The Aftermath of Gettysburg; What If. (interior, army, American, government)
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of better yet, Wittenberg, Petruzzi, Nugent and Beatie's work in "Gettysburg One Continuous Fight"
Despite the two above cited examples, the fact remains, and as Grant would have seen it and you have pointed out, both sides suffered horrendous casualties, but one side was a long ways from its base of supply and had been thoroughly repulsed over the last two days of the battle. Secondly Meade's pursuit was based upon his calvary and 2 of his eight remaining divisions, as beat up as they may have been, they were certainly no worse off than Lee.
That's easy to say from a distance of 146 years. On the battlefield, surrounded by the dead, dying and wounded, and exhausted after 3 days of very heavy combat, it would be far different thing.
The aftermath of Gettysburg shows how poorly Americans used cavalry until the last few months of the war when Sheridan and Wilson finally used it properly.
Inmagine the Hell a couple of brigades of European style heavy cavalry could've raised in the wake of the repulse of "Pickett's Charge".
Meade lacked ruthlessness. He had more men on their feet than Lee did and more ammunition too. Plus Lee had to carry wounded along, Meade could've abandoned his. Lee had just as far to march in retreat as Meade did to pursue. I don't know that a vigorous pursuit would've destroyed Lee (afterall Thomas energetically pursued Hood after Nashville but Hood still got a considerable portion of his army away) but Meade did not give it his all.
When Meade and the AotP finally did give it their all (with new corps commanders and under Grant's direction) in April of 65 it was a very fast moving and hard hitting army. Too bad it took so long to get it firing on all cylinders.
The aftermath of Gettysburg shows how poorly Americans used cavalry until the last few months of the war when Sheridan and Wilson finally used it properly.
Inmagine the Hell a couple of brigades of European style heavy cavalry could've raised in the wake of the repulse of "Pickett's Charge".
Meade lacked ruthlessness. He had more men on their feet than Lee did and more ammunition too. Plus Lee had to carry wounded along, Meade could've abandoned his. Lee had just as far to march in retreat as Meade did to pursue. I don't know that a vigorous pursuit would've destroyed Lee (afterall Thomas energetically pursued Hood after Nashville but Hood still got a considerable portion of his army away) but Meade did not give it his all.
When Meade and the AotP finally did give it their all (with new corps commanders and under Grant's direction) in April of 65 it was a very fast moving and hard hitting army. Too bad it took so long to get it firing on all cylinders.
Most wars involve the evolution of the "Operational Art",our army in the ETO in WW2 didn't really achieve it until Late Winter-Spring of 1945,fully 3 and a half years after the initial onslaught.Many similarities exist between the two wars,before each conflict,the nations armed forces were small,with a professional cadre that would lead it through the conflict,with only a few exceptions.And both operated initially under flawed doctrines:Napoleonic tactics,not taking into actount the rifled musket in the ACW,and our ridiculous idea that tanks don't fight each other in WW2.
The aftermath of Gettysburg shows how poorly Americans used cavalry until the last few months of the war when Sheridan and Wilson finally used it properly.
Inmagine the Hell a couple of brigades of European style heavy cavalry could've raised in the wake of the repulse of "Pickett's Charge".
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Lee saw to it that the Union cavalry was otherwise occupied that day. There was no cavalry available to pursue the remnants of the attack, they were East of the battlefield fighting Jeb Stuart.
While the western generals seemed more alert and active, and the western soldiers able to march and fight with more effectiveness, I'm not ready to buy into a thesis which holds that Grant and the western army would have easily rolled up Lee.
The first consideration is the vastly different geography involved. Lee was defending a realtivey narrow corridor which lay between the ocean and the mountains. That area was criss crossed with numerous rivers running on an East/West axis, perfect for defense, a bear for the attacker. I credit Lee with taking exceptionally intelligent advantage of the favorable terrain, but we should keep in mind that it was a huge advantage.
The opposite conditions prevailed in the west. The territory requiring defense was immense and the main rivers cut deep into Confederate territory on a North/South axis...avenues of invasion rather than obstacles to overcome. In the west the geographic advantages lay with the invader.
We should also consider that in 1864, when Grant opened his campaign, Lee's army could no longer rely on finding replacements for the attrition, could no longer rely on getting fed, and began to experience a severe desertion problem as men went home to defend their families from Sherman. They were still skillful, spirited fighters, but their numbers and resources could only shrink from that point. Despite his advantage in numbers and ability to replace casualties, it still took Grant nine months, enormous losses, and a prolonged siege to prevail.
Lee saw to it that the Union cavalry was otherwise occupied that day. There was no cavalry available to pursue the remnants of the attack, they were East of the battlefield fighting Jeb Stuart.
While the western generals seemed more alert and active, and the western soldiers able to march and fight with more effectiveness, I'm not ready to buy into a thesis which holds that Grant and the western army would have easily rolled up Lee.
This may be a circular argument but part of using cavalry effectively is to have more of them than American armies did and to hold them in reserve to exploit opprotunities. This was not the American way.
I'm not saying that Grant and AotT would have easily whipped Lee. But I think Grant could've done better with them than he did with in 64 with AotP and AotJ. That and the idea of concentration, bringing two armies against Lee, AotT and AotP.
