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As soon as Russian was defeated and withdrew from the war, what did Germany do? It went back to trying to win on the western front via taking the offense.
yes, BECAUSE the Americans were coming, and if they waited till the Americans were on the western front in force, they would lose. I dont have the quotes handy, but Im pretty sure that was explicitly stated in the strategic discussions - and that Ludendorff implied that in the absence of the American intervention he would not attack in the West.
yes, BECAUSE the Americans were coming, and if they waited till the Americans were on the western front in force, they would lose. I dont have the quotes handy, but Im pretty sure that was explicitly stated in the strategic discussions - and that Ludendorff implied that in the absence of the American intervention he would not attack in the West.
Regardless of motive, they did indeed attack as soon as conditions permitted them to do so.
I still have little idea how any of what you have been saying relates to my original point...that without attacks, there is no war. And if there is no war, what is everyone doing out there with guns?
Just what is your notion regarding how the war should have been conducted after the western front trench lines were in place at the end of 1914? How would you win the war without ever attacking anyone? If you were France, how would you have gone about evicting the Germans from your territory? Threaten to take them off your Christmas card list?
Not to get into the middle of the pissing match, lol.
I think Felix's comments may have some merit, but it all comes down to how we define things. He said this:
You need to parse that a little bit to see what he was getting at...
"line infantry" = only frontline infantry combat units actually involved in combat.
"loss rate" = all casualties incurred, not necessarily just deaths, but wounds and losses to disease as well. This is also generally controlled for comparative purposes by "time on the line".
Basically you cannot look at the raw casualty figures and really determine anything, you need to control it to figure anything out and when you do you will find that what Felix is talking about is true to an extent. The British historian Gordon Corrigan in his work Poppycock has claimed that the British suffered higher losses in Normandy in 1944 then they did at the Somme in 1916. He arrives at this by looking at the total number of casualties and then controlling that by the number of divisions involved and the length of the battles. He determines that at the Somme the British suffered 89 losses per division per week versus 100 for Normandy. His general case is not that the Somme in WW1 wasn't bloody or that WW2 Normandy was worse, just that, the general "image" of WW1 being some slaughter for the ages beyond equal is largely inaccurate.
To further back this up, the British recently had media headlines mentioning that their casualty rate in Afghanistan was the same as what they experienced in WW2. When they adjusted for the fact that they only had three combat brigades in Afghanistan and these were doing all the fighting, they realized that the casualty rate among these units was approaching the average of what frontline combat units in WW2 endured. The point of their study was that while the losses were numerically low, the stress on the individual units was very high.
Looking back at the figures posted by stillkit, we can sort of make the same argument is we control for the changes in the composition of the forces. In WW1 there was a support to combat soldier ratio of 3:1 for the Americans. In WW2 this had increased to 7:1. These figures have been used and quoted in multiple threads on this forum and we all seem to agree on them.
Using that ratio...
WWI:
4,743,826 men in uniform. Divide by 3 and we get 1,581,275 combat soliders.
53,513 battle deaths and 63,195 died from disease or injury. This totals to 116,708 casualties or "loss rate".
116,708 / 1,581,275 = 7.4% loss rate
WWII:
16,353,659 in uniform. Divide by 7 and we get 2,336,237 combat soldiers.
292,131 battle deaths and another 115,185 disease or injury. This totals to 407,316 casualties or "loss rate".
407,316 / 2,336,237 = 17.4% loss rate
Now, we are doing two things here, first off we are counting all casualties as combat casualties. I imagine the vast majority are, so we'll just go with it. Now, WW2 was fought over a span of several years versus one for US involvement in WW1. However, major combat operations are pretty much limited to a two year period from mid-1943 to mid-1945. Not discounting anything before that, but for as apples-to-apples as possible, this is what we would need to use.
If we take our WW2 loss rate and divide it by two we get 8.7% per year versus the 7.4% per year in WW1. Even if we extend it to a three year period we get 5.8% in WW2 vs. 7.4% in WW1, not that big of a difference.
