64 Years Ago, 8:15 am (western, surrender, why, different)

[NJGOAT]

Originally Posted by WesternPilgrim

By adhering to the rules of civilized warfare. The West has striven to uphold high standards of conduct in war since St. Augustine enunciated the principles for a just war in the 5th century. See here and here.

Oh, I'm sorry, I didn't know we were using Catholic doctrine as a measurement for morally waging war. I have read much of the source material they are quoting from at your links. The irony of course is that the Catholic Church is more then guilty of having waged "uncivlized and immoral" war throughout its history. Attempting to use these "precepts" to discredit US actions in WW2 is hypocritical to say the least. When the Church holds itself to a higher standard then it can preach to the rest of us. Still though, let's entertain your links. The following six precepts must be met to consider a war just/moral:

(1) Just cause — The war must confront an unquestioned danger. "The damage inflicted by the aggressor or the nation or community of nations must b lasting, grave and certain, assets the Catechism (#2309).

(2) Proper authority — The legitimate authority must declare the war and must be acting on behalf of the people.

(3) Right Intention — The reasons for declaring the war must actually be the objectives, not a masking of ulterior motives.

(4) Last resort — All reasonable peaceful alternatives must have been exhausted or have been deemed impractical or ineffective. The contentious parties must strive to resolve their differences peacefully before engaging in war, e.g. through negotiation, mediation, or even embargoes. Here too we see the importance of an international medial body, such as the United Nations.

(5) Proportionality —The good that is achieved by waging war must not be outweighed by the harm. What good is it to wage war if it leaves the country in total devastation with no one really being the winner? Modern means of warfare give great weight to this criterion.
(6) Probability of success — The achievement of the war's purpose must have a reasonable chance of success.

So, let's apply these to the US versus Japan:

1. There was obvious "just cause" as Japan had attacked the United States first and had for nearly a decade been engaged in a brutal war in China, a nominal US ally.

2. The declaration of war was asked for by the President and authorized by a near unanimous vote in Congress.

3. The intent of the war was to defend the US and its allies against Japanese aggression.

4. I think we passed this test when the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor and then declared war upon us.

5. There was an obvious "good" to be gained through waging the war in terms of people being oppressed and attacked by the Japanese. We can continue this that in hindsight, that overall the region is far better and more peaceful today because of the war having been fought.

6. The US ultimately didn't have much choice but to fight and their chance of success was very good.

So, there we go, the war itself from the US perspective was good/just/moral using the Catholic lithmus test. The precepts go on to also cover conduct during that war:

(1) Discrimination — Armed forces ought to fight armed forces, and should strive not to harm non-combatants purposefully. Moreover, armed forces should not wantonly destroy the enemy's countryside, cities, or economy simply for the sake of punishment, retaliation or vengeance.
(2) Due proportion — Combatants must use only those means necessary to achieve their objectives. For example, no one needs to use nuclear missiles to settle a territorial fishing problem. Due proportion also involves mercy — towards civilians in general, towards combatants when the resistance stops (as in the case of surrender and prisoners of war), and towards all parties when the war is finished.

1. Our armed forces actively engaged their armed forces. Our enemy made the choice to employ what were essentially non-combatants in a combat role. Our military did strive on many occasions to limit the number of civilian casualties inflicted when possible. Our forces did not wantonly destroy "countryside, cities or economy" for the sake of "punishment, retaliation or vengeance". The targets for our bombing were entirely tied to the enemies ability to support their ongoing war effort. Collateral damage was of course unavoidable and regrettable. Unless one can prove that the bombings were done solely on the basis of punishment, retaliation or vengeance and bore no importance to the enemies ability to wage war, then this test is passed. Even the atomic bomb was essentially used for a greater purpose. It targeted important industrial and military cities. The dropping of the weapon was intended to force the enemy to accept total surrender and end the war without incurring much greater casualties with an incasion.

2. This was essentially a total war, but an entirely just one on the basis of the US. We used the means necessary to prosecute and bring the war to an end on terms that were favorable to us and the world as a whole. The atomic bomb, to our knowledge, was nothing more then a really big bomb and carried no moral difference versus sustained bombing campaigns of equal tonnage. The US acted with great mercy towards civilians, POW's and all parties at the conclusion of the war. Many millions of civilians were spared death by the decision to use the bomb to force an early end to the war. Japanese civilians in US occupied areas up to that time were treated with a large degree of humanity and afforded food and medical care as well as safe passage to non-combat areas. Japanese POW's were similarly treated extremely well. The whole of Japan as well as Germany were afforded immense mercy after the war in terms of aid to their people and financing to rebuild their countries. They were also afforded protection from hostile powers. The people were allowed to establish their own governments while preserving their own traditions. The only "vengeance" levelled was against men who had committed barbarous and wanton acts of destruction. These men were put on public trial, afforded all rights and then sentenced for their crimes.

So, what part of even the Catholic definition of "moral/just/right" war do you presume the US violated?

In many cases it is true that for one side to engage in "total war", and the other side to adhere to more civilized rules, the more civilized belligerent is put at a disadvantage. But that's true in business, sports, and everything in life: moral scruples get in the way of "success". And yet we do not, therefore, toss out basic moral conduct because it puts us at a disadvantage.

I think I've answered that above. The US did adhere to "more civilized" rules and I think a case can even be made for the atomic bombs given what was known about them at the time.

