striking first rather than responding in shock to a surprise attack like it did a year later.
He might have.
On the other hand, Stalin might also reasonably have figured that Germany's turn west would give him at least two-three years to complete his rearmament and the massive reorganization of the Red Army that would be so inconveniently (for the Soviets) in the process of being implemented in June of 1941 when Barbarossa was launched. He might also have figured it would leave the Wehrmacht significantly diminished. Rearming and rebuilding while Germany was bogged down on the other front was a reasonable plan - when the bogging-down failed to happen, it was too late for Stalin to go on the offensive - and as a practical matter, it would have taken the USSR months to shift from a defensive posture to one ready to pour units across the Eastern Front, and such maneuvering might well have caused Hitler not to move west had he seen the impending threat from the east.
Stalin certainly made some very unwise decisions. But not attacking in 1940 wasn't one of them. He played his cards well for the situation - Hitler simply drew a much better hand.
1. For starters Stalin could have torn up the von Ribbentrop -Molotov Pact and launched a pre-emptive attack on East Prussia and Poland (German Occupied part),
2. one could also throw in German allies like Hungary, and Romania and present the Germans with their nightmare (1914 all over again).
3. The USSR of 1940 was much stronger than the Russia of Czar Nicholas II in 1914 and would have had the advantage of striking first rather than responding in shock to a surprise attack like it did a year later.
1. But even if the Soviet-Finnish War did not begin yet, would it really be that good of an idea for Stalin to do this so soon after he purged the Red Army?
Also, Stalin worried about his own interests, not those of France and Britain.
2. How much military strength did Hungary and Romania have back then, though?
3. You are probably right in regards to this, but the thing here is that Stalin would need to believe that it is in his interests to attack Nazi Germany at that moment.
On the other hand, Stalin might also reasonably have figured that Germany's turn west would give him at least two-three years to complete his rearmament and the massive reorganization of the Red Army that would be so inconveniently (for the Soviets) in the process of being implemented in June of 1941 when Barbarossa was launched. He might also have figured it would leave the Wehrmacht significantly diminished. Rearming and rebuilding while Germany was bogged down on the other front was a reasonable plan - when the bogging-down failed to happen, it was too late for Stalin to go on the offensive - and as a practical matter, it would have taken the USSR months to shift from a defensive posture to one ready to pour units across the Eastern Front, and such maneuvering might well have caused Hitler not to move west had he seen the impending threat from the east.
Stalin certainly made some very unwise decisions. But not attacking in 1940 wasn't one of them. He played his cards well for the situation - Hitler simply drew a much better hand.
^
I agree with this.
I am not sure that Stalin expected Germany to defeat France that quickly. Thus, having Germany, France, and Britain bleed each other dry while the Soviet Union watched and waited does not appear to have been that bad of a strategy for Stalin without hindsight.
People do not really appreciate the devastating outcome of WW1 on all its participants, winners included. France, Britain were in shambles. From US perspective, it was different, because US involvement was late, partial and on a far away continent. But the British and French sacrificed an entire generation of young men, their future. In the 30s, France was politically unstable. There was no government in Paris when Hitler became dictator in 1934 or later, when he annexed Austria in 1938. With the economic depression, nobody really cared.
Let me try again. Sometimes, being occupied is not as bad as a war. OK? If you disagree, that is your opinion. But the basic principle is not all that hard to comprehend.
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