So, IMO, what Felix is saying really does have a lot of truth in it, the actual statistics are just difficult to work through to make everything comparable. Overall, what has really changed in terms of deaths is that more soldiers who recieve wounds are saved in modern times. In terms of casualties, the disease loss rate is much lower now then it was then. However, in terms of looking at the numbers of men actually involved in combat and who was shot, whether they died or were wounded, the numbers hold relatively constant.
Oh, I see what you're saying and understand perfectly. But, you'll never be able to nail down statistics like that because there are just so many variables. The best we could do is agree upon a basis for comparison and let it go at that. There is literally no way to differentiate casualty percentages among different MOS's, different divisions or even different platoons and squads.
For instance, take my rifle company in Vietnam. It was Co. C, 2/1 Infantry, 196th Light Infantry Brigade. During the company's 7 years in Vietnam, the best figure we can come up with is that we endured 101 KIA's (including some attached troops). Since a full-strength rifle company at the time amounted to about 140 personnel, that doesn't sound so "bad," does it? Given that the usual tour of duty was one year, it could reasonably be assumed that roughly 980 men served during those 7 years, for a KIA rate of about 1 in 9, a figure which exceeds the average for WWI.
However, the weapons platoon generally did not go the field, but was usually assigned to the battalion fire base for fire support duties. That means full field strength was about 100. That, times 7 years, yields an effective KIA rate of 1 in 7.
We have no figures on the numbers of wounded or injured, but if the typical rate of 4 wounded for each KIA is applied (roughly 400), that would yield an overall CASUALTY figure of about 500 during those 7 years, for a casualty RATE of less than 1 in 2, or worse even than the Civil War. That sounds pretty bad.
But, that figure too must be qualified for a couple of reasons:
1. The unit never operated at full TOE strength in the field, so the number of people actually engaged in combat during that 7 year period was less even than 980. How much less can't be determined without knowing exactly how many troops were in the field on any given day. It could vary widely from day to day.
2. 1/5 of our KIA's, and probably 1/5 of the wounded, were hit during a 3 day period in January, 1968. That will skew the figures even more and drive the most buttoned-down mathematician to fits of apoplexy.
Let me get even more specific to highlight the impossibility of ever determining a legitimate casualty ratio.
I arrived in the company in late 1970, after the level of combat had begun to decline because the war was winding down. During the 9 months I served in 2nd Platoon, we had 2 KIA's and 10 WIA's (defined as qualifying for a Purple Heart). Since the TOE field strength of a full platoon would be roughly 38 men, that yields a casualty ratio of about 1 in 3, or similar to the Civil War. However, as long as I was with the 2nd Platoon, we were never at TOE strength and, at one time, were down to 12 men, or roughly a squad. Our "usual" strength was between 20 and 25, which means a casualty rate of 1 in 2, or a 50% chance of being hit. And this was in a period of declining contact with the enemy. So much so that the only "real" battle we engaged in during that time period lasted only about an hour. The rest of it was small skirmish's, snipers, booby traps and mortars or rockets.
The company as a whole was just as bad. By the time I left Charlie Company, it's field strength was down to about 35, or just barely the same as a single platoon.
Given all that, how would you determine our casualty rate or casualty ratio to use as a basis for discussion and comparison?
You'll find that the same kinds of issues arise when trying to compare casualties between WWI and WWII. Heck, they'll even tilt the figures from one year to another during WWI. Or, ANY war.
"Just One Long Degradation'
-- Major Sidney Baker, A Letter from the Front
Not counted among the causalties of WWI are those who suffered long, painful illnesses because of the effects of mustard gas, among other things. We will never know how many millions died from similar causes. If there were a misnomer for a war, the 'Great War for Civilization' would be it.