One problem with the secular mentality in war is that God's favor is left out of the equation. George Washington acknowledged that victory was in God's hands, and that God's favor was dependent upon honorable conduct:

"The fate of unborn millions will now depend, under God, on the courage and conduct of this army .... Let us therefore rely on the goodness of the cause and the aid of the Supreme Being, in whose hands victory is, to animate and encourage us to great and noble actions."

From Lepanto to the Cristeros, history is replete with examples of morally superior but vastly disadvantaged armies triumphing over more powerful but unscrupulous enemies.

Wrong forum to begin invoking the concept of God's favor in war. Which God(s) is it that governs the conduct of war? In the case of Washington and his army, there is plenty to nitpick on the morality front. If anything, the British arguably were the ones who fought in a more "moral and right" manner. Afterall weren't the colonists simply rebelling against their divinely appointed sovereign? Lepanto was won with superior cannons, muskets and tactics. The Cristeros got their church bells to ring after the US put pressure on the Mexican government and brokered a deal with them and the church to end the war. However, the repression of the Church remained, Cristeros leaders were rounded up and shot, even the Church turned on their former supporters and threatened them ex-communication if they didn't put down their arms. Any more great examples of the banner of God leading men to victory over insurmountable odds?

Spears, huh? I'm not impressed. This corps, which exempted children under 15, was intended to be a defensive force in the event of an invasion.

Sounds like they weren't so formidable after all.

You're not paying attention. There is nothing morally reprehensible about killing anyone who is attacking you - women, children, or otherwise. That is not and never has been my argument. The Volunteer Fighting Corps, insofar as they constituted a serious threat, were a legitimate target. But it seems that they were: a) organized for defensive purposes; b) consisted of only 5 percent of the "combat ready" population in Japan which numbered about 28,000,000; and b) not a formidable threat anyway.

There were units of the force engaged at Okinawa. It was intended to be a defensive force in the event of an invasion. Remember, the alternative to no a-bomb was invasion. Those millions of people would have been engaged in combat if an invasion had happened. You want to paint a moral absolute, I am simply trying to show you that it is far more dynamic then that, especially when one is fighting an enemy willing to strap a grenade to a 15 year old girl, hand her a spear and tell her to charge battle hardened Marines.

If you don't like that moral example, let's try this one. During the battle for Okinawa the Japanese took young mothers, strapped bombs to them, placed their infants in their arms and made them, at gunpoint, charge American positions. The Marines upon seeing a number of women carrying infants come scrambling towards their lines held their fire. As the women approached, one story goes that a woman flung her baby at the Marines before she exploded. The Marines now faced a dilemma, shoot women and infants or allow them to penetrate their lines and have their suicide bombs go off and kill Marines. Under great duress the Marines had no choice but to fire on the women carrying infants. As the Marines moved through villages it was not uncommon for them to find infants lying in bassinets placed on top of landmines. When a Marine would pickup the wailing, abandoned infant, the mine would detonate killing everyone nearby. The Marines had no choice but to leave the infants behind, or end their suffering quickly. Do you still want to preach the moral ambiguity of using the atomic bomb to bring the war to a quick conclusion against such an enemy?

Total war is evil. If we engage in total war, we lose everything that matters - we lose God's favor, and we lose a country worth defending in the first place.

I think we managed to engage in a moral total war, using the standards you believe in. As for God's favor, not something I'm concerned about in terms of a secular historical discussion. Where was God when the Japanese brutally occupied China and slaughtered the Christian population in Tsingtao and executed Catholic priests and nuns in the streets of Nanking when they tried to intervene and stop the slaughter? Perhaps God finally got around to avenging the attacks on His Church by inspiring a member of the 'tribe', Oppenheimer to develop the atomic bomb. Perhaps Hiroshima and Nagasaki are nothing more then a modern Sodom and Gamorrah. Cities punished for the brutal crimes of their nation. Seems kind of in God's character to commit such an act against a Godless barbaric people who chose to ignore Him and wage war upon Christian nations.

[ovcatto]

Originally Posted by NJGOAT

It is true that the Japanese were sending out peace feelers to begin negotiations, but these feelers were coming from a minority group within the Japanese government.

Again, that is rejected by the most recent and critically accepted analysis done by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa a Japanese born historian and professor at the University of California Santa Barbara, who is not only fluent in Japanese but Russian and who used those language skills to pour over both Japanese documents but those of the Russians as well. In his 2006 book, Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan.


Racing the Enemy — Tsuyoshi Hasegawa | Harvard University Press

Summarizing Hasegawa's work, Kevin Young writes:

While the ultimatum was never rejected, Truman and his Secretary of State James Byrnes knew that the
demand for unconditional surrender would not be readily accepted either. According to Hasegawa, they
insisted on unconditional surrender knowing it was unlikely to yield any result, so that afterwards they
could justify the bombs' use by citing Japan's intransigence [18]. Hasegawa's strongest supporting
evidence for this claim is a detail of supreme importance, though one which is usually neglected in the
standard histories: Stimson, Chief of Staff George Marshall, and General Thomas Handy had, prior to July
26, already approved a directive (circulated on July 24-25) that ordered the use of multiple atomic bombs
against Japan "as soon as weather will permit" [19]. In addition, Hasegawa notes that US officials had not
sent the ultimatum through normal diplomatic channels and cites passages from the diaries of Truman and
Department of State adviser Walter Brown that suggest the ultimatum was merely a "prelude" to the use
of the bombs [20].

http://www.nonukes-nowar.org/files/TsuyoshiHasegawa.pdf

Add to this what I have already presented regarding the deletion of the offer to maintain the position of Emperor within a constitutional monarchy (which was the political status prior to the rise of the militarist) one cannot honestly argue that the ultimate terms of surrender that Japan finally did accept could not have been reached if the Truman administration had been serious about pursuing them.

