Quote:
Originally Posted by samyn on the green
This should be an easy one for the. NTSB to unpack. If they are on-point this is what the report should look like.
Capt was transitioning from the A320 to the B777. The design philosphy difference between airbus and boeing was a the root cause that set the stage for the entire debacle. Boeing designs their cockpit assuming that there will be a professional pilot on-board who can handle hand flying an aircraft. Conversely the airbus is packed with automation that protects the flight crew from errors. Take a guy from the A320 and put him in the 777 and he will have to a transition to make. It seems that this capt may have passed his ground school but he lacked the practical skills to make the transition.
Since capt was accustomed to the airbus product he expected the autothrottles to kick-in when the aircraft slowed to below VREF. He not only expected it he. Likely depended on it. In the airbus the Autothrottles will not let an aircraft slow to below vref. When the autopilot is disengaged on the Boeing it is off. There is no passive VREF protection like the A320. It is up to the flight crew to maintain speed and all other parameters in the 777.
This capt was so new to the Boeing products he expected them to act like the airbus. He had been indoctrinated into the airbus- he never. Made the transition to the Boeing design philosophy. He lacked the operating experience to instinctively fly the 777. Unfortunatly the last linr of protection -the check airman in the right seat- failed. The check airman in the right seat did not intervene. These three factors -three always seems like the holy number- caused the crash.
1. Check airman lack of intervention
2. Initial operating experience Capt not having working knowledge of Boeing systems.
3. Design difference between the Airbus and Boeing cockpit.
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That is a well thought out report.
As to number 1, we would need to know what was going on in the cockpit, and the NTSB has not issued complete information. They only released bits and pieces, out of context. If the check pilot didn't recognize they were low and slow, then why did he not recognize it, and why did he not intervene earlier? And if the relief pilot recognized the situation earlier, did he mention it, and if he didn't, then why. If he didn't recognize it, then why didn't he?
As to number 2, when he got out of initial training he would have been thoroughly familiar with the new airplane. I discuss this in detail below.
As to number 3, while that may be a possibility, after the initial training, his thought process should have eliminated the Airbus from his mind. He has had nothing but this aircraft in his mind during his study for the past few months. I would also have to research to see if he transitioned from the 747 or the Airbus. I seem to recall that he had flown the 747.
I would think that Aviana operates the same as the US airlines in that prior to the pilot getting the line training, he would have completed a ground school to learn all of the aircraft systems.
Then he would have to pass an oral exam on the aircraft systems and operation, which includes being able to locate and describe every system, switch, dial, instrument, etc., in the cockpit and on the aircraft.
Then he would have completed a specified minimum number of flight training hours in a 777 simulator. Flying the simulators are just like flying the real airplane. They go through normal flight operations, and conduct every type of emergency that is likely to happen on the airplane, and they have to work with the emergency checklists to successfully work through the emergency. The approaches and landings in the simulator would include hand flying the aircraft to landings, with all engines operating, and with an engine failed, as well as auto landings. However, in training, much of the flying is done by hand.
Then he would have to pass a simulator flight check, after the training. It's only after passing that check ride, where he gets his Type Rating, that he would be cleared to operate the aircraft on the line with a check captain.
I could be wrong, but I doubt if a difference in the Airbus and Boeing systems would be a factor. And I say that because of the training that's required, and because of the sophisticated simulators that are just like being in the real airplane.
As to what actually happened to cause the aircraft to be low and slow, and why corrections were not made until it was too late, the NTSB will have to discover those answers. I could speculate with many scenarios, but any one, or all of them, could be wrong.
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