That's easy to say from a distance of 146 years. On the battlefield, surrounded by the dead, dying and wounded, and exhausted after 3 days of very heavy combat, it would be far different thing.
Seemed pretty clear to Lincoln 146 years ago!
Executive Mansion,
Washington, July 14, 1863.
Major General Meade
I have just seen your despatch to Gen. Halleck, asking to be relieved of your command, because of a supposed censure of mine. I am very--very--grateful to you for the magnificent success you gave the cause of the country at Gettysburg; and I am sorry now to be the author of the slightest pain to you. But I was in such deep distress myself that I could not restrain some expression of it. I had been oppressed nearly ever since the battles at Gettysburg, by what appeared to be evidences that yourself, and Gen. Couch, and Gen. Smith, were not seeking a collision with the enemy, but were trying to get him across the river without another battle. What these evidences were, if you please, I hope to tell you at some time, when we shall both feel better. The case, summarily stated is this. You fought and beat the enemy at Gettysburg; and, of course, to say the least, his loss was as great as yours. He retreated; and you did not, as it seemed to me, pressingly pursue him; but a flood in the river detained him, till, by slow degrees, you were again upon him. You had at least twenty thousand veteran troops directly with you, and as many more raw ones within supporting distance, all in addition to those who fought with you at Gettysburg; while it was not possible that he had received a single recruit; and yet you stood and let the flood run down, bridges be built, and the enemy move away at his leisure, without attacking him. And Couch and Smith! The latter left Carlisle in time, upon all ordinary calculation, to have aided you in the last battle at Gettysburg; but he did not arrive. At the end of more than ten days, I believe twelve, under constant urging, he reached Hagerstown from Carlisle, which is not an inch over fifty-five miles, if so much. And Couch's movement was very little different.
Again, my dear general, I do not believe you appreciate the magnitude of the misfortune involved in Lee's escape. He was within your easy grasp, and to have closed upon him would, in connection with our other late successes, have ended the war. As it is, the war will be prolonged indefinitely. If you could not safely attack Lee last Monday, how can you possibly do so South of the river, when you can take with you very few more than two thirds of the force you then had in hand? It would be unreasonable to expect, and I do not expect you can now effect much. Your golden opportunity is gone, and I am distressed immeasurably because of it.
I beg you will not consider this a prosecution, or persecution of yourself As you had learned that I was dissatisfied, I have thought it best to kindly tell you why.
What's all this talk of Grant and Lee in 1863? If Meade routed Lee's army at Gettysburg, or in the retreat from, Grant would have not been needed in the east and we would not be talking about him now. So that direction of discussion is irrelevant...
The defeat of Lee's army wouldn't end the war then, it would possible end the war a year sooner. The confederates still had assets in the east. The real result however is that the south would have no ability to go on the offensive on the east (instead of finally meeting that mark at The Wilderness 10 months later) or even resist a union advance, and they would have dug in at Richmond, which they would have been able to hold for a period of time pulling forces from the valley, survivors from Lee's army, forces around the carolinas, maybe from the west, and conscripting the last of their manpower sources. Richmond would be easily approached and invested, without the Grant's struggle the next year to continually try to flank around Lee, and probably fall in late 1863 or early 64. After that is anyones guess. Confederate's could relocate the capital and then it would have been just a matter of defeating the western army, which essentially was done at Nashville in early 65 (but with only one army yet, I see the CSA as strictly defensive, not being able to play the hail mary campaign of Hood's December 64 adventures).
One other possible scenario however, is with a huge defeat in the east and the fall of Richmond in 1863, before war weariness has fully set in with events like the Fall of Atlanta and Sherman's March, the CSA remaining forces could have turned into a guirrella force based in the hills of the Appalachians and the war could have ironically lasted for years more than 1865. The only reason that it didn't after the fall of Richmond in 65 was the south was totally beaten and exhausted. Troops were starving and deserting, the south had no more replacements, and the people were done with war.
One good book to read, not quite this scenario, but something similiar - is Newt Gingrich's two books on Gettysburg. Actually, his book has the South winning Gettysburg decisively, but losing the war several months later after Grant takes charge. .
What's all this talk of Grant and Lee in 1863? If Meade routed Lee's army at Gettysburg, or in the retreat from, Grant would have not been needed in the east and we would not be talking about him now. So that direction of discussion is irrelevant...
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The talk of Grant coming east in 63 is a digression from the OP and about what might have happened had Meade lost.
the CSA remaining forces could have turned into a guirrella force based in the hills of the Appalachians and the war could have ironically lasted for years more than 1865. .
The mountains were full of Unionists, indeed over 20,000 east Tennesseans served in the Union army. Hardly fertile ground for guerilla warfare as the Rebels would have nowhere to "go to ground". They would've had to exist as permanent military forces and as such could have been easily run down and eliminated.
Other "What ifs" that intrigue me with Gettysburg...
A) Lee remains on Seminary Ridge and digs in.
B) Lee never orders Pickett's Charge on day 3 and digs in on Seminary Ridge.
Does Meade flinch and make his own bumbling attack on a well-fortified position?
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