It was the civilian, not the military government, that was making the openings for peace talks.

You pretend that there were two separate governments in Japan in 1945, there wasn't. As I have already pointed out the militarist were out of power, the role of Chairman of the Imperial Advisory Council and Prime Minister having been handed over to Kantarō Suzuki.

Basically, while the overtures were there it was hard to take them seriously given who was putting the feelers out there. It's not as if the Japanese government called up Washington and said they wanted to negotiate.

This why the debate is contemporaneously important to rehash, your argument is not dissimilar to the Bush administrations dismissal of offers from the Iranian government in 2001 despite documented efforts that assisted in the removal of the Taliban from Afghanistan. If you are looking for peace, then any overture is worthy of considering. It doesn't cost a damn thing to talk, no matter how inchoate those discussion might appear to be.

As for the fatuous argument that the Emperor didn't get on the phone and call Truman... how else to foreign governments who have severed relations communicate with each other, through third party nations, in this case the Japanese conveyed their desire for discussions through the Soviet Union and its foreign minister Molotov. Frankly, from the Japanese perspective who would be better to approach than one of the three most important nations within the alliance?

Certainly some Japanese envoys knew the war was lost, but they had no power. The warlords did.
Regardless, this article is totally dismissed as a result of Japan's official undisputed response to the Allies Potsdam decleration to Japan wich was very clear in July 1945 - unconditional surrendor. The Japanese official response was - mokusatsu. Look up what it means. No, actually, I will help you - it means "kill with silence". A sign of contempt.
Japan would not even surrendor after one atomic bomb dropped and the impact of an unimaginable terrible weapon was reality, and the military even after that was threatening to entirely overthrow the government and fight on. We (or they) are actually lucky they surrendored after two bombs, the war council was split. What does that tell you?

Once again, your view point is based upon a jaundice view, which characterizes Japan during the war as this simplistically monolithic society instead of even attempting to delve into what is to this day an extreme complex and multi-shaded culture.

[ovcatto]

Originally Posted by NJGOAT

Our forces did not wantonly destroy "countryside, cities or economy" for the sake of "punishment, retaliation or vengeance". The targets for our bombing were entirely tied to the enemies ability to support their ongoing war effort. Collateral damage was of course unavoidable and regrettable. Unless one can prove that the bombings were done solely on the basis of punishment, retaliation or vengeance and bore no importance to the enemies ability to wage war, then this test is passed. Even the atomic bomb was essentially used for a greater purpose. It targeted important industrial and military cities. The dropping of the weapon was intended to force the enemy to accept total surrender and end the war without incurring much greater casualties with an incasion.

If the test is based upon malice and forethought, I can agree with you, but to deny malice and forethought as a motivation in our strategic actions, I not so sure that your argument is supportable.

I have always held two voices regarding this issue, one is a total lack of sympathy for the Japanese to eke out even the slightest moral outrage over the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the other is a more internal argument that more nefarious political motivations were a part of the mix and deserving of attention within a democratic society.

[Dd714]

Originally Posted by ovcatto

Again, that is rejected by the most recent and critically accepted analysis done by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa a Japanese born historian and professor at the University of California Santa Barbara, who is not only fluent in Japanese but Russian and who used those language skills to pour over both Japanese documents but those of the Russians as well.

Your post wasn't to me, but I read it to see what evidence you provided to conclude that the japanese surrendor claims were sincere or rejecting the other posters claim. The book may propose that, but nothing in your excerpt does, certainly you must have more data. I'm dissapointed. You simply detail that a few facts already known and that don't support any conclusion of near surrendor at all:

-the allies expected the terms for unconditional surrender to be refused. Certainly, since it was refused in the past and it has already been historically acknowled that japan's war goals was a negotiated end to the war. The relevant fact is that the Allies issued them terms under which they could surrendor, that should be a positive attribute, instead of waiting for them. Are you suggesting we should have had a negotiated surrendor? Maybe no Japanese war crime trials? Maybe they keep China? Regardless, the terms were agreed by all allied leaders, not just US leaders, not all were aware of the atomic bomb.

-Directive for atom bomb on July 25th. No suprise, these missions need final logistical planning, reconnasance, weather, etc. Regardless, Japan had almost 2 weeks to respond to the ultimatum. They essentially publically refused the ultimatum on July 28th. The final strike order was not given on in July, but on August 5th. No doubt the bombing could have still been called off with the bomber in the air.

-Ultimatum a "prelude to dropping the bomb". Well certaintly, thank you Captian Obvious. Isn't that the right thing to do? If not, you would be in here complaining "there was no ultimatum as a prelude to dropping the bomb".

[NJGOAT]

Originally Posted by WesternPilgrim

Let's be crystal clear about one thing: the decision did not merely result in the deaths of innocents, it intended the deaths of innocents. Therein lies the evil of the act.

It intended to showcase the futility of continuing the war. No one dropped it with the intention of killing innocent people, though it was fully understood that would have been the result. In that sense, it was no different then the massive destruction and suffering levelled against Japanese cities as we targeted their war industries. Both cities where the atomic bombs were dropped were also important military and industrial centers, so they were not purely civilian targets upon which to demonstrate the power of the weapon.

First, according to these men who knew a little more than you or me about the situation, Japanese surrender was imminent and not even a land invasion was necessary. Second, even if surrender were not imminent, it isn't clear that a final land invasion or inaction were the only two alternatives to atomic bombs. Third, even in the event of a land invasion, the casualty estimates seem way overblown (20 million Japanese casualties? At the time there were already 8,000,000 refugees crowded in rural villages due to the destruction of cities.) Finally - and this is the only point that really matters - indiscriminately targeting 80,000 effective non-combatants (whether "potential" combatants or not) is a "decision" that should never have been on the table in the first place.

Those men are referring to the military defeat of Japan. Japan had been militarily defeated. They could no longer threaten the US and our allies effectively. Their remaining armies and occupied territories were cut-off and could be retaken with near impunity. However, that situation was not the same as a desire to unconditionally surrender. It's been said many times, the options were thus:

1. Invasion
2. Blockade and continue the conventional bombing until they were starved into submission.
3. Atomic bombs.

There were no other options to achieve unconditional surrender unless you happen to have some revolutionary information on the topic.

Originally Posted by chielgirl

It was mass murder.
These people were not collateral damage.
This bombing was meant to kill as many people as possible.

Might I suggest that you go to the Hiroshima war memorial and tour the building and grounds.

How is anyone going to hear anything when an area is completely destroyed.

For those celebrating this, perhaps if it were your family, you might feel a little different.

I completely disagree.
How was that ever response in kind?
It wasn't.

The US always chooses to respond with I've got a bigger dick than you.

Perhaps you should visit the memorials to the victims of the Nanking Massacre before you climb on that high horse of yours. Take a look at these images and then tell me how much you weap for the innocent victims of the atomic bombs. Perhaps you should speak to Marines who were forced to kill women carrying infants and wearing suicide vests on Okinawa or die themselves. Ask them how they felt when they had to shoot a wailing infant to end its suffering because the retreating Japanese forces had booby trapped the baby to explode if it was picked up. Perhaps if it was your family member that ended up in a brutal Japanese POW camp or found themselves trapped under Japanese occupation you would feel differentely. Don't weap for the people of Nagasaki and Hiroshima. They gave their lives for the greater good of preserving the lives of millions of others. The people who were brutalized and murdered by the Japanese have no such honor in their suffering and death.

***Warning graphic images***

Spoiler

Originally Posted by ovcatto

That is simply not true. The Committee of Three, consisting of Sec of War, Stimson, Acting Sec of State Joseph Grew and Sec of the Navy Forrestal, proposed that the Potsdam Proclamation include language insuring the position of the emperor prior to the Potsdam Conference for the very purpose of precluding the need for the use of the atomic bomb or the proposed invasion of Japan.

From Stimson's diary dated June 26 to 30 1945:

"At the meeting this morning of the Committee of Three, Forrestal, Grew and I were present with McCloy as recorder and Correa as legal adviser for the Navy. I took up at once the subject of trying to get Japan to surrender by giving her a warning after she had been sufficiently pounded possibly with S-1. This is a matter about which I feel very strongly and feel the country will not be satisfied unless every effort is made to shorten the war. I had made a draft of a letter to the President on the subject and I read this to the Committee and a long thorough discussion followed. When we got through, both Forrestal and Grew said that they approved of the proposed step and the general substance of the letter. We then appointed a sub-committee consisting of McCloy for the War Department, [State Dept. Japan experts Eugene] Dooman and [Joseph] Ballantine for the State Department, and Correa for the Navy, to draft an actual [surrender] warning to be sent [to Japan] when the time came."

"I personally think that if in saying this we should add that we do not exclude a constitutional monarchy under her present dynasty, it would substantially add to the chances of acceptance."

This is reaffirmed in Truman's own memoirs:

The U.S. War Against Asia by William P. Meyers, Notes from Memoirs by Harry S. Truman

Pages 416-417. Acting Secretary of State Grew proposed allowing the Emperor to remain as had of state if the Japanese surrendered. This was approved, prior to the successful a-bomb test. Truman claims he wanted to get a surrender without using the bomb or even an invasion, and that the Potsdam Declaration was a final chance for the Japanese. He does not explain why the offer to keep the Emperor is not included in the Declaration.

The original proposal for a constitutional monarchy was originally included as part of Article 12 and was only deleted by newly appointed Sec of State James Byrnes while in transit to Potsdam.

Well I wasn't party to that discussion so I'm not that impressed with the substantiation entered so far.

Originally Posted by ovcatto

Becaaaauuuse, there is much to debate from a political point of view but more importantly an ethical one as well. Atomic weapons, far more devastating than what was deployed in Japan, remain the Sword of Damocles hanging over our heads and it behooves every nation to consider and reconsider, repeatedly the events that led up to and after their first and so far only use.

As for your argument that there weren't any plans for surrender, there wasn't a "plan" but as I have pointed out above, there was a desire. The argument about their combat history is a non sequitur because once they accepted defeat their combat history became a moot point because they ultimately did surrender, in toto.

Your arguments are based upon the same prevailing stereo-types about Japanese culture adopted by individuals, not unlike yourself, whose limited experience with Japanese culture cast the Japanese in a fairly one-dimensional characterization rather than those who understood the excruciating complexity of Japanese society men in the War Dept like Joseph Grew and State's Joseph Grew.

Now besides that fact that you have yet to rebut the evidence of Japanese surrender initiatives other than to say that they were fiction despite the official documents of the Soviets, the Japanese foreign ministry and intercepted communications, you accused another contributor of cherry picking quotes. Here again the fact remain that the leading members of the U.S. military did not believe that the atomic attack was either moral or necessary. That list of leaders included Admiral William D. Leahy, Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Under-Secretary of the Navy, Ralph Bard, Rear Admiral L. Lewis Strauss, Gen Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, General Carl "Tooey" Spaatz, General Claire Chennault,

OK, this is going to be long...

