Quote:
Originally Posted by Hellion1999
is not my argument but an historical fact....you want me to change the words to make it my own?
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Pukipedia is not a valid source for anything.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Hellion1999
all that to defend Castro and blame the USA ? .......
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If Truth offends you, then gouge out your eyes.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Hellion1999
I laugh in how serious you take yourself and then act childish with your "surrender is accepted" in your arguments, are you in high school? then you type your name at the end in all your posts to make youself feel important. ....LOL
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Proof Surrogate
Substituting a distracting comment for a real proof.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Hellion1999
Cuba began expropriating land and private property under the auspices of the Agrarian Reform Law of 17 May 1959.....
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The info he plagiarized is here.....
Cuban Revolution - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Quote:
Originally Posted by Hellion1999
Yeah the I.R.S. in the U.S.A does the same thing! just because you say it!
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Someone mentioned the literacy rate in Cuba.
In your attempt to read the Puki article, the absence of rationale or motive went unobserved by you.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Hellion1999
Castro didn't change the tax code like any new government does when taking power and giving businesses the chance to pay or give them due process, he confiscated all private property and all bank accounts of all Cubans and Americans. No democratic elections and no due process.
So your silly argument and defense of Castro that he confiscated property because they didn't pay taxes and he did what the I.R.S does is very ignorant and shows that you have no idea what you are talking about here.
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There are 74 "references" cited for the Puki article, yet the Pike Committee Report, the Church Committee Report and the House Select-Committee On Assassinations Reports are never referenced.
Gosh...I wonder why.
U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS,
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:40 a.m., in room 2300, New Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C., Senator Thomas J. DODD presiding.
Present: Senators DODD; James O. Eastland, chairman; and Roman L. Hruska.
Also present: J. G. SOURWINE, chief counsel; Benjamin Mandel research director, and Frank W. Schroeder, chief investigator.
Senator DODD. Mr. Ambassador, will you rise and raise your right hand? Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing the truth, so help you. God?
Mr. SMITH. So help me God.
Senator DQDD. Mr. SOURWINE.
Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Smith, wou.ld you give the reporter your name and your address, please?
TESTIMONY OF EARL E. T. SMITH
***
Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir. You were appointed Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Cuba, June 3, 1957?
Mr. SMITH. Confirmed by the Senate in May 1957.
Mr. SOURWINE. And you served until when, sir?
Mr. SMITH. Until January 20, 1959.
Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Smith, when you were appointed Ambassador to Cuba, were you briefed on the job?
Mr. SMITH. Yes; I was.
***
Mr. SOURWINE. Is it true, sir, that you were instructed to get a briefing on your new job as Ambassador to Cuba from Herbert Matthews of the New York Times?
Mr. SMITH. Yes; that is correct.
Mr. SOURWINE. Who gave you these instructions?
Mr. SMITH. William Wieland, Director of the Caribbean Division and Mexico. At that time he was Director of the Caribbean Division, Central American Affairs.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, sir, in fact see Matthews?
Mr. SMITH. Yes; I did.
Mr. SOURWINE. And did he brief you on the Cuban situation?
Mr. SMITH. Yes; he did.
***
Mr. SOURWINE. Specifically what did he say about Castro?
Mr. SMITH. In February 1957 Herbert L. Matthews wrote three articles on Fidel Castro, which appeared on the front page of the New York Times, in which he eulogized Fidel Castro and portrayed him as a political Robin Hood, and I would say that he repeated those views to me in our conversation.
***
Mr. SOURWINE. It was true that Batista's government was corrupt, wasn't it?
Mr. SMITH. It is true that Batista's government was corrupt. Batista was the power behind the Government in Cuba off and on for 25 years.
The year 1957 was the best economic year that Cuba had ever had. However, the Batista regime was disintegrating from within. It was becoming more corrupt, and as a result, was losing strength. The Castro forces themselves never won a military victory. The best military victory they ever won was through capturing Cuban guardhouses and military skirmishes, but they never actually won a military victory.
The Batista government was overthrown because of the corruption, disintegration from within, and because of the United States and the various agencies of the United States who directly and indirectly aided the overthrow of the Batista government and brought into power Fidel Castro.
Mr. SOURWINE. What were those, agencies, Mr. Smith?
Mr. SMITH. The U.S. Government agencies-may I say something off the record?
(Discussion off the record.)
Senator DODD. Let it appear on the record that Ambassador Smith at this point has a statement which he feels will answer more completely some of the questions already asked, and questions which may be asked later on.