In his book, British Butchers and Bunglers of World War I, John Laffin, whose mother and father both served in WWI, is particularly scathing of the British military leadership, especially naming Field Marshall Earl Haig and Field Marshall Lord French, although several others are called out as well. The callousness,insensitivity and incompetence of the British commanders is cited by Laffin in a paragraph written by Brigadier-General Rees after his brigade's advance on July 1, 1916:
"They advanced in line after line, dressed as if on parade, and not a man shirked going through the extremely heavy barrage, or facing the machine-gun and rifle fire that finally wiped them out. I saw that lines which advanced in such admirable order melting away under the fire. Yet not a man wavered, broke the ranks, or attempted to come back. I have never seen, I would have never imagined, such a magnificent display of gallantry, discipline and determination. The reports I have had from the very few survivors of this marvelous advance bear out what I saw with my own eyes, viz, that hardly a man of ours got to the German front line."
The preceding paragraph describes a carnage with less dispassion than that of a sporting event. Even the German gunners must have been appalled by such indifference to death.
According to Laffin, even after the Battle of the Somme, "Haig appeared undismayed by the number of casualties and with the help of the London press -- he had friends among the newspaper proprietors -- he set about convincing Britain that all was going according to plan." As Laffin said, many battles in history were called off after fewer than 60,000 casualties, but "Haig never entertained the the idea of calling off the offensive."
Predictably, the senior generals were well rewarded for their service. The already wealthy General Haig was given the thanks by parliment and a grant of 100,000 pounds. Other officers received 30,000 pounds. "Next-of-kin of servicemen who gave their lives received a bronze memorial plaque but no other details."
"Just One Long Degradation'
-- Major Sidney Baker, A Letter from the Front
Not counted among the causalties of WWI are those who suffered long, painful illnesses because of the effects of mustard gas, among other things. We will never know how many millions died from similar causes. If there were a misnomer for a war, the 'Great War for Civilization' would be it.
In his book, British Butchers and Bunglers of World War I, John Laffin, whose mother and father both served in WWI, is particularly scathing of the British military leadership, especially naming Field Marshall Earl Haig and Field Marshall Lord French, although several others are called out as well. The callousness,insensitivity and incompetence of the British commanders is cited by Laffin in a paragraph written by Brigadier-General Rees after his brigade's advance on July 1, 1916:
"They advanced in line after line, dressed as if on parade, and not a man shirked going through the extremely heavy barrage, or facing the machine-gun and rifle fire that finally wiped them out. I saw that lines which advanced in such admirable order melting away under the fire. Yet not a man wavered, broke the ranks, or attempted to come back. I have never seen, I would have never imagined, such a magnificent display of gallantry, discipline and determination. The reports I have had from the very few survivors of this marvelous advance bear out what I saw with my own eyes, viz, that hardly a man of ours got to the German front line."
The preceding paragraph describes a carnage with less dispassion than that of a sporting event. Even the German gunners must have been appalled by such indifference to death.
According to Laffin, even after the Battle of the Somme, "Haig appeared undismayed by the number of casualties and with the help of the London press -- he had friends among the newspaper proprietors -- he set about convincing Britain that all was going according to plan." As Laffin said, many battles in history were called off after fewer than 60,000 casualties, but "Haig never entertained the the idea of calling off the offensive."
Predictably, the senior generals were well rewarded for their service. The already wealthy General Haig was given the thanks by parliment and a grant of 100,000 pounds. Other officers received 30,000 pounds. "Next-of-kin of servicemen who gave their lives received a bronze memorial plaque but no other details."
There has always been a class distinction between the officer and the enlisted ranks. That was very pronounced in the British Army of that day. Officers were considered to not only superior in rank, but superior in education, bearing, demeanor, breeding, intelligence. In short, they were assumed be better PEOPLE and therefore deserving of considerations which the "other ranks" didn't get.
I don't know if that's chanced substantially since then. In any case, it goes a long way toward explaining not only the seeming lack of concern for the junior grades, but the lack of accountability for failure.