The Japanese government was always dominated by the military which held 4 of the 6 cabinet posts. The military was also able to exercise great control by either refusing to form or resigning from a government as they controlled the appointment of their ministers and cabinet members. Basically, the military ran the country.

Beginning in 1945 the Japanese recognized that the war was going badly. They became divided into two camps. One side wished to pursue a diplomatic settlement through the Soviet Union. The other believed in seeking a "decisive battle" that gain Japan leverage in negotiations.

In January 1945 Prince Konoe persuaded the emperor to agree to send a peace dossier to the Allies. Terms were transmitted to the British and Americans. The military hardliners were completely opposed to the move, but went along with sending out the feelers. The terms were lengthy and included territories to be retained by the Japanese, namely Korea and Formosa and their possessions in China as well as the preservation of the Imperial family, no occupation of the home islands and a voluntary disarmament to be adminstered by the Japanese themselves. FDR and Churchill rejected these immediately based on their desire for unconditional surrender.

In Febraury 1945 Prince Konoe appealed to the emperor again to more seriously consider peace. The emperor rejected the idea thinking that the time was not correct until the Japanese had sought and won the "decisive battle". At the same time the Japanese leadership pondered what the Allied demands would be. These included: unconditional surrender, occupation, disarmament, elimination of militarism, democratic reforms, punishment of war criminals, and the status of the emperor. All of these were a non-sequitor for the Japanese military leaders, but most offensive was the occupation of Japan and the removal of the emperor in any capacity.

On April 5th the Soviets told the Japanese that they were not going to renew the five-year non-aggression pact. The Soviets were simply following their commitments made to the Allies at the Tehran Conference. At Yalta the Allies had also made concessions to the Soviets to bring them into the war against Japan when Germany surrendered. This gravely concerned the Japanese government, but the Soviet ambassadors continually told them that the Soviet Union would honor the final year of the pact, which would take it to April 1946.

At high level meetings in May following the formation of the final Suzuki government serious discussion was made about ending the war. However, none of those included any proposals that would have remotely met the Allied demands. The meetings were held in secret behind closed doors do to the fear that zealous military officers would assassinate anyone who had been speaking of surrender.

Following those meetings on June 6th the new government issued a proclamation laying out the aims of the new government. The government pledged to "fight to extinction rather then surrender". Only one member of the cabinet, the Foreign Minister opposed this statement. At the same time the Japanese laid out their plans for approaching the Soviet Union. They wished to convey to the Soviets that their victory over Germany was made possible by Japan's neutrality and that in a future world where the United States is the enemy of the Soviets it was in the Soviets best interest to maintain a friendly Japan in her current international position of power.

On June 9th Marquis Kido approached the emperor and begged him to consider more generous terms for surrender as the ability of Japan to "wage modern war" would be exhausted by the end of the year. Kido proposed that Japan: withdraw from the occupied European colonies provided they were granted independence, that the nation disarm provided this not occur under Allied supervision, and that Japan for a time be content with minimum defense. Kido's proposal did not contemplate Allied occupation of Japan, prosecution of war criminals or substantial change in Japan's system of government. The emperor authorized Kido to "float" this plan to the minsiters. There was a mixed reception with two in favor, two nominally in favor and two ambivalent and wanting to continue to wait for the decisive battle.

Later in June the emperor learned of the losses on Okinawa and the rapidly deteriorating position of the Japanese military, even at home. Most compelling to him was that iron scrap from bombs being dropped on Japan were now being used to make shovels to clear the rubble, obviously in his mind the situation had become extremely dire. The emperor convened the government on June 22nd and ordered them to solicit Soviet aid in ending the war. The Soviets were chosen over Switzerland, Vatican City or Sweden precisely because they hoped the Soviets would use their influence to gain the Japanese better terms. The other entities could do no more then transmit messages.

On June 30 Togo told the Ambassador Sato in Moscow to start a dialogue with the Soviets. The Soviets ever mindful of their promises to the Allies and the deteriorating situation dealyed any meetings until July 11th with no result from the meeting. On July 12th they met again and Sato informed the Soviets that: "His Majesty the Emperor, mindful of the fact that the present war daily brings greater evil and sacrifice upon the peoples of all the belligerent powers, desires from his heart that it may be quickly terminated. But so long as England and the United States insist upon unconditional surrender, the Japanese Empire has no alternative but to fight on with all its strength for the honor and existence of the Motherland."

Sato informed Togo that in reality the best Japan could hope for was unconditional or near unconditional surrender. The Soviets continued to press for more detailed proposals and this led Sato to question whether or not Togo actually had the backing of the government in his current initiatives. On July 17th Togo sent a message to Sato to inform him of his position: "Although the directing powers, and the government as well, are convinced that our war strength still can deliver considerable blows to the enemy, we are unable to feel absolutely secure peace of mind ... Please bear particularly in mind, however, that we are not seeking the Russians' mediation for anything like an unconditional surrender."

Sato replied: "It goes without saying that in my earlier message calling for unconditional surrender or closely equivalent terms, I made an exception of the question of preserving [the imperial family]." Togo responded to that message on July 21st and made it clear he was speaking for the entire government: "With regard to unconditional surrender we are unable to consent to it under any circumstances whatever. ... It is in order to avoid such a state of affairs that we are seeking a peace, ... through the good offices of Russia. ... it would also be disadvantageous and impossible, from the standpoint of foreign and domestic considerations, to make an immediate declaration of specific terms."

It is important to note that US intelligence had long broken the Japanese codes, even their diplomatic ones. All of the messages being transmitted were known in full to the Allies. It is very obvious from these messages that the Japanese government was NOT in any way, shape or form seeking anything but a conditioned surrender favorable to Japan.

On July 26th the Allies (US, Britain and China) issued the Potsdam Declaration. It was made clear that the Potsdam terms were the only terms acceptable to the Allies. They included numerous provisions but most importantly insisted on these points: the Japanese government would be disbanded and reformed along democratic principles, Japanese territory would be reduced to their pre-1894 borders, Japan itself would be occupied by Allied forces, the Japanese military would be completely disarmed, war criminal would be tried for their crimes by an Allied tribunal. At the same time it also declared that: the Japanese people were not to be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, basic human and democratic rights would be put in place and preserved, Japanese industry critical to the economy would remain intact and Japan would have global trade rights, the occupation would end as soon as the above had been accomplished. Completely absent was anything regarding the status of the emperor. The only mention of "unconditional surrender" was in the last line that required that action of all Japanese armed forces or Japan would face "prompt and utter destruction".

On July 27th the Japanese government debated the Declaration. The military cabinet members wanted to reject it ouright. Togo persuaded them to wait until they could discuss it with the Soviets. Japan's ambassador to Switzerland, Kase, made an impassioned plea to the government to consider the Declaration as the language had been carefully chosen to allow the Japanese to save face. The "unconditional surrender" he implored them applied only to the military and not the government and people and contained a "great deal of thought" as to the terms and language used.

The next day Japanese media reported that the Declaration had been rejected. Leaflets had been dropped on Japan announcing the terms and the media responded to that with a further call to arms. The Japanese government through Suzuki needing to manage the situation publicly stated, "I consider the Joint Proclamation a rehash of the Declaration at the Cairo Conference. As for the Government, it does not attach any important value to it at all. The only thing to do is just kill it with silence (mokusatsu). We will do nothing but press on to the bitter end to bring about a successful completion of the war." The word mokusatsu essentially mean to "ignore with contempt". The Allies felt they had gotten their answer.

On July 30th Sato in Moscow reported that Stalin was working with the Allies and would soon join the war. He said: "There is no alternative but immediate unconditional surrender if we are to prevent Russia's participation in the war." On August 2nd Togo replied that: "It should not be difficult for you to realize that ... our time to proceed with arrangements of ending the war before the enemy lands on the Japanese mainland is limited, on the other hand it is difficult to decide on concrete peace conditions here at home all at once."

On August 6th with the last peace overtures made and the ready realization that Japan was rejecting any talk of surrender unless under conditions favorable to Japan, the US dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima. The Japanese were rather unmoved knowing the difficulties of building a bomb through their own programs. They theorized that even if the US had built one (they still weren't convinced it was actually an atomic bomb) they couldn't have many of them available.

As detailed reports flooded into Tokyo on the destruction in Hiroshima the government delayed officially meeting until August 8th to discuss what had happened. The next day at 4am the Japanese received word that the Soviets had broken the pact and declared war. This deeply shocked Suzuki and Togo and they immediately called for the government to end the war at once. The military block refused and began making preparations to declare martial law on the nation, sieze control of the government and block any attempts at peace. The military underestimated the scale of the Soviet attack and was steadfast in their belief that the US did not possess anymore atomic weapons.

Hirohito implored Kido to control the situation as it was now spiralling out of control with Soviet entry into the war. At 10:30am the council met and Suzuki who had just come from an audience with the emperor told them that was must be ended. Togo suggested accepting Potsdam with one condition, being the preservation of the royal family. The Navy Minister Yonai conceeded that they must make some diplomatic move as the war was lost. At 11am the meeting was interupted with news that Nagasaki had been hit with another atomic weapon. At the end of the meeting, Togo, Suzuki and Yonai were in favor of accpeting Potsdam with the condition of the preservation of the emperor. The remaining military members were against the proposal, the government was split 3-3 after two atomic bombings and the Soviet invasion. The military block steadfastly refused to accept; occupation, disarmament at the hands of the Allies and the loss of Korea, Formosa and sections of China.

At 2:30pm the full cabinet met, but remained split with neither "side" garnering a majority. Anami told the other members about information given to the Japanese from a captured American pilot that the Americans had 100 atomic bombs and that Tokyo and Kyoto were next. The pilot was lying, but even that information given to the highest echelons of the government wasn't enough to make a consensus. That meeting ended at 5:30pm and was immediately followed by a second that lasted from 6pm-10pm and again ended in no consensus.

Suzuki and Togo then went to meet the emperor and proposed holding an Imperial Conference that began near midnight on August 9th/10th. Both sides presented their position to the emperor. By 2am on the 10th no consensus had been reached and Suzuki implored the emperor to decide. The emperor stated:

I have given serious thought to the situation prevailing at home and abroad and have concluded that continuing the war can only mean destruction for the nation and prolongation of bloodshed and cruelty in the world. I cannot bear to see my innocent people suffer any longer. ...

I was told by those advocating a continuation of hostilities that by June new divisions would be in place in fortified positions [east of Tokyo] ready for the invader when he sought to land. It is now August and the fortifications still have not been completed.

There are those who say the key to national survival lies in a decisive battle in the homeland. The experiences of the past, however, show that there has always been a discrepancy between plans and performance. I do not believe that the discrepancy in the case of Kujukuri can be rectified. Since this is also the shape of things, how can we repel the invaders? [He then made some specific reference to the increased destructiveness of the atomic bomb]

It goes without saying that it is unbearable for me to see the brave and loyal fighting men of Japan disarmed. It is equally unbearable that others who have rendered me devoted service should now be punished as instigators of the war. Nevertheless, the time has come to bear the unbearable.

I swallow my tears and give my sanction to the proposal to accept the Allied proclamation on the basis outlined by the Foreign Minister

The military leaders and head of the Privy Council then questioned the emperor: "Your majesty, you also bear responsibility (sekinin) for this defeat. What apology are you going to make to the heroic spirits of the imperial founder of your house and your other imperial ancestors?" The emperor simply rose and left the room. Suzuki then implored everyone to accept the emperors will. The Japanese then sent a message via Switzerland that they accepted Potsdam on one condition, that the "prerogatives of the emperor should not be prejudiced", essentially saying that the emperor would remain a powerful force in the country.

On August 12th the Allies responded with the following: "From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms. ...The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people." Truman also then ordered a complete halt to bombing activities which had been suspended on the 11th do to weather as he did not want the Japanese to think we had rejected their peace proposals and resumed the war.

The cabinet then debated the Allied response. Suzuki wanted to reject it and ask for explicit guarantees for the emperor and imperial family. Anami wanted to reject it on the grounds of the Allied occupation of Japan. Togo and Suzuki privately met and determined that there was no hope of better terms. Kido then informed them that the emperor wanted them to surrender.

At the same time the emperor was hearing from Yonai about gorwing civil unrest and dischord in the country that threatened to bring down the government. He ascribed the atomic bombings and Soviet attacks as divine gifts that would mask the deteriorating situation at home. The emperor announced his decision to his family and his uncle asked him, "Will we continue the war if the national sovereignty could not be preserved?" The emperor replied succinctly, "of course".

On August 13th the cabinet continued to debate the Allied offer without consensus. The US was growing concerned as they had asked the Japanese to transmit their acceptance "in the clear". However, the Japanese were sending a large volume of coded military and diplomatic messages. This gave the US the impression they were most likely preparing to reject the offer and prepare a final "banzai" assault on the Allies. Truman ordered a resumption of the attacks on Japan by both bomber and naval forces in a "massive show of force" to drive home the message the war was lost.

On August 13th the US had also decided to drop leaflets yet again detailing Japans offer to surrender to the US and the Allied response. These leaflets had a profound impact on the Japanese and Suzuki, Kido and the emperor all agreed that they needed to accept the surrender terms as is, or face a military coup that was gaining growing support among hardliners and devoted citizens.

On August 14th the emperor met with his most senior military officers about the situation. Several spoke in favor of continuing the war, but one notable exception was General Hata who was in command of the Second Home Army which had been headquartered in Hiroshima. Hata believed that it was impossible for his forces to resist invasion and that surrender was the only option to avoid further suffering. The emperor then implored the military to work with him to end the war.

Yet another conference was held by the military officers who made another attempt to pressure the emperor to continue fighting. The emperor responded by saying: "I have listened carefully to each of the arguments presented in opposition to the view that Japan should accept the Allied reply as it stands and without further clarification or modification, but my own thoughts have not undergone any change. ... In order that the people may know my decision, I request you to prepare at once an imperial rescript so that I may broadcast to the nation. Finally, I call upon each and every one of you to exert himself to the utmost so that we may meet the trying days which lie ahead."

The cabinet then convened and unanimously ratified the emperors wishes for surrender. They began extensive operations to destroy documents that could be used against them in war crimes trials while the Foreign minister transmitted the acceptance notice to the embassies in Switzerland and Sweden. The Us picked up these transmissions at the same time the emperor was preparing to record his message to the people.

That night an army officer Hatanaka led a coup to attempt to prevent the surrender. Senior officers knew of the attempt, but did not support it as they had all agreed earlier to abide by the emperors wishes. The coup was stopped by the actions of General Tanaka who convinced the officers to abandon the occupation of the palace. The coup also targeted Suzuki, but he was able to avoid their attempts to kill him.

At noon on August 15th the emperor's speech was played for the nation. Reaction was mixed with some listening and then just going about their business. Some military officers responded by dragging allied prisoners out of their cells and killing them. There were numerous suicides among the military. A large crowd gathered at the palace to weep, the sound being occasionally broken by a gunshot from an officer committing suicide at the gates. On the 17th Suzuki stepped down as Prime Minister and the emperors uncle took the position to help prevent any further coup attempts.

From there, it was just the play out of the formal surrender, cessation of fighting and the beginning of the occupation.

So, you tell me, at exactly what point were the Japanese really considering surrendering? It would seem to me that the conditions went well beyond the emperor remaining in place.

[NJGOAT]

Originally Posted by ovcatto

Again, that is rejected by the most recent and critically accepted analysis done by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa a Japanese born historian and professor at the University of California Santa Barbara, who is not only fluent in Japanese but Russian and who used those language skills to pour over both Japanese documents but those of the Russians as well. In his 2006 book, Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan.


Racing the Enemy — Tsuyoshi Hasegawa | Harvard University Press

Summarizing Hasegawa's work, Kevin Young writes:

While the ultimatum was never rejected, Truman and his Secretary of State James Byrnes knew that the
demand for unconditional surrender would not be readily accepted either. According to Hasegawa, they
insisted on unconditional surrender knowing it was unlikely to yield any result, so that afterwards they
could justify the bombs' use by citing Japan's intransigence [18]. Hasegawa's strongest supporting
evidence for this claim is a detail of supreme importance, though one which is usually neglected in the
standard histories: Stimson, Chief of Staff George Marshall, and General Thomas Handy had, prior to July
26, already approved a directive (circulated on July 24-25) that ordered the use of multiple atomic bombs
against Japan "as soon as weather will permit" [19]. In addition, Hasegawa notes that US officials had not
sent the ultimatum through normal diplomatic channels and cites passages from the diaries of Truman and
Department of State adviser Walter Brown that suggest the ultimatum was merely a "prelude" to the use
of the bombs [20].

http://www.nonukes-nowar.org/files/TsuyoshiHasegawa.pdf

Add to this what I have already presented regarding the deletion of the offer to maintain the position of Emperor within a constitutional monarchy (which was the political status prior to the rise of the militarist) one cannot honestly argue that the ultimate terms of surrender that Japan finally did accept could not have been reached if the Truman administration had been serious about pursuing them.

You pretend that there were two separate governments in Japan in 1945, there wasn't. As I have already pointed out the militarist were out of power, the role of Chairman of the Imperial Advisory Council and Prime Minister having been handed over to Kantarō Suzuki.

Basically, while the overtures were there it was hard to take them seriously given who was putting the feelers out there. It's not as if the Japanese government called up Washington and said they wanted to negotiate.

This why the debate is contemporaneously important to rehash, your argument is not dissimilar to the Bush administrations dismissal of offers from the Iranian government in 2001 despite documented efforts that assisted in the removal of the Taliban from Afghanistan. If you are looking for peace, then any overture is worthy of considering. It doesn't cost a damn thing to talk, no matter how inchoate those discussion might appear to be.

As for the fatuous argument that the Emperor didn't get on the phone and call Truman... how else to foreign governments who have severed relations communicate with each other, through third party nations, in this case the Japanese conveyed their desire for discussions through the Soviet Union and its foreign minister Molotov. Frankly, from the Japanese perspective who would be better to approach than one of the three most important nations within the alliance?

Once again, your view point is based upon a jaundice view, which characterizes Japan during the war as this simplistically monolithic society instead of even attempting to delve into what is to this day an extreme complex and multi-shaded culture.

Please see my post #155. It exhaustively details the actual history of the peace overtures and what was happening in the Japanese government. It most assuredly was a divided house and their communications never presented any real indication to anyone that they were prepared to accept surrender on the one condition that the emperor be untouched until the very end. Even then peace was almost pre-empted by a military coup that only failed because the generals sought to live up to their oath to the emperor and obey his wishes. Unless you can present compelling evidence to counter the exhaustive history I have laid out about what was going in Japan and what the US knew, I cannot accept your argument that there was a legitimate attempt at peace by the Japanese prior to the atomic bombings.

Originally Posted by ovcatto

If the test is based upon malice and forethought, I can agree with you, but to deny malice and forethought as a motivation in our strategic actions, I not so sure that your argument is supportable.

I have always held two voices regarding this issue, one is a total lack of sympathy for the Japanese to eke out even the slightest moral outrage over the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the other is a more internal argument that more nefarious political motivations were a part of the mix and deserving of attention within a democratic society.

I do not think that the decision to use the bombs was made lightly or with malice against the Japanese people. The decision to use the bombs was made to attempt to force them to accept surrender, something I exhaustively detailed in post #155 what their actual stance on it was. I have studied it extensively and I do not accept any of the theories regarding "we used it because we spent $2 billion building it", "we used it to "f" the Japanese up" or "we used it to intimidate the Soviets". We used it to try and end the war swiftly and on our terms. Powerful factions in the Japanese government were resistant to surrender if it included disarmament, occupation and loss of territory right up until the last moment when the emperor forced them to accept his decision to surrender. There was NO CONSENSUS in the Japanese government to seek out peace before then on anything but terms entirely favorable to the Japanese.

[ovcatto]

Originally Posted by Dd714

Your post wasn't to me, but I read it to see what evidence you provided to conclude that the japanese surrendor claims were sincere or rejecting the other posters claim. The book may propose that, but nothing in your excerpt does, certainly you must have more data. I'm dissapointed.

A lesser person might say, wtfay to be disappointed about lack of substantiation when the best you can come up with is the been, here done that, refrain?

Just say'in

[Fleet]

Originally Posted by liebknecht

Absolutely unneccasary atrocity resulting in the death of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians.

My dad didn't think so. (He would have been one of the many which were scheduled to be part of the invasion of Japan in Nov., 1945 had the A-bomb not been used.)

[Dd714]

Originally Posted by NJGOAT

Please see my post #155. It exhaustively details the actual history of the peace overtures and what was happening in the Japanese government. It most assuredly was a divided house and their communications never presented any real indication to anyone that they were prepared to accept surrender on the one condition that the emperor be untouched until the very end. Even then peace was almost pre-empted by a military coup that only failed because the generals sought to live up to their oath to the emperor and obey his wishes. Unless you can present compelling evidence to counter the exhaustive history I have laid out about what was going in Japan and what the US knew, I cannot accept your argument that there was a legitimate attempt at peace by the Japanese prior to the atomic bombings.

I think we all agree that any chance of peace with Japan was unlikely without the atomic bombing...but for the few remaining that weakly claim it was likely, I leave you with this quote:

Originally Posted by ovcatto

I don't deal in "likely".

[Mac_Muz]

Fleet, liebknecht, is upset that germany didn't win in the Euro theater.