***
Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Smith, the pending question before you read your statement was: What agencies of the U.S. Government had a hand in bringing pressure to overthrow the Batista government, and how did they do it?
Mr. SMITH. Well, the agencies, certain influential people, influential sources in the State Department, lower down echelons in the CIA. I would say representatives of the majority of the U.S. Government agencies which have anything to do with the Embassy.
***
Mr. SMITH. I have been asked many times what part if any the United States played in Castro and Communist rise to power in Cuba. The U.S. Government agencies and the U.S. press played a major role in bringing Castro to power.
Three front-page articles in the New York Times in early 1957, written by the editorialist Herbert Matthews, served to inflate Castro to world stature and world recognition. Until that time, Castro bad been just another bandit in the Oriente Mountains of Cuba, with a handful of followers who had terrorized the campesinos, that is the peasants, throughout the countryside.
Fidel Castro landed on the south coast of Oriente in December of 1956 from Mexico with an expeditionary force of 81 men. Intercepted by Cuban gunboats and patrol planes, Castro and a handiul of stragglers managed to ensconce themselves in the rugged 8,000-foot Sierra Maestra Range.
After the Matthews articles which followed an exclusive interview by the Times editorial writer in Castro's mountain hideout and which likened him to Abraham Lincoln, he was able to get followers and funds in Cuba and in the United States. From that time on arms, money, and soldiers of fortune abounded. Much of the American press began to picture Castro as a political Robin Hood.
Also because Batista was the dictator who unlawfully seized power, American people assumed Castro must, on the other hand, represent liberty and democracy. The crusader role which the press and radio bestowed on the bearded rebel blinded the people to the leftwing political philosophy with which even at that time he was already on record.
***
Rivero Aguero, the former Prime Minister of Cuba, was elected, I believe it was November 8, 1958, to succeed Batista. It is true, in reply to your question, Senator, that
the U.S. Government instructed me through the State Department to say that we would not give aid and support to the Rivero Aguero government when installed because we did not feel that he could maintain effective control of the country.
***
Senator EASTLAND. Let me ask you this question.
As a matter of fact, isn't it your judgment that the State Department of the United States is primarily responsible for bringing Castro to power in Cuba? Mr. SMITH. No, sir, I can't say that the State Department in itself is primarily responsible.
The State Department played a large part in bringing Castro to power. The press, other Government agencies, Members of Congress are responsible.
***
Senator HRUSKA. When you say "numbers," do you mean serials? Mr. SMITH. Numbers on the riles, the serial numbers on the rifles. The Cuban Embassy had those serial numbers because they were advised of their shipments. It later turned out that a secretary, I believe it was the secretary to the Ambassador and also the sergeant who was in charge of the code room, were Castro revolutionaries planted in the Cuban Embassy in Washington, and they were the ones who were relaying this information to Castro.
***
Senator EASTLAND. Do you know at the same time the Latin American desk was receiving advices from other Latin American countries of Castro's Communist affiliation?
Mr. SMITH No, sir, I did not. They never told me that. No, sir, I did not.
In my own Embassy there were certain ones of influence who were pro-26th of July, pro-Castro, and anti-Batista.
Senator EASTLAND. Who were they?
Mr. SMITH. Do I haye to answer that question, Senator?
Senator EASTLAND. Yes, I think you have to. We are not going into it unnecessarily.
Mr. SMITH. I don't want to harm anybody. That is the reason I asked.
I would say the Chief of the Political Section, John Topping, and the Chief of the CIA Section. It was revealed that the No. 2 CIA rnan in the embassy had given unwarranted and undue encouragement to the revolutionaries. This came out in tke trials of naval officers after the Cienfuegos revolution of September I957.
Senator EASTLAND.
Did Castro ever win a battle?
Mr. SMITH.
Castro never won a military victory. The best victories that Castro ever won were raids upon Cuban guardhouses that are spread out through the hinterland and small skirmishes with Government troops.
***
Senator HRUSKA. Yes, was disappearing.
Mr. SMITH. That, is correct; it was disappearing: toward the end, but now you are speaking of the last 2 or 3 months ol Batista's regime.
In the middle of November I958-I do not recall exactly the date--I went to the State Department and I informed Wieland and Rubottom that the Batista qovernment was on its last legs.
They said, "Why do you say that now?" This was a complete reversal from my previous position. My previous position had been that the Batista government was surviving. For many months I had found it necessary to counteract the slanted opinions of certain people who wanted to portray chaotic conditions in Cuba and who wanted to give the impression that the Government of Cuba would momentarily fall.