In his book, British Butchers and Bunglers of World War I, John Laffin, whose mother and father both served in WWI, is particularly scathing of the British military leadership, especially naming Field Marshall Earl Haig and Field Marshall Lord French, although several others are called out as well. The callousness,insensitivity and incompetence of the British commanders is cited by Laffin in a paragraph written by Brigadier-General Rees after his brigade's advance on July 1, 1916:..
Your post really addressed my motivation for starting the thread. I wasn't so much concerned about the details of battles, but the mindset of all involved. To me the similarities between the Civil War and WWI have alway been striking.
Aside from the almost freudian motivations of an inbred aristocracy, the initial romanticism of war, the similarity to the compositional make up of the units involved, the arrogance of leaders like Haig and Foch folk who caused the deaths of hundreds of thousands of their men using tactics which were so discredited for half a century at Gettysburg and Cold Harbor is just inexplicable. These were the issues that I had hope would come out of this discussion. Perhaps, I was to hasty to post the thread before better formulating my thoughts.
Another thing I find IRONIC, is that King George V, Czar Nicholas II, and Kaiser Wilhelm II were all FIRST-COUSINS (all grandsons of Queen Victoria) and had cordially visited each other on prior official occasions, and yet their nations fought each other.
Kaiser Wilhelm II had always harbored a grudge against Britain because his father, Kaiser Frederick, was treated in Britain for cancer of the larynx (an almost untreatable condition at that time), and Dr. McDonald botched the surgery and so Kaiser Frederick lost his voice for the rest of his short life. After that incident, Kaiser Wilhelm's mother (Empress Victoria) and also his private Tutor both taught him to hate all things British (even though his mother was born British). This personal grudge of his, was one factor in starting the war. It's like George W. Bush attacking Iraq because Iraq had earlier tried to assassinate his father George H.W. Bush.
Last edited by slowlane3; 05-15-2012 at 08:43 PM..
Your post really addressed my motivation for starting the thread. I wasn't so much concerned about the details of battles, but the mindset of all involved. To me the similarities between the Civil War and WWI have alway been striking.
Aside from the almost freudian motivations of an inbred aristocracy, the initial romanticism of war, the similarity to the compositional make up of the units involved, the arrogance of leaders like Haig and Foch folk who caused the deaths of hundreds of thousands of their men using tactics which were so discredited for half a century at Gettysburg and Cold Harbor is just inexplicable. These were the issues that I had hope would come out of this discussion. Perhaps, I was to hasty to post the thread before better formulating my thoughts.
Anyway, thanks for your contribution.
One the war on the Western Front settled into trench warfare, what other tactics could they have used?
One the war on the Western Front settled into trench warfare, what other tactics could they have used?
Actually, those employed by Ludendorff's spring offensives in 1918 (small unit attacks in concentration, hedgehog advances with interlocking fields of fire, and specific limited objectives with multiple options upon the completion of each bite-sized advance), very nearly turned the tide by splitting the French and English armies and brought about the defeat of both the French and the BEF (as it was, England's Fifth Army vanished in the face of the German onslaught.)
One could make the argument that only the fact that Germany had no more reserves to throw against the overwhelming mass of the burgeoning American forces (which Foch used in his devastating counterblows), coupled with a lack of overall strategic planning on the part of the Germans in favor of tactical concerns, saved the Allies from defeat.
The ability of the German army to commit itself to an offensive on this scale, at this late date, is truly amazing. It is matched only by the incredible courage of the Allied soldiers who faced up to the tragic stupidity of their leaders day after day, month after month, and year after year, and rescued "victory" (for want of a better term) from what could easily have been defeat on the battlefield.
To my thinking, France and England have never really recovered from the atrocious waste of human life and the stupendous failure of leadership which characterized the Allies in the Great War, and which taught them the limits of hubris. Germany needed another more thorough lesson, though...
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