It was an uphill fight to keep reports factual.
In November, I virtually informed the Department that the Batista government could not survive much longer. They said: "Why is it going to go? Why do you say that?"
And I said, "Because, until now, the revolutionaries have been taking amateurish acts in trying to destroy the economy"-the amateurish acts were such things as burning the sugar cane, kidnaping the Argentine automobile driver, hijacking airplanes, kidnapping Americans- "but now they are getting professional advice."
They said, "What do you mean by 'professional advice?'"
I said, "Now they are learning how to destroy the economy by disrupting the main arteries of transportation."
They have learned how to blow up the correct bridges, to bomb the main highways so that commerce cannot move in Cuba.
And I said, "They obviously are receiving professional advice."
That was in November. By that time it was clearly obvious that the tide had swung the other way.
Senator EASTLAND. Who were those individuals in the State Department?
Mr. SMITH. That were doing what, sir?
Senator EASTLAND. That were slanting the news that way; that were telling falsehoods; that were pro-Castro.
Mr. SMITH. There were quite a few, Senator.
Senator EASTLAND. Who were they?
Mr. SMITH. I repeat again, Do I have to mention names?
Senator EASTLAND. Yes. We have reasons, Mr. Smith.
Mr. SMITH. Yes, sir. You see my point: I do not want to get people in trouble, either.
Senator EASTLAND. Well, I know that.
Mr. SMITH. Because I do not believe that they are dangerous. If I thought they were dangerous, I would not hesitate.
Senator EASTLAND. I am not certain about that.
Mr. SMITH All right, sir.
Senator EASTLAND. We have sources of information.
Mr. SMITH. Yes.
I believe Wieland, William Wieland, and that is as far as I would like to go in the State Department. I had my own troubles in the Embassy, but I corrected it in the Embassy by neyer allowing one single cable to go out that did not have my signature.
I wrote practically every political cable that went out.
Senator EASTLAND. Who is
William Wieland?
Mr. SMITH He is
Director of the Caribbean Division and Director of Mexican Affairs in charge of San Domingo, Cuba, Haiti, Mexico.
At that time he had all of Central America in addition to these.
In an embassy where I served as Ambassador at that time, when I first went there, I saw the difference. Those in the economic field were pro-Batista because they were dealing with American business. Those in the political section and the intelligence section were pro-revolutionary. We could say for humanitarian reasons, or whatever the reasons may be.
Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Smith, you spoke earlier of the No. 2 CIA man in your mission having been caught giving aid and comfort to the Castro forces.
Would you tell us just what it was he did?
Mr. SMITH. Yes. In September I957, the Navy had an uprising at Cienfuegos, Cuba. We in the American Embassy were familiar that a revolt of some type wou.ld take place. That information came to us through the CIA, or some other source in the Embassy.
If I may divert for a minute, that is the trouble with Cubans; they talk too much. We did not know when it was going to to take place.
We finally heard that the revolt at Cienfuegos had been called off. However, the Navy in Havana forgot to notify the Navy at Cienfuegos, and they went on with the revolt while the Navy in Havana did not participate.
This revolt was squashed by the Batista government.
In the trial of the naval officers, it came out that the No. 2 man had said that if the revolution was successful, that the United States wou.ld recognize the revolutionaries.
***
Senator EASTLAND. As a matter of fact, now, wasn't it the impartiality of the U.S. Govermnent that brought Castro to power?
Mr. SMITH. Wasn't it the impartiality?
Senator EASTLAND. Yes.
Mr. SMITH.
Senator, we are responsible for bringing Castro in power. I do not care how you want to word it.
Senator DODD. Wouldn't you want to say the partiality?
Senator EASTLAND. I mean the partiality, certainly.
Mr. SMITH. Senator, let me explain to you that the United States, until the advent of Castro, was so overwhelmingly influential in Cuba that, as I said here a little while ago,
the American Ambassador was the second most important man in Cuba; sometimes even more important than the President.
***
Mr. SOURWINE. Former Ambassador Gardner expressed the opinion in testifying before this committee that the State Department was anxious, in his words, "to replace Batista with Castro." Do you. agree with this?
Mr. SMITH. "Was anxious to replace"? No; I do not agree with that. I think that the State Department did not believe that Batista should remain in power. However, on the other hand,
I am sure that those who are on the fifth floor of the State Department did not think very highly of Castro.
***
Senator EASTLAND. Mr. Smith, we certainly thank you. I would like to have a little executive session.
(Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.)
Providing real historical facts....